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The thesis is devoted to a study of the law regulating the
harmonisation and co-ordination of social security in the
European Economic Ooimimnity. The first part examines the law
governing harmonisation (especially Articles 117 and 118 of the
Treaty of Rome), the socio-economic function of harmonisation and
the relation between the legal interpretation of Articles 117 and
118 and the political conflict which surrounded their implementation.
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and relates their legal development to their changing socio-economic
function.
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The subject of this thesis Is the law relating to the harmoni-
satlon and co-ordination of social security systems In the European
Economic Community. The principal provisions governing harmonlsatlon
are Articles 117 and 118 of the Treaty of Rome. The law relating to
co-ordination Is to be found mainly In Article 51 of the Treaty and
In Regulation No. 3 which has now been replaced by Regulation No.
1408/71. These regulations have been the subject of a large number
of Interpretative decisions by the European Court of Justice which,
although very interesting, have attracted relatively little attention.
This thesis may, as its sub-title Indicates, be understood as a
commentary on these legal provisions.
The question immediately arises as to the form which such a
commentary should take, as to how the study of these provisions
should be approached. The most obvious approach, and that which is
adopted by most legal analyses, would be to study the provisions in
a purely legal frameworks to analyse the terms of the Treaty and of
the relevant regulations, to expose the rights and obligations arising
therefrom, to relate the various provisions to their legal precedents,
to analyse the reasoning and the consistency of the case law relating
to the provisions, to trace their legislative and judicial develop¬
ment, etc. Such an approach certainly does not necessarily exclude
all reference to the external, Mnon legal" world: one might, for
example, look briefly at the origins, the effect or even the wisdom
of the legal provisions being analysed; but there is an implicit
assumption that the lawyer should subject only the specifically legal
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sphere to close scrutiny, that he must take the external world on
trust, at its face value. The aim of legal study, in such a view,
is to elucidate the law, to purify it of inconsistencies, to suggest
ways in which the desired objective might be attained more neatly or
more efficiently, perhaps also to point out apparent injustices.
The structure of this thesis reflects an attempt to go beyond the
limits of the normal legal analysis. The objection to the normal
approach lies precisely in its limited character. By accepting the
legal framework as marking the bounds of the inquiry, it obscures the
historical and social nature of that framework and of the provisions
under scrutiny, it glosses over the inter-relations between these
provisions and the other features of the social order of which they
form but a part. By focusing exclusively on the internal coherence
of the law, it blurs our image of the social function of the law,
of the place of the legal provisions in the social order. The fault
is not so much a moral or political one; the danger is rather that,
by accepting as given a social order which is constantly changing,
the student of the law excludes himself from a proper understanding
of the law, for it is from changes in the socio-economic environment
that impulses for the development of the law ultimately come.
If one wishes to transcend the limitations of the positivist
approach described, it is necessary to relate the legal provisions
under study to their social environment and to understand this
environment as a changing one, driven forward by its internal contra¬
dictions. One must try to grasp, therefore, both the relations
between the legal phenomenon being studied and the other significant
features of the society and, at the same time, to understand the
historical nature of the phenomenon^' \ i.e. to relate it not only
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to the development of the law, but also to the general development
of society. The aim of this approach Is not so much to elucidate
the law or to make suggestions for its reform, but rather to under¬
stand the social function of the law, its place in a particular
society, and to see in what way the law is shaped by the changing
needs of that society. Such an approach is, no doubt, more ambitious
and more liable to go astray, but surely essential if legal study is
to aim at throwing light on a particular aspect of society and not
just at improving the means of social control.
Going beyond the positivist, internal analysis of the law does
not mean, however, that such an analysis should be neglected or
abandoned. On the contrary, it would be a mistake to try to explain
the development and function of the law purely by reference to its
external environment. It is in the very nature of the law in Western
society that it is relatively independent of its environment, that it
should confront social change with legal stability. The capitalist
mode of production, unlike previous modes, requires, as Weber pointed
(2)
out, a system of law which is calculable and predictable . This
need for calculability means that the law must, for some time at
least, remain untouched by the currents of social change. It is the
socio-economic environment itself, therefore, which requires that the
law should have a certain degree of independence from that environ¬
ment, that it should have its own internal coherence, its own logic,
its own language. It is this appearance of autonomy and this actual
relative autonomy which give to the positivist analysis of the law
its apparent and indeed relative validity. To understand the develop¬
ment of the law, especially over a short period, it is necessary to
understand the internal coherence of the law, to respect the spec!-
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ficity of the legal structure. If, for example, we wish to understand
the significance of the decision of the Court of Justice in the case
of Ciechelski (which will be discussed in Chapter 5), this can be
done only within the framework of legal thought and a particular legal
tradition, and not solely by reference to external pressures. In
order to understand the development of this or any other law, it is
necessary to study not only the external forces which may influence
legislation and interpretation, but also the specific legal frame¬
work and tradition of which the law forms part. It is this need both
to comprehend and to transcend the form in which the legal phenomenon
presents itself which leads Poulantzas to suggest that, in studying
the law, it is necessary to adopt a dual approach, or what he calls
more precisely a ''methode dialectique interne-externe" ^ An
internal analysis is necessary to reveal the inner structure of the
law being studied and the internal dynamic of its development; but
this must be completed by an "external" analysis for, contrary to
appearances, the law cannot long remain immune from social and economic
change.
It would be wrong to claim that this thesis seeks to "appiy" the
method elaborated by Poulantzas: nevertheless, it is this method
which has inspired the structure of the thesis. The study is divided
into two parts: the first is concerned with the harmonisation of
social security systems under Articles 117 and 118 of the European
Economic Community; the second part deals with the co-ordination
of social security systems in accordance with Article 51 of the
European Economic Community. Each part consists of three chapters.
The first chapter of each part consists of an "internal"
analysis of the relevant law. The aim of these chapters is to
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examine the relevant provisions within a purely legal framework:
to place the provisions within the relevant legal traditions, to
analyse the rights and obligations to which the provisions give rise,
to study particular problems of interpretation which have arisen, to
look at the judicial and legislative development of the law. In the
case of the law relating to harmonisation, the problems to be examined
are relatively few and the chapter is correspondingly brief. The law
relating to co-ordination, on the other hand, is extremely complex and
demands a much lengthier treatment. In neither case is any attempt
made at this stage to relate the law to external factors.
An "external" approach to the law Is made In the second chapter
of each pert. The aim here is to try to understand the social function
of the legal provisions, their relation to their socio-economic environ,
ment. In the case of harmonisation, we shall find that the discussion
surrounding the application of the law leads, of its own momentum,
to consideration of the social function of the law. In the case of
co-ordination, however, no such discussion has taken place, and it is
necessary to look at the socio-economic environment of the law before
trying to situate the law within that environment. In each case, the
concern will be not only with the origins of the legal provisions, hit
also with the changes which have taken place in the socio-economic
environment and consequently in the relations of the provisions to
that environment, i.e. in their social function.
After the "internal" and "external" analyses, an attempt is
made in the third chapter of each part to relate the conclusions of
the previous two chapters: to see to what extent the legal norms and
their Interpretation have followed the movement of their socio-economic
-6-
environment, or to what extent they have indeed remained untouched by
(4)
external change .
The subject of the study is two-fold: the harmonisation and the
co-ordination of social security. The unity of the subject, obviously,
is provided by the notion of social security. The bond of unity, how¬
ever, is perhaps not as strong as might at first appear to be the case,
for the two subjects differ in many respects. "Harmonisation" refers
to the project of bringing into line the various social security systems
of the member states of the European Communities: if this project were
realised, it would affect these systems in their entirety, and all
persons covered by them. More broadly, the discussion bracketed under
the heading "harmonisation" refers to all attempts to elaborate a
general Community policy on the development of social security. The
term "co-ordination" as used in this context, is much more specific:
it refers to attempts to minimise the loss of rights suffered by
those who move from one national social security system to another,
by using various mechanisms to co-ordinate the functioning of the
social security systems in such cases. The only persons affected by
co-ordination are the "migrants" (in the broadest sense of the word),
and not those who remain within the domain of a single system.
Not only is the subject matter of each part quite distinct, but
the relevant legal provisions are of a very different nature, and not
merely because they are contained in different parts of the Treaty
Those relating to the ambitious goal of harmonisation scarcely rise
above the level of a vague declaration of intention, whereas the regu¬
lations which realise the more modest aim of co-ordination regulate the
rights of migrants in very great detail. As one might expect, the
relationship between the "internal dynamic" of the law and the influence
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of external pressures Is also very different in each case.
A word is necessary on the notion which runs throughout the
whole thesis. The terra "social security" is used in a special sense.
In discussions in this area it is normally understood to refer to the
nine branches of social insurance listed in Convention No. 102 of the
ILO, i.e. those which provide medical care, sickness, unemployment,
old age, industrial injury and industrial illness, family, maternity,
invalidity and survivors' benefits. It is in this sense that the term
is used in this thesis, unless otherwise specified. It should be noted
that it does not normally include social assistance, although this is
what is often popularly understood by the term in this country.
The contents of the social security systems vary greatly from
/ g \
country to country. Broadly speaking , however, the systems of the
original six member States (with which we are principally concerned)
can be seen as belonging to the Continental rather than to the Anglo-
Scandinavian tradition of social insurance, i.e. they start from the
notion that the function of social security benefits is to replace
the earnings of wage- and salary-earners during a period of forced
inactivity and not primarily (as in the Anglo-Scandinavian tradition)
to provide a guaranteed minimum income to all categories of the popu¬
lation. This distinction between the two traditions is rapidly
(7)
becoming blurred , but, as we shall see, it has left its mark parti¬
cularly on the law relating to the co-ordination of social security
schemes.
Beyond this, it is not necessary to describe the structure and
evolution of the various systems. Our concern is not with the indi¬
vidual systems but with Community law and the policies behind that
law - essentially Community policies. The aim is not, as in some
studies in this area, to compare the contents of the different
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systems and to make suggestions as to how they might be better co¬
ordinated or harmonised. The aim - as has already been stressed -
is not an immediately practical one, it is simply to understand the
development and the social function of the law being studied. It is
this lack of immediate practical perspective which accounts also for
the fact that the particular problems of Britain are not singled out
for special treatment.
The absence of an immediately practical purpose does not, of
course, mean that the thesis is intended to be useless, that it
aspires to the realms of "pure science". The contrary is true: it
is based on the belief that a proper understanding of the processes








The Legal Basis of Harmonisation
Introduction
At first glance, the provisions of the Treaty of Roine relating to
the harmonisation of social security present little difficulty.
Articles 1t7 and 118 are short, they have not formed the basis of any
regulation or other legally binding act and they have given rise to
no court decision: there is thus no need to deal with the hundreds of
pages of regulations and the hundreds of court decisions which it is
necessary to consider in treating the law on the co-ordination of
social security under Article 51 of the European Economic Community.
But this apparent simplicity ^ in fact conceals lively differences
of opinion among the commentators ("la doctrine") as to the meaning
of these articles and as to the powers and obligations which the
Treaty creates in relation to the harmonisation of social security
systems.
But before turning directly to the problems of interpretation
raised by the European Economic Comnunity provisions, we shall attempt
to place these provisions within the context of international social
security law.
Harmonisation of social security in international law
The traditional international law of social security knows two
branches, both of which find their place in the Treaty of Rome. On
the one hand, there is the co-ordination of social security systems,
in order to provide protection for those (particularly migrant workers)
who move from one national social security system to another. Co-ordi¬
nation affects only a limited category of people and does not aim to
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have any effect on the social security systems themselves. The
second branch of international social security law is concerned with
these systems: the aim here is that the national systems involved
should accept certain coaroon principles or adopt certain common
standards.
The international haraonisation of social security is, as one
might expect, far less developed than the international law of co¬
te)
ordination. The norms which do exist in this area have resulted,
not from bilateral treaties, but from the work of International org¬
anisations^. In order to illustrate the techniques which have been
developed in order to promote the acceptance of common principles and
standards, it is sufficient to describe briefly the most important of
these international norms, Convention No. 102 of the International
(4)
Labour Organisation and the European Code of Social Security, con-
(5)
eluded within the framework of the Council of Europe •
IU) Convention No. 102: Convention No. 102 lays down certain
minimum standards to be satisfied by the social security systems of
those states which ratify it. The problem in devising such a
Convention, given the very great economic and social differences
between the member states of the ILO, was to find some system of
standards which would not be totally out of reach of the poorer
countries, but would nevertheless have some relevance for the more
developed systems. It was proposed at first to have two sets of
standards, at a basic level for everyone and at a hi$K*r level for
countries with more developed systems, but this proposal was abandoned
In the face of the employers' opposition. As a result, the Convention,
which was adopted in 1952, contains only one set of standards.
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The Convention contains nine parts corresponding to the nine
risks covered by most developed social security systems, namely:
medical care; sickness benefits; unemployment benefits; old age
benefits; industrial injury and industrial illness benefits; family
benefits; maternity benefits; invalidity benefits; survivors'
benefits. Each state ratifying the Convention is required to
satisfy the standards it lays down with regard to at least three
of these risks, according to its own choice, but one of which must
be unemployment, old age, industrial injury, invalidity or survival.
For each of these nine branches of social security, the Convention
lays down:
(1) Minimum standards as to the proportion of workers or of the
population who must be protected;
(?) Appropriate conditions for the receipt of social security
benefits and the duration of such benefits; the provisions of
the Convention may be complied with either by schemes of the
social insurance type or, in the case of certain contingencies,
by means-tested benefits of the social assistance type;
(3) Minimum rates of benefits. The rates must be sufficient to
provide a specified sum for a "standard beneficiary", defined
by the Convention, for the purpose of most contingencies, as a
man with a wife and two children. The sura specified is not a
fixed sum valid for all countries but is defined by reference
to the average wage-rate of a typical unskilled adult male
worker in the country concerned. For each contingency a per¬
centage (from 40 to 50 in most cases) is prescribed, and the
benefit in question must be at least equal to that percentage
of the wage-rate, account being taken of any family allowances
paid.
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Other parts of the Convention deal with such matters as equality
of treatment for non-national residents, disqualifications and the
incidence of contributions for the benefits for which the Convention
provides. These parts apply to all countries ratifying the Convention.
The techniques adopted by Convention No. 102 are certainly very
flexible, but do they solve the problem of providing standards which
are meaningful for rich as well as for poor countries? The existing
social security systems of the countries with which we are concerned
are sufficiently developed for the countries to ratify the Convention
with regard to at least three of the nine risks, and in most cases to
more than three. Once the minimum requirements of the Convention are
satisfied, there is little incentive for states to modify their laws
to meet the standards laid down in respect of those contingencies not
covered by their ratification. Whatever the influence of Convention
No. 102 in raising international standards of social security, it is
hard to conceive of any real harmonisation except in a regional
context.
European Code of Social Security: The Council of Europe regards it
as one of its aims to promote social progress in its member states,
and as early as 1950 it began to study the possibility of harmonising
social security benefits in the various countries. Its work, con¬
ducted with the assistance of the ILO, met with considerable dif¬
ficulties and it was not until 1964 that the European Code of Social
Security was signed.
The Code is not in fact a "code" at all, but a convention model¬
led very closely indeed on Convention No. 102 of the ILO. The
original ambition of trying to bring uniformity to the social security
systems of Europe was abandoned in favour of an effort to raise the
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minimum standards established by Convention No. 102. Essentially,
the Code repeats the provisions of that Convention with only very
slight modifications, but requires ratifying states to comply with
six, instead of three, parts of the Code. However, of these nine
parts corresponding to the nine risks, Part II (medical care) counts
as two parts, and Part V (old age benefits) counts as three parts,
because of the costs involved. Moreover, instead of specifying six
branches, a ratifying state nay specify only three branches providing
they all fall within the group of five branches consisting of unemploy¬
ment, old age, industrial injury, invalidity and survival. The result
13 that the Code constitutes only a very limited advance on Convention
No. 102.
The only other innovation is the addition of a Protocol annexed
to the code. This lays down, with regard to each branch, a higher set
of standards which any state wishing to go beyond the minimum require¬
ments may ratify.
The Treaty of Rome
If the authors of the Treaty of Rome had been determined to bring
about a harmonlsatlon of the national social security systems, there is
no apparent reason why they should not have developed, on a higher plane,
(6)
the legal technique which had already been used in Convention No. 102.
But, as is clear from the text of Articles 117 and 118 of the Treaty
and as we shall see in the next chapter, the unambiguous will to
harmonise did not exist. Whereas Regulation No. 3 on the social
security of migrant workers built directly on the traditions of the
international law of co-ordination and some knowledge of those tra¬
ditions is essential to understand why it has given rise to so many
problems of interpretation, the Treaty of Rome makes no use of the
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techniques of international harmonisation law, as developed by
Convention No. 102 and the European Code of Social Security.
Far from laying down explicit standards or principles for the
social security systems of the member states, the Treaty, although
it raises the issue of harmonisation, does not provide a very clear
basis for Community action. It is the extent of this basis, the
extent of the competence of the Community institutions, particularly
of the Commission, and the extent of the obligations of the member
States, which ha3 been the centre of the controversy surrounding the
provisions of the Treaty on harmonisation. Articles 117 and 118
provide the core of the law relating to harmonisation in the European
Economic Community, but other provisions are also relevant. The
following survey will look first at the rights and duties arising from
Articles 1i7 and 118, then at the other legal provisions which have
been called in aid to argue that the position of the Commission is in
fact much stronger than at first appears to be the case, and finally
at the action which has been taken under these provisions. Since
there have been no judicial decisions on the subject, reference will
be made primarily to "la doctrine", the body of interpretation
developed by legal commentators.
Articles 117 and 118
Article 117 has been described as the "article-cle de 1'harm-
onisation sociale^7^, but, taken by itself, it does little more than
throw the issue of harraonisation into the airs
"Les Etats raembres conviennent de la necessite' de promouvoir
l'am^lioratlon des conditions de vie et de travail de la
main-d'oeuvre permettant leur egalisatlon dans le progr^s.
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Ils estiment qu'une telle Evolution r^sultera tant du
fonctlonnement du march£ comroun, qui favorisera l'harmo-
nisation des syst&mes sociaux, que des procedures prevues
par le present Traite et du rapprochement des dispositions
(8)
legislatives, r^glementaires et administratives"
Most commentators agree that the agreement declared in the
first paragraph does not create any enforceable legal obligation
for the member states. There are, however, different nuances of
interpretation which, when taken together with other provisions of
the Treaty, do lead to different appreciations of the duties of the
member states. Thus, von der Groeben and von Boekh emphasise the
lack of obligation arising from this article and deny that Article
117 provides aqy basis for a Community social policy:
"Artlkel 117 geht davon aus, dass grundsatzlich die
Mitgliedstaaten fur die Sozialpolitik verantwortlich
bleiben ... Deshalb setzt Artikel 117 fur die Sozial¬
politik der Mitgliedstaaten ledglich eine allgemeine
Richtlinie ... und gibt weder Konmission noch Rat das
(9)
Recht, sozialpolltisch tatig zu werden"
Other commentators, however, emphasise not the lack of binding
obligation but the formal declaration of intention which they see
as an "engagement formel" or as the statement of a formal aim
of the Treaty^1As we shall see later, this emphasis on the
declaration of intention assumes importance when Article 117 and
Article 118 are related to Article 5 of the Treaty.
At first sight, the second paragraph of Article 117 appears to
do no more than express an expectation on the part of the member
-re¬
states, but it does in fact carry our analysis forward, in two
respects. It mentions the term "hannonisation", and it indicates
the methods by which the objectives of the first paragraph are to
be achieved.
No definition of the term "harraonisation" is given in the
Treaty. Although it is generally assumed that the "harmonisation
of the social systems" mentioned in the second paragraph refers to
the "egalisation dans le progres" of the first paragraph, it is
(12)
universally recognised that "harraonisation,, does not mean
"egalisation" in the sense of "uniformisation".
(13)
As Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi put it :
"Armonizzare non e sinonimo di unificare ... Piu che ad una
identita si deve pensare ad un orientamento commune. E cio
non per un fine astratto e teorico, ma in vista dell1
attuazione e del funzionamento del Mercato commine".
Few comwentators would disagree with this, but the definition does
no more than postpone the problem of Interpretation, for there has
been wide disagreement on what action is justified or required by the
"attuazione e ... funzionamento del Mercato commune". Whereas
(14)
Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi relate harmonisation to the objective
announced in the first paragraph which they see as being the improve¬
ment of living and working conditions, other commentators (notably
Wohlfarth-Everling-Glaesner-Sprung) argue on the basis of the origins
of Article 117 as well as on the formulation of the first paragraph
that the improvement of living and working conditions is intended to
bring about their"egalisation", that this "egalisation" is the prime
objective announced by Article 117, and that action to achieve this
"^galisation" is justified only on economic grounds, to remove dis-
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tortions to free competition in the Common Market . The
argument concerning the definition of harmonisation thus resolves
itself into an argument concerning the aims of harmonisation. Since
it is our intention to examine this question in the next chapter,
further consideration of the meaning of "harmonisation" must be post¬
poned.
The second paragraph of Article 117 expresses the expectation
that the objectives of the first paragraph will be attained in three
ways: by the functioning of the common market, by the "procedures
prevues par le present Traite" and by the "rapprochement des dis¬
positions legislatives, reglementaires et admlnistratives". Again,
the differences of interpretation can be reduced mainly to differences
of emphasis, but these differences of emphasis are not without con¬
sequence. The essential question is whether this paragraph urges
action to achieve the objectives stated or whether, on the contrary,
the ends sought are expected to be achieved automatically. The
problem can be broken down into three questions: what emphasis is
to be given to the "functioning of the common market"? What are the
"procedures" to which the paragraph refers? And to what does the
"rapprochement des dispositions" allude?
The difference in interpretation between those authors who emphasise
the lack of binding obligation in the first paragraph and those who
(16)
stress the element of agreement is reflected in the importance which
the various commentators attach to the "functioning of the conroon market"
in relation to the other two means of attaining the stated objectives.
Thus, Groeben Boekti, who emphasised the continuing autonomy of the member
states in matters of social policy, assert:
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"Eine Verbesserung der Lebens-und Arbeitsbedingungen
wird ... ira wesentlichen aus der Automatik des
(17)
Gemeinsamen Marktes ... erwartet"
Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi, on the other handt place their stress on the
need for action:
"Tale mezzo, non< e ... sufficiente. Le consequenze sul
piano sociale dell*integrazione Europea non possono
derivare solo, e quasi automaticamente, dall'attuazione
del Trattato nei vari settori, ma devono essere solle-
citate e favorite anche dall'attuazione delle procedure
previste
There are various versions of what these "procedures" may be.
For Kahn-Freund they are "very obviously the steps which, in accord¬
ance with Article 8, will be taken during the transitional period,
(Id)
that is, before the Common Market can be said to "function" .
What is "very obvious" to Kahn-Freund does not even appear to have
occurred to any of the other conmentators. Most ^2!^assume that
the phrase refers primarily to the other provisions of the Treaty
(21)
concerning labour power , but here again there are differences in
emphasis: one can distinguish between those (such as Groeben-Boekh
and Wohlfarth et al) who present the harmonisation merely as a
possible result of the various other "procedures" connected with
labour power, and those (principally Quadri et al) who present these
"procedures" as forming a Community social policy necessarily involving
(22)
a close collaboration between the member states in the social field .
The third means by which the objectives are to be realised, the
approximation of legislative and administrative provisions, is generally
agreed to refer to Article 100 - 102, although, as we shall see when we
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come to those provisions, these articles apply only in certain conditions.
Although the differences in the interpretation of Article 117 are
primarily differences in emphasis, it is already possible to distinguish
the different line3 of approach to the problem of the extent of the
legal basis for harmonisation and of the competence of the Cbmmunlty
institutions, even although the Gbmmunity institutions are nowhere
mentioned in the article. Those who adopt a restrictive approach
stress the fact that the article does nothing to limit the autonomy
of the member states in their social policy and emphasise the expect¬
ation that harmonisation will result primarily and automatically from
the functioning of the Common Market. Those who favour a broader inter¬
pretation point to the States' agreement on the necessity of harmoni¬
sation and interpret the reference to the "procedures pr^vues' as a
reference to the various powers of action conferred on the Community
institutions by the Treaty.
Whereas Article 117 concentrates on the member states, the subject
of Article 118 is the Commission:
"Sans prejudice des autres dispositions du present Traltd",
et conformement aux objectifs generaux de celui-ci, la
Commission a pour mission de proraouvoir une collaboration
etrolte entre les etats raerabres dans le domaine social,
notamment dans les matl&res relatives:
-A la securite sociale ...
A cet effet la Commission agit en contact etroit avec
les etats membres, par des etudes, des avis et par
l'organisation de consultations, tant pour les problemes
qui se posent sur le plan national que pour ceux qui
interessent les organisations Internationales.
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Avant d'eraettre les avis prevus au present article,
»*(23 )
la Comaission consulte le Comite' ^conomique et social.
It is generally assumed that Article 118 should be read together
with Article 117 and hence that the aim of the collaboration which the
Commission has the task of promoting should be the harmonisation
or "egalisation" declared by Article 117 to be necessary, but Article
118 does little to clear up the difficulties of interpretation raised
by Article 117; on the contrary, those who favour Community action can
point to the task entrusted to the Commission as evidence that the
intention expressed in Article 117 did constitute an "engagement formel",
while those who argue that there is no basis for a Community social
policy, except on very specific points, can point to the weakness of
the powers transferred to the Commission.
The Commission is entrusted with the mission of promoting close
collaboration between the member States, but the only ways in which
it can act are through studies, opinions and the organisation of consul¬
tations. Two questions have caused difficulty. To what extent are
member States obliged to collaborate with the Commission? And to what
extent has the Commission a right of initiative in organising studies
and consultations?
Quadri et al argue that, by entrusting the Commission with the
task of promoting collaboration between them, the member States have
assumed the obligation to collaborate and cannot, without infringing
their obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty, refuse to collaborate
in the studies or participate in the consultations organised by the
(o/i\
Commission*1" . Wohlfarth et al , emphasising the autonomy of the
states in the area of social policy, der\y that they are under any
obligation to collaborate, except in so far as they are obliged to
/ 20 j
supply information under Article 213 of the Treaty . But this
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reference to Article 213 does not really solve the problem, for that
article gives the Commission the right to collect information only
"dans les limites et conditions fix£es par le conseil en conformite'
avec les dispositions du present Traite". This merely raises the
question of how far the Treaty gives the Commission the right to
organise studies etc. on its own initiative.
Here, again, opinions differ. The Commission has forcefully
asserted that it does have a right of initiative. In its own words:
"La Commission de la CEE a reaffirme", a maintes reprises, sa
competence et ses pouvoirs a entreprendre, egalement dans
les mati&res indiquees a l'article 118, toutes les etudes
qu'elle estime necessaires, et a organiser toutes les
consultations qu'elle estime opportunes, surtout avec les
(07)
partenaires sociaux"
Others, however, have argued from the fact that the member states
preserve their autononjy in this field and from the fact that the
Commission is to act "in close contact" with the member states that
the action of the Commission must be subordinate to the wishes of
(28 )
the member States .
Thus, the differences of opinion concerning Article 118 centre
around the interpretation of Article 117: does Article 117 merely
express an intention and an expectation of the member states, or does
it mark out, if not an area of Comnunlty policy, at least an area of
Community concern? Those who take the former approach see the task
of the Commission as that of an assistant to the member states. Those
who see Article 117 as setting out an objective for the Community regret
the disparity between the magnitude of the goal (and consequently of
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the mission entrusted to the Commission) and the paucity of the powers
given to the Commission. Consequently, they try to interpret those
powers as widely as possible.
Those who adopt this approach have also tried to find provisions
in the Treaty which would strengthen the position of the Commission,
i.e. to find other legal bases for action designed to bring about a
harmonisation of social provisions. It is necessary, therefore, to
complete our discussion of the legal basis for harmonisation by looking
at these other provisions.
Other relevant legal provisions
The reference to other articles of the Treaty in support of the
objectives of Article 117 and 118 is justified both by the references in
Article 117 to the "procedures prevues par le present Trait£" and to
the "rapprochement des dispositions legislatives, reglementaires et
administratives", and by the fact that the mission entrusted to the
Commission by Article 118 is "sans prejudice des autres dispositions
du present Traits".
The provisions which have been invoked to strengthen the position
of the Community can perhaps be divided into procedural provisions,
which could be used to give the Conmisslon's action under Article 117,
118 more force, and the more substantive provisions which provide a
basis for action in their own right.
Of the "procedural" provisions, we have already mentioned
(29)
Article 5 . Both paragraphs of this article have been Invoked
against the member states. Quadri et al have argued that a refusal
of the member states to co-operate in the studies and consultations
initiated by the Coimnission would constitute a breach of their
obligation under the first paragraph of Article 5 to facilitate the
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accomplishment of the Community's mission and also of their obli¬
gation under the second paragraph to abstain from measures likeiy
(30)
to imperil the realisation of the aims of the Treaty . Caesar
goes even further than this:
"Selbst wenn man von dem Standpunkt ausgeht, dass es
grundsatzlich Angelegenheit der einzelnen Staaten der
EWG 1st, ihre Sozialpolitik selbst zu bestimmen, wird man
auf dem Gebiet der sozialen Sicherheit auf Grund des
Art. 117 und des Art. 5 Abs. 2 des EWG-Vertrages die
Verpflichtung der einzelnen Regierungen herleiten mussen,
dafflr Sorge zu Tragen, dass die Rechtsunterschiede auf
sozlalem Gebiet sich nlcht welter vergrossern, sondern
vielmehr sich einander anpassen sollen"^*'.
These references to Article 5 in support of the Commission's position
are, however, open to query. Quadri's argument based on the first
paragraph rests on a rather broad interpretation of the notion of the
"Community's tasks", while the reference to the second paragraph
assumes that the aims announced in Article 117 can be included among
"the objectives of the Treaty": but it is precisely this which is
contested by those who would limit the action of the Commission.
Moreover, whereas Quadri's argument is consistent with one inter¬
pretation of Article 117, Caesar's extension of this argument is
less tenable, for it assumes, apart from anything else, that there
exists some commonly accepted notion of what harmonisation means,
which is not the case.
The Commission has also sought to reinforce its authority
(32)
slightly by making use of its general power under Article 155 to
issue recommendations. A recommendation is no more binding than an
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opinlon, but it may carry slightly more moral force^33\ This
practice has met with some opposition, but there seems to be little
legal foundation for such opposition. The Commission has, in fact,
(34)
issued two recommendations designed to encourage the harmonisation
of social security.
It has been suggested that the Commission should make use of two
(35)
other procedural provisions to strengthen its powers, Article 121
f 36)
and Article 235 , but both of these provisions require unanimous
agreement on the part of the Council, and this has not yet existed.
Should bhe unanimous desire to take action ever come into being, these
articles could, of course, be used, if no other basis for action were
found.
More interesting than the appeals to procedural devices are the
attempts to find a basis for action in more substantive provisions.
These attempts raise again the question of the meaning and the aim of
harmonisation.
Article 117, we saw, refers to the"rapprochement des dispositions
legislatives ...". It is generally accepted that this is a reference
to the chapter of the Treaty entitled "Approximation of Laws", which
consists of three articles, Articles 100 - 102. The first two of these
articles give power to the Council if certain conditions are fulfilled,
to issue directives (which are, of course, legally binding on the
member states) requiring the approximation of legal or administrative
provisions. Since Article 117 refers to these articles, and since
Article 118 is "without prejudice to the other provisions of this
Treaty", there is prima facie no reason why these provisions should
not be used to bring about an approximation of social security laws,
providing always that the requisite conditions mentioned in the
-25-
(37)
articles are fulfilled .
(38)
The condition required by Article 100 is that the provisions
to be approximated should be such "as directly affect the establish¬
ment or functioning of the common market". This is rather an ill-
defined condition. Firstly, it is not clear what is meant by
"directly". Cannella has argued that although disparities in social
security provisions may have an effect on the functioning of the
common market, such an effect would be negative and indirect, and
that the consequences of the disparities would not be such as could
"influer sur le marche commun par un lien £tiologique, direct et
(39)imm£diat" . But to admit, as Cannella does, that disparities in
social security provisions distort competition and disturb the free
movements of capital and workers and yet deny that they have a "direct"
effect on the functioning of the common market seems at best arbitrary.
More significant is the fact that Article 100 can be used to
approximate legislations only where it can be shown that the existing
disparities "affect the establishment or functioning of the conation
market. By interpreting "common market" in its popular sense, as a
synonym for the European Economic Community, and by seeing the
"functioning of the common market" in the light of the very broad
alms expressed in Article 2, it is possible to reduce this limitation
to complete insignificance. It has been more usual, however, to
interpret "common market" in its narrower, literal sense. The aim
of approximation under Article 100 must, according to this approach,
be primarily an economic one; to remove obstacles to the creation or
(40)
functioning of the new, enlarged market . However, this raises a
problem, for those authors who favour a broad interpretation of
Articles 117, 118, i.e. those authors who interpret these articles
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as creating a task for the community without giving it sufficient
powers and who therefore iook to other articles to find these powers,
tend to interpret the aim of harmonisation as being primarily a
(41)
"social" one - the improvement of working and living conditions
In other words, Article 100 is not seen by these authors as filling
the gap between the task entrusted to the Commission by Articles 117,
118 and the insufficiency of the powers vested in it. The difficulty
is a real one, for harmonisation which takes as its starting point the
removal of obstacles to the functioning of the common market will tend
to focus on the costs of social security schemes to employers, whereas
harmonisation which aims at the improvement of working and living
conditions will concentrate on the level of benefits, and the results
(42)
of the two types of harmonisation may be very different indeed .
A way out of this dilemma is suggested by Kapteyn-Verloren van
Themant:
"Een onderlinge aanpassing van sociale zekerheidsstelsels
op grond van sociale overwegingen ... zou wdderom op
artikel 100 kunnen worden gebaseerd, indien men de
rechtstreekse invloed op de instelling of de werking
(43)
van de gemeenschappelijke arbeidsmarkt kan aantonen" .
The line suggested here would presumably be to argue, not that dis¬
parities in social security charges distort competition between
producers of different countries and hence affect the functioning
of the common market of goods, but that disparities in social security
benefits act as an obstacle to the migration of workers and thus affect
the functioning of the common labour market. On this basis, it would be
possible to justify a harmonisation aimed at raising the level of
benefits, an "egalisation dans le progres" in the terms of Article 117.
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The main objection to this approach is that Article 51 already
gives the Council power to "adopt such measures in the field of
social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for
,,(,44)
workers . As we know, the Council has already adopted measures
under this article, but these measures are designed to co-ordinate
and not to harmonise the national systems, i.e. they affect only
those insured workers who move from the area covered by one system
to that covered by another and they leave the individual systems
untouched. If it were felt that this co-ordination %vas insufficient,
that some degree of harmonisation was also necessary to ensure that
the continued existence of separate social security systems did not
constitute an obstacle to labour mobility, then surely there is no
need for recourse to Article 100, since Article 51 gives the Council
power to "adopt such measures ... as are necessary to provide freedom
of movement for workers". It might be difficult to establish that
harmonisation was "necessary" to achieve this aim, but if this were
established, there seems to be no reason why Article 51 should not
(45)
be used as a basis for harmonisation
The only attempt which the Commission has actually made (until
recently) to use Article 100 in pursuit of the objectives of Articles
117, 118 was in a proposal for a directive to harmonise security
requirements for "pistolets de scellement" used in the building
Industry. The harraonisation of these requirements was in any case
Justified on economic grounds, but the Commission also Justified its
proposal by relating it to the prevention of accidents in accordance
with the aims of Articles 117 and 118. This caused considerable
i AfS \
controversy, and the proposal was not accepted . It is difficult,
besides, to see how social security provisions could be harmonised in
-2P—
this way, under cover of the standardisation of regulations applying
to goods.
In short, the arguments that Article 100 can be used as a basis
for harmonisation based on social considerations, i.e. aiming
primarily at the improvement of working and living conditions, are
not very convincing. This does not mean that a sympathetic Council
could not interpret Article 100 broadly in order to achieve the ends
it desired. In this respect, it will be interesting to see the result
of the Commissions new attenpt to use Article 100 as a basis for
directives in what is considered to be the sphere of social policy,
namely, on collective redundancies, equal pay for men and women, and
(47)
the rights of workers in the case of a merger. .
The restriction of Article 101 and Article 102to
measures based on economic considerations is somewhat clearer.
These articles give the Council power to take action only where "a
difference between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States is distorting the conditions
of competition: in the common market and that the resultant distortion
meeds to be eliminated". There is no reason why, if this condition
were fulfilled, action should not be taken under these articles to
remove disparities between the various social security systems, but
the aim of such action would, of course, have to be the removal of
distortions to competition.
It should be noted that Article 100 and 101 give power to the
Council to act by directive. Under Article 101, such directives may
be issued on the decision of a qualified majority since the ending of
the first stage of the transitional period, under Article 100 the
decision to issue the directive must be unanimous. But even where
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the Council must act unanimously, the Commission will have more
influence and more chances of success in proposing a directive under
Article 100 than it would have in recommending concerted action under
Article 118s this results from the established procedures of Community
(50)
negotiation and the Commission's role in such negotiations .
Finally, some authors (notably Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat)^5^
have suggested that a basis for harmonisatlon might be found in
provisions which mention neither social policy nor the approximation
of laws but the co-ordination of economic policies. But this pre¬
supposes a certain view of the purpose and function of the harmonisation
of social security provisions, and it is more convenient to postpone
(52)
consideration of this argument until a later chapter .
Measures Taken
All the measures taken which have aimed at harmonisation or
encouraged collaboration in the field of social security have been taken
under Articles 118 and 155. 1\vo recommendations have been issued by the
Commission, numerous consultations have been organised and studies
published. Before drawing a conclusion to this chapter, we shall survey
briefly the principal results of the Commission's work.
Both of the recommendations concern industrial diseases. The
(53)
first, issued in 1962 proposed to the member states the adoption
of a "European list of industrial diseases". Although each state had a
list of industrial diseases and about fifty diseases were recognised as
such by the various states, only a dozen of these diseases were common
to all six national lists. The Commission drew up a list of all
diseases recognised as "industrial diseases" by the various national
lists and recommended that each state should adopt that list. The
Commission also proposed that the states should adopt a "mixed system",
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i.e. that, in addition to recognising a list of diseases which give
rise to a legal presumption that they resulted from the employment
of the victim and thus entitle him to a higher rate of benefit, the
states should recognise the right of the victim to show that his
particular illness, although not featuring on the recognised list,
did in fact result from his employment and that he is thus entitled
to the industrial disease rate of benefit.
(54)
The second reconmendation, issued in 1966 aims principally
at the suppression of the limiting conditions to which the payment
of such benefits are made subject, conditions concerning , for example,
the clinical manifestations of the infections, the types of employment
concerned or the period within which the disease must be observed
after the exposure to the risk.
The recommendations have met with some, but not with complete
success. The proposals of the Commission, and particularly the
European list of industrial diseases, have certainly had some influence
on the laws of the member states, but no aspect of either recommendation
has been adopted in its entirety by all the member states. Progress
has been made, but differences still exist between the lists of the
various countries, the mixed system has been adopted without restriction
only in France, Germany and in Luxembourg, and the conditions which the
later Recommendation aimed to suppress still exist, particularly in
France and Italy. In addition, the Netherlands abolished the whole
system of special benefits for industrial injuries and diseases by
legislation of 1967, though this, of course, in no way contravenes the
liberalising spirit of the Commission's recommendations .
Of the consultations organised by the Commission, the most
important has been the European Social Security Conference held in
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1962, which brought together representatives of trade unions,
employers* organisations and social security institutions, as well
as independent experts, with representatives of the governments
participating as observers. In addition, regular contacts take place
both within the framework of the Council and of the studies undertaken
(57)
by the Commission .
( 58)
The studies 1 published are probably the most valuable result of
the Commission's work to date. In addition to publishing regular
statistics, the Commission has published, inter alia, descriptive
studies on the structure, benefits and financing of the general
social security systems of the member states and on the special and
"complementary" or occupational schemes. In recent years, it has
undertaken a number of studies on the economic aspects of social
security, on its economic impact and on its financial problems, and it
is currently engaged in the elaboration of a "social budget" for the
Coram inity.
Conclusion
It has not been the purpose of this chapter to reach ar^y firm
conclusion as to the exact extent of the rights and obligations of the
parties concerned with the harmonisation of social security. The aim
has been rather to outline the main arguments concerning the existence
and extent of a legal basis for harmonisation and the extent of the
rights and duties of the Community institutions and the member states
under the various provisions of the Treaty. We have made a deliberate
attempt to restrict the argument to a consideration of the legal
provisions of the Treaty, preferring to leave "extra-legal" consider¬
ations to subsequent chapters. It is perhaps helpful to conclude the
chapter by repeating briefly the main lines of the analysis.
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Two approaches to the interpretation of Articles 117 and 118
may be distinguished, a "narrow" and a "broad" approach, typified
respectively by the analyses of Groeben-Boekh on the one hand, and
Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi on the other. Those who adopt the narrow-
approach take the view that these articles do nothing to restrict
the autonorgy of the member states in the social field and do not
establish a basis for a general Community social policy. They
maintain that the member states expected harmonisation to result
automatically from the functioning of the common market and regard
the weakness of the powers entrusted to the Commission as being
fully consistent with this approach. Those who favour the broad
interpretation on the other hand argue that Article 117 establishes
harmonisation as one of the aims of the Treaty and that Article 118
entrusts the Commission with promoting that harmonisation without,
alas, putting the necessary instruments at its disposal. Hence a
(59)
gap exists , in this view, between the duties of the Corrmission
and the powers at its disposal, a gap which one must try to fill
by reference to the other provisions of the Treaty,
Thus, it is those who adopt the broad interpretation who lead the
argument on to other articles of the Treaty, However, the other
articles of the Treaty fail to "fill the gap", or at least fail to
fill it in the way in which those who favour the broad interpretation
of Articles 117 and 118 want to fill it, for the latter generally
interpret harmonisation as the harmonisation of benefits in order to
raise social standards, whereas, if we leave aside the procedural
provisions (Articles 5, 155, 121, 235), the only articles^60^ which
supply the necessary instruments to "fill the gap" (principally
Articles 100 - 102) restrict the use of those instruments to the
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pursuit of "economic" ends, i.e. the removal of obstacles to the
functioning of the common isirket or distortions to competition.
Whether one regards the gap as being filled, i.e. whether one
regards the Treaty, as it stands, as providing a sound basis for
the harmonisation of social security systems, depends on how one
interprets "harmonisation", on what one thinks to be the aim of
ha rmonisat ion •
CHAPTER 3
Chapter 3
The Function of Harroonisatlon
Very little has been done under Articles 117 and 118 EEC,
yet harmonisation (or indeed non-harmonisation) of social security
in the EEC has been the subject of continuous debate since the mid-
1950s. We shall therefore start from this debate, which has centred
on the aims, that is, on the necessity or otherwise, of harmonisation
The debate has not been a purely academic one. The arguments
put forward have almost always been advanced in support of certain
interests. Thus, the struggle between the two principal lines of
approach, the "social" and the "economic" closely mirrors a clash
between the interests of the trade unions and employers on one
plane, and between those of the Commission and the Council on another
A turning-point in the discussion comes in 1966, when the
Council imposes a practical consensus. After this date, the
whole discussion moves to a new level of seriousness. After this
date too, it becomes clearer how the question of an EEC social
security policy relates to the development of the EEC in general,
to the changes which were taking place In the economic policy of
the Member States in the mid-60s, and indeed to the development
of modern capitalism in Western Europe.
I shall look first at tire origins of Articles 117, 118 EEC,
then at the debate which ensued between 1958 and the meeting of the
Council of Ministers in December 1966. This will be followed by an
analysis of the new concept which has been emerging since that date,
which should permit us to look finally at the implications for the
future of an EEC social security policy.
The aim of this chapter is not to look at the various national
social security systems and make suggestions as to how they might
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be harmonised: this has already been done by experts^1 \ The
immediate aim is not a practical one; the aim is not to make
positive proposals but merely to try and understand what the
discussion under Articles 117, 118 is all about, that is, how it
relates to general political and economic development.
Origins of Articles 117.118
It has often been remarked that the Title of the Treaty devoted
to social policy contains only twelve of the 248 articles of the
Treaty. What is perhaps more remarkable is that any part of the
Treaty at all is devoted to social policy. For, although it might
be argued that the ultimate aim of economic activity is social,
the immediate aim of the Treaty-makers was to create an economic
union, and only such provisions as were deemed necessary to that
end were included in the Treaty. If we can accept the word of
Mr. Veldkamp, the former Dutch Minister of Social Affairs:
"On est parti du principe qu'il fallait regler
tout ce qui «?tait de nature a perturber artificiellement
les regies de concurrence, en d*autres termes, tout ce
qui pouvait aboutir h des distorsions sur le plan
£conomique, mais que la reglementation des conditions
sociales et la politique sociale en soi - c*est-a-dire
Independamment des efforts en vue de l*instauration de
* * * (2)1'unite £conomique - n'etaient pas necessaires" .
The inclusion of the social provisions in the Treaty was by no
means a deviation from this principle, it was not an attempt to
make the Treaty more "social", but resulted from economic motives
The French government, supporting the claims of the French
(4)
employers , maintained during the negotiations that the social
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charges^ borne by employers were higher In France than in the other
negotiating states and that, consequently, French industry would be
placed at a disadvantage in competition in the Common Market. They
argued that this was an "artificial" rather than a "natural" dis¬
tortion of competition, that is to say, that the social charges
were not the result of the free play of market forces but were
imposed on the market by the State, acting no doubt to protect the
interests of the workers. The existence of disparities between the
social charges in the various countries would therefore constitute
a hindrance to the establishment of a common market, and should be re¬
moved by harmonisation. In particular, they called for equal pay for
men and women (already notionally attained in France) and the harmo¬
nisation of the length of the normal working week and of the financing
of social security.
The governments of the other negotiating states, led by Germany
and supported by the conclusions of a study published by the ILO on
(6)
"social aspects of European economic co-operation" , did not agree
that harmonisation of social charges was necessary for the creation
of a conroon market. They argued that social charges were not
"artificial" but "natural", that, like wages, they resulted from the
operation of the market; and that anyway, distortions of a global
character (such as those arising from general taxes or social security
charges) are compensated for by other mechanisms in the economy^.
(8)
The result was a compromise . The chapter of the Treaty
entitled "Social Provisions" sketches out an area of social policy
without providing any real means by which the policy can be imple¬
mented. As has been seen in the last chapter, the member states
agree, in Article 117, on "la necessite de promouvoir 1'amelioration
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des conditions de vie et de travail de la main d*oeuvre permettant
leur egalisation dans le progres*. But, if they did believe it was
necessary, they were not prepared to commit themselves to any
action: "lis estiment qu'une telle evolution resultera tant du
fonctionnement du marche' coinmun, qui favorisera 1*harmonisation
des systemes sociaux, que des procedures prevues par le present
Traite" et du rapprochement des dispositions legislatives,
r£glementaires et administratives". In addition, the Commission
has the task (under Article 118) of promoting close collaboration
between the member states in the social field, one of the areas
specifically mentioned being that of social security.
(9)
It is a rather confused and clumsy compromise which leaves
more than ample room for debate between those who favour harrao-
nisation for whatever reason, and those opposed to it. The area
for debate is extended by the fact that, although the removal of
distortions of competition was the motive for including these
provisions in the Treaty, competition is nowhere mentioned, the
only reason given for wanting harmonisation being "l'am/lioration
des conditions de vie et de travail de la main d*oeuvre". Although
the argument of the French government did not prevail, it did succeed
in setting the problems of the harmonisation of social security
firmly within the area of Community debate.
It is interesting to note that the basis for the French
argument (and hence for the inclusion of Articles 117, 118 in the
Treaty) is a liberal economic notion. Disparities in social
charges are seen as constituting a hindrance to the creation of a
free market, a hindrance that must be cleared out of the way so that
the economy of the Coimnon Market could operate smoothly. This is
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very different, as we shall see, from the economic notions on which
the latest discussion is based.
Debate on the aims and meaning of hanaonlsations: 1958-1966
After the Treaty came into force, the Conmission was faced with
the confused compromise embodied in Articles 117, 118. There was no
agreement on the necessity for the harmonisation of the social
security systems, nor on what "harmonisation" meant in this context,
nor on how it should be carried out. There was general agreement
that the social security systems of the Six could not be made
uniform immediately and^10^ that the goal was not "uniformisation",
but "harmonisation", which was not the same thing. Very many
definitions have been given of "harraonisation", but any attempt
to define it as though it had some meaning in isolation from the
aims pursued, seems foredoomed to sterility.
More interesting than the attempts to define the notion in
abstract are the reasons which have been given to explain why the
harmonisation of social security is necessary. The first years
of the EEC (up to 1966) are characterised by the rejection, at
least by the Commission and the trade unions, of the removal of
distortions to competition as the prime aim of harmonisation, in
favour of the more nebulous "social progress", that is, by the
rejection of the "economic" for the "social" approach. Let us
look separately at each of these two lines of argument.
Competition^ 1 ^
The argument put forward by the French employers at the time
of the negotiations has already been stated: where the social
security charges borne by the employer are heavier in one country
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than in the others, this will mean that the labour costs and hence
production costs of that employer will be artificially raised and
that he will be placed at an unfair disadvantage vis-a-vis competi¬
tors in other countries. Conversely, where a state reduces the
charges on the employer (for example, by taking a greater part of the
financing of social security benefits on itself), this operates as a
subsidy which gives that state's producers an advantage over foreign
competitors. Hence, it is argued, it is necessary to harmonise at
least the financing of the social security systems in order to remove
these distortions. Benefits may incidentally be affected by the
financial harmonisation, but that is by the way.
This argument has met with resistance on a number of grounds,
both economic and social. From the social point of view, the
argument is unsavoury. Clearly, harmonisation of the financing of
the social security systems is bound to affect benefits and the
redistributive effect of those systems. If harmonisation is carried
out merely with a view to removing hindrances to competition, there
is a great danger that benefits could be adversely affected.
Perhaps more important is the economic objection that the
French argument is incorrect, or at least grossly over-simplified.
Firstly, it is unrealistic to compare social security charges
in isolation. For the purpose of the French argument, these
charges matter only in so far as they affect production and, more
particularly, labour costs. But the relationship between social
security charges and the other components of labour costs (wages
and taxes) is far more complex than the French argument suggests.
It is quite untenable to see social security charges as simply
being imposed on top of other labour costs. Thus, high social
security charges may well be compensated for by low wage costs,
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(12)
and low social security charges by high wage costs or high taxes .
High social charges may be accompanied by relatively low wage
costs, because, especially if the high charges correspond to high
benefits, the employer will often be able to make his workers accept
correspondingly lower wages, or, in other words, he will be able to
(13)
pass the costs on to his workers . This interdependence of social
security benefits and wages is expressed in the notion which sees the
(14)
benefit as an "indirect or deferred wage" . Thus, Montes, for
example, observing that, in spite of the growing importance of social
security in the French national income, the proportion of that income
going to wage-earners has not increased, deduces from this that the
growth in social security benefits has taken place at the cost of a
(15)
slower rise in direct wages , If this is so, then clearly the whole
(16)
distinction between "natural" and "artificial" distortions breaks down.
Although the rates of social security contributions and benefits may be
fixed by the State, this does not mean that they are not subject to
the influence of, or in turn affect, the market and social forces
which determine wages.
This relationship between wage costs and social security
charges is of course disturbed when the State steps in. If the State
takes on a big share of social security costs, this may indeed lighten
the burden on the employer, for, if the benefits are accompanied by
lower wages, the State is in effect paying part of his wages for him.
Thus, one of the motives of the British Government in taking on the
financing of such a large part of the British national insurance
(17)
benefits was reportedly to boost exports . What the effect of the
state participation will be on the production costs of the producers
depends, however, entirely on how the state participation is financed,
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that is, on the system of taxation. Thus, it may weli be that low
social charges will be compensated for by higher taxes.
It is hardly surprising, then, that there is no simple
(18)
relation between social charges and labour costs. Schork
points out that the harmonisation of social charges would increase,
rather than reduce disparities in labour costs, if other elements
remained constant. Although it is no doubt true that, in the
short term, the producers of one country may gain an advantage in
competition from the way in which their social security system is
financed, it does not seem that a simple harmonisation of social
charges would solve the problem.
The second part of the economic objection to the French
argument is that whatever competitive advantage is gained will in
any case only be a short-term advantage. Even where heavier social
charges are not compensated for by lower wages or taxes, the
resulting competitive disadvantage will in the long term be balanced
out by the exchange rate mechanism. Existing disparities in social
security charges, at least as long as they are global and not limited
to any particular sector, will not affect competition because they
will already have been accounted for by modifications to the rate
(19)
of exchange
There are two limitations to this exchange rate argument.
Firstly, it applies only to disparities affecting the whole of the
economy. Where there is a specific distortion, that is, where the
(20)
charges to which a specific industry is subject differ from
the national average and from the charges imposed on that industry
in the other countries, this inequality will not be corrected by
the exchange rate mechanism. In such a case, even the opponents
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of the French argument agree that, in theory, harmonisation may be
necessary in the interests of fair competition. In practice,
however, for all the reasons already given, it would be extremely
difficult to know whether and to what extent such specific distortions
existed. Such specific harmonisation would, it is argued, require far
more information than is at present available and should in any case
(2t)
be attempted only in extreme cases .
The second limitation is that the argument applies only to
already existing disparities. But any innovations which sub¬
stantially affect social charges - whether they increase or decrease
existing disparities - will disturb the balance between the economies
concerned. Within the framework of a Common Market (and particularly
when it is aiming at monetary integration), monetary fluctuations are
particularly undesirable and the imbalance created will not so easily
be corrected by the exchange rate mechanism. Therefore, in the
interests of monetary stability as much as in the interests of
competition, what is necessary is not a harmonisation of social
security charges, but, on the contrary, a harmonisation of the rate
of change of these charges. The charges themselves must not be
harmonised or, if they are harmonised for reasons other than
competition, then this should be done very slowly and with extreme
(22)caution .
It is to be noted that the argument has now moved to a dif¬
ferent level. Whereas at first it was in terms of the production
costs of the individual producer, it is now becoming clear that the
harmonisatiom of social security cannot be discussed outside the
macro-economic context, outside the context of economic and monetary
integration. This is to become increasingly obvious after 1966.
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In view of these arguments and of the complexity of the whole
question, the removal of obstacles to competition was soon rejected
as a ground for calling for harmonisation, at least in the short
term. The economic objections (put forward mainly by the German
employers and their allies) robbed the original French argument of
( 23)
its force . In the recent negotiations on the accession of the
U.K. to the EEC, when, in view of the important participation of the
state in the financing of the British national insurance system, one
might have expected that the issue would arise, it seems that it was not
(24)
even mentioned .
With the competition argument, the original reason for including
Articles 117, 118 in the Treaty, out of the way, or at least absorbed
into a long-term economic argument, one might have thought that the
discussion on harmonisation would lose all heat. In fact, however,
the Conmission and the trade unions introduced a new element into
the discussion: rejecting the idea that harmonisation was necessary
(25)
in the interests of competition , they nevertheless argued that
it was desirable - for social reasons. Attention is turned to what
first appeared to be stylistic embellishments in Article 117 -
"l'amelioration des conditions de vie et de travail de la main
d'oeuvre" and "egalisation dans le progres". Although the original
argument based on competition is rejected, nevertheless,
"l'harmonisation reste un objectif parce
qu'elle porte en soi l'annonce de la volonte
de progres sociaux qu'iraplique l'amelioration
/ OA \
des conditions de vie et de travail" * .
It was the rejection by the unions and by the Commission of the
original "economic approach" in favour of this "social approach"
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which led to the vehement clashes between employers and unions at
the 1962 Social Security Conference and to the tension between
Commission and Council which came to a head in 1966.
Social Progress
The view that the aim of social security harmonisation is
social progress (and that harmonisation is desirable for this
reason) may follow a number of lines of approach.
The most extreme form of the argument is to identify
"harmonisation" with "upward alignment". If the expression
"egalisation dans le progres" is to be taken literally, it is
argued, one must look at the standards of protection in the various
countries, taking each branch (or indeed each aspect of each branch)
separately, and raise the standards of the other countries to that of
the country which gives the best protection in that branch (or with
regard to that aspect). This might mean, for example, that all the
countries would raise their old age pensions to the German level,
maternity and sickness benefits to the Dutch, industrial injuries
benefits to the Luxembourgeois, unemployment benefits to the Belgian
(27)
and family benefits to the French level. Such a proposal was in
(•>8)
fact made by Veillon, a French trade unionist , in his report on
(29)
benefits to the 1962 Conference: upward harmonisation would, he
hoped, be complete by 1970. Veillon*s report gave rise to a vehement
(30)
reaction on the part of the employers . It was rightly pointed out
that such a demand is Utopian, because both the enormous increase in
(31)
social expenditure which it would involve and the effect which it
would have on income differentials and the position of the individual
(3*>)
in society would be incompatible with the market econorny ~ .
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A less extreme form of this approach has been of greater
influence. Instead of demanding total upward alignment, one can
approach the matter more selectively, by singling out small dif¬
ferences which seem unjustifiable and demanding harmonisation of
those particular provisions, either to conform to the highest
existing standard or to some new standard which takes account of
the experience or trends in the various countries. For example,
if maternity allowances are paid during a period of twenty-one
weeks in one country and only twelve weeks in another, one can
argue that upward harmonisation requires that they should be paid
for twenty-one weeks in all the member states; or if unemployment
benefit is paid from the fourth day of unemployment in most countries,
but from the first day in one, upward harmonisation would require
that it should be paid from the first day in all countries. By
confronting the provisions of the various systems, inadequacies will
be shown up which could be eliminated one by one by means of
progressive harmonisation. This approach was very much favoured by
both trade unions and the Commission. It is prominent in many of
(33)
the papers by unionists at the 1962 Conference and elsewhere ,
and it inspired much of the early work of the Commission, including
its recommendations on industrial diseases and its proposed recom¬
mendations on maternity and invalidity.
The third form adopted by the social progress theory is that
it is the Commission^ task to foster social progress by the cross-
fertilisation of ideas. According to this view, closer contact
between the member states in the social domain would mean that in
each country the government, the "social partners" and others would be
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raade aware of solutions adopted In other countries to meet problems
common to all the member states. This knowledge would either lead
governments to adopt the most rational solution, or, failing that -
and this point is less often made, though it seems to me more import¬
ant - would provide the trade unions and other groups with a lever
with which they could press for reforms. The emphasis here is still
on harmonisation seen as the upward harmonisation of benefits, and
the process is seen as being primarily one of learning. Thus,
in the discussion of the social effects of Britain's entry, the
question has often been posed in terms ofs "what do we have to
(34)
offer, what lessons do we have to learn?" .
One thing that these three forms of the argument have in common
is that in reality they have not very much to do with harmonisation.
The demands for total or partial alignment are not really concerned
with alignment: they are surely only a novel form for presenting the
(35)
real demand of the unionists: that social benefits should be raised .
It nay be desirable that social security benefits should be raised
throughout Europe, but it is very hard to think of any purely social
reason (i.e. a reason affecting the material welfare of the individual
recipient) why benefits should be the same in all the member states.
For the unions and other groups who put forward these arguments, the
EEC is merely providing a new and stronger frame of reference by which
to measure their own country's standards, a new measuring rod with
which to beat their own governments. Thus, for example, the purpose
behind the late Professor Titmuss's article on the harmonisation of
social security in the EEC , in which he argues that the Govern¬
ment's pension proposals would, by increasing the role of private
insurance, bring the British system further out of line with the
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systems of the Six, is surely not to advance harmonlsation but to
castigate the Government. Similarly, when the TUC argued that
British benefits should be raised to the level of the other member
(37)
states when Britain acceded to the EEC , the aim was certainly
not to further European integration. In a sense, harmonisation
would be self-defeating from this point of views if the benefits
in all the member states were the same, one country could no
longer "learn" anything from the others.
I do not, of course, wish to reject the social progress
approach, merely to suggest that its primary function was to
advance the national claims of the trade unions and like-minded
pressure groups. But why did the Commission associate itself
with this approach, in spite, as we shall see, of the opposition
of employers and member states?
The answer no doubt lies, in part at least, in the fact that
the Commission had a broader concept of European integration than
(38)
that which, according to Mr. Veldkamp , inspired the Treaty-
makers. It was felt that citizens of the EEC should, if it was to
become a real "Community", enjoy more or less the same social
(39)
standards • More important, they should actually feel that
they are citizens of the one Community:
"What is required is that countries which have linked
their destinies ... should reduce their differences
as much as possible, and that their peoples should
feel part of the same Community ... People must feel
(40)
that their social levels are equivalent"
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And not only should the Dutchman feel that he shares something with
the Frenchman, etc., but he should be aware that their common
fortune is attributable to the Community. If the Community is to
be a success and win the allegiance of the people of Europe, it
must be seen not just as an economic club but as the bearer of
(41)
social improvements . Thus the social progress approach
corresponded also to the political interests of the Commission.
It should now be obvious why the course adopted by the
Commission in the early '60s encountered strong opposition from
both employers' associations and the member states. The employers
objected because the Commission seemed to favour trade union demands
and any upward harmonisation of benefits would increase the charges
they had to bear. The social security institutions, particularly in
FR Germany, objected because they felt that their autonomy was
(42)
threatened by the calls for structural harmonisation . The
governments of the member states objected because, in addition, they
felt that the Commission was trying to usurp their powers and the
(43 )
allegiance of their citizens . Whereas the original idea had been
that social security would be a concern of the Community only in so
far as it had undesirable international effects, the Commission was
now trying to set certain standards within the member states.
The coolness of the member states towards the Commission's
policy was shown by their refusal to participate in the 1962 Euro-
(44)
pean Social Security Conference other than as observers. This
(45)
Conference, organised by the executives of the three Communities
to promote discussion of the harmonisation of social security, was
supposed to bring together representatives of the governments, of
the trade unions and employers* associations, and a number of
"independent experts". In the event, only the last three groups
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took an active part. It is striking that at this conference (and
in the debate which followed), it is the union representatives who
are the main protagonists of harraonisation, while the employers Insist
that the removal of obstacles to competition can be the only ground
for harmonisation and that the whole question must be approached with
very great caution^4*^. It is clear that the shift in emphasis from
the competition to the social argument marks a shift from the
employers' to the unions' point of view.
The tension between the Commission and the Council came to a
(47)
head in the period between 1964 and 1966 . At the meeting of the
Council on 21st April, 1964, the six ministers responsible for social
affairs stated unanimously that social security fell within the juris¬
diction of the governments only, and that the institutions of the
(48)
European Communities had therefore no competence in this area .
Thereafter, there was a complete breakdown in communication between
the Commission and the Member States. The governments refused to
co-operate with the Commission's work under Article 118 and, for two
years before the meeting of December 1966, the ministers of social
(49)
affairs refused to meet in the Council , despite the bitter
conqxLaints of the Parliament which even threatened to have recourse
to Article 175 of the Treaty to compel the Council to take certain
(50)
decisions . Whereas originally only the Federal Republic was
strongly opposed to the expansive social policy of the Commission, it
seems that by 1966 she had been joined in her opposition by all the
member states except Italy, which had most to gain (if not in this,
then in other areas) from an expansive social policy^0'The member
states made three demands of the Commission: that it should not
undertake any study without the prior authorisation of the Council;
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that it should consult the "social partners" only on the subject-
matter of the authorised studies and only within the organs provided
for that purpose either by the Treaty itself (i.e. the Economic and
(50 )
Social Council) or by decision of the Council * ; and that it should
not make any recommendation without first obtaining the unanimous
(53)
agreement of the Council . The Conraission wag not at first
prepared to accept these conditions.
But by 1986 it was clear that the Commission's social policy
had failed and that something would have to be done. The Commission
had been chastened not only by the continued opposition of the
Council to its policy; but also by the French boycott of the Council
from mid-1965 until the Luxembourg agreement of January 1966, which
had been occasioned in part by the general expansive policy of the
(54)
Commission, in the social as in other domains •
A compromise was reached as a result of the work of Mr. Veld-
(55)
kamp, Dutch Minister of Social Affairs at the time . The Dutch
held the chairmanship of the Council during the second half of
1966, and Veldkamp, who felt that the demands of some of the member
states went too far, presented a conciliatory memorandum, the main
proposal of which was a sort of "gentlemen's agreement" under which
the Conmission would be disposed to concentrate its efforts under
Article 118 on those subjects which it knew to be of interest to the
member states; in return, the member states would, of course,
/ rg \
co-operate with the Commission in its work .
Veldkamp succeeded in bringing the ministers of social affairs
together on 19th December 1966, and an agreement was reached on the
basis he had suggested. At this meeting, it was decided that the
Commission should concentrate its attention on three areas:
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- an examination of the opportunity, necessity and
possibility of harmonising the notions and definitions
used in the different social (and particularly social
security) systems;
- a study of the costs of social security and the manner
in which the burden is divided between the workers, the
employers and the State;
- an examination of the possibility for States to ratify
social agreements concluded within the framework of
international organisations.
Veldkarap claimed that both the "economic" and the "social" ap¬
proaches to harmonisation were represented in this compromise;
the Study of the costs reflected the wishes of those who saw
harmonisation as an economic requirement, the other two points
corresponded to the "social progress" approach^57\ Subsequent
developments indicate, however, that it is the economic side of
the Commission's work which is more significant.
It should be noted that the idea of partial upward alignment
/ ro \
(i.e. the upward alignment of particular benefits) ' is abandoned.
The proposed recommendation on the protection of maternity, which
the Commission had presented to the Council before the meeting,
has never been made - one of the governments thought that it would
(59)
cost too much . Veldkamp makes the distinction between "harmon¬
isation materlelle" and "harmonisation des principes". By the
former term he refers to the harmonisation of the benefits them¬
selves, particularly of their amount and coverage. Such harmon-
isation should not, he argues, be imposed from outside, for benefits
must depend on national, social and economic priorities. Apart
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from the exchange of information on these matters, "harmonisation
mate'rielle" should be left to the functioning of the Common Market.
This is, of course, the same as what employers* associations and
governments had been arguing all along.
By "harmonisation des principes", Veldkamp refers to the
harmonisatlon of legal principles and definitions, of procedural
rules, etc. He feels that here there is a sphere in which
"technico-Juridical" harmonisation can be usefully pursued without
meeting financial, economic or political barriers. Hence the
first of the three areas of study mentioned above: the harmonisation
of definitions. In fact this approach has brought no results. The
only action along these lines appears to have been the proposal for a
recommendation, submitted to the Council by the Commission in 1968, on
a Community definition of the state of invalidity. The proposal,
on which work was started after the 1962 Conference, has had no more
/ gQ \
success than the proposed maternity recommendation .
The examination of the problems of ratifying international
conventions - the second "social" area of the three areas specified
at the 1966 meeting - led to a report by the Commission in 1968 on
important conventions (including ILG convention No. 102, the
European Social Charter and the European Social Security Code) and
the possibilities and difficulties of ratifying them for the member
states. This work, modest though it is, appears to have been fairly
/ gl \
successful in persuading states to ratify these conventions
Friction between the Council and Commission continued even after
i \
the meeting of December 1966 though on a lesser scale but the
Veldkamp "compromise" succeeded in starting the dialogue between
Commission and member states again. It is clear, however, that,
from the institutional point of view, the clash of views between
-53-
Council and Commission had ended, inevitably, in the Council's
/ g? \
favour , in so far as:
(1) The Commission's programme of studies and action
were to be determined by the Council rather than by
the Commission: after 1966, the initiative in the
field of social policy passed from the Commission
to the Council;
(?) Recommendations are not in practice issued unless the
(64)
Council has given its unanimous approval ;
(3) Contacts between the Commission and the trade unions
and employers* organisations were restricted.
(4) The "independent experts" consulted by the Commission
were in future to be chosen by the Council .
But the outcome of the clash marks not only an institutional
defeat for the Commission, it also marks the defeat of the
"harmonlsation for social progress" approach. As we shall see,
the Commission's work after 1966 has been increasingly economic
in nature.
It was, no doubt, almost inevitable that the social approach
should fail, not only because of the general deterioration of
relations between Council and Commission during this period, but
because it was too idealist in its conception. Changes in social
security systems cost a lot of money and they do not normally
come about simply because a Minister or his civil servants
suddenly perceive the most just or the most rational solution.
Rather, they are primarily the result of economic pressures,
which may come from either within or outside the country, or of
social pressures, which surely must come primarily from within
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the country. Social arguments arising from a comparison with
other countries may be very attractive, but they are unlikely to
be of any force unless supported by strong pressure from within
the country. As one civil servant in the DKSS put it recently,
"it's all very well and noble for the EEC and other international
organisations to ask us to raise our standards, but where is the
^ (66)
money to come from?"
The debate since 1966
It is, of course, a stark simplification to divide the
discussion on Articles 117, 113 into "before 1966" and "since 1966".
The rigid distinctions I make did not exist in reality. The
competition and social progress arguments continue to be advanced
after 1966, and the new policy which now emerges had already been
emerging for some time before the meeting in December 1966. Yet
it is clear that there is a change in the direction of the Com¬
mission's social policy, particularly with regard to social security,
in the late mid-'60s, and that the meeting of 19th December 1966 is
the most significant eveitin this process of change, and therefore
/ gy \
the most convenient way of dating the change . Further, the
dominant feature which characterises the debate before this date
is the clash between con^tition and social arguments, between
unions and employers' organisations, between Commission and Council;
the dominant feature of the debate after 1966 is the new technically
rational, macro-economic approach.
Before examining the new policy and its significance, it is as
well to remind oneself of the main thrust of the argument so far
and the questions it raises. The main argument is that, behind the
obvious clash between Commission and Council, there lay another
-55-
conflict, that between trade unions and employers or, more accurately,
a conflict between those who wanted to make use of harmonlsatlon as a
means of raising social security benefits and those who were opposed
to this. If this is correct, then the question arises whether the
fact that the clash between Commission and Council resulted In the
/ go \
subordination of the Commission to the wishes of the Council
means that the new policy will reflect the interests of those opposed
to using harmonlsation as a means of raising benefits, i.e. will the
new policy reflect the Interests of the employers, or will it be purely
"neutral"? If the discussion before 1966 was in reality a struggle
between unions and employers, who won? This is the first question to
ask in assessing the new policy. A second question which arises from
the discussion so far is: why did the tone of the debate change in 1966:
was it merely the result of the new relationship between Council and
Commission which was established after the Luxembourg agreement of
January 1966, or should it also be seen in relation to the changing
function of social security in the economic policy of the member States?
Is it sufficient to see the new policy simply as the outcome of a clash
between institutions, or can we relate it to more general social and
economic changes at this time? Thirdly, if the arguments presented so
far in favour of harmonisation were so unconvincing, why is social
security still a matter of serious Community concern? These are the
three main questions we will try to answer in the analysis which follows.
The debate before 1966 is seen often as a conflict between the
"economic" and the "social" concept of harmonisation. In these terms,
the new policy marks a return to the economic approach. But the
emphasis is not so much on the individual producer and his competitive
position, but on the welfare of the "econonjy" as a whole. The approach
is now a deliberate macro-economic one, the principal concern being the
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posltion of social security in the economy and its impact on economic
policy and development. Thus, the Commission has produced a number
of studies on the financing and on the economic impact of social
security, and its main task in this area at the moment is the ela¬
boration of a social budget, i.e. a medium-term forecast of the financial
development of the social security schemes of the member States
Whereas the original competition argument saw social security as
something negative, of relevance to integration only in so far as it
was a hindrance to be removed in order to clear the path of free comp¬
etition, the new approach is far more Keynesian: social security is of
interest because it can play an important part in economic policy and
because dcooomic policy is important for the EEC. Naturally, the
economic importance of social security was appreciated long before 1966.
At the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, it was declared that social
policy came within the framework of economic policy for the purposes
of Article 145, which gives the Council the task of ensuring the co¬
ordination of the general economic policies of the member States
But, for various reasons (the growing acceptance of economic planning at
national and at Community level, the growth of social security expend¬
iture, etc.)^71\ it was not until the mid-1960s that serious attention
(72)
was devoted to the problem .
The macro-economic approach is already implicit in the rejection of
the social approach to harmonisation. Against the demands, especially
the more extreme demands, of the trade unionists at the 1962 Conference,
the employers and those who supported their cause maintained that such
demands did not make economic sense, that the econorqy could not possibly
stand the greatly increased expenditure which would be involved. This is
especially so at the moment (the argument continues), when social
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security costs are already rising "spontaneously" at a dangerous
rate, far more quickly than the national income of the various
countries. If too much money is spent on social security benefits,
this will bring inflation and monetary instability, damage foreign
trade and lead to a recession^73^; it could also destroy wage
differentials and the incentive system upon which the market econoi^y
(74)
is based . The main problem of Community concern should be not the
inadequacy of benefits - which, after all, is the affair of the indivi¬
dual states - but the problem of rapidly rising costs, which threaten
to provoke, indeed are already provoking, disturbances in the economy
of the Community^73^. The Community harmonisation policy should con¬
centrate, not on upward alignment of benefits, which is economically
impossible and counterproductive, but on curbing the rise of social
security costs in the Community.
Here, the notion of harmonisation is being harnessed to arguments
which favour restricting the growth in social security costs (and
therefore benefits). This is the complete opposite of the view ad¬
vocated at the time by the Commission and the trade unions, for their
argument linked harmonisation with raising social security benefits
(and therefore costs).
The argument linking harmonisation with curbing the growth of
costs is put forward frequently, especially in the few years following
the 1962 Conference. Thus, Frisch, in an article written in 1965
with the interesting title, "Das System der sozialen Sicherung in
Frankreich - Vorbild fiir die Harmonisierung der Sozialpolitik In der
EWG?", describes the French system and commends it - or, to be more
accurate, the French employers' suggestion for the reform of the system -
as a possible model for harmonisation. He finishes ups
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"Jedenfalls sollte man mit alien Mitteln versuchen,
die sozlale Sicherung elnigermassen In Schranken
zu halten, damit sle nlcht die Gesellschaftsorduung
elnen auf die Dauer gewiss nlcht wOnschenswerten
kollektivistischen Sterne 1 aufdrtlckt"
Lell, in a book devoted to the topic, "Die soziale Hanaonisierung
in der EWG", explains that the trade unionists' demands of 1962
would lead to economic crisis and social impoverishment and argues
that harmonisation should take the form of the creation of a minimal
social insurance scheme, which would be supplemented by a system of
assistance for those in real need, the rest being left to private
initiative. One of the advantages of this scheme would be that it
(77)
would reduce the costs of social security .
That the problem is seen in terns of a struggle between the forces
which want the system of social protection to grow more quickly and
those forces which favour their restriction, emerges most clearly from
an article by Meenzen with the title, "Sind Nivellierung und Superburo-
(78)
kratie europSisches Schicksal?" . He vigorously condemns the Com¬
mission's policy and the unions' demands, and calls for a rallying of
the opposing forces. He concludes that for a proper social policy
it is necessary:
"nlcht nur in der Bundesrepublik, sondern in ganz
♦
Westeuropa jene Krafte zu mobilisieren, die es mit
jenen halten, die nicht eine Ausdehnung, sondern eine




This rallying-cry is taken up in an article in 1964 ' by
Meinhold, the most sophisticated and eloquent proponent of the
(81)
macro-economic approach . After pointing out that upward align¬
ment as demanded by the unions is not economically feasible, esp¬
ecially in view of the tendency of social security costs to rise
more rapidly than the national income, he points too to the fact
that in all the countries concerned there are forces opposed to
this tendency:
"Wir brauchen jedoch dabei nicht zu ubersehen, dass
es auch entgegengerichtete Tendenzen geben kann,
es gibt bekanntlich Krafte, und zwar - wenn in
verschiedenen Formen - iiber alle Parteien und
LSndergrenzen hinvveg, die darauf abzielen, bei
steigendem Wohistand die Zahl der von der Allgemeinheit
zu deckenden Risiken Oder mindestens den Anteil,
in dem sie gedeckt werden, zu reduzieren und damit
(82)
das Sozialbudget zu entlasten" .
rrhe more effective these forces are, the more economic room there
will be for harmonisation:
"der sehr enge Spielraum, der einer Harmonisierung
der Sozialsysteme im Sibne .hrer Annaherung von der
Verwendung des Sozialprodukts her gageben 1st, kann
in eben dem Masse ausgeweitet, das Verfahren einer
soltcrten Harmonisierung also beschleunigt werden, in
dem es gelingt, in der nationalen Eigendynamik Krafte
zu verstarken, die deren Tendenz nach oben abschw&chen
(83)
Oder gar aufheben" .
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Whereas Meenzen's rallying call seemed little more than a crude call
to battle in the defence of Individual freedom, Meinhold presents the
rallying of the same forces as the only course consistent with economic
rationality. But both urge the same point: the first concern of
Community social security policy should be with the problem of rising
costs.
Has this point of view been adopted by the Commission? If so,
then it means, not just the development, but the complete reversal of
its earlier policy. la this what the new socio-economic orientation
is really about? The tentative answer to this important question must
at this stage be: yes. The emerging perception of the rising costs of
social security as the major problem to be dealt with, rather than the
inadequacy of benefits, is not something that is self-evident, but
marks the adoption of a viewpoint much akin to that advanced by
Meinhold in 1964.
The argument is at first sight very obvious: all the countries
in the EEC now spend about 20% of their national income on social
security, and the proportion is rising rapidly. This is because of
rising medical costs, because the demographic structure, together with
such factors as rises in school leaving age, means that there are more
people receiving benefits, and because there is a natural tendency for
social legislation to be improved as new iaadequacles appear and as el¬
ections approach. It is felt that this rapid rise cannot be allowed
to continue, that the "econon\y" demands that the rise in costs be kept
under control.
But why is 20% such a crucial figure? Why was it not decided
when the proportion of national Income spent was 10% or 15% that the
trend could not be allowed to continue? Or rather, is it not the case
that, from the start of social insurance, there have always been those
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who argued that a rise in sociai expenditure could not be borne by
the econoiqy? Why is it then that first the governments of the member
states and then the Commission come to see this as a major problem in
the early and mid-1960s?
The answer has little to do with the magic figure of 20%: the
mere citing of such a figure tells us little about the social or
(84)
economic effects of the expenditure . The attempt to curb social
security can only be understood in relation to the economic dif¬
ficulties faced by the number States at this time. The changes in
the Commission's policy were preceded by national concern over the
rapid rise in costs.
There seems to have been a strong movement to limit social
(35 )
security in nearly all the countries of the Common Market in
the early 1960s. It was argued that the affluent society had made
such a high degree of social protection unnecessary, that it was
/ OA \
time to ask whether the "economic and psychological limit" of
the institution of social security had been reached. The fact that
the Federal Republic had a greater measure of social redistribution
than any comparable country failed to arouse the enthusiasm of the
CDU in 1965, for it was impossible to ignore the "Feststellung der
internationalen Wissenschaft ... dass die Uraverteilung von einem
.i (87 1
ganz bestiraraten Punkt an fragwurdig wird" .
Yet, for all this talk of the "affluent society", it was
becoming increasingly clear that there was still a great deal of
poverty in Germany, as in the other countries of Europe. The social
Inquiry (Sozialenquete) which had been commissioned by the government
and which published its report; in 1966, discovered that 14.3^ of
Germany's pensioners had a net income of less than 150DM per month,
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at a time when the existence minimum set by the federal assistance
law (Bundessozialhilfegesetz) had been fixed at 203DM per month.
The average pension received under the workers' pension scheme
(Arbeiterrentenversicherung) - under which 6 million people received
(88)
pensions - was slightly below the assistance level . An inquiry
in 196S^89^ found that in Stuttgart, said to be the richest city in
Germany, almost 5000 children in large families had no bed of their
own because the flats in which they lived were too small to take an-
(90)
other bed . In order to put the arguments on the limits of social
security and social redistribution in perspective, it is worth insisting
on the fact that poverty is a continuing problem in all the countries of
Europe. In France, it has been calculated that, with luck, the income
of more than two million pensioners may have actually reached half the
minimum wage, "c'est a dire la moitie d'un minimum tenu, par bypothese,
pour incompressible" by the end of the period covered by the Vlth Plan
(91)(1975) . In Britain there are about four million people living on
supplementary benefit at ar\y given time, a figure which is constantly
rising.
This being so, why is it urged that social redistribution must not
be allowed to go too far, that the main social needs have been satisfied?
The answer can be found only by seeing the attempt to curb social security
in relation to the general attempt to restrict labour costs by political
means, which in turn must be understood as a reaction to the economic
situation of the early and mid-60s.
This was a period of difficulty for the economies of most of the
member states; the long period of rapid growth enjoyed since the end
(92)
of the War showed signs of coming to an end " . Profits were falling,
a smaller share of the national Income was going to owners of capital
and the share going to wage and salary earners had risen. This latter
(93)
share is known as the wage quota . As usually measured, it includes
social security contributions (both employers' and employees') and
income tax, so that it is likely to reflect any rise in social security
(94)
expenditure . The rise of the wage quota was most marked in Germany.
(95)
Between 1950 and 1965, it rose from 59% to 65% but the rise after
1960 was particularly rapid^6^. This was largely the result of the
advent of full employment and the consequent strengthening of the
position of labour on the market: it was not until 1960, when the
number of vacancies exceeded the number of unemployed for the first
time, i.e. when demand first exceeded supply, that the wage quota per
(97 )
worker employed began to rise . Although Germany provides the most
striking example of the difficulties which followed the advent of full
(98) (99) (lOO)
employment, similar problems arose in France , Italy , Belgium
and the Netherlands^'0'^.
A rise in the wage quota, i.e. a rise in national labour costs,
threatens investment and economic growth for two main reasons.
Firstly, it mean® a rise in the proportion of the national
Income going to those who will consume rather than invest it. For
obvious reasons, wage earners are less likely to invest their money
productively than are the large owners of capital^'02^. This is
particularly true of social security benefits, the aim of which is
merely to satisfy the immediate needs of the recipients.
Secondly, it means that labour costs are rising more quickly
than productivity and that, consequently, profits are being squeezed.
This will make investment less attractive and could lead to a flight
of capital to other countries^'Oo^ as the investors seek more profitable
means of investing their capital. The consequence is unemployment, fall
(104)
in the rate of growth, crisis . This second and more important
reason why a rise in the wage quota is a threat to investment and growth
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is peculiar to capitalist economies, that is, to economies in which the
power of investment is divided among a large number of autonomous bodies,
each one impelled by the necessity, arising from competition, to invest
profitably^05^. Because the central power of decision is limited, the
question of social expenditure cannot be seen simply as a question of
dividing resources between consumption and investment. It is necessary
to make Investment attractive, i.e. to make conditions such that the
investor will find it more attractive (or at least as attractive) to
Invest in this rather than in another country. It is necessary,
therefore, for governments to compete with other governments in attract¬
ing investments. In so far, therefore, as the Common iVIarket lias made
capital movements easier, it will also have led to an intensification
of this competition, i.e. to an increase in the pressure on individual
governments to make investment attractive by keeping labour costs
(106)down .
Hence, it is necessary, in the interests of the economy, to
ensure that not too ranch of the national income is paid in wages and
salaries (direct and indirect); in other words, it is necessary to
restrict labour costs when they are rising too quickly, and thus to
restore the margin for profits. This means indeed, as the "Inter¬
nationale Wissenschaft" has seen, that the redistribution of social
wealth must not go too far, "dass die IJmverteilung von einem ganz
bestlnraten Punkt an fragwurdlg wird"^07^.
There are basically two ways of reducing the cost, i.e. the
market price of labour. The traditional way is to increase the supply
of labour relative to the demand. If there is no state intervention,
this should come about anyway; the fall in investment will cause un¬
employment and redress the balance of supply and demand. Another way
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of increasing the supply is to bring in foreign workers^08^. But
there are limits to the number of foreign workers that can be
imported, and, since the Second World War and especially (on the
Continent) since 1960, apy significant degree of unemployment has
become politically unacceptable and will jeopardise the life of the
(109)
government in power , The second way of restricting labour costs
is to try to depress the price below the market price, to influence the
normal process of wage bargaining by persuasion or by law^10^. This
is the function of an incomes policy^111
If an Incomes policy is necessary, then so also is the control of
indirect Incomes, i.e. of social security benefits. These benefits
form an important part of the income received by the worker, Just as
the costs form an important part of the labour costs of the employer.
It has been calculated that benefits make up about 20% of the dis¬
posable income of households in all the original member states^
The employers' contributions alone constitute between 10% and 30%
of the total mass of wages^113\ The importance of social security
benefits and contributions is such that any attempt to control labour
costs must aim at regulating not only direct wages but also the growth
of social security costs and benefits. Just as these benefits may be
seen as an indirect wage, so the attempt to control costs may be seen
as an indirect wages policy^
But there is an additional reason why social security costs should
be restricted, particularly when there is a tight labour market. Those
who argue that costs must be controlled, often speak not only of the
"economic" but of the "psychological" limit to the increase in social
protection, of the need to preserve Individual freedom, responsibility,
initiative^1,5^ or (more honestly) incentive^1The reality behind
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this fear for individual responsibility would seem to be an economic
one: especially where there is a shortage of labour, it is important
that social security benefits should not be developed to such an
extent that workers would be able to withdraw themselves for long
periods from the labour market and live on benefits.
Thus, we find similar developments in all the member states in
the early 1960s. A squeeze on profits leads to the introduction of
of an incomes policy and an attempt to control the growth of social
security. In the Federal Republic, the new economic situation
arising from full employment and a rapidly rising wage quota
compelled the gradual abandonment of the liberalism which had guided
economic policy in the 1950*s. However, the Government's policy was
too slow in changing: the calls to curb social security expenditure
were ineffective and the attempt to restrict wage increases by
appeals ("Seelenmassage") was unsuccessful. The Governments' failure
led to the recession of 1966-67 and its own downfall^ As part
of its measure to restore stability to the economy (i.e. to restore
profits, investment and growth), the new Government introduced a form
of incomes policy (the "Konzertierte Aktion"), cut back on social
security expenditure and set up a committee to work out a social
budget, which would serve as an instrument for controlling social
security costs^118\ In Italy too, partly as a result of the fall in
unemployment, wages and the wage quota rose sharply between 1961 and
1963. Although this was followed by a period of deflation, profits
were slow to recover. This, together with the Centre-Left govern¬
ment's unwillingness to accept increasing unemployment, led to the
attempt to include a wage policy in the first economic development
plan, covering the years 1966-1970.The first medium-term
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financial projections on the development of social security were also
included in the Plan^'20^. We find the same development in France:
the share of wages and salaries increased substantially in the early
1960's, and the planners, wishing to arrest this trend, introduced an
incomes policy within the context of the V Plan^21^ (1966-70),
(122)
Medium term social security planning was introduced at the same time
The tale in the Benelux countries is very similar^1
After about 1960, therefore, there is a shift in policy on
social security in all of the member states. There is a growing
concern with the need to limit the rise in social security costs in
the interests of the economy, with the need to plan these costs in
relation to the needs of the economy. This is part of the general
attempt to restrict and to plan labour costs, i.e. the incomes of
employed persons.
This development is reflected in the new Community policy which
has emerged since 1966. The Commission had referred to the problem of
(124)
rising costs before this date but it is only after this date that
the problem is linked with the possibility of Community action in this
field. It is in the Commission's report on the development of the
social situation in the Community in 1966, published in August 1967
(eight months after the meeting of the Council of December 1966), that
the link Is first made clear. The rise in social security costs ted,
the report maintains, posed a double problem: that of ensuring that the
growth in social expenditure was adapted to the possibilities of the
national economies, and that of deciding what proportion of the national
Income should be spent on social security, in view of other social
needs. The necessity is being increasingly felt, the report continues,
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of defining a policy of social transfers co-ordinated with economic
policy, and of re-thinking social policy in terms of present needs
considered in a certain order of priority. But there is a danger that
a purely national approach to these problems will lead to a false
(1 ^>5)
perspective ~ . Levi-Sandri, the member of the Commission responsible
for social affairs at that time, laid particular stress on this point
/ 1 ^
when he presented the report to the Parliament
The new orientation is shown even more clearly by Levi Sandrl's^27^
speech to the Parliament in March 1967. Although social advances already
achieved must be safeguarded, he said, it might be necessary for the
governments to take unpopular measures to restore financial equili¬
brium to the social security systems. However, the long terra problem
resulting from the rapid rise in expenditure could only be overcome by a
system of comprehensive economic and social planning, for it is only
within such a framework that restrictive iisaasures affecting social
security would be conceivable, because only thus could priority be
given to all needs and legitimate interests safeguarded. Previously,
social security had not really been seen properly in its economic
context, but now:
"Mais maintennant, une analyse econoraique plus poussee
s'impose pour determiner les marges disposables et la
repartition optimale de la croissance du revenu
national, notamraent entre le present et l'avenir,
/ 1 Oft \
c'est-a-dire entre la consolidation et les investisseiaents
en ayant clairement conscience que ce choix conditionne
l'avenir economique et social"^;.
Finally, it is worth quoting from the Social Report for 1971,
published in February 1972. The beginning of the chapter on social
security makes explicit the link between the "affluent society"
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argument and the European social budget which now constitutes the
Commission's principal work in this areas
"Social security has now evolved beyond the stage
of meeting the most vital needs and is reaching more
and more social groups for whom it ensures better and
better protection. Representing 20% of the Member
States' national revenue, it reaches such heights of
sophistication that the legitimacy of some of its
applications is disputed, either on grounds of economic
efficiency or even equity itself. It is therefore
important for social progress from now on to be made by
convergent efforts and to follow a definite programme.
In this spirit, the Commission at the request of the Council
has adopted, as one of its priorities, the creation of a
European Social Budget"
Thus the national attempts to curb the rise of social security
costs and to control their future development within the framework of
a plan are taken over at Conmunity level. This is the substance of
the Commission's new policy. That the control of social security
costs is seen as an essential part of incomes policy is clear from
the Commission's "Second Programme de Politique Economique a Moyen
Terme"^"'1^. The section on "Politique des transferts sociaux" is
part of the chapter on incomes policy. It is stressed here that:
"L'incidence economique et sociale des cotisations
et prestations sociales est d'une extreme importance
{13"?)
du- point de vue de la politique des revenus"
And again:
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"... la politique des revenus ne pent se desinteresser
du developpement des prestations sociales et des
modalites de leur financement^133
But the problem is so complex that it is put aside for further study
(I34)
within the framework of medium-term economic planning .
The new policy can perhaps be seen as an indirect consequence of
economic and political changes in the Federal Republic. It is from
there that the principal opposition to the Commission's old policy
came^^ and it is from there also that, after the change in govern¬
ment and in economic policy, the proposal for the establishment of a
(1 3G )
European social budget issued J . But to try to relate it too
closely with a change of government in one country would be to miss
the point. The change in the Commission's policy reflects a change in
attitude towards social security expenditure which was taking place in
all the member states, as a result of the economic developments of the
early 1960s
The Commission's new policy is in effect a complete reversal (not
merely a development) of its earlier policy. Whereas previously the
prime concern of harmonisation was the raising of benefits, now the
prime concern seems to be the restriction of costs. Should this be
seen as a victory for the employers over the trade unions? Certainly,
the Bund der Deutschen Arbeitgeber (BD\), the German employers'
association, welcomed in 1966 the fact that the Commission was starting
(138)
to pay attention to the macro-economic implications of social security
If it is to be seen as a victory for the employers, is this not simply a
victory for good sense over utopianism? Is it at all relevant to talk
in terms of a struggle between unions and employers when considering
the new policy? Is it not simply good sense to plan the development of
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social security and to see how much the nation can afford? Before
trying to answer these questions, I shall look raore closely at the
notion of social security planning, as it emerged in the member
states and was adopted by the Community.
As we have seen, the concern caused by the rapid rise in costs
led to more or less developed attempts in all the member states to
control the development of social security systems within the framework
(139)
of some sort of medium-term plan or forecast v . The function of
such plans would seem to be three-fold: to restrict or control the rise
in costs, to forecast costs and to provide a basis for calculations in
relation to anti-cyclical or conjunctural policy.
The relation between curbing the rise in costs and social
security planning or budgeting should already be clear. As Mackenroth
(140)
put it in his very influential article on "Die Reform der Sozial-
politik durch einen deutschen Sozialplan", a social plan would indicate
"wo mit der Anerkennung von Anspruchen Halt gemacht werden muss, well
die Wirtschaft das nicht raehr hergibt Oder well die Leistungseinkoraraen
zu stark beschnitten werden rallssten"^4' That social security
planning was introduced in order to restrict the growth of social
security expenditure does not, of course, mean that it cannot, in
certain circumstances be used by trade unions to press for higher
(,4?)
expenditure
That a second function of these plans is simply to forecast the
development of social security costs is equally obvious. This has a
certain significance quite apart from the fact that it provides a
basis for those seeking to restrict the growth of social security, and
again this significance derives from the economic developments of the
last quarter century. Increased technological complexity and the
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accelerated rate of technological innovation has led to the need for
large corporations to plan their investments on a medium or long term
basis. One of the elements involved in calculating the profitability
of investments is labour costsand one of the components of
(144)
labour costs is social security charges . For this reason it is
desirable, in the interests of balanced economic growth, that the
development of social security costs should be as predictable as
possible.
The third function of social security planning is related to its
possible use as an instrument of anti-cyclical and general economic
policy. Again it is not too difficult to trace the growing importance^'45^
of this aspect to general economic developments. It is due, on the one
hand, to the growing proportion of the national income spent on social
security, and, on the other, to the greater importance which economic
policy has assumed since about 1960. Since that time, the difficulties
experienced by the economy and the political commitment to a relatively
low rate of unemployment have led to more active government intervention
in the economy. A further factor which contributes to the renewed
interest in the economic impact of social security, is the fact that
entry into the Common Market has meant for the member states that some
of the traditional instruments of economic policy (for example, the
manipulation of tariffs, taxes, exchange rates) have become less
effective, more difficult or even impossible; and this process will
accelerate as the Community progresses towards full economic and
monetary union.
Social security is important for economic policy because it affects
the economy in a number of ways. As a component of labour costs, it has
an effect on prices (i.e. in so far as monetary and economic policy
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allows employers to pass rises in labour costs on to prices)^6^
and therefore on exports, the balance of payments and monetary
stability^117K We have seen already the effect it has, again as
an element of labour costs, on investment and growth. The way in
which schemes are financed, the extent to which funds are formed and
the way in which such funds are invested also have an important
bearing on general economic policy. The labour market may be strongly
influenced by the structure of social security benefits, for example
the age limits and conditions attached to family allowances and old
age pensions. Again, depending on how it is structured, a social
security scheme may have a favourable (i.e. weakening) or unfavourable
effect on the cyclical fluctuations of the econoiqy. Thus, benefits will
have an anti-cyclical effect in so far as they offset a drop in wages
and thus maintain consumption during a period of recession: this is
particularly true of unemployment benefits. During a period of boom,
the effect will also be anti-cyclical in so far as there is a reduction
in the number of persons supported by social security benefits. This
anti-cyclical effect is often annulled by the fact that benefits tend
(148)
to rise as wages rise, and are in fact very often tied to wages
Financing too, and the way in which funds are invested, may also have
a more or less anti-cyclical influence. The Comnission's study on the
"Economic Impact of Social Security" comes to the conclusion that,
generally, social security has a mainly pro-cyclical effect during
lengthy boom periods, but a mainly anti-cyclical effect during periods
(149)
of recession *" . While pointing out the impossibility and undesir-
ability of structuring social security schemes merely to meet the
requirements of short-term economic policy, the study none the less
emphasises "that the possibilities in this field have not yet been
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exhausted" ^ and quotes with approval^'the conclusion of
the German Sozialenquete:
"Wo irgend moglich, sollte man versuchen, die
Sozialpolitik innerhaib der von ihren Zielen gesetzten
Grenzen auch konjunkturpolitisch zu orientieren"^'^'?^
It is clear, then, that no active economic policy can afford to
ignore the development of social security schemes, and that their
economic significance extends beyond their importance in relation to
incomes policy.
If these points explain the emergence of social security planning
at the national level, they should also help us to understand wi\y,
after all these years, the question of a European social security policy
is still a serious issue: it is still a serious issue because the control
of the development of social security is essential for an effective
economic policy; because, with the enmeshing of the national economies
as a result of the creation of a common market, national economic
policy has become more difficult, less effective and more susceptible
to disturbances in other member states; and because, for this reason,
the establishment of a common economic and monetary policy is one of
the prime aims of the Comnunity^ . As this aim comes closer to ful¬
filment, so the establishment of some sort of Community policy on
social security will become more and more necessary.
It is now possible to see the Comnission's new approach in pers¬
pective. Since 1966, its work in this field has been mainly economic:
(154)
it has published a number of interesting studies on the economic
(155)
and financial aspects of social security. Since 1970 its main
work^156^ has been on the establishment of a European social budget
which would give statistics on the receipts and expenditure of the
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different social security schemes and would also contain medium-term
forecasts based on existing legislation and taking into account a
certain number of parameters-demographic developments, evolution of
(157)
prices and wages, of the GJiP etc. . It can be seen that this
interesting work, and the Commission's emphasis on the problem of the
"limits of social security" and the need for a "European perspective",
forms part of a more general reaction to the economic difficulties
experienced by the member states since the early 1960s^158^.
The question remains whether this reaction, and particularly what
I take to be its sore important feature, the attempt to curb or "control"
the rise in social security costs, is a necessary reaction. Whereas it
is fairly clear in the early debate that each side is pressing its own
interests, the new policy is advocated, not because it serves anyone's
interests, but because it is the "rational" thing to do, the only way
to satisfy the needs of the economy, and therefore the interests of
everybodty. Is this the case? In particular, has a limit to the
growth of social security been reached?
The first point to be made is that a rise in social security costs
does not necessarily lead to a rise in total labour costs. On the
contrary, it seems that the rise in the proportion of the national
income spent on social security has been accompanied by a corresponding
fall in the proportion spent on direct wages. In other words, a rise
in social security costs does not necessarily lead to a rise in the wage
(159) ,
quota (which, as we have seen, covers almost all the costs of
(1 BO)
social security) . This has led Montes to quote one of his comrades
to the affect that:
"la securitd' sociale a dttf avant tout une victoire
de la classe ouvri^re, sur elle-meme"^16'K
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There is thus no reason why a rise in sociai security expenditure
(16? )
shouid automatically lead to a fall in investment. Meinhold
argues that, with a constant wage quota, any significant increase
in benefits would mean that taxes and/or contributions would have
to be raised to such an extent that either the net income of the
lowest paid would sink to an intolerable level, or the range of net
incomes of employed persons would be so compressed that incentive, the
differentiation of incomes according to achievement ("eine der grundle-
/ J ^7 \
genden Voraussetzungen unserer marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung")
would be threatened. This seems to be exaggerated: it would take
an enormous increase in social security expenditure before any major
inroad was made into income differentials. Where the wage quota is
constant, then, as long as there is admittedly widespread poverty
among pensioners, there is no obvious reason why one should say that
there is a limit to the proportion of total wages received by the
worker in the form of social security benefits (i.e. as indirect,
"deferred" or "socialised" wages).
Where, however, the situation on the labour market is such that
the rise in social security costs contributes to a rise in the wage
quota, as was the case in the early 1960s, then the question raised is
a different one: is there a limit to social redistribution of income?.
Is it economically necessary that the proportion of national income
which goes to wage-and salary-earners should be limited to about 60%
in order that the proportion going to the much smaller number of
capital owners should be sufficient to make it attractive for them to
invest their property? It seems that there is indeed some limit to
social redistribution here: any significant rise in the wage quota
is likely to cause a fall in the profits of private investors: this
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would lead to a flight or withdrawal of capital, unemployment and
crisisThis is true, of course,only so long as the decision
whether and where to invest is in the power of a large number of
autonomous bodies, all impelled by the necessity to invest profitably.
This leads to the final point to be made here: the argument in
favour of limiting labour costs is rational, the policy followed is
economically necessary, only within the framework of the capitalist
economic system. The limits to social redistribution mentioned above
are not absolute limits, they are the limits only within a capitalist
economy. That these limits exist in a society in which there is great
material inequality, suggests that the argument establishing these
limits is rational only within a framework of profound irrationality.
It is within this context that the victory of the employers* "economic
good sense" over the "utopian" demands of the trade unionists must be
seen.
Effects and Implications
After the Paris Summit meeting of October 1972, a pre-election
meeting^165^ which, according to Ribas, marked "la relance de la
politique sociale de la Commanaute", it is still possible to discern
both the social and the economic arguments for a European social
security policy.
The social approach was urged at this meeting in particular by
( 1 fifi \
Herr Brandt . With regard to social security he proposed the
elaboration of basic principles which would serve as a basis for
Comrmmity development and the gradual approximation of the social
policies of the member States. The European policy he said, should
guarantee similar levels of protection to the inhabitants of all the
countries of the Community^167^. And yet, despite the fine words
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spoken at the Paris summit, the experience of the last fifteen years
suggests that social arguments have little to do with the creation
of a European social policy. The political variation of the social
approach, i.e. the argument that the Community laust find a "human
face" if it is to attract the support of the people, is more con¬
vincing; the more so as it is put forward not only by the
Conmission but also by the governments, now more committed to European
integration and conscious of its lack of popularity. Thus, M. Messmer,
the French Prime Minister, speaking of the bad impression which people
have of the Community, said that it was necessary to:
"dementlr cette impression en assignant a la
construction europeenne des objectifs de nature
a entratner l'adhesion populaire".
This does not refer specifically to social security; topics such as
regional policy, "participation" and "job enrichment" are possibly
more suitable for changing the image of the Community. The Commission's
(168 )
current Social Action Programme contains only four proposals which
fall within our area: to continue work on the Social Budget and on the
elaboration of social indicators and to promote the "dynamisation" of
pensions and the extension of social security protection to the whole
population. Of these four, only the last can be said to fall squarely
within the "social" approach; and it is unlikely that that will have
very much influence on the rate at which social security protection
is extended. While not wanting to dismiss the social approach as
entirely without influence, I would suggest that the economic argument
for a European social policy remains the only serious one, and that
only where there is some economic force behind the "social" proposal
has the latter much chance of success.
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Although It was the "social face" which was emphasised at the
Paris summit, the economic approach was given more weight at the
subsequent meeting in the Council of Ministers of Social Affairs,
on 9th November 1972. The statement by M. Faure, the French
Minister of Social Affairs, is particularly illuminating. He
based the need for a European social policy on three points: the
need to reconcile competitivity and social progress, the growing
internationalisation of centres of economic decision and, thirdly:
"L*union £conomique et moneftaire ne pourra fonctionner
sans une politique sociale, car 1'evolution des revenue.
des coQts salariaux, de ltensemble des charges sociales
des entreprises est au coeur du probleme de la politique
economique et monetaire comme de la politique sociale;
elle commande largement Involution des prix ... Les
depenses de security sociale atteignent desormais des
montants proches de celul du Budget de l*F.tat et ex-
ercent sur l*equlllbi:e economique et monetaire une
influence comparable a celle du Budget"
The significance of this and the seriousness of the new approach to
a European social policy is underlined by a complete volt-face
on the member States* earlier bitter insistence on their sovereignty
in matters of social policy:
"Des lors qu'lls constituent une partie d'un
marche unique, les Etats perdent en fait ^auto¬
nomic de leur politique sociale".^170^
The degree of harmonisation of social security policies so far
achieved has been slight. As was seen in the last chapter, the
Commission has succeeded in issuing only two recommendations, both of
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them on industrial diseases. Yet, despite the limited scope and
evident usefulness of these recommendations, their acceptance by the
member States has been only gradual and partial^171^. These are
the only formal acts which have been issued in relation to general
social security policy.
Yet it may be - and often is^17' ^ - argued that a certain degree
of "harmonisation" has come about "spontaneously", i.e. as the result
of a heightened awareness of common problems induced by contact within
the framework of the Community and by the interesting studies published
by the Comaission, and as a result of the functioning of the Common
Market. One example often quoted is the fact that many of the member
States have taken measures in the last ten years to deal with the
problems of handicapped children. Another example, quoted more
frequently than any other, is the fact that in 1958 the proportion
of the national incomes spent on social security varied between 12$ and
18$ in the various member States, whereas by 1968, the gap had been
reduced from 6$ to 3$, the proportions then varying between about
20$ and 23$*173*.
Perhaps the weakness of these examples, particularly of the
latter, illustrate best the limited effect which the EEC has so far
had on the development of social security systems. Quite apart from
the fact that, as a result of developments in the Netherlands, the
proportions have begun to diverge again since 1968^these figures
( 17 ^ ^
tell us, as Mannoury points out , no more about the social or
economic effect of social security systems than the fact that a man
spends a given percentage of his income by cheque tells us about the
effects of his expenditure. Important divergences between the systems
have remained or even increased. The most obvious example is that of
the major reforms in the Dutch system during the late 1950s and the
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1960s, reforms which made the Dutch system resemble British arid
Scandinavian models more than those of the other member States^
Nor is there any evidence that reform plans in any of the member States
take much account of developments in other countries^177\
Yet, harmonisation of social security policies is a serious topic.
Firstly, there is some truth in the argument that the mere functioning
of the Common Market will lead to some degree of "spontaneous" harmon¬
isation. The development of social security is closely related to the
development of the economy and of economic policy. The functioning of a
Common Market will tend to create similar economic problems in all the
member States and, in so far as social security systems develop in
reaction to economic problems, similar trends may appear: hence, for
example, the coiwnon concern in the 1960*s with the rise in costs and
the introduction of social planning. It would, however, be too much
to expect that reactions to similar problems would always be the
same.
Secondly - and this has been one of the main theoies of this
chapter - the establishment of a European social security policy will
become more and more important as economic integration progresses.
It is the establishment of a European policy which is necessary rather
(178)
than the harmonisation of the various systems . As Meinhold
pointed out(179), the harmonisation of benefits would create precisely
those disturbances which a European policy should aim to avoid.
What would be more important, in the interests of monetary stability,
would be to harmonise the general rhythm of development of the various
systems, i.e. in effect to maintain existing disparities. This is what
M. Faure said in the Council meeting of 9th November 1972:
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"... le but a atteindre n'est pas d*aboutir a 1 'unifomlte'
sociale au sein de la CEE', mais d*avolr un rythme de
progres relatlvement comparable sous reserve de redulre
(180 )
un peu les distorsions excessives" .
What would be the most Important would be to be able to control
at Community level the development of social security in the various
parts of the Community, in order to co-ordinate that development with
economic and monetary policy.
Beyond saying that, for economic reasons, there is an increasing
need for the control of social security development to be established
at Community level, it is very difficult to predict what the effects
of a Community policy might be^18^. The mere fact that the most
convincing arguments for the establishment of a European policy are
economic arguments, does not, of course, mean that all sorts of social
and political forces will not come into play in the formation of such
a policy. Yet the discussion so far suggests that such a policy would
be more concerned with the financial side of social security (funding,
investment, contributions, structure, etc.) than with benefits, that
its effects would be mainly restrictive, and that, although important,






Harmonisation: Law and its Social Function
In the last two chapters we have surveyed in immediate and
unrelated juxtaposition the legal and political arguments sur¬
rounding Articles 117 and 118 concerning the harmonisation of
social security. The legal argument centred around the extent of
the rights and duties of the Community institutions and of the
member states under the provisions of the Treaty. The political
argument focused on the question of the necessity and purpose of
harmonisation. Behind the political debate, a clash of various
interests could be discerned: on the first level, a clash oetween
Commission and Council and, behind that again, a clash between trade
unions and employers. This clash resulted in what amounted to a
victory for the Council and for the employers and in the emergence
of a new concept of harmonisation.
It Is time now to attempt to relate these two debates, to relate
the legal argument to the political argument, the conflict of legal
opinion to the conflict of interests which we have outlined. What
influence has the political conflict of interests had on the legal
argument and on the legal interpretation of Articles 117 and 118?
What Influence has the legal form provided by these and the other
articles of the Treaty had on the political conflict? The aim of
this chapter is to look at each of these questions in turn.
That the particular content of Articles 117 and 118 is the
outcome of a political dispute is universally recognised. Article
117 is, as Wohlfarth says, "eine typische Kompromissformel"^; it
represents a compromise, not just between different concepts of the
economic significance of social security, but between the material
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(2)
interests of French and German producers . This is hardly
surprising: the creation of a law, the act of legislation, is always
the outcome of a political debate, a political conflict. The interesting
question is whether political conflict stops there, halts, so to
speak, at the gates of the legal domain, leaving the arguments within
that domain to the disinterested reasoning of lawyers. Does the act
of legislation, in other words, create a sphere which is autonomous,
or do the political conflicts which lie behind the act of legislation
continue to permeate the interpretation of the measure enacted?
Is it possible to distinguish a separate sphere of disinterested legal
argument, or is the legal debate which we examined in chapter two
merely a means of conducting, in a particular language, the political
debate which was examined in chapter three? How is the legal argument
that the Treaty provides no basis for Community action related to the
political argument that such action is undesirable? And what link
exists between the broad interpretation of Articles 117 and 118 and
the views of those who, like the Commission and the trade unions,
saw Community action in this area as being in their interest?
There are two levels on which a link can be seen between the
legal argument and the political debate. Firstly, it is clear that
groups, in putting forward their particular interests, often seek
to strengthen their argument by giving it a legal justification.
This is perhaps characteristic of the EEC: arguments often take
place, not with reference to the "national interest" as in national
political debate but with reference to the provisions or the aims of
the Treaty. Such a tendency is certainly evident in the debate sur¬
rounding the harmonisation of social security. Broadly speaking,
those who favoured harmonisation (principally the Commission and the
trade unions) generally complemented this view with a broad inter-
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pretation of Articles 117 and 118, while those who urged caution
often bolstered their arguments with a narrow interpretation of the
Treaty provisions.
Thus, the Commission consistently put forward the broad inter¬
pretation described in Chapter ?, maintaining that Articles 117 and
118 established a legal basis for a Conaminity social policy, that
Article 118 gave the Commission a right of initiative and that the
member states were bound to co-operate with it, that harmonisation
meant "social harmonisation", that other articles of the Treaty could
be used in support of this objective, etc.^
The same interpretation, although less forcefully expressed,
is used by many trade unionists in putting forward their claims.
Thus Veillon prefaces his controversial report to the European
Conference on Social Security with some coranents on "^interpretation
(4)
des textes" . Cannella, in his co-report supporting the arguments
of Veillon, also includes at the beginning of his report a section
on the "fondement juridique de l'harmonisation sociale" which leads
him to the conclusion that:
"l*harmonisation sociale ... possede un fondement juridique
particulier qui est constitue par les dispositions combinees
des articles 117 et 118 du Traite, puisque l*etroite
collaboration entre les etats merabres dans le domaine
social, prevue par lfarticle 118, n*a pas de sens si elle
n'aboutit pas a l'objectif consistent a r^aliser
l'amelioration des conditions de vie et de travail de la
(5)
main d*oeuvre grSce a l*harmonisation sociale"
Kulakowski, pronouncing the closing discourse on behalf of the trade
union delegates to the Conference presents a similar legal inter¬
pretation of Articles 117 and 118^.
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The employers' organisations, not surprisingly, favour the
more restrictive interpretation of the Treaty provisions. Seffen,
the most explicit and persistent spokesman for the interests of the
German employers continually attacks the broad interpretation
of Articles 117 and 118 in his articles in the "Deutsche Versicher-
ungszeitschrift". In his view, the member states retain exclusive
competence in the area of social security, the harmonisation
mentioned in Article 117 was intended to come about automatically
and Articles 100 - 102 cannot be used to pursue a social policy:
in short, the Treaty provides no legal basis for the harmonisation
of social security:
"Die Sozialvorschriften des EWG-Vertrages sind also,
entgegen der Meinung der EWG-Organe, durchaus nicht
unprSzise, sondern vielmehr sehr pr&zise sogar
(8)
in der Bergrenzung der E»VG-Zust8ndigheiten und Befugnisse"
(9)The governments , more particularly the German government,
adopted the same approach. At the European Conference, only two
representatives of the governments of the member states spoke,
both of them representatives of the German government, Knolle
and Schwarz. Both interventions did little more than reiterate
the narrow interpretation of Articles 117 and 118. It is worth
recording the force with which Schwarz put forward this interpretation:
"Le traite instituant la CEE ne continnt nulle part
1'obligation de proceder ei une harmonisation dans le
domaine social, merne pas dans le domaine de la securite'
sociale. II part de l'hypoth^se que les etats qui
s,unissent pour constituer une conmunaute' economique
restent autonomes. Dans ces conditions ... il n'existe,
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d,apr^s le Traite, aucune politique sociale "coniaune"
ou "communautaire". Aussi la Commission de la CEE
n'est-elle pas habilit/e a forrauler des propositions
et le conseil de la CEE n*est-il pas autoris^ a
arr£ter dans ce domaine des reglementations obligatoires^10^.
This interpretation of the Treaty is consistent with the refusal of
the member states, in the two years preceding the compromise of 1966,
to co-operate with the Commission in the social domain.
This small sample gives some indication of the way in which
legal arguments concerning the interpretation of the Treaty
provisions were used to strengthen political arguments and to weaken
the arguments of the opponents. This is the first link between the
legal arguments and the political interests involved: the different
interests use different legal arguments to support their case. The
peculiar authority of the legal arguments derives, in part at least,
from the notion that there is a separate sphere of legal argument
above the competing interests, an impartial tribunal of legal reasoning
to which the parties appeal in support of their case. In the absence
of judicial intervention - and there has never been any question of that
in this context - such a "tribunal" must in practice be "la doctrine",
a body of independent legal analysis.
In this particular case, however, the "doctrine" is very difficult
to define. This is so because of the second level on which a link
exists between the legal argument and the political conflict: interest
groups not only make use of pre-existing legal arguments, they also
create their own legal arguments to justify their political views.
In these cases the legal interpretations are presumably devised to
attain a particular end. This is certainly the view of Seffen, who,
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particularly in his article entitled "Der Pragmatisraus in der
Rechtsauffassung der EWG-Organe zur Harraonisierung der EuropSischen
Sozialpolitik"^11 \ accuses the Commission of concocting interpretations
in order to give itself more room to pursue its expansionist policies*
It is indeed one of Seffen's merits that he documents the Commission's
inventiveness in this respect.
It may be argued, however, that there is an important distinction
to be made here between the legal argument put forward by spokesmen
for particular interests who adapt or invent the argument specifi¬
cally to forward their own ends, and "la doctrine" stricto sensu,
the body of legal analysis elaborated by lawyers with no direct
interest in the outcome of the issue. In practice, however, the
distinction is difficult to make in this particular area. The line
between "la doctrine", the sphere of legal argument on the one hand,
and the advancement of particular interests in legal form on the
other, is extremely blurried. Interest groups, just as they use
legal arguments to give weight to their claims, also express those
arguments in legal text books. This is most strikingly exemplified
by Groeben-Boekh and Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi. It was seen in
chapter two that these two works typify respectively the narrow and
the broad interpretations of Articles 117 and 118. In neither of
these books, however, did the editors write the sections on the
social provisions of the Treaty. In the case of Groeben-Boekh,
the author of the relevant section was Knolle, who, as we have Just
seen, presented the interpretation of the German government at the
Conference of 1962} in the case of Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi, the
author was none other than Levi Sandrl, at that time member of the
(1 •>)
Commission responsible for social affairs . There is nothing
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illegitimate in this, but it does illustrate the difficulty of drawing
any clear line between legal argument and political debate, at least
in this area.
That this is true in this particular area of law does not, of
course, mean that it is true of all areas of law. The area being
studied in this part of the thesis has several distinctive features:
the relationship between political interests and legal conclusions is
particularly transparent; the legal provisions are general, vague and
relatively simple; the nature of the subject matter is such that few
write about it apart from those actively involved in the political
dispute. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that legal
argument becomes merged with political conflict. Political positions
are put forward in legal terse and legal arguments are almost invari¬
ably consciously linked with particular political positions. Although
the legal argument derives much of its authority from its air of
impartial neutrality, from its supposed origins in an extra-political
sphere, this separate sphere tends, in fact, to vanish on close
inspection.
As a corollary to this link between legal dispute and political
conflict, one might expect that the legal interpretation of the
disputed provision might be affected by the issue of the political
conflict, even although no formal change has been made in the provision
being interpreted. That this is so is suggested by one of the more
recent legal commentaries, Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat. In the
opening paragraph of the section devoted to the social provisions of the
Treaty, the authors point to the recent trend, "dat men de social©
politiek mede als integrerend bestanddeel van de economische politiek
(13)
is gaan zien" . And when they come to the detailed analysis of the
second paragraph of Article 117, they draw the appropriate conclusions:
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"Blj'de in het verdrag bepaalde procedures* zal men o.i.
mede kunnen en moeten denken aan de procedures tot
coOrdinatie van de economische politiek, waarvan de
basis is vastgelegd in de artlkelen 105 en 145 en aan
de andere bevoegdheden op economisch gebied ... Wij
wezen er reeds op, dat de praktijk sinds enkele jaren
(14)
in deze richting gaat .
This is an interpretation which not only was not suggested by ai\y
legal commentator ten or more years ago, but which would have been
surprising if it had been put forward in the early years of the
Community, simply because no one then presented harmonisation of
social security as an element in the co-ordination of economic
policies.
Perhaps it is possible now to answer a little more precisely the
question: what influence has the political conflict of interests had
on the legal argument and on the legal interpretation of Articles 117
and 118? A number of propositions may be ventured. In the period
before 1966 the conflict of political interests was accompanied by
a sharp controversy concerning the legal interpretation of Articles
117 and 118. In the political debate, both sides made use of legal
arguments to strengthen their case: the Commission and the trade unions
put forward the "broad" interpretation of these articles, the employers
and the governments insisted on the narrow interpretation. Very often
the legal arguments were not only used but also developed or invented
by the parties to the dispute in order to forward their own interests:
this can be discerned not only where the interpretation is put forward
in the name of, or in a polemical article on behalf of, one of the
parties to the political dispute, but also in the case of at least
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two of the legal commentaries on the EEC Treaty, those edited by
Groeben-Boekh and by Quadri et al, Even where there is little
obvious evidence of a subjective, conscious link between a particular
political interest and a particular legal analysis, it can be observed
that, objectively, a piece of legal analysis may serve the interests
of a particular group. In the period since 1966, the easing of
political conflict as a result of the Veldkamp compromise and the
emergence of a new policy towards harmonisation has been reflected
in an apparent slackening of legal controversy and in a new, more
economic interpretation of certain provisions of Article 117,
It should now be quite clear how unsatisfactory it is to
attempt, as was done in chapter two, to analyse Articles 117 and
118 and their interpretation by "la doctrine** in a formal and a-
historical fashion. Not only does such an analysis conceal from
view the conflict of social forces which has surrounded the inter¬
pretation and application of these articles and which provides the
key to their development, but it is also unsatisfactory from the
point of view of trying to reach some legal conclusion as to the
meaning of these articles and the rights and obligations of the
parties under them. Although it is the same legal provisions which
are being interpreted in each case, it would be misleading simply
to place, say, the arguments of Groeben-Boekh or of Quadri et al,
beside those of Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat, Because of the course
taken by the political conflict, the arguments of Groeben-Boekh and
Quadri et al (both of which date from the early years of the Community)
do not have the same legal relevance any more: if one is looking for a
legal basis for the sort of action that the Council is likely to take
in relation to the harmonisation of social security, then probably
-92-
Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat*s reference to Articles t05 and 145
(and they might also have mentioned Article 103) would be the most
fruitful line to follow.
So far we have looked only at the influence of the political
conflict on the legal interpretation of the Treaty provisions. It
is equally pertinent to ask what influence the legal provisions have
&ad on the conflict of interests. In the last chapter the outcome
of the conflict and the new trend in policy were explained as the
result of the balance of political and economic forces: it does not
seem that the legal provisions had very much influence on this out¬
come. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the law had no
influence on the political debate.
In the first place, it can be argued that it was the law which
created the political conflict. True, the dispute between those
who argued that the harmonisation of social security was a necessary
part of the creation of a common market and those who argued that it was
not existed before the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, but it is
very doubtful whether the dispute would have continued, at least in
the acute and peculiar form which it took, if the compromise
enshrined in Articles 117 and 118 had been omitted from the Treaty,
or indeed if those articles had not been framed in such a loose and
contradictory manner. Perhaps one can say that Articles 117 and 118
created the ring in which the fight could take place, and indeed
almost pushed the fighters into that ring. These articles, together
with the other provisions of the Treaty, determined the limits of
the political conflict: the ambiguity of the provisions and legal
ingenuity made these limits very vague, but, although the Commission
might argue that the provisions of the Treaty should be changed, it
could not, nevertheless, go beyond the limits set by the Treaty.
Secondly, the law influenced the style of the political conflict.
As was seen above, the parties often couched their interests in legal
language. If the metaphor used in the last paragraph is stretched,
it might be said that the law not only creates the ring for the
fighters but also fixes, in part, the rules according to which the
fighters must fight. But there is little evidence that it had much
effect on the result of the contest.
In conclusion, it may be said that the relationship between
the legal interpretation of Articles 117 and 118 and the political
conflict surrounding the notion of harmonisatlon is a two-way relation¬
ship. The political conflict had a very important influence on the
form of the legal controversy, but the content of Articles 117 and 118,
that which existed for interpretation, had a not insignificant effect
on the political conflict. It will not do to reduce the legal inter¬
pretations to a mere reflection of the political debate, without any
autonomous significance: the legal arguments could be manipulated for
political ends, but only within certain limits.
What has been said about the relationship between the inter¬
pretation of Articles 117 and 118 and the political conflict which
has surrounded them is not, of course, necessarily true of ail legal
provisions. These articles are particularly vague and open-ended In
their nature, one might say particularly "political". This must be
borne in mind when we come to consider the abstruse legal techni¬
calities of some of the provisions concerning the co-ordination of







1. International Law relating to the Co-ordination of
Social Security Systems 95
A. The problems of providing social security for migrant
workers: 96
(i) Nationality restrictions 97
(ii) Conservation of acquired rights 99
(iii) Conservation of rights in the process of being
acquired 102
(iv) Choice of iaw 103
B. Solution of problems by Treaty 104
(i) Development of international social security law 104
(ii) Principles adopted by social security treaties 107
(a) Equal treatment of nationals 107
(b) Conservation of acquired rights 108
(c) Conservation of rights in the process of being
acquired 110
(d) Choice of law 113
(e) Multilateral treaties 113
C. Conclusion 115
2. Regulation No. 3: Origin, Structure and Principles 116
A. Origin 116
B. Structure and Function 119
C. Principles 120
(i) Scope of application 121
(ii) Equality of treatment 122
(iii) Conservation of acquired rights 122
(iv) Conservation of rights in the process of being
acquired 124
Page No.
(v) Choice of law 125
(vi) Problems relating to nultilateral conventions 125
(vii) Administrative and jurisdictional arrangements 126
D. Conclusion 127
3. The Judicial Interpretation of Regulation No, 3. 128
A. The Court of Justice 129
(i) The aims of Regulation No. 3. 130
(XI) The balance between Community and national law 138
(a) Definition of the proper spheres of Community
Law and national law 139
(b) Overlapping of Community and national law 141
- Conflict 141
- Simultaneous application 142
- Option between Community and national law 144
(c) Division of legislative competence between the
Community and the Member States 144
- Direct applicability of Article 52,
Regulation No. 3 145
- Unilateral amendment of the scope of
Community law by the member states 146
(XXX) Effect of the Court's interpretation 149
(a) Scope of Application 149
(b) Equality of Treatment 157
(c) Conservation of Acquired Rights 158
(d) Conservation of Rights in the Process of being
acquired 159
(e) Choice of Law 175
(iv) Conclusion 176
Page No.
B. The National Courts 178
(i) Introduction 178
(ii) Interpretation of certain articles by the
national courts 180
(a) Articles 27, 28. 180
(b) Article 4 184
(c) Article 12 186
(iii) Regulation No. 3 before Courts of last instance 187
(iv) Conclusion: Functioning of Article 177 with
regard to Regulation No. 3. 188
C. Conclusion: Interpretation of the social security
regulations by the courts of the European Communities 192
4. Revision of the Social Security Regulations:
Regulation No. 1408/71 196
A. Scope of Application of the Regulation 199
B. Equality of treatment 200
C. Conservation of Acquired Rights 201
D. Conservation of rights in the process of being acquired 203
F. Choice of Law 205
F. Relation with bilateral treaties 206
G. Administrative arrangements 206
H. Conclusion 207
Appendix 1. Social Security Cases dealt with by the
Court of Justice 335
Appendix 2. Selectrlve List of Regulation No. 3 cases
dealt with by national courts 340
Appendix 3. Extracts from Regulation No. 3 and




The law relating to the co-ordination of social security In the
EEC differs In almost every respect from the law relating to harmon-
isation. The provisions of Articles 117 and 118 do not form a
closed legal system: their interpretation and application cannot be
separated from the political and economic issues which they raise.
There is, as we have seen, a fairly direct link between their inter¬
pretation and the conflict of ideas and interests which surround them.
Moreover, they do not give rise to any individual rights, they have
not formed the basis of any binding legal acts and they have not been
the object of any legal decision. In terras of strictly legal analysis,
they do not offer a great deal of interest.
A very different picture is presented by the law on the co-ord¬
ination of social security. This is the true realm of the specialist
lawyer^: hundreds of pages of regulations, hundreds of court
decisions, a large and complex domain of rights and obligations, not
related in any obvious or direct way to political considerations.
Whereas the attempt to analyse Articles 117 and 118 in purely legal
terms is artificial, since one is constantly confronted by questions
concerning the purpose of harmonisation or the economic effect of
social security, a legal analysis of Article 51 and the regulations
made thereunder is essential if one is to understand their develop¬
ment.
The analysis of the legal provisions of Article 51 and its
regulations presents a certain interest for a number of reasons.
These regulations (especially Regulation No. 5 and Regulation
No. 1408/71 which has now replaced Regulation No. 3) probably
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directly affect more individuals than any other Community regulation*
(2)
About two million people benefit each year from their application ,
and this involves the annual transfer of hundreds of millions of
dollars^. Although these regulations have not attracted a great
deal of attention from legal conmentators, they have nevertheless
been one of the main sources of litigation in Community law.
Regulation No. 3 has been the subject of no fewer than fifty
decisions by the European Court of Justice and of well over two
hundred decisions by national courts*
In order to understand the principles of Regulation No* 3 and
Regulation No. 1408/71 and the difficulties of interpretation which
have arisen, it is essential to look first at the difficulties which
migrants are likely to encounter in relation to social security, and
at the way in which these problems have traditionally been solved by
international treaty. The first section of the chapter will therefore
sketch the problems and principles of the international law relating
to the co-ordination of social security. The second section will
examine the development of these principles by Regulation No. 3, and
this will be followed by a section devoted to an analysis of the
courts* interpretation of Regulation No. 3. A fourth section will
deal with the revision of Regulation No. 3 and the changes introduced
by Regulation No. 1408/71.
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1 * International Law relating to the Co-ordination of Social
Security Systems
A. The Problems of providing Social Security for Migrant Workers
Not surprisingly, the problem of providing social security for
migrant workers is one which has grown with social security it3elf
since the end of the last century.
It is not so much the cases of conscious discrimination against
foreigners which create these problems and make their solution
difficult. More often the difficulties arise from the fact that the
social security schemes have been devised primarily for the large
majority of people sensible enough to stay at home and work in their
own country, so that the migrant is, in a 3ense, a deviant who does
not easily fit into the pattern. Thus, a migrant coming to work in
France, say, will find not only that he is not admitted to certain
social security benefits, such as the 'allocation aux vieux travaill-
eurs salaries* (AVTS), the 'allocation temporaire aux vieux' or the
'allocation de maternite', all of which require that the beneficiary
(4)
(or her child in the last case) be of French nationality ; he will
also find himself faced by restrictions which, although not based on
nationality, are, by their nature, more likely to hurt the migrant
than the non-migrant. Family benefits, for example, are not payable,
as a rule, in respect of children not resident in France. If the
migrant becomes disabled and receives a disablement benefit, he will
not be able to return home without forfeiting it, for such benefits
may not be served outside France. He will receive no old-age pension
unless he works in France for fifteen years; and even if he does that
and is given a pension, he will find that if he returns to his native
land, then, although he will not lose his pension, he will lose the
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free medical care which he would have received in France as part of
his old-age benefit^.
These are only some examples of the difficulties and restrictions
encountered by migrants under the law of one country. It need hardly
be emphasised that the loss of a pension or a family allowance could
bring serious hardship to the person concerned in these days of
weakened family ties, sharply rising medical costs and indeed costs of
living in general, nor that a migrant, living away from his family
and probably earning low wages will be particularly susceptible to
such hardship.
If we look more closely at the legal problems involved in
assuring the provision of social security to migrant workers, we find
that they are of four main kinds. When a migrant moves from one
country to another, he may find himseif confronted by nationality
restrictions; he may find that the social security benefits to which
he has a right may not be served in the new country, i.e. that there
is a problem of the conservation of acquired rights; thirdly, he may
find that he loses the rights which he had not yet acquired but was
in the process of acquiring; and fourthly, there may be difficulty
in determining the country whose legislation governs the various
rights and duties of the migrant. Let us look at each of these
problems in turn, for it is primarily to these problems that social
security treaties and Regulations Nos. 3 and 1408/71 of the EEC aim
to give a solution.
(i) Nationality restrictions. It is the exception rather than the
rule that social security benefits should be subject to nationality
(6)
restrictions • That this is so is due largely, no doubt, to the
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notion of insurance which still lies at the bottom of most social
securityi if a person pays his contributions, then he should
receive a benefit in return, commercial contracts know no national¬
istic sentiments. It is mostly in cases where social security has
been influenced by other considerations that nationality clauses
appear. Thus in many cases of non-contributory benefits financed
by the state, we find a restriction of benefits to the nationals of
that state; examples are the student social security system in
France, or certain old age benefits in the same country, like the
Assocation aux vieux travailleurs salaries, the assocation temperaire
(7)
aux vieux ; presumably the restriction to Dutchmen of transitional
benefits under the old-age scheme (AOW) and the "widows and orphans"
(8)
scheme (AW ) in the Netherlands rests on the same grounds . Per¬
haps this is also what is at the basis of the surprising and rather
shocking rule in Belgium that the retirement and survivor's pensions
of manual workers ("ouvriers") is to be reduced by 20% if the bene-
(9)
ficiary is of foreign nationality .
A second reason given for limiting benefits is that the benefit
may be designed to achieve some political,gene rally demographic, end.
If the French government gives a special benefit on the hirth of a
child to encourage fertility, it is not to have more Algerians
and Spaniards, "e'est pour avoir beaucoup de petits Franyais!"^10^.
Thus we find that such "primes de naissance" are limited in both
France and Luxembourg to nationals of these countries^1^.
Another reason which may sometimes motivate discrimination
against non-nationals is the desire on the part of the discriminating
state to use its discriminations as a bargaining counter in nego¬
tiations with other states which discriminate against its own
nationals^2^.
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(li) Conservation of acquired rights: The problem here Is not
that of open discrimination against foreigners, but more complex
and more difficult to solve. The restriction is not one of nation¬
ality but of residence: where a person or his family is not resident
in the state in which he has acquired social security rights, what
happens to those rights? In what circumstances, if at all, will
state A provide benefits to a person in state B?
In theory obstacles could be raised by either state A or
state B. In practice, however, the legal problems raised by
state B will confine themselves to taxation, which we must leave
aside here. Let us imagine then a migrant, a national of state B,
who goes to work in state A and there acquires a right to the various
social security benefits granted by that state: sickness, disability,
family benefits, old age, etc. If the migrant now goes outside
stateA, for a short period, either to state B or elsewhere, and
falls ill or is killed, will he receive sickness benefit and medical
care, and will his widow receive a widow's pension? Or again, if
the migrant working in state A is forced to leave his wife and
children in state B, will he receive a family allowance to help him
support them, or will the fact that he has a family be taken into
account in assessing his sickness benefit or unemployment benefit?
Or again, if he can no longer work because of disablement or old age,
and returns home to state B, will he continue to receive an old age
pension or disablement or industrial injury benefit from state A?
In none of these cases need there be any question of discrimination
against foreigners, yet it is clear that the answers to these questions
are of great importance to migrants and their families.
The answers to these questions, whether a potential beneficiary
will benefit only If he satisfies certain residence requirements,
-100-
depend principally on two factors: the conception behind the social
security scheme Involved and the practical administrative problems
which provision of the benefit would raise.
The two social security conceptions which are opposed in this
matter are the notions of personality and territoriality of social
security. Under the notion of personality, social security rights
are seen as adhering to a person. This is closely related to the
contractual or insurance concept of social security: the benefits
have been earned by the beneficiary: they are the counterpart either
of his contributions to the system or of the work he has contributed
to society. As he has earned his social security rights, he may take
them with him wherever he goes, and there is no reason for not serving
social security benefits abroad. The territoriality concept, on the
other hand, is not unconnected with the notion of social security
as a public service: it is for each country to satisfy the social
security needs of those who are on its territory. As the social
security benefit is not the direct counterpart of the contribution,
it is not a contractual right but the idea of public service which
(13)
forms the link between the state and the individual beneficiary .
But probably the links between personality and contract, on the one
hand, and territoriality and public service on the other should not
be pushed too far. It seems more likely that the prevalence of the
territoriality principle owes less to the notion of social security
as a public service within a state than to the existence of (and
unreadiness to overcome) administrative problems attached to the
service of benefits abroad. May we not explain the fact that old
age pensions are more often "exportable" than are unemployment benefits,
by observing, not (or not only) that unemployment benefits are further
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divorced from the insurance principle than are old age pensions, but
that, whereas administrative control of some kind may- be necessary
to check that a recipient is still unemployed, no such control is
necessary to ensure that an old age pensioner remains old? That
this is indeed the case is suggested by the fact that in Belgium,
where the old-age pension is a retirement pension payable only on
the cessation of professional activity, the pension is not paid
outside the country because there would be no means of checking
(14)
whether the recipient had indeed retired ,
Be that as it nay, the migrant is almost certain to encounter
difficulties if he leaves his country of employment either for a
short or for a long period, or if he leaves all or part of his family
at home. The general rule is that of territoriality, that is, he
will not be able to receive any benefits outside his country of
employment. There are exceptions to this. In many cases he maj'
receive sickness benefit and medical care If he receives a special
authorisation from the social security institution before going
abroad, or if he falls ill unexpectedly while away. Under Dutch
legislation, more generous than other legislations In this respect,
a number of benefits may be provided abroad: old age, widows' and
orphans' pensions, industrial injury and disease benefits, even
family allowances. In some cases, a lump sum In lieu of pension Is
paid when the worker leaves the country: a sum equivalent to three
years' pension is paid to non-nationals leaving the country in the
case of French industrial accident benefits and Luxembourgeois old
age and disablement pensions. This is clearly to the detriment of any
beneficiary whose expectation of life is greater than three years. Yet
even this Is better than receiving nothing at all, as would happen
(15)
under the strict territoriality principle .
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The provision of long and short-term benefits outside the
country is, therefore, an important problem to be dealt with by
international treaties.
(iii) Conservation of rights in the process of being acquired:
If the two problems already mentioned may be said to stem from
the public service character of social security, then this third
problem flows from those features of social security more closely
linked to the notion of insurance, or, more specifically, from the
idea that a right to a benefit is acquired only after contributions
have been paid during a certain period of time. The person concerned
will have no right to a benefit before this period is completed.
The subordination of social security rights to such a minimum
period is very widespread among the present members of the EEC, with
the exception of the Netherlands, which is again more generous in
this respect. The length of this period varies according to the
nature of the benefit: there is never any such period in the case
of industrial injury benefits, where the benefit is seen as arising
from the mere fact of a contract of employment. In the case of sick¬
ness and maternity benefit, the period is either non-existent or very
short (60 hours in France, but 6 months in Belgium); for unemployment
benefit it is generally about 6 months. It is in the case of the
long-term benefits, essentially old-age, disablement and survivors'
pensions, that the minimum period can cause serious problems for the
migrant. In these cases, the minimum period required may be anything
up to 15 years (as in the case of the German old-age pension), or
even 25 years (as for some miners' pensions, for which long periods
are required in all the countries).
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The problem is simple enough: a migrant worker who works in
several different countries might easily fail to satisfy the minimum
old age pension requirements in any of those countries and be left
without any pension at the end of his working life.
A variant of the same problem occurs where the condition of a
minimum period of contribution either is satisfied or does not
exist, (as in Belgium, for instance), but where the amount of benefit
paid depends on the period of contribution. This is the case in all
theoriginal member countries except the Netherlands. The problem
here is the same: that of taking periods of insurance in another
(16)
country into account in the calculation of pensions •
Another variant on the same problem arises in the case of
industrial Injury or disease benefits. Under German law, for example,
(and the laws of Belgium, France and the Netherlands present the same
problem), 20 ' loss in capacity Is required before an industrial
injury pension can be awarded. In calculating this minimum limit,
previous accidents (or industrial diseases, as the case may be) are
taken into account, so that it would suffice if the worker lost 10^
capacity in each of two accidents. However, accidents are normally
counted only if they happen outside Germany, so that for the migrant,
the problem of the aggregation of industrial injuries in different
countries presents itself in much the same way as does the problem
(17)
of aggregating periods of insurance .
(iv) Choice of Law: Finally, there is the problem of determining
which law governs the rights and duties of the migrant worker. If
a worker lives in one country and works across the frontier in
another, or if he is sent by his employer in one country to work
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for a few weeks in another, by which social security system will
his rights be governed? If he lives in a different country from
his children, which law will determine his entitlement to a family
allowance? Is it conceivable that a court or other institution
in one country should have to apply the social security law of
another country?
This question of the choice of law has to be answered before
any benefit can be awarded. Since the applicability of the various
schemes may be governed by different criteria (residence, employ¬
ment, etc.), the unbridled operation of national laws might mean
that a worker would find himself subject to two laws at once or to
no law at all. Here is another problem to be solved by international
law"8'.
In the absence of international co-ordination of social
security law, the worker who moves from one country to another
is playing a game of chance in which the odds are weighted against
him. Depending on his luck (or, conceivably, his skill), he may
find that he has a right to no social security benefits, to normal
benefits or to two or even more times the normal benefit. The
object of co-ordinating social security law internationally is to
normalise the position of the migrant, to ensure that he is
provided for, but only once.
B. Solution of problems by Treaty
(i) Development of international social security lawi
The regulation of the social security rights of migrant workers
by international treaty is nearly as old as the institution of social
security itself. The first treaty concerning the social security of
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migrants was concluded by France and Italy as long ago as April 15th
1904. This treaty contains provisions on old age, Industrial
injuries and unemployment insurance. This example was soon followed
in a large number of bilateral treaties concerned with the conditions
of migrants. The principle adopted in these early treaties was that
of equal treatment of the nationals of the contracting parties on the
territory of each of them. But some treaties went further than that,
and in another Franco-Italian treaty, that of September 30th 1919,
we find already the notion of the aggregation of periods of contri¬
bution in assessing the rights of the migrant.
After 1919 this growth in the number of bilateral treaties was
stimulated and accompanied by the work of the ILO, which sought by
means of recommendations and international conventions to spread the
principle of equal treatment of nationals and non-nationals in social
security matters. States ratifying Convention No. 19, for instance,
which came into force in 1926, guaranteed the equal treatment with
their own nationals, in the matter of industrial injury benefits, of
the nationals of other states ratifying the convention.
But it is really after the second world war that an enormous
expansion in the number of international social security agreements
(19)
took place, particularly in Europe. It has been calculated that
between 1946 and 1966, 401 bilateral agreements on social security
were signed, and that in 94% of these agreements both parties were
European, while a large number of the remaining 6% had one European
signatory. These post-war treaties are more sophisticated than
the earlier ones and seek to tackle not only the problem of dis¬
crimination against non-nationals, but also that of the conservation
of acquired rights and of rights in the process of being acquired:
the methods by which they sought to do so are considered below.
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After the last war too It was realised that even a thick network
of bilateral agreements would be inadequate to meet the needs of those
workers whose career spills over into more than two countries or whose
families nay be scattered in more than two countries. In these cases
there had to be some co-ordination between all the countries concerned:
multilateral treaties were needed.
The first step in this direction was the conclusion between the
members of the Brussels Pact (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxem¬
bourg and the Netherlands) of two agreements in Paris on November 7th
1949. The first of these concerned medical and social assistance; the
second sought to tie together the various bilateral agreements which
had been concluded by these countries. Tripartite agreements along
similar lines were also concluded between Belgium, France and Italy (Jan.
19th 1951) and between France, Italy and the Saar (November 27th 1952).
The Council of Europe tried to extend the Brussels Pact agreement so
that it would cover all of the members of the Council, but this ambition
was hindered by the fact that, whereas the Brussels Pact agreement co¬
ordinates a network of bilateral agreements previously concluded
between the signatory states, no such network existed between all the
states members of the Council of Europe. In the meantime, until such
a network should come into being, two interim agreements were concluded
on December 11th 1953, the one covering old age, disablement and death,
the other covering the other branches of social security. The interim
agreements have since been succeeded by the European Convention on
Social Security, elaborated by the Council of Europe and opened to
signature by the member states of the Council on 14th December 1972.
To the solutions adopted by these multilateral treaties we shall
return in due course.
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Finally, there have been a number of multilateral treaties
concluded under the auspices of the ILO and restricted to certain
groups of workers. Most Interesting of these are those covering
the Rhine boatmen. International transport workers, refugees and
stateless persons
(11) Principles adopted by social security treaties
A number of techniques were developed by the International treaties
to overcome the obstacles to the provision of social security benefits
for migrants. We shall look briefly at the techniques developed to
meet each of the problems outlined, and then at the special solutions
adopted by the multilateral treaties which preceded Regulation No. 3.
(4) Equal treatment of nationals
The overcoming of discriminations against non-nationals provides
no difficulties of a technical natures bilateral treaties have simply
provided that each contracting state should treat the nationals of the
other contracting state as if they were its own nationals. This
principle, however, although immediately recognised, did not succeed
in doing away with the problem of nationality restrictions even within
Western Europe. This is so for a number of reasons. The treaties are
often limited in their application. Often they cover only certain
specified branches of social security. Again, although the treaty
will usually apply in a general manner to the present and future
(21)
"legislation" governing that branch, exceptions are often made
and, even where this is not the case, each state generally retains
the right to refuse the application of the treaty to any new category
of beneficiary covered by an extension of the domestic social security
system. Even where a specific law is covered, it may be that not all
discriminations contained in that law are removed.
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The treaties may also be limited in their personal application.
Usually, though not always, they apply only to nationals of the two
states, so that a Spanish worker, say, who works in France for twenty
years before going to continue his career in Belgium will gain nothing
from a treaty concluded between France and Belgium. Many treaties
require the beneficiary to be not only a national of one of the two
countries but also resident in one of them; in the case of the same
hypothetical agreement between France and Belgium, a Frenchman living
In Germany would be in no better position than the Spaniard. Finally,
some treaties do away with nationality restrictions only to replace
them by residence requirements, which vary with the nature of the
benefit in question. The European interim agreement, for example,
grants equality of treatment in the case of non-contributory old age,
disablement and survivors' pensions only to those non-nationals who
(22)
have resided in the country for at least fifteen years!
(b) Conservation of acquired rights:
One might have expected that it would be easy enough to remove
residence restrictions, yet progress in this area has been fragmentary.
As we have seen, residence requirements are sometimes the counterpart
of real administrative problems, and a country of immigration, though it
may have reason to provide social security for its foreign workers
while they remain in the country, has, no doubt, little incentive to
overcome these problems and provide for them when they leave the
country. The inquiry conducted by the High Authority of the ECSC
into the position of non-nationals from certain countries in the
five labour-importing members of the EEC found that the agreements
concluded by Belgium, France and Luxembourg were particularly faulty
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in this respect • The area in which least progress has been made
and which causes most concern is the question of providing family
benefits in respect of children who have been left in the country
of emigration (or indeed in a third country). Where such benefits
are granted, they are often subject to a time limit of two or three
years, and are often at the rate of benefit of the country of emi¬
gration, or sometimes at whichever of the two possible rates (i.e.
that of the country of emigration and that of the country of im¬
migration) is the lower.
When provision is made for payment of benefits abroad, certain
practical arrangements have to be made for carrying out that provision.
Broadly speaking, there are two possible methods. Payment may be
made directly to the beneficiary by the institution to which he is
affiliated: this is the method usually employed where control of the
condition of the beneficiary is not too complex, as in the case of
pensions or sickness benefit. Alternatively, the institution of the
country of residence provides the benefit as it would to its own
beneficiaries and then settles its account with the debtor institution
separately. This arrangement is found more practical in granting
medical care. Though we can pay little attention to them here, it
should not be forgotten that the administrative provisions of these
treaties and their protocols play an important part in the inter-
(24)
natio .alisation of social security .
(c) Conservation of rights in the process of being acquired:
The general principle here is that of aggregation, that is, of the
assimilation of periods of contribution under the two regimes. But a
distinction must be made between the three branches in which the
problem generally occurs: sickness and maternity benefits, old age
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(and survivors*) pensions, and disablement pensions; unemployment
is rarely covered.
The preliminary period for sickness and maternity benefits is,
as we have seen, usually very short if it exists at all. If the
period required by the country of immigration is not satisfied, then
the treaties normally provide that the periods of contribution in the
two countries may be aggregated to satisfy this requirement; the
benefits or care are then provided by the institution of the country
of immigration, normally without any right to claim reimbursement
from the institution of the country of emigration. But in order to
prevent frauds, it is usually provided that the institution of the
country of immigration should not support the charge of the benefits
unless the beneficiary has worked or been insured in the new country
and the illness has been contracted after immigration; in the case of
maternity, this means that it is the institution to which the mother
was subject at the presumed date of conception which must finally
support the costs involved.
More complex are the arrangements in the case of old age pensions.
These are often subject to a very long preliminary period of contri¬
bution and in most of the countries of Western Europe (including all
the member states of the EEC except the Netherlands) they vary with the
number (and the amount) of contributions paid. Where this is not the
case in either country (as in agreements between Scandinavian countries),
the whole of the pension may be provided tyy the country of residence.
But where the pension is related to contributions paid, a more
complicated procedure is followed, that of aggregation and "prorati-
(25)
sation" (division pro rata temporis). This involves two
steps:
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- First, each country determines the amount which the
claimant would have received under its own legislation
if he had been insured in that country for the total
duration of his periods of insurance, that is, it
treats the periods accomplished in another country as
if they had been accomplished under its own legislation;
- secondly, each country divides the amount thus obtained in
proportion to the period of insurance in fact accomplished
under its own legislation: this is the division pro rata
temporis, or "proratisatlon*. Each country then pays the
resulting pension.
In fact, numerous other practical arrangements, involving the calcu¬
lation of periods (in months, weeks, days, etc,), the consideration
of periods which though not in fact periods of contribution are
treated as such (periods of illness, military service, etc,) and
many otter problems, make the system extremely complicated. It is
this system, embodied in Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation No, 3,
which was to give rise to most of the social security problems
coming before the Court of Justice,
This system of aggregation and proratisation is not, without
modification, suitable where one party to the treaty has a pension
system under which the pension is not directly related to the contri¬
butions: this too will become dear when we examine the problems of
Regulation No, 3 involving the Dutch system. For this reason, it is
perhaps worthwhile looking at the treaty of June 30th 1951 between
France (which has a contributory system) and Denmark (where the pension
is based on residence). The mechanism employed here is even more
complex:
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- the pensioner receives a pension determined according to
the law of the country of residence and provided by the
institutions of that country*
- the periods of residence in Denmark after the 18th birthday
are assimilated to periods of insurance in France* These
periods are aggregated with the periods of insurance in
France*
- the French institutions bear the charge of a pension calcu¬
lated according to French law, aggregated and proratised as
explained above®
- if the pensioner is resident in Denmark, then he received
either the Danish pension or the proratised French pension,
whichever be the higher. The French institutions reimburse
to the Danish institutions the amount of the proratised
French pension;
- if the pensioner is resident in France, then he receives a
pension calculated according to French law and corresponding
to the total period obtained by aggregating the periods of
insurance in France and the periods of residence in Denmark*
Then the Danish institution reimburses to the French institu¬
tions the fraction of the pension which corresponds to the
periods of residence in Denmark*
Disablement may be seen either as anticipated old age or as
prolonged illness* In the former case, the amount of the pension will
vary according to the period of contribution; in the latter it will
not. On this will depend the manner in which the problem is dealt
with* The treaties usually provide for one of the three following
solutions:
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1, the granting of a pension composed of two elements,
after aggregation and proratisation, as with old age
pensions;
2, the granting of a single pension calculated according to
the law of the country in which the pensioner became
disabled and paid for by that country; or
3, the granting of a pension, the cost of which is divided
between the two countries and which may not be inferior
to the more advantageous of the two pensions which would
have resulted from the application of the two methods
mentioned above^26^.
(d) Choice of law: No doubt because a person*s social security
rights and duties often depend on his status as a worker, the principle
generally adopted in international agreements is that the law applicable
is that of the place of work. The law of the place of residence applies
only in the case of those who exercise no professional activity.
An exception is generally made in the case of those who are
dispatched to work abroad for a short time (generally less than six
months); such persons generally remain subject to the law of their
country of origin.
Special arrangements are made for special cases, as where a
border runs through the middle of a factory, for international trans-
(27)
port workers, seamen, embassy staff, etc, •
(e) Multilateral treaties: We have seen that the disadvantage of
bilateral treaties is that they fail to cater for those who have been
Insured in more than two countries or who have dependants living in
more than two countries. The remedy sought by the early multilateral
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agreements (we refer to the Brussels Pact agreement and the two
European Interim agreements) Is the co-ordination of bilateral
agreements concluded between the signatory states* There already
existed a complete network of bilateral agreements between the parties
to the Brussels Pact agreement. This agreement provides that the
provisions of each bilateral treaty shall apply to the nationals of any
of the contracting parties* Where a person has worked In more than
two of the contracting states* aggregation (and* If necessary* pro-
ratlsatlon) may take place with regard to all the periods of Insurance
In each country. Where the dependants of an Insured person, who Is a
national of one of the contracting parties* normally reside on the
territory of one of the five states while the insured person works In
another* then the dependants receive benefits In kind (essentially
medical care) granted by the social security law of the country of
residence and at the charge of the institutions of that country*
Finally, Article 11 of the agreement provides that the agreement
may, with the agreement of all the parties* be extended to cover the
nationals of any country which has concluded bilateral social security
agreements with all of the said parties*
The European interim agreements are less complete * for the net¬
work of bilateral treaties between the member states of the Council
of Europe was only half completed at the time when the interim agree¬
ments were concluded* The interim agreements have a double aim:
- to ensure equal treatment for the nationals of the
contracting states; but in some cases removal of nation¬
ality restrictions is subject to a residence requirement:
in the case of non-contributory old age, disablement and
survivors* pensions a period of fiteen years, of which five
must be uninterrupted*
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- to extend to the nationals of all the contracting parties
the advantages flowing from the bi- or multi-lateral social
security agreements which have been or will be concluded
between two or more of the contracting parties.
Article 9 of the two agreements weakens their force to some
extent: it allows contracting parties to formulate a reservation
limiting the application of these two principles with regard to aqy
social security regime or any of the treaties which it has concluded.
(28)
5everal states have made use of this procedure ♦
C. Conclusion
It may be helpful to summarise this sketchy outline of the
problems which confronted the authors of Regulation No. 3 and the
antecedents with which they were presented:
1. The obstacles to be overcome in providing social security
for migrants are chiefly four:
(i) Nationality restrictions;
(ii) Residence restrictions (loss of acquired rights);
(ill) Loss of rights in the process of being acquired;
(lv) Problem of the choice of law.
2. Solutions were sought by means of bilateral and then
multi-lateral conventions:
(i) By removing nationality and residence restrictions;
(ii) By providing for aggregation (and in some cases
"proratisation") of periods of insurance in the
different countries;
(ill) By choosing the law of the place of work as the
law applicable;
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(iv) By making the necessary administrative arrangements and
establishing the necessary collaboration between social
security institutions.
Nevertheless, many lacunae remained. In particular:
(1) Not all nationality restrictions had been removed;
(2) Many residence restrictions remained, particularly in the
field of family benefits;
(3) The system of aggregation and proratisatlon is complex
and unsuitable where one contracting party has a non-
contributory pension scheme;
(4) Many subjects were untouched or inadequately covered
by international treaties, such as unemployment
benefit, voluntary and complementary insurance
schemes;
(5) Despite the large number of treaties, the network was
still far from complete; until the European convention
which was to become Regulation No. 3, no agreement
existed between West Germany and Belgium, nor between
Germany and Luxembourg.
For these reasons the provision of social security for migrant
(29)
workers still constituted a problem when the E.C. were set up .
2. Regulation No. 3: Origin. Structure
and Principles
A. Origin
Although Regulation No. 3 has now been superseded by Regulation
No. 1408/71, its analysis is of more than mere historical interest.
Not only did it mark an important advance in the international
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regulation of the social security position of migrants, but it provided
the basis for the later regulation: Regulation No. 1408/71 retains
the same structures and principles as Regulation No. 3. although it
aims to provide more complete solutions to some problems and to
remedy many of the defects which had become apparent in the old regu¬
lation. There can be no doubt that the judicial interpretation of
Regulation No. 1408/71 will be based on the principles developed in
the interpretation of Regulation No. 3.
The origins of Regulation No. 3 must be sought, not in the Treaty
of Rome, but in the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC. One of the
aims of this treaty was to promote the free movement of qualified coal
(30)
and steel workers and the problems relating to social security were
seen as an obstacle to such free movement. Consequently. Article
69 (4) of the ECSC Treaty provided:
"lis (les Etats membres) interdiront toute discrimination
dans la remuneration et les conditions de travail des
travailleurs nationaux et travailleurs iiwnigres, sans
prejudice des mesunes speciales interessant les travail¬
leurs frontaliersj en particulier, lis rechercheront entre
eux tous arrangements qui demeureraient necessaires pour
que les dispositions relatives a la securite' sociale ne
fassent pas obstacle aux mouvements de main-d'oeuvre*.
Making use of the power granted to it by Article 69 (5).
"d'orienter et faciliter 1'action des Etats membres pour 1'application
des mesures prevues au present article", the High Authority undertook
at the end of 1953, together with a group of national experts and with
the technical assistance of the ILO, the preparation of a European
convention on social security. It was intended that this convention,
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although under the auspices of the ECSC, would apply to all employed
workers and those treated as such: although coal miners usually benefit
from a special social security system, this Is not the case for steel
workers. This convention was signed In Rome on December 9th 1957, but
It was never ratified.
IMs was because the treaty establishing the EEC Intervened. One
of the alms of the EEC treaty Is to establish the free movement of
labour within the Community and one of the chaptersof the treaty
is devoted to that aim, described by the treaty Itself as one of the
•foundations' of the Community. The last of the four articles In this
chapter is Article No. 51, which says much the same as Article 69 (4)
ECSC, but with more precision and force:
MLe Conseil, statuant a l'unanimite sur proposition de la
Commission, adopte' dans le domaine de la s^curlte' sociale
les mesures necessaires pour l'e'stablissement de la libre
circulation des travailleurs, instltuant notamnent un
syst&me permettant d'assurer aux travailleurs migrants et
a leurs ayants droit:
(a) la totalisation, pour l'ouverture et le maintien du
droit aux prestations, ainsi que pour le calcul de celles-ci,
de toutes periodes prises en consideration par les difftfrentes
legislations rationales,
(b) le paiement des prestations aux personnes rdsidant sur les
(32 )
territolres des Etats membres'* •
In view of this article and the power it granted to the Council,
it was decided that the simplest course was to adopt the European
Convention as a Regulation of the new Community, thus avoiding the
need to have the Convention ratified. With only slight modlfi-
«{19**
cations, the text of the Convention was adopted by the Council on
September 25th 1958 as Regulation No, 3, The administrative arrange¬
ments which had been prepared for the application of the Convention
were then adopted as Regulation No, 4 on December 3rd 1958^33^. We
shall see that the origin of these Regulations was to cause some
difficulties in their interpretation.
It soon became clear that these complex regulations contained a
number of faults and minor modifications were introduced by later
regulations. The system was also completed by three fairly important
regulations covering persons not covered by Regulation No, 3:
(34)
Regulation No, 36/63 covers frontier workers and Regulation
No, 73/63covers seasonal workers, A third regulation^36^
applies to seamen.
These later regulations naturally increased the complexity of
the system. As early as 1963, work was begun on the revision of
Regulation No, 3j the result was the Regulation No, 1408/71,
which now replaces the other regulations. But as the new regulation
retains the same principles as the old, we shall first examine
(37 )
Regulation No, 3 before considering its revision .
B, Structure and Function of Regulation No, 5
Structure: As regulations go, Regulation No, 3, with its fifty-
six articles and seven annexes covering thirty-one pages of the Journal
Offlclel, is quite long. Its fifty-six articles are divided up under
five Titles.
Title I (Dispositions gendrales) begins with an article of
definitions - a surprising "anglo-saxonism" which Lyon-Caen finds
(38)
baffling - then defines the scope of application of the Regulation
(Articles 2-4), its relation to international social security con-
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ventions (Articles 5-7) and sets forth 30me important general
principles (Articles 8-11).
Title II (Dispositions determinant la legislation applicable)
gives rales for deciding what law is to be applied (Articles 12-15),
Title III (Dispositions partlculikres) contains seven chapters
dealing with the different branches of social security covered
(roaladie-materaite (Articles 16-23); invalidity (Articles 24-26);
vieiliesse et ddcks (pensions) (Articles 27, 28); accidents du
travail et maladies professionnelles (Articles 29-31); allocation
au decks (Article 32); chomage (Articles 33-38) and allocations
familiales (Articles 39-42). An eighth chapter establishes a
Commission administrative and defines its function and composition
(Articles 43-44).
The two other Titles (Dispositions diverses (IV) and Dis¬
positions transitoires et finales (V) contain mainly administrative
provisions.
C. Principles adopted by Regulation No. 3:
There is nothing very revolutionary about the approach adopted
by Regulation No. 3. The starting-point here, as in other inter¬
national social security arrangements is formed ljy the principles
already discussed - equality of treatment, aggregation, etc. But
in the application of these principles Regulation No. 3 goes much
farther than any previous international arrangement. We shall look
briefly at the solutions adopted by Regulation No. 3 in the same
order as that in which we considered them in relation to bilateral
and multi-lateral treaties: equality of treatment; conservation of
acquired rights; conservation of rights in the process of being
acquired; and the special problems of multi-lateral treaties. We
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shall end by looking at the special administrative and jurisdictional
arrangements; and we shall begin by making a few comments on the scope
of its application,
(1) Scope of application!
Details of the scope of application of Regulation No, 3
ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis are to be
found in Articles 2 and 3, Article 4 and Article 5 respectively.
Suffice it here to point out that Regulation No, 3 applies to all
legislation concerning the nine branches of social security mentioned
by Convention No. 102 of the ILO, that isi sickness, maternity, dis¬
ablement, old age, survivors, industrial injuries and diseases, death,
unemployment and family benefits, whether the social security regime
be general or special, contributory or non-contributory. Social and
medical assistance and special arrangements for public officials and
war victims are expressly excluded. The most important omission is
that of "complementary regimes", that is, of occupational and other
schemes which seek to provide benefits (usually old age pensions)
outside and in addition to the basic state system.
Ratione personae, the regulation does not apply to non-nationals
of the member states (except in the case of resident refugees and
stateless persons), nor does it apply to "independent"(i.e. self-
employed) workers (unless they are "assimilated to the position of
an employee"); nor, finally, is there any express requirement that
the worker claiming benefit from Regulation No. 3 must be a "migrant".
When we come to the work of the Court of Justice, we shall see that
the interpretation of Article 4 caused some difficulty.
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(ii) Equality of treatment:
The incorporation of this principle In Article 8 of the
Regulation is but one application of the general principle of
equal treatment of nationals of the member states in the application
of the Treaty of Rome set forth in Article 7 of the Treaty and re¬
iterated with regard to conditions of work by Article 48 of the Treaty.
The importance of this principle in Community thought is reflected by
the sweeping terms of Article 8 of the Regulation. Despite this.
Regulation No. 3 permits some small exceptions to this principle to
subsist. Annex A (which specifies the legislations to which the
Regulation applies) specifically excludes the French "allocation de
matemite" and the Luxembourgeois "prestations de naissance"; we have
seen that in both of these cases, nationality restrictions exist for
political, demographic reasons. Nor does Regulation No. 3 affect
restrictions barring non-nationals from participation in the manage¬
ment of social security institutions (a right of insured persons under
many social security schemes in the Six),
(ili) Conservation of acquired rights:
It is the removal of residence restrictions that Regulation
No. 3 has made most progress over pre-existing treaties. For the
first time it becomes the general rule, rather than the exception,
that benefits may be provided abroad, or in respect of persons living
abroad.
Article 10 (1) establishes this principle in general terms with
regard to the long-terra benefits, although the second paragraph of
that article provides for some fairly minor exceptions in the case
of some non-contributory pension arrangements, usually of a trans¬
itional nature: these are defined in Annex D.
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In the event of sickness or maternity, where the removal of
residence restrictions raises more problems, provision is nevertheless
made for the provision of benefits abroad:
- where the worker or a member of his family is temporarily
in another country of the Community and their condition
requires immediate treatment;
- where residence is transferred during an illness;
- when the family continues to reside in another member
state;
- when a pensioner lives in a member state other than that
which pays the pension, where the pension carries with
it a right to free medical treatment.
In each case benefits in kind are provided by the institution of the
place where the patient is at the time; in general, reimbursement
may be sought from the institution to which the insured was affil¬
iated, Payment of money benefits is irade either directly by the
institution of affiliation or through the other institution. In
either case, the insured person is subject to the medical and
administrative control of the latter institution. Similar arrange¬
ments have been made for industrial injury and disease benefits.
Article 35 provides for the "export" of unemployment benefits,
a provision contained only in very few bilateral treaties. The
right to receive these benefits abroad is, however, limited to a
maximum period of four months and subject to the prior authorisation
of both the debtor institution and the institution of the new place
of residence. Another Important limitation is the reservation by
France and Luxembourg, restricting the application of this article to
qualified coal and steel workers - a remnant reminding us of the
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origin of Regulation No. 3. The benefit Is paid through the Insti¬
tution of the new place of residence at the rate of the place of
last employment. This Institution supports a small part of the
cost, the rest being reimbursed to it by the Institution of affil¬
iation.
A third area in which an important step forward has been made is
that of family benefits, which must, under Regulation No. 3, be paid
also in respect of members of the family living in another member
state. There was originally a limit of three years, but, in view
of the difficulty of re-uniting families, this was later removed.
The benefit is paid by the institutions of the country of employment,
but may not be more than the amount which would be payable under the
legislation of the country of residence. As in the case of un¬
employment, the system was still not perfect, although considerable
(39)
progress had been made .
There is further help for the worker who is separated from his
family, in the provision (in Article 18 (2), 26 (4), 28 (1) (d) and
34 (2)) that where the amount of other types of benefit (sickness
and maternity, disablement, old age, unemployment) varies with the
number of members of the family, then those members resident in
another member state should be taken into account.
(iv) Conservation of rights in the process of being acquired:
Article 51 of the Treaty itself provided that any measure taken
by the Council should provide for the aggregation of periods of
insurance in the various countries. The principle is adopted by
a number of articles in the Regulation in the branches of sickness
and maternity (Article 16), death grants (Article 32), unemployment
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(Article 33), family benefits (Article 39) and, of course, for
disablement (cf, Article 26) and old age and survivors* pensions
(Article 27), where aggregation is combined with proratisation
(Article 28), We shall have ample occasion to return to the endless
entanglements of Articles 27 and 28 when we come to the problems which
were to face the Court of Justice,
Where the existence of previous accidents or diseases is liable
to affect the assessment of an industrial injury or disease benefit,
such accidents or diseases must be taken into account even if they
occurred in another member state (Article 30),
(v) Choice of law>
Regulation No. 3 adopts the normal rule in international social
security treaties, that the law applicable should be that of the place
of work (Article 12). Article 13 provides several exceptions to this
rule, the most important of which is that provided for workers sent
abroad to work for a period of up to twelve (and not just six) months.
(vi) Problems relating to multi-lateral conventions:
The Brussels Pact agreement and the two European interim
agreements all aimed to co-ordinate the system of bilateral treaties.
Regulation No. 3, on the other hand, aims to take the place of existing
bilateral treaties, and the general rule is that it does replace exist¬
ing treaties between the member states (Article 5). Exceptions are
made in the case of ILO Conventions, the two European interim
agreements, the Rhine boatmen agreement, the treaty of 9.7.1956
covering international transport workers, and a number of provisions
of bilateral treaties between member states (Article 6). These
provisions are specified in Annex D and are generally
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provisions more favourable to migrants or administratively more
convenient than the provisions of Regulation No. 3. For example,
there were a few conventions which contained provisions on the
payment abroad of unemployment benefits more favourable than those
contained in Article 35, Regulation No. 3j these provisions are
preserved in Annex D. As for the future development of social
security relations between the Community countries by means of
bilateral treaty, member states may conclude agreements between
them as long as they are founded "sur les principes et l*esprit
du present r^glement" (Article 7). Other mentions of bilateral
conventions are contained in Article 25 (disablement),
(40)
Article 41 (family benefits) and Article 52 (subrogation).
The Court of Justice had had to deal with the problem of bilateral
treaties on a number of occasions.
(vii) Administrative and jurisdictional arrangements
Regulation No. 3 and, in more detail, Regulation No. 4 organise
a close collaboration between the social security institutions of the
various countries, which are bound to lend one another their "good
offices" in the application of these regulations. To facilitate this
collaboration, a central liaison organ has been set up in each of the
countries.
The functioning of the system is further facilitated by the
creation of the Commission administrative (Articles 43, 44 of
Regulation No. 3). This Commission is composed of a representative
of each member state, in practice the director general of social
security. A representative of the Commission of the EC also
participates, but without the right to vote, and technical assistance
is given by the ILO. Its secretariat is provided by the EC Commission.
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The Commission's main functions are to settle problems of
administration and - acting unanimously - of Interpretation (though
it Is not a jurisdiction, and its decisions do not preclude recourse
(41)
to a national court, nor to the Community court ); to help with
the financial transactions under Regulation No, 3 between the social
security institutions; to provide translations; to promote col¬
laboration in matters of social security; and to make proposals to
the Commission of the EC for the revision of Regulation No, 3 and
later social security regulations. Its work has been important in
the implementation of Regulation No, 3, Involving the drawing-up
of essential forms and lists, decisions on problems of application
and interpretation, the most important of which are published in the
Official Journal and are directly applicable in the member states,
and proposals for the improvement of social security regulations.
The Coranission publishes an annual report on the regulations con¬
cerning the social security of migrant workers. Another important
advantage of the system instituted by Regulation No. 3 - although
not mentioned In the regulation itself - Is the authority of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities to give a binding
decision on problems of interpretation of the Regulation. This
authority, which results from Article 177 EEC, has proved Import-
tant In view of the complexity of the Regulation.
D. Conclusion
Regulation No. 3 continues the work of the International social
security treaties in helping those who move from one state to another
to surmount the national barriers. It not only deals with the same
problems as the international treaties which had preceded It, it also
adopts the principles developed by them. This Is not surprising as It
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owes Its own origin to an International convention signed by the six
states on December 9th 1957. As was the case with the treaties which
preceded it, the object of Regulation No. 3 is not to replace
national laws but to co-ordinate them.
But there is a new Intensity in Regulation No. 3 not present in
earlier agreements. It is not an international treaty, but a
regulation of the EEC and, as such, it is directly applicable in the
member states of that Community and enjoys priority over the laws of
those states. Its application and administration are under the
responsibility of a European body, the Commission administrative, and
disputes as to its interpretation are subject to the jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice of the E.C. It is to these problems of inter¬
pretation that we shall now turn our attention.
3. The Judicial Interpretation of Regulation No. 3
The interpretation of the social security regulations by the
Courts is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the work of the
courts has had an important influence on the development of the
regulations: many of the innovations contained in Regulation
No. 1408/71 result directly from the decisions of the Court of
Justice. Secondly, the interpretation of Regulation No. 3 provides
an interesting and somewhat neglected example of the working of the
judicial system of the communities.
By the "judicial system" of the Communities must be understood
not only the Court of Justice of the European Communities but also
the courts of the member states in so far as they apply Community law.
One of the novel features of the legal structure of the Communities
is the relationship which it establishes between the national courts
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and the European Court of Justice.
The application of Community law is primarily the responsibility
of the national courts. The authors of the Treaty recognised, however,
that if such a complex system of law fell to be interpreted by six
different judiciaries, it would not be long before divergences of
interpretation arose; this might result in the creation of a different
body of Community law in each country; a French Community law, a
German Community law, a Dutch Conmunity law, etc. The method usually
adopted in national and federal systems to ensure uniformity law is
the creation of an appeal system of some sort. At the time of the
creation of the EEC, however, it was felt that such a system would
be untimely, that the national courts were not yet ready for it. A
more intricate solution was found in the "renvoi prejudicial"
established by Article 177. This article provides that when a question
of Community law arises before a national court, that court may (or,
if it is a court of last instance, must) refer that question to the
European Court for a preliminary ruling. Although somewhat hesitant
in the early years, the national courts have come to make more and
more use of the provisions of this Article, and Article 177 cases
now form the major source of the Court's work.
One of the questions which may arise in the study of the inter¬
pretation of any provision of Community law is, consequently, whether
the system established by Article 177 actually works, whether Article
177 has indeed succeeded in ensuring uniformity of interpretation.
To this and to other ends, we shall look in turn at the case law of
the Court of Justice and at that of the national courts,
A. The Court of Justice
Quite a hi#i proportion of the cases sent to the Court of Justice
under Article 177 have involved problems of social security; to date,
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there have been no fewer than fifty reported uses involving the
(42)
interpretation of Regulation No, 3 , The relatively large number
of cases is due in part to the often overlooked Importance of the
Regulation, in part to its complexity - and in part to the answers
given by the Court in some of the earlier cases.
The requests for interpretation have covered a wide range of
problems, but the provisions which have caused most difficulty are
the definition of the scope of application of Regulation No, 3
(Articles 1-4), the provisions governing the choice of law (Articles 12,
13) and the system of aggregation and proratisation of old age pensions
(Articles 27, 28), But, before looking at the content of the Court's
decisions and their effect on the development of the principles
contained in Regulation No, 3, it is necessary to look at the general
orientation which has guided the Court's interpretation: first at the
Court's interpretation of the aims of Regulation No, 3 and then at the
problem of the relationship between Community law and national law,
(i) The Alms of Regulation No, 3:
Much stress has rightly been put by commentators on the
"teleologies!* approach adopted by the Court to problems of inter¬
pretation, on its insistence that provisions of Community law should
be interpreted in the light of their aim or "spirit*, The social
security cases afford a very good example of this method, of its
advantages and of the pitfalls into which it is liable to fall.
The interpretation which the Court has given to many of the
provisions of Regulation No, 3 can be understood only in the light
of its interpretation of the aims of the regulation, The interest
of this interpretation of the aims is not, however, confined to
Regulation No, 3, for the Court has defined the aims of the Regulation
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in terras of the aims of Article 51; which provides, of course, also
the basis for Regulation No, 140^/71, Article 51 is contained in the
Chapter of the Treaty devoted to the free movement of workers. Time
and again the Court has insisted that Regulation No, 3 can be inter¬
preted only in the light of the articles of this Chapter (Articles 48
- 51) "qui constituent le fondement, le cadre et les limites des
reglements de security sociale".
What, then, are the aims of these articles, and especially of
Article 51, which provide such an important guide for the inter¬
pretation of the Regulations? Not surprisingly, the Court defines
this aim as being to promote the free movement of workers. This is
established already in the first social security case (Case 75/63:
Unger):
"que I'etablissement d'une liberty aussi complete que
possible de la circulation des travailleurs, s*inscrivant
dans les "fondements" de la Coranunaute", const!tue ainsi le
but principal de l*article 51, et, de ce fait, conditionne
1*interpretation des reglements pris en application de cet
article"
The Implication is clearly that the absence of co-ordination between
social security schemes would constitute an obstacle to the free move¬
ment of workers and that the purpose of the Regulations is to remove
that obstacle. An "attendu" in the Court's judgment in the next
case (Case 42/63: Nonnenraacher) puts this a little more fully:
"attendu que ces dispositions (Art, 48-51) tendent a
etablir une liberty aussi complete que possible de la
circulation des travailleurs;
que ce but comporte l'eliminatlon d'entraves legislatives
susceptibles de d^savantager les travailleurs migrants"
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It should be noticed, however, that there are two elements In
this last phrase: the aim of establishing freedom of movement of
workers is said to involve not simply the elimination of legislative
barriers, but only such as are "susceptibles de desavantager les
travailleurs migrants", But it should be clear that the aim, as so
defined, may come into conflict with what had traditionally been seen
as the aim of social security treaties and of Regulation No, 3, namely
the *co-ordination* of social security schemes. It was seen at the
beginning of this chapter that, in the absence of co-ordination, a
migrant may, if he is lucky, fare better than the non-migrant in his
entitlement to social security benefits, and that the object of co¬
ordinating social security laws was to deal with this anomaly as well
as with the case where the migrant finishes up with no entitlement; it
was asserted that the object of co-ordination was "to normalise the
position of the migrant, to ensure that he is provided for, but only
(45)
once" » This corresponds, moreover, with the notion sometimes
advanced of the "vocation europeene" of Regulation No, 3 ' and
the idea that European integration involves the removal of barriers
between the member states.
What if there is a conflict, if the co-ordination of the national
systems is not to the advantage but to the detriment of the migrant?
In such a case, the Court must decide whether the promotion of the
free movement of workers by protecting their social security rights
is more important than creating a logical, co-ordinated system.
This is the problem which arose in Case 34/69 (Duffy)
The facts were these:
Mme D lived in France with her husband, but she had worked
only in Belgium and hence received a Belgian old age pension.
Her husband who had worked only in France, received a French
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old age pension until his death in 1965, On his death,
Mae D claimed a widow's pension from the French insti¬
tution, Now, under French law, if a widow receives
another French pension in her own right, this is ded¬
ucted from the widow's pension she receives. Accord¬
ingly, the French institution deducted the amount of
Mme D*s Belgian old age pension from the widow's pension
she would otherwise have received, claiming that Article
11(2) of Regulation No, 3 removed territorial restrictions
to the application of such reduction clauses. »Vhen the
problem came before it, the Cour d'appel de Paris asked
the Court of Justice whether Article 11 (2) did have the
effect claimed by the Caisse d'assurance.
(4-8)
Now, the text of Article 11 (2) appears clearly to support
the contention of the Caisse d'assurance, and Mme huffy fell within
the broad interpretation which the Court had already given to the
scope of application ratione personae of Regulation No. 3; but, on
the other hand, the removal of territorial restrictions in this case
would be to the detriment of Mme Duffy.
The Commission, in its observations in the case, took the
orthodox "European" stance that one might have expected:
(1) Article 11 (2) is clear and applies to this case.
Moreover, the suppression of territorial restrictions
is justified because it is the "complement logique"
of those provisions in the Regulation which suppress
territorial restrictions to the benefit of the insured
persons.
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(2) This interpretation of Article 11, Regulation No. 3
is perfectly compatible with Article 51, for the basis
of Article 51 and Regulation No. 3 is the notion of
"co-ordination des l/gisiaticns nationales", which is
based in turn on the general principle of "la sup¬
pression des restrictions territoriales par la prise
en consideration des faits qui se produisent dans un
autre Etat membre comme s*ils sVtaient produits sur
(49)
le territoire de l*Etat en cause" . This principle
has been recognised by the case law of the Court
(Case 31/64, 33/64, etc.),
Koemer, the Advocate General in the case, disagreed with the
Commission. His arguments may be summarised as follows:
(1) It is true that the text of Article 11 (2) is clear,
but:
(2) An examination of the case-law of the Court shows:
(i) That Regulation No. 3 does not seek to organise
a common system of social security but leaves the
various distinct systems in existence
(cf. Cases 2/67, 9/67);
(ii) That the aim of Article 51 is to favour the free
movement of workers (cf. Cases 75/63; 100/63;
44/65; 4/66; 9/67; 12/67; 22/67);
(ill) That, moreover, the application of Regulation No. 3
may not lead to a reduction of the migrant*s rights
(cf. Cases 100/63, 4/66, 9/67, 22/67 and especially
2/67);
(3) Consequently, Article 11 must be interpreted in such a
way as not to reduce Mne D*s rights; this may be
done either by saying that Article II has a
narrower application ratione personae than the
other provisions interpreted by the Court, or by
limiting its application to those cases in which
Regulation No, 3 has other favourable effects for
the person concerned.
Here was a direct clash between the two approaches to the inter¬
pretation of Regulation No, 3, What would be the position of the
Court?,
The Court began by rejecting one of the "escape routes"
suggested by the Advocate General, namely, that they should limit
the personal application of Article It, Instead, they adopted his
other suggestion:
"que pour definir le sens et la portee de cette disposition
(Art, 11 (2)), il convient de l'interpreter a la lumiere
des articles 48 a 51 du traite qui constituent le fonde-
ment, le cadre et les Unites des r&glements de security
sociale;
que, ces articles ayant pour but d*assurer la libre
circulation des travailleurs en leur confe'rant certains
droits, ce serait se ddplacer en dehors de la finalite"
et riii cadre desditea disPQsjttlQns que d'jmpoger aux
travailleurs une reduction de leurs droits sans la
(50)
contrepartie d'avantages prdVus aux rfcgiements ' ,
Thus, the Court recognises that the aim of protecting the
rights of migrant workers must have priority over the approach adopted
by the Commission and by many experts in the field, i,e, the idea that
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the aim of the Regulations is to co-ordinate the social security
systems in the sense of creating a logical, interlocking structure.
It is this difference of approach which is at the bottom of many
of the controversies surrounding Regulation No. 3 most notably in
relation to the aggregation and proratisation of pensions under
Articles 27 and 28, Regulation No, 3.
This is not to say that the notion of the "vocation europeenneMf
of the "Europeanisation" or "deterritotalisation" of social security
has been of no influence. This influence can be seen in many of the
Court's decisions. It is particularly clear in Case 61/65 (Vaassen--
GDbbeb), One of the points at issue in that case was whether the
maintenance of a residence restriction not specifically mentioned by
apy of the provisions of Regulation No. 3 was nevertheless incom¬
patible with that Regulation. In its decision on the issue, the
Court supported a broad interpretation by saying that this was:
"conforme k 1'esprit des articles 48 a 51 du traite'
ainsi que du r&glement No. 3, qui est d'empScher, au
dela de la protection du travailleur migrant stricto
sensu /ju'en matiere de se'curite' sociale, des clauses
de territorialite' pulssent etre opposes aux travail-
leurs et & leurs survivantsH#^5^.
In his commentary on the judgment, Lyon-Caen concludes from this
that:
HLe souci d'eliminer le cloisonnement territorial de
la securite sociale est le fil rouge qui traverse
d'un bout a 1'autre le r^glement NO. 3 ... II s'aglt
en effet d'un objectif essentiel du trait^: au-delk de
la protection du travailleur migrant lui-m§me, eliminer
les clauses de territorialite"^52^.
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This conclusion can be accepted only within certain limits. It is
certain that the "deterritorialisation" approach has had considerable
influence: one can see that in the decisions concerning the scope
of application of Regulation No. 3, in the Court's insistence that there
should be no "cumul indu" of benefits under the system of aggregation
and proratisation, or in the Article 52 cases where the Court empha¬
sises that the extension of the subrogation rights of social security
institutions is the "complement logique et equitable" of the extension
of their obligations entailed by Regulation No, 3. It is clear,
however, from the judgment in the Huffy case (Case 34/69) that this
is subject to the overriding principle that Regulation No, 3 should
be so interpreted that it does not operate to the disadvantage of
the migrant. As the Court emphasised in its judgment in Case 100/63
(Van der Veen), any reduction of the rights of the workers would be
incompatible with the aim of Article 51:
"1'article 51 ne saurait ... permettre aux r6glements de
meconnaftre les objectifs fixes et destinefs & favoriser
la libre circulation des travailleurs, lesquels seraient
incompatibles avec une reduction eventuelle de leurs
droits"^53
The importance of this approach must be stressed. Since the
social security regulations are subordinate to the aims of Article 51,
any provision of the regulations which was incompatible with the Court's
interpretation of Article 51 would, presumably, be void. Hence, the
aims of Article 51 are not to be referred to only in cases where the
text of the regulation is ambiguous, but must condition all inter¬
pretations of the regulations. It is logical that the aims of
Article 51 ought to be considered even where the text of the
regulation appears to be clear. Thus, Roemer, in presenting his
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opinion as Advocate General In Case 2/67 (De Moor), said:
MSi on devait s'en tenlr au seul texts du reglement No, 3,
1*interpretation ne pourrait gu£re soulever des dif¬
ficulte's, a notre avis •••• (mais) une telle methode
d*interpretation n*est pas sufflsante pour les textes
(54)
du droit coramunautalre ... w ,
It is this emphasis on the aims of the Treaty provisions, and the
flexibility which it allows to the Court, which explains the contro¬
versial nature of many of the Court*s decisions and the sometimes
daring manner in which it has developed the principles of this area
of Community law,
(ii) The balance between Community and national law
Tiie aims of Regulation No. 3, though influential, are not, of
course, the only factors which determine the interpretation, of one of
its provisions. The text of the provision itself must naturally be
considered, and also the problem of the balance between Community and
national law. It is to this latter problem, a problem which traces
its course through the whole field of Community law, that we shall now
turn our attention.
Where Community law and national law are liable to be applied in
the same case, a number of problems arise.
First, the proper sphere of each system must be determined. But
even then there are other questions to be answered: what happens if
both laws purport to apply to the same subject? What happens when a
member state has a part to play in Community legislation and either
fails to play its part or does so incorrectly?
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These questions are familiar to the student of Community law, and
this makes it all the more interesting to examine their treatment by
the Court in the context of Regulation No. 3.
(a) Definition of the proper spheres of Community law and of
national law:
Since Community law enjoys precedence over national law, defining
the proper sphere of each system means in effect defining the scope of
application of Community law. Since this task falls to a Conmunity
institution, the Court of Justice, it is not surprising that there is
a tendency to expand the field of Community law at the expense of
national law, while nevertheless trying to respect the competence
of the latter. This is well illustrated by the Interpretation which
the Court 1ms given to Regulation No. 3,
TTw! problem of defining the proper spheres of Community law and
of national law has arisen especially in connection with the definition
of the scope of application of Regulation No. 3. The subjects covered
by the regulation are defined in its first four articles but the
definitions are in general terms which have naturally given rise to
problems of interpretation. These terms, contained in a Conmunity
Regulation, are terms of Community law which fall to be interpreted
by the Court of Justice.
The problem first arose in the first social security case
(75/63 (linger)) to come before the Court. In that case a Dutch court,
the Centrale Rand van Beroep, asked whether the notion of "travailleur
salarie" du assimile" was defined by the national legislations or
whether it had a supranational meaning. The Court, disagreeing with
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Lagrange A.G. on this point, replied that the term had indeed "une
port/e comraunautaire": firstly, because the personal application
of the Regulation could only be understood within the framework of
Article 51, which aims to establish the free movement of workers; and
secondly, because, even if the notion "travailleur salarie ou
assimile" were familiar to each of the national laws, this would
not mean that it meant the same thing in each member state. Having
established that it was for itself and not for the national authorities
to define the term, the Court proceeded to give a fairly wide defi¬
nition.
However, the object of Regulation No. 3 is not to replace, but to
co-ordinate national laws, so that ultimately the scope of application
of Regulation No. 3, the persons to whom and the laws to which it
applies, must be determined by reference to national law. The Unger
case has its complement in case 19/68 (De Cicco) and it is well to
read the two cases together. Here the question was whether Italian
artisans could be considered as "travailleurs salaries ou assimileV.
Although the interpretation given by the Court is not restrictive,
the emphasis is much more on the fact that any definition of the
application of Regulation No. 3 must refer ultimately to national law;
whether one defines "assimilation** broadly or narrowly (this is for
Community law to decide), there must be some sort of assimilation at
the national level before Regulation No. 3 can apply. Community law
in this area may perhaps be compared to a roof supported by six (or
more recently, nine) pillarst the roof-builder may define the shape and
extent of his roof, but ultimately he can do this only by reference
to the position and size of the six (or nine) pillars.
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(b) Overlapping of Community and national law
The fact that the social security regulations seek to co-ordinate
the national laws does not mean that they will not overlap with those
laws| on the contrary, where previously one only had to consider
national law (and bilateral treaties) to see the legal position of
the migrant, one now has to consider Community law in addition.
Where the two sets of law - we leave aside international treaties
for the moment - claim to cover the same person in the same situation,
there are three problems which may arise:
(1) If the two are incompatible, it must be decided which
one enjoys precedence;
(2) If the two are not obviously incompatible, it must be
decided whether they can be applied simultaneously;
(3) It must in some cases be decided whether an interested
party may opt for the application of one law rather
than the other.
Let us look briefly at each of these questions in turn to see what
solution they have found within the framework of the social security
regulations.
(56)
Conflict: It has long ago been decided by the Court that
Community law enjoys precedence over national law, as indeed it
must if it is to be applied uniformly throughout the Conraunlty.
The problem has never caused any difficulty in the sphere of social
security law, for clearly Regulation No. 3 would not make sense
if it did not prevail over the barriers raised by national law.
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Slmultaneous application: The problem of the simultaneous application
of Community and of national law has not been posed In general terms
but was the principal feature of two cases concerning Articles 12 and
13, Regulation No, 3, articles which govern the choice of law applicable.
The question in case 92/63 (Nonnenmacher)^57^ was whether the
application of Article 12, Regulation No, 3 (which designates the law
of the place of work as the law applicable) was exclusive, or whether
the law of the place of residence might also be applied. Both Lagrange,
the Advocate General in the case, and the Commission concluded that the
application of Article 12 must both be obligatory and exclusive. The
Court, perhaps less tried in its reasoning to traditional insurance
concepts of social security, agreed that the application of Article 12
should be obligatory, since its main object is to ensure that workers
are covered by some system of social security. But its reasoning on
the other part of the question, whether Article 12 excludes the
application of laws other than that of the place of work, is as
follows:
(1) Article 12 does not expressly forbid the simultaneous
application of several national laws, nor can such a
restriction on the national legislature be presumed
unless this is required by the "spirit" of the Treaty,
especially of its Articles 48 to 51,
(2) The only restriction which the aims of these articles
impose is that the simultaneous application of national
law must not be detrimental to the legal position of
migrant workers:
"les articles 48 a 51 du traite ,,, ne permettent pas
dUnterdire a un Etat d*appliquer k toute sa population,
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y compris a ceux de ses ressortissants qui travaillent
dans un autre pays membne, un complement de protection
soclale"^58^.
(3) Therefore, the application of the legislation of
another member state is forbidden only where the
worker would be obliged to finance something from
which he could not benefit.
This decision has not gone uncontested: Seche^59^, for example
points out that it is difficult to reconcile it with the text of
( 00)
Article 11 (1) Regulation No. 3, while Lyon-Caen has suggested
that it can only be understood in the light of the particular facts
of the case. But, whatever the motives which prompted the Court In
this particular case, its reasoning on the relationship between
Regulation No. 3 and national law is in general terms and seems quite
consistent with its general MJurispradenee" on social security. A
(61 )
similar approach was followed in case 80/69 (Brock) , where the
question arose whether certain pensions could be revised "d'office*,
when Article 53 Regulation No. 3 provided only for revision on
request. The Court replied In the affirmative:
"l'article 53 ne fait pas obstacle aux solutions eventuelle-
ment plus avantageuses pour les assures contends dansles
legislations nationaies"^62'•
This, then, would seem to be the general rule.
The decision In Nonnenmacher (Case 92/63) was modified slightly
in a later case, Case 19/67 (Van der Vecht)'63^, also concerning
Article 12. In this case, the Centrale Raad van Beroep repeated the
question which it had asked in the Nonnenmacher case, whether application
of the law of the place of work excluded the law of the place of
-144-
resldence. The answer given by the Court is not quite the same as
that which it gave in the earlier case:
(1) The emphasis, instead of being on what the national
law can do, is on what it cannot do;
(2) Whereas the only restriction on the power of the
national legislature in the earlier case was that the
national law must not harm the workers, this is now
extended: the national law may not oblige either
workers or employers to pay contributions which would
find no counterpart in an increase in social protection.
Literally, this extension of the principle to cover employers contra¬
dicts the decision in Nonnenmacher, but perhaps it is more realistic to
see it as expressing something merely left unexpressed in the earlier
(64)
case .
Option between Community and national law: Where there is a possibility
that the application of national law may be more beneficial to an
interested party than Community law, the problem arises whether the
application of Community law is mandatory, or whether the party has
(65)
some rights of option . In fact, this problem has arisen only
in relation to the mechanism of aggregation and proratisation and it
is better considered within that context.
(c) Division of legislative competence between the Community and the
Member States.
It is not only within the framework of social security that
problems arise from the attribution to member states of some function
in the legislative process of the Communities. But for the moment we
shall confine ourselves to that framework and examine the problem
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under the two aspects which have caused problems in the application
of Regulation No. 3: namely, the direct applicability of Articles
52, Regulation No. 3, and the unilateral amendment of the Regulation
by member states. Both of these problems are, in large part, a hang¬
over from the conventional origins of Regulation No. 3.
Direct applicability of Article 52, Regulation No. 3: The first
paragraph of Article 52 provides for the recognition in all the member
states of the subrogation rights of social security institutions; a
second paragraph then adds:
"L,application de ces dispositions fera l'objet d*accords
bilat£raux".
The problem soon arose whether the first paragraph gave rights
to the social security institutions even where the member states had
failed to conclude such agreements.
/ gg \
In its judgments in Cases 31/64 (Bertholet) and 33/64
{67 ^
(Van Dijk) , the Court, rejecting the arguments of the French
government, held that it did not really matter if the member states
had not played their part, for:
(1) The text of Article 52 (1) is peremptory, clear and
capable of direct application;
(2) It does not appear from Article 52 3een as a whole
that there was aqy intention to subject the rights created
by it to the conclusion of the said agreements;
(3) Moreover, the ri$its conferred on the national social
security institutions are the "complement logique et
equitable" of the extension of the obligations of those
institutions to cover the whole area of the community:
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(4) "qu'ainsi le deuxifcme alin£a trouve sa raison
d'etre dans la prudence de ses auteurs, desireux
de permettre aux Etats de regler entre eux les
/ go \
details dfapplication ^ventuels"
Louis, in his comment on the decision^69\ suggests, in effect,
that the second argument above was a fiction, and that there is ample
evidence to show that the member states did indeed intend the first
paragraphs of Article 52 to be subject to the conclusion of the agree¬
ments. Certainly, this point of view is supported by the opposition
of the French Government in the Van Dijk case: it is rare for a
government to intervene in a social security case where none of its
nationals or institutions is involved. For this reason, Louis sees
the decisions as being of political significance, in the traditions
of Van Gend en Loos^70^ and Costa/Enel^7^.
These decisions were more recently confirmed in case 27/69
(72)(Entr'aide m^dicale) and it was emphasised that, where agreements
were concluded under Article 52 (2), they could not restrict the scope
of Article 52 (1), but only determine the details of its application.
Unilateral amendment of the scope of Community law by the Member States:
The function of Regulation No. 3, we know, is to co-ordinate national
legislations and it is on them that the scope of its application ulti¬
mately depends. Now, since national legislation must remain ifirfee to
change, it was found most convenient to relegate certain provisions
(such as the list of laws to which Regulation No. 3 applies, and the
classification of disablement laws under Article 24) to Annexes.
(73)
These annexes form an integral part of the Regulation , but in the
event of a change in national legislation, the country concerned is





These annexes have caused problems In a number of cases ,
but we shall look here only at the problems concerning directly
the participation or non-partlcipatlon of the member state in the
definition of the scope of Community law. In other words, what
happens if the country concerned either fails to make any notifi¬
cation, or else does so, but does so incorrectly?
The former problem was one of the Issues in Case 100/63
(76)
(Van der Veen) . The Dutch Algemene Weduwen en Wezenwet (AWW)
had been passed after the coming into force of Regulation No. 3,
yet it lad not been notified in accordance with Article 3 (2) and
Annex B. Did this failure to notify affect the application of
Regulation 3 to the new law? The Court held that it did not:
(1) It was not necessary to notify AWW, because the
general terms of Annex £ already covered it;
(2) Even if notification of AWW were required by
Article 3(2), failure to notify would not affect
the application of Regulation No. 3; to say otherwise
would mean that any member state could "disposer
arbitrairement du champ d'application1^77 ^ of Regulation
No. 3.
The delicacy of the Comnunity-national law balance was, however,
to be illustrated by the next social security case to come before
the Court.
(78)
Case 24/64 (Dingemans) concerns both Annex B, as did
100/63, and Annex F, which relates to Article 24 cf the Regulation.
Article 24 classifies disablement benefits for the purpose of ag¬
gregation as being either of type A (where the amount of the benefit
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Is independent of the period of contribution) or of type B (where
the opposite is true). Annex F then lists the laws of the member
states as being either type A or type B. A new law governing dis¬
ablement pensions (Ml) came into force in the Netherlands in 1963.
No one appears to have disputed that MI was in fact of type A, but
it was notified as being of type B, and this notification was published
in the Journal Officlel. The Centrale Raad van Beroep pertinently
asked whether MI should be treated as being of type A or of type B.
This presented the Court with a dilemma. On the one hand, if it
accepted the member State's manifestly incorrect classification of MI,
would this not be doing Just what it had said in 100/63 that it could
not do: allow a member state to "disposer arbitrairement du champ d*
application" of Regulation No. 3? On the other hand, if the Court
were not to accept this classification of MI, it would mean both
interpreting national law (which it has no competence to do under
Article 177) and ignoring the fact that Article 24 recognises the
right of member states to classify their own legislation.
Faced with this problem, the Commission counselled the first sol¬
ution: to say that MI was of type A. But the Advocate General (Gand)
and the Court refused to take this step. Although the Court repeated
its earlier decision on Annex B - for this was also in issue - it did
not really face up to the problem of Annex F. It merely noted that
the amendment to Annex F published in the Journal Official after the
entry into force of MI had classified the Dutch disablement legis¬
lation as being of type B; and that the regularity of this amendment
had not been contested.
The decision is not entirely satisfactory, for it is difficult
to see how the amendment could effectively have been contested; it
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also seems to leave a situation where failure to notify matters
nothing, whereas incorrect notification is of some effect.
(iii) Effect of the Courts interpretation
For the sake of clarity, the structure and principles of Reg¬
ulation No. 3 were considered under various headings. It is con¬
venient to adopt the same headings in examining the substance of
the Court's interpretation of the regulation: scope of application;
equality of treatment; conservation of acquired rights; conservation
of rights in the process of being acquired. The problems of muiti-
(79)
lateral agreements and the special administrative and juris-
(00)
dictional arrangements of the regulation do not require separate
treatment.
The retention of these headings does not, of course, mean that
all there issues have raised questions of equal interest. On the
contrary, it will be seen that the most controversial and the most
interesting decisions of the Court fall under the headings referring
to the scope of application of the regulation and the conservation of
rights in the process of being acquired.
(a) Scope of application
The Court's interpretation of the scope of application of
Regulation No. 3 has been perhaps the most striking and the most
important aspect of its work. It has insisted on a broad inter¬
pretation of the subject-matter covered by the regulation, both
ratione personae and ratione materiae.
Differences of opinion as to the persons covered by the regulation
became clear soon after its entry into force. Some countries (France
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and Luxembourg) argued, on the basis of the title of the regulation
that Regulation No. 3 was intended to apply only to migrant workers
stricto sensu. The other countries argued that there wan no such
limitation contained in the text of the regulation, the provisions of
which they applied to all "travailleurs salaries ou assimiles" who
satisfied the requirements of Article 4 of the regulation and who
moved from one member state to another, for whatever reason. It was
not until 1962, at the 37th and 38th sessions of the Commission
(81)
administrative established by Article 43 of the regulation, that the
member states unanimously agreed upon the broad interpretation of
Regulation No. 3.
Despite the agreement of the member states, the Court was called
upon to pronounce upon the issue a number of times. In the very first
(£2)
social security case (Unger, Case 75/63) , the Court implicitly
accepted the agreement in the Comoission administrative by its inter*-
pretation of Article 19, Regulation No. 3 in a case involving a woman
on a visit from the Netherlands to see her parents in Germany.
(83)
In Case 33/64 (Van Dijk)w , the Court was asked whether Regulation
No. 3 applied to a Dutchman working in Germany who was injured while
spending his leisure hours in the Netherlandsi the Court replied in
the affirmative. This interpretation was directly challenged in
(84)
Case 44/65 (Hessische Knappschaft c. Singer) • In that case, which
involved a German holiuay-raaker killed in a road accident in France,
one of the parties argued that the broad interpretation of Regulation
No. 3 was incompatible with the provisions of Article 51 which only
gave the Council power to draw up regulations to ensure the free
movement of workers. The Court brushed this objection aside by
referring to the "spirit" of Article 51:
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Mqu'il ne serait pas conforroe k cet esprit de limiter
la notion de M travail leur" aux seuls travailleurs migrants
strict.o sensu ou aux seuls d^placements relatifs &
1'exercise de leur emploij
que rien dans 1'article 51 n*impose de telles distinctions,
qui d'ailleurs seraient susceptibles de rendre 1'application
des regies envisagees impraticable;
que, par contre, le syst^me adopts pour le r^glement No, 3,
qui consiste a supprimer, autant que possible, les limites
tcrritoriales de 1'application des diff^rents regimes de
s^curite' sociale, correspond bien aux objectifs de 1'article
51 du trait^1'^8v>^
This interpretation was finally confirmed some years later in the
extreme case of a Luxembourger, living and working in Luxembourg, who
was killed in a car crash just across the border in Belgium on an
/ Qg \
evening's outing (Case 27/69, Caisse d'entr'aide) • Asked whether
Regulation No. 3 applied where what was involved was not migration
for employment but wune randonntTe de plaisir", the Court replied that
the regulation applied
Ma tout travailleur salarie^ ou assimild' placef dans l'une des
situations a caract&re international prevues par ledit regle-
\ (87)
ment, ainsi, qu'a ses survivants"
This insistence on the broad interpretation of Regulation No. 3 is
probably the most important single contribution the Court has made to
the development of the international co-ordination of social security.
In these days of expanding tourism the number of people who can potent¬
ially benefit from the application of the regulations is enormous.
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This development is reflected in the title of the new Regulation 1408/71.
Whereas Regulation No. 3 was said to concern "la security sociale des
travailleurs migrants", Regulation 1408/71 is "relatif k l,application
des regimes de s^curiW sociale aux travailleurs salaried et k leur
famille qui se deplacent a l'int^rieur de la Communaute"•
The Court has also sought to widen the protection afforded by
Regulation No. 3 by a generous interpretation of the phrase "travail-
eurs salaries ou assimiles" contained in article 4 of the regulation
which defines its scope ratione personae. The first interpretation of
. . . (88)
this provision was in Case 75/63 (Unger) , where the Court held that
the notion covered those who, having ceased to be employed and no
longer subject to compulsory insurance, nevertheless, with the intention
of returning to employment, continued to be insured voluntarily under a
scheme governed by principles similar to those of the compulsory
insurance. More interesting, however, are two more recent cases,
those of De Cicco (19/68)and Janssen (23/71
An important problem is constituted by "mixed careers", by those
who migrate and are employed in one member state, and subsequently
return home to work not as an employee but in some independent capacity.
The problem arises whether such workers can, if they are insured not as
workers but in some separate scheme when they return home, nevertheless
avail themselves of the Community regulations. Both Case 19/68 and
Case 23/71 are concerned with this problem. In the former, De Cicco,
an Italian national, was employed and insured as an employee for several
years in Germany; later he returned to Italy, where he worked and was
insured as an artisan. The question arose whether, as an artisan, he
should be considered as falling within the category of "travailleurs
salaries et assimile's". The Court was not competent to Interpret the
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status of artisans under Italian law, but it gave a definition of
"assimile's" broad enough to cover Italian artisans:
"qu'une telle assimilation a lieu chaque fois que, par
l'effet d'une legislation nationsle, les dispositions d'un
regime g£ne'rale de se'curite^ sociale sont etendues a une
categorie de personnes autres que les salaries vlsds par
le r&glement No. 3, quelles que soient les formes ou
modalite's utilisees par le l^gislateur national;
que les artisans doivent des lors etre considerds
comme assirailes aux travailleurs salaries dans
la mesure oil lis sont, en vertu des dispositions
d'une legislation nationale, prot^gds contre un ou
plusieurs risques organised au benefice de la
(91)
gendralite de travailleurs" .
The problem arose again In the case of Janssen (Case 23/71), who
ted worked and ted been insured as an agricultural employee in France,
before returning to his native Belgium. In Belgium, he worked as an
"aidant", i.e. as a family helper on his father's farm and was insured
as an "independent" or self-employed worker. Again, the question arose
whether he could benefit firom the provisions of Regulation No. 3,
whether "aidants" were to be considered as falling within the category
of "travailleurs salaries et assimile's". Both the Commission and
Roemer, the Advocate General in the case, advised the Court to give a
negative reply.
The Court's decision provides a good example of its resourcefulness.
On the one hand, it gave an interpretation of "assimile" which, although
broad, does not appear in fact to have covered the legal position of the
"aidant" under Belgian law. Having interpreted the notion of "assimil^",
*»1 o4—
the Court nevertheless went on to hold that Janssen was covered by
Article 4 of Regulation No. 3 by virtue of the fact that he had been
Insured as an employee. What follows this Illustrates the use to which
the Court puts Its teleological approach:
"Attendu que ie but des articles 48 a 51 ne serait pas
attelnt mals meconnu si les p^iriodes d'assurance acqulses
par le travailleur conformement a la legislation d'un Etat
membre, devalent etre pour lul perldues lorsque, profltant
de la llbre circulation qui lul est garantie, 11 change de
lieu de travail et est alnsl soumls a un regime de s^curlte"
soclale d'un autre Etat merabre;
que cette conclusion est d'allleurs confirmee ... par
(92)
l'artlcle 9 1 du reglement No. 3 ..." .
There follows a broad Interpretation of Article 9 (1) which leads the
Court to the conclusion that, where (as In the Belgian case) the
legislation governing the insurance of independent workers alloys
periods of insurance completed under the social security scheme for
employed workers to be taken into account in assessing the insured's
right to benefits, such periods of insurance completed in another member
state must be treated as having been completed in the first member state.
The effect of this decision is to bring the worker who has had an
international "mixed career" into the same position as the worker who
has had a "mixed career" within one member state, no matter what the pre¬
cise insurance status of the non-employed part of the career.
The Court's contribution to the definition of the material scope
of application of the Regulation has been scarcely less positive. It
has insisted that it applies equally to contributory and non-contri-
(93) (94)
butory schemes and to voluntary as well as compulsory insurance
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provided, of course, that the scheme is governed by some "legislation"
in the sense of Article 2 and 1(b) of the Regulation. In Case 61/65
(95)(Vaassen-Gobbels) , it was held that this term was broad enough to
cover regulations governing private law insurance institution (in this
case the Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf) when those regulations
either take the place of, or complement the laws and statutory regu¬
lations which set up a general or special social security regime. This
interpretation corresponded, said the Court, to the obvious desire of
Regulation No. 3 not to exclude from its coverage the regimes run by
private institutions which constitute, in some countries, an import-
tant part of the social security system. Lyon-Caen sees this decision^9^
as paving the way to a possible extension of Regulation No. 3 to cover
complementary social security schemes, or at least those schemes which
have their origin in collective agreements and are in soms way ratified
or made obligatory by public authority. But the Court did not have the
opportunity to develop this line in any of the later cases on Regulation
No. 3, and Article 1 (j) of the new Regulation No. 1408/71 specifically
excludes such schemes from its coverage. Moreover, in case 80/70
(97)(Defrenne) , where the question arose whether social security
benefits could be considered as indirect remuneration within the meaning
of Article 119 EEC, the Court makes a clear distinction between statutory
schemes, whether general or special, and complementary schemes which
result from collective bargaining. The problem of co-ordinating
complementary social security schemes remains tnerefore one of the
principal lacunae in the system instigated by the EEC.
One of the most interesting and important cases in this area
(98)
is the case of Frilli (Case 1/72) , which concerned the distinction
between "social security" in the sense of the regulation and "social
assistance", which is excluded by Article 2 (1) (c) from the scope
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of application of the regulation. The subject of dispute in the case
was the "revenu garanti", the non-contributory pension granted by the
Belgian state under a law of 1969 to all old people who satisfy a
means test, and who are of Belgian nationality, ivtae Frill!, an
Italian national who had been employed for a short time in Belgium
and *v¥B3 resident there, claimed that the nationality restriction was
incompatible with the provisions of Regulation No. 3, since the
"revenu gcranti1* was a non-contributory pension. The Belgian state,
on the other hand, argued that the aim of the "revenu garanti" was to
provide "un minimum vital" to old people in need and that it was a form
of assistance, and therefore not covered by the regulation,Against this,
both the Commission and the Italian government argued that:
"les critkres distinctifs classiques d'une prestation
d'assistance sociale, a savoir l'<£tendue de son
champ d'application, les conditions de ressources
auxquelles est subordonne son octroi ainsi que son
(99)
mode de financement, ne seraient plus suffisants1'
The important question, they argued, was whether the claimant had a legal
right to the benefit, or whether It depended on the discretion of the
Institution granting It,
The Court, however, refused to draw a clear distinction between
social security and social assistance: legislations such as the one in
question were related to both categories "echappant ainsl h toute
classification globale". Instead, the Court made a personal distinction
between those beneficiaries who already had some right to a pension and
those who did not:
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"que, compte tenu de la definition large du cercle des
b/n^ficiares, une telle legislation remplit, en realite^
une double fonction, consistant, d'une part a garantir
un minimum de moyens d*existence a des personnes placees
entlerement en dehors du systeme de securlte' sociale et,
d*autre part, a assurer un compleWnt de revenu aux
beneficialres de prestations de sdcurite"' sociale
insufflsantes"^,
In the case of the latter, the "revenu garanti" merely represented a
supplementary pension and so fell within the scope of Regulation No, 3,
whereas those who had no right to a pension could not be helped in the
absence of some "intervention legislative de la Coramunaute",
This decision is of considerable importance, for the idea of
guaranteeing a minimum pension to old people has been gaining ground
in many of the member states in recent years, and much of the modern
"assistance" legislation in fact grants "supplementary benefits" to
those whose social insurance benefits are insufficient^'0'^,
(b) Equality of treatment
The problem of discrimination against non-nationals has not caused
very much difficulty in any of the social security cases which have
come before the Court, As we have just seen, the Court refused in the
Frllli Case (1/72) to accept the discrimination against non-Belgians
contained in the Belgian law on the "revenu garanti". The Court
referred in that case to
"la regie dVgalit/ de traitement qui est l'un des principes
fondamentaux du droit communautaire, consacrd^ en la mati^re,
par 1'article 8 du reglement No, S.^'02^,
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The principle of equal treatment was reasserted in the more recent
case of Smieja (Case 51/73)^°'^, In that case the question arose
whether Miss Smieja, a German national who had been insured in the
Netherlands but was now resident in Germany, could benefit from
certain transitional provisions under the Dutch old age pensions
law (AOV), when Article 44 of that law restricts the benefit of
those provisions to those who "(a) possess Dutch nationality and
(b) reside within the Kingdonf, The Court held, in effect although
not, of course, in form, that neither of these restrictions could
be opposed to Miss Smieja*s claim: under Article 8, Regulation No, 3
(and under Article 3 (1), Regulation No. 1408/71), Miss Smieja must
be treated as a Dutch national, and under Article 10 (1), her
acquired pension rights could not be reduced simply because she
resided in another member state
(c) Conservation of acquired rights
The Court has been no more tolerant of residence restrictions than
it has been of nationality restrictions. Although it does not emerge
very clearly from the text of Regulation No, 3, the Court has insisted
that the general rule is that residence restrictions are incompatible
with the Regulation,
In the Vaassen-Gobbels case (61/65^0S\ an apparent gap in
Regulation No, 3 was discovered. Although provision had been made that
residence should be no bar to the provision of medical care in the case
of active workers (Article 12), nor in the case of pensioners where the
pensioner is automatically insured against illness (cf. Articles 10, 12,
22), no provision had apparently been made for pensioners whose health
insurance was independent of their pension. However, the Court,
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empliasising the deterriturialising aspect of Regulation No, 3, held
that It resulted from Article 10 of the Regulation (which applies to
"les pensions ou rentes et les allocations au decks'*, a phrase which
does not, one would have thought, cover the provision of medical care)
that, where Regulation No, 3 intends to preserve residence restrictions,
it does so expressly. The "dlspositif" of the judgment is unusually and
no doubt deliberately vague, referring not to particular provisions, but
simply saying that "les dispositions du reglement No, 3 s'opposent h ..."
residence restrictions like that in question. But, however faulty the
(106)
reasoning, the result of the case is surely most welcome .
(d) Conservation of rlpfots in the process of being acquired:
More than anything else, it is the intricacies of the system of
aggregation and proratisation which have caused difficulties for the
Court and the problem has come before it more than twenty times^07^.
We shall look first at the application of the system to non-contributory
schemes, secondly at the more controversial aspect of the Court's 'juri¬
sprudence", the relation which it has seen between aggregation and
proratisation.
When discussing the techniques of aggregation and proratisation^08^,
we saw that they were designed primarily for contributory social security
schemes and were not particularly suitable where one of the systems is
non-contributory. Hence the introduction in the Netherlands of non-
contributory pensions for widows and orphans^09^ and for invalids
was bound to cause some problems. Nevertheless, the Court confirmed in
case 100/63 (Van der Veen) and 24/64 (Uingemans) that Regulation No. 3^**^
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and its system of aggregation and proratisation did indeed apply to these
new schemes''12'.
What this actually means was made a little bit clearer by the
judgment in the Hagenbeek case (4/66)*113\ Normally, as we have
seen, the technique of aggregation means simply the addition of
periods of insurance in order to overcome preliminary periods, the
completion of which is a condition precedent to the granting of benefits*
But where, as in the case of the Dutch survivors' pension, there is no
preliminary period required and the only condition is that the insured
person should be subject to the IXitch system at the time of his death,
the mere addition of periods of insurance means nothing. In Hagenbeek,
however, the effect of the Court's decision was that, where a person has
been insured in the Netherlands, but is no longer insured there at the
time of the realisation of the risk (i.e. at the time of his death, if
we are considering his survivors' pension), aggregation operates to
recover his (survivor's) pension rights. Seche^*4^ is surely right
in pointing to this as a modification in the notion of aggregation, which
here involves not simply an arithmetical addition of periods of Insur¬
ance, but the principle that if some event, which is essential for the
opening of social security rights in one member state, occurs in another
member state, then it must be treated as though it had occurred in the
first state.
But it is on the question of the proper relation between aggregation
(Article 27, Regulation No. 3) and proratisation (Article 28, Regulation
No. 3) that the Court's "jurisprudence" has been particularly contro¬
versial and troublesome, lite fact that it is the Court's teleological
approach, its insistence on the aims of the Regulation, that is at the
source of the troubles, gives the study of these cases a more than
technical interest.
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When we discussed the social security problems which faced the
migrant worker in the absence of international co-ordination, we noted
that, despite the problems, he might be lucky (or skilful) and benefit
from two (or even more) full pensions^We shall retain the most
obvious example; a man works in Germany for, say, forty years, then
goes to the Netherlands and works for one year and dies. His widow
will receive a German pension corresponding to the forty years*
insurance of her late husband and, aswe have seen, she will also receive
a Dutch pension^ for the only condition required is that the
insured person should die while resident in the Netherlands. In the
absence of international co-ordination, the migrant's widow will, in
this case, be better off than either the widow of a nan who had worked
all his life in Germany, or the widow of a mar. who had spent his whole
career In the Netherlands. We saw also that the aim of International
co-ordination Is to ensure that the migrant Is covered by social security,
but only once, that Is, to put him in the same position as a non-migrant.
If the co-ordinating arrangement succeeds in this aim, clearly it will
be to the disadvantage of our widow. But we know already from our
examination of the Court's view of tlie alms of Regulation No, 3 that
it considers that the main aim of Regulation No. 3 and Article 51 EEC
is to ensure the free movement of workers and that any reduction in the
rights of the migrant would be contrary to that aim. How can this be
reconciled with the traditional view that it Is wrong for our widow to
enjoy two pensions? It is from this contradiction that much of the
thorniest litigation before the Court has sprung.
Now, the traditional Idea of aggregation and proratisatlon Is that
each country should conduct the operation separately: first, each
country In which the migrant has worked calculates the pension which
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would have been due to him had he completed the entire period of
Insurance in that country; then each country divides the resulting
sum in proportion to the period of insurance actually completed in that
country, Thus, in the case of our widow's pension, each country,
Germany and the Netherlands, will calculate the amount which she would
have received had her husband been insured under their legislation for
41 years: Germany will then pay her 40/41 of the sum which they
calculate, and the Netherlands will give her 1/41 of the sum which
they, for their part, calculate. Now, if the amount of the pension in
each country were directly proportional to the period of insurance^17^
the pension which the widow would receive would be exactly the same as
that which she would have received in the absence of international
co-ordination. But where the amount of the pension does not increase
at the same rate as the period of insurance, thatisintthenot infrequent
case where there is either a fixed minimum or a flat rate pension (as
with the Dutch survivors* pension), the amount which the migrant
receives after aggregation and proratisation nay be less than the amount
which he would have received if no such operations had been conducted.
In our own particular case, this means simply that, although the widow
will receive the same German pension as she would have received in the
absence of international arrangement, she will receive only 1/41 of the
Dutch pension she would otherwise have received, since that pension is
flat-rate and dependent only on residence.
The solution to this problem which was adopted by most post-war
treaties Is to grant the migrant the possibility of opting between the
application of the treaty and the application of the two separate
national laws. This would, of course, suit our widow very well - she
would presumably opt for the separate application of the two laws.
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However, for those who regard the aim of international co-ordination
as being to rationalise the system, so that a migrant neither loses
nor gains by migrating, it is an unsatisfactory solution. No doubt
because this rationalising, deterritorialising influence is an important
force in the attempt to construct a united Europt, Regulation No. 3
adopted a different solution, i.e. Regulation No. 3 does not provide
for any right of option. Article 28(3) provides that, where the pension
to which a migrant (or, of course, his widow) is entitled after ag¬
gregation and proratisation is smaller than the pension which he would
have received under the legislation of one of the member states, had
there been no aggregation, then he has a right to a complement equal
to the difference.
This would mean, in the case of our widow, that if the sum she
would receive after aggregation and proratisation (40/41 and 1/41
respectively of the German and Dutch pensions to which she would have
been entitled after 41 years) were less, say, than the German pension
she would otherwise have received (an unlikely event), then she is
entitled to a complement equal to the difference. In other words, if a
migrant loses on aggregation and proratisation, the most he can possibly
receive, even after the application of Article 28(3), is the higher
of the two pensions to which he was entitled in the absence of inter¬
national regulation. There is no right of option: Article 28(4).
On the face of it, then, there are some migrants, like our widow,
who will not benefit but will lose from the application of Regulation
No. 3,who wfeuld be in a better position if Regulation No. 3 did not
exist. This is the problem which faced the Court of Justice.
It was against this background that the Dutch Centrale Raad van
Beroep (the highest Court in social security matters) asked the Court
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In case 100/63 (Van der Veen)^**8^ whether proratisation under
Article 28 applied to AWW (the Dutch law governing widows' and
orphans' benefits), even where there was no question of aggregation
"en vue de 1'acquisition, du maintien ou du recouvrement du droit
aux prestations" under Article 27 (1), Regulation No. 3, i.e.
whether the technique of proratisation should be applied even where -
as in the case of our hypothetical widow - no aggregation under Article
27 was necessary to open the widow's right to a pension. The Court
replied that Article 27 and 28 were applicable to legislations such as
the AWW, but that Article 28 (proratisation) was applicable only when
Article 27 was applicable, only
"s'il s'agit de 1'acquisition, du maintien ou du recouvrement
du droit a prestation, vise's k l'artiele 27"
If Article 28 could be applied independently of Article 27, the Court
argued, migrants might suffer a loss of rights and this would be in¬
compatible with the aim of Article 51 to favour the free movement of
workers.
The lade of clarity of this decision gave rise to a flood of liti¬
gation. There were two possible interpretations, each of which was a
break with the traditional approach:
(1) It was clear that the Court meant that there should
be neither aggregation nor proratisation where the
former was not necessary for the purpose of acquiring,
maintaining or recovering rights in either country.
This would mean that in case of our widow, there would
be no application of Regulation No. 3, since she was
already entitled to a pension in each country under
internal law.
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(2) It was also clear that if aggregation were necessary for
the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or recovering
rights in a country, proratisation under Article 28
should also be applied In that country.
(5) What was not clear was whether Article 27 and 28 should
be applied in both countries If aggregation was only
necessary in one. For example, if a migrant works for
four years In Germany and then the rest of his career In
the Netherlands, then aggregation will be necessary to
open his widow's ri#it to a pension in Germany (where the
preliminary period required is 15 yearsl but not in the
Netherlands. Should the Dutch pension also be proratised
in this case? The traditional answer is a clear yes.
The confusion which followed is well Illustrated by the decisions
of the national courts. The Centrale Raa-1 van Be roep assumed that the
Court meant that proratisation should take place In all the countries
concerned if aggregation were necessary In one of them, and it applied
/ «(V\\
this assumption to the Van der Veen cases • In another case, a
rather extraordinary decision, the Raad van Be roep te Zwolle^** ^
held that the Court's decision in Van der Veen meant that prora¬
tisation applied only in the country in which aggregation was
necessary, and that, although this interpretation of Article 28
was manifestly contrary to the intention of the authors of the
Regulation and would cause a number of 'mdlarlties, it was nevertheless
an authoritative interpretation and should be followed. On appeal,
The Oentrale Raad van Beroep disagreed with this Interpretation of
case 100/67 (Van der Veen) and quashed the lower court's decision.
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Surprisingly, the Oentrale Raad, which Is usually very ready to
send preliminary questions to the Court of Justice under Article 177
EEC, does not even seem to have considered doing so In this case*
These doubts as to the proper Interpretation of Article 28
were further increased by the decision in Hagenbeek (4/66). In
(122)
that case, the Court introduced an "attendu" which was not
strictly necessary for its decision: it pointed out that, although
Article 51 EEC would not allow a worker to be deprived of his rights
by the fact of his migration, this does not mean that he may receive
an accumulation of benefits which would be unjustified in the light of
Article 28(3) Regulation No* 3* This seemed to indicate a shift in
the Court's interpretation* In the light of all this, it is not
surprising that the national social security institutions were
reluctant to abandon what had seemed the obvious interpretation of
Article 28 Regulation No. 3 before the Judgment in Van der Veen*
The reluctance of the national social security institutions led in
turn to a wave of litigation, part of which hit the Court of Justice
in 1967.
In the first of the 1967 cases, Ciechelski (l/67)^23^, the Court
cleared up some of the doubts which surrounded the Van der Veen
decision. The Cour d'Appel d1Orleans asked the Court what the
proper interpretation of Article 51 EEC and Article 27, 28
Regulation No* 3 was, and, in particular, whether the Regulation
could validly deprive a worker of a part of the rights which he had
already acquired in one of the states of the Community. The Court,
taking a different approach from that of the Commissionand the Advocate
General (Gand in this case), held:
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(1) That there should be no proratisation unless
aggregation was necessary for the purpose of acquiring,
maintaining or recovering rights under the legislation In
question. This conclusion was seen to result from the
text of Article 27 (1) and Article 28 (1) (b) and to be
supported by the aim of Article 51 which is to favour the
migrant worker "par rapport a la situation qui resulteralt
pour lul de 1'application exclusive du droit interne" ^124^
Moreover, Regulation No. 3 does not aim to create one
common social security system, but leaves the different
systems intact.
(2) That these principles do not apply where this would lead to
an accumulation of benefits relating to the same period.
But there is no such accumulation simply by the fact that the
insured maintains his rights in one country while obtaining
through aggregation a new right to a benefit in another state,
even where the sum gained in the latter by aggregation is
greater than the loss that would be caused by proratisation
in the former.
This decision thus rejects the traditional interpretation of the
technique of aggregation and proratisation, according to which the
proratisation should be carried out in both countries if necessary
in either. The decision reiterates the principle that any inter¬
pretation of Regulation No. 3 which would put the migrant in a
position less favourable to him than it would be in the absence of the
Regulation would be incompatible with the aim of Article 51. As in
the case of Duffy25\ the Court's rejection of the Commission's
argument represents the rejection of the aim of "rationalising"
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the co-ordination of the social security systems in favour of the
aim of safeguarding the rights of migrants. The decision was con¬
firmed by two other decisions of the same day, the judgments in
Cases 2/67 (De Moor) and 9/67 (Colditz).
Grave doubts have been raised as to the correctness of these
decisions. Voirin, in particular, has argued cogently against them .
It is worth considering some of his objections, for in this apparently
very technical dispute we can see some of the basic ideas as to the
purpose of Regulation No. 3 working their way out of theory and crystal¬
lising into reality.
After pointing out that the Court's interpretation of the tech¬
nique of aggregation and proratisation is contrary to the traditional
view of those techniques and to the apparent intentions of the authors
of the Regulation, his principal arguments are: firstly, that the
Court's decision conflicts with the text of Regulation No. 3, seen
as a whole; and secondly, that this decision against the text was
in no way required by the aims of the Treaty.
It would be difficult to deny that the Court would have been
bound to come to a different result if they had given more weight
to the text of Article 28 and of Regulation No. 3 and Regulation No. 4
as a whole, instead of immediately averting their gaze to the
"spirit" of Article;48-51 EEC. The Court's decision deprives at
least three provisions of all meaning: Article 28 (1) (f), 28 (3)
and 28 (4) of Regulation No. 3^'2^. Article 28 (1) (f) provides
that if the claimant does not, after aggregation, satisfy the require¬
ments of all the legislations applicable but does, without aggregation,
satisfy the requirements of one legislation, the benefit will be calcu-
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lated according to that legislation; Article 28 (4) provides that
this (the eventuality mentioned in Article 28 (1) (f) is the only
case in which a claimant may claim a pension on the basis of the
provision of a single legislation. These provisions make sense only
if one assumes that, where a claimant is entitled to pension in one
state without aggregation and to a pension in another through ag¬
gregation, both pensions must be proratised. The same is true of
Article 28 (3), Regulation No. 3, which provides, as was seen already,
that, where the pension to which a migrant is entitled after aggreg¬
ation and proratisation is smaller than the pension which he would
have received under the legislation of one of the member states had
there been no aggregation, then he has a right to a complement equal
to the difference: such a situation cannot, of course, arise under
the Court's interpretation of the relation between Article 27 and
Afticle 28. The Court's interpretation in the Ciechelski and De
Moor cases is one which shows scant respect for the text of the
regulations.
However, the second part of Voirin's argument, to the effect
that a departure from the traditional interpretation of Regulation
No, 3 is in no way required by the aims of Articles 48-51 EEC,
appears to rest on his claim that Regulation No. 3 was elaborated
"dans la double perspective de la suppression des discriminations
et de la realisation de la liberte' de circulation ... Les deux
objectifs sont d'ailleurs lies, que la discrimination Joue en
/19g )
faveur ou en cHffaveur du migrant" , We have seen already that
this view is not shared by the Court, which has insisted from the
beginning that Regulation No. 3 must not operate to the detriment
of the migrants.
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The difference in view on this point between Voirin (who
represents more or less the viewpoint of the Commission and of the
Advocate General)on the one hand, and the Court on the other,
betrays different attitudes towards the function of law, of social
security, of Regulation No. 3 and, by implication, of the European
Communities.
Voirin clearly considers the text of the law to be of prime
importance and regards an interpretation which goes against this
text with a certain abhorrence as a "procede qui paralt bien
«aa\
e'tranger a la tradition juridique des six Etats membres .
We must assume that the Court's approach is different, for although
the considerable textual arguments were raised before it, parti¬
cularly by Roemer, the Advocate General, in De Moor, it did not even
mention them in its judgments, preferring to concentrate on the aims
of Article 51Surprisingly, it did not even take the opport¬
unity offered to it in De Moor (where the question concerned the
validity of Article 27, 28 Regulation No. 3) to declare invalid those
provisions of Article 28 which conflict with its view of the aims of
Article 51. Hie Court appears to be taking a broad, creative view
of the law and shuns detailed analysis of texts.
It is more difficult to see whether the decision involves a
certain concept of social security. Voirin assumes that the Court's
reasoning is governed by the outdated and socially undesirable notion
that social security is governed by the same principles as private
insurance, so that an accumulation of social security benefits would
be no more repugnant than an accumulation of benefits resulting from
several policies of life insurance. But, if this is the way in which
the Court reasons, it is nowhere expressed in the Court's Judgments,
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nor Is It a necessary step in the argument, once one accepts the
Court*s definition of the aims of Regulation No. 3. On the other
hand, Voirin*s own assumption^'3'\ that a non-contributory pension
based on residence is nevertheless the counterpart of the work done
during a professional career, suggests that his reasoning is not un¬
influenced by the contractual origins of social security.
The most striking contrast, and one to which we have already
drawn attention, is that between the two views of the aims of
Regulation No. 3 and, by implication, the aim of the European Com¬
munities. The Court, although its "jurisprudence" is much influenced
by the idea of removing nationality and residence restrictions, does
not allow this idea to interfere with what it considers to be the more
immediate aim of securing the rights of migrants. Perhaps it is legi¬
timate to extrapolate and suggest that the Court thinks of European
integration more in terms of empirical, practical objectives, whereas
those like Volrin or the Commission, for whom the accumulation of
social security benefits is as abhorrent as the loss of all benefits, see
integration more in terms of principle; if the important principle is
that the "irrational" effects of the fragmentation of Europe should be
removed, then it matters but little whether those effects be advant¬
ageous or disadvantageous to the person concerned.
There is much to support Voirin*s criticism of the Court*s
decisions on Article 27 and 28. Uncertainty,remained as to the proper
application of these articles, and indeed there is something unsatis¬
factory in the fact, say, that &he pension of a migrant who works both
in Germany and the Netherlands may be greatly affected by the direction
in which he moves. But with the reservation that it ought to have
dealt more explicitly with the textual arguments, the Court*s defence
of tiie migrants* rights is merely to be welcomed. Moreover, if the
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European Communities can be seen to offer direct advantages to indi¬
viduals who come into touch with them* is this not likely, in the long
run, to benefit the European construction, however irrational it may
appear?
The Court itself was content to maintain its interpretation in
later cases, though it is forced to admit one exception to the rule.
In the next case of interest following the judgments of 5.7.67,
Ooffart (Case 22/Q7)^32\ the Court is asked to interpret Article
28 (1) (f). The case is curious, for the Court both confirms its
earlier interpretation of the relationship between Article 27 and
Article 28 and also interprets the provisions of Article 28 (1) (f)
which its former decision had rendered redundant; yet at no point
does the Court actually point out that Article 28 (1) (f) is redundant.
The Court's view on the interdependence of aggregation and prorati-
sation is again repeated in Case 11/67 (Cottture) but in the
"dispositif", it is accompanied by an obscure reservation: this
rule applies "tout an mains (tens ie cadre de ceux des systemes a
periodes ou la pension de retraite varie uniquement en fonction des
periodes d'assurance accoraplies"^134
This reservation is repeated in the next case, Gulssart
(Case 12/67)^^. Moreover, the Court was forced to admit an
exception to the general rule it had elaborated:
"attendu cependant que la complex!te' des problemes
poses par la coordination des legislations rationales
emp£che dVriger 1 'interpretation cj-dessus de'gagde en
principe absolu";^36 ^
It went on to say that the general rule could lead to an unjustified
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accunwlatlon of benefits relating to one and the same period, where,
as in this case, periods of insurance actually accomplished in one
country, were nevertheless fictively presumed by the legislation of
another country to have been accomplished in that country. In this
case the problem arose from transitional arrangements under a Belgian
law of 1957, according to which non-manual workers ("employes)
reaching pension age before the end of 1961 and who were insured for
12 of the preceding 15 years were deemed to have been insured in
Belgium for 45 years. In fact Guissart, who fulfilled these conditions,
had been insured in Luxembourg for 18 of the 45 years and was entitled
to a Luxembourg pension without any need for aggregation under Article
27. In this case, unlike our hypothetical case of the German/Dutch
widow, it was possible in argument to define a period and say that
Guissart would receive two pensions relating to that period. In
such a case, said the Court, it must be legitimate for the country
by which the fictional periods are taken into consideration, to
subtract from this fictional period the real period of insurance
accomplished in the other country, without this subtraction being
considered contrary to the aims of Article 51 EEC. But, in the
absence of Community provisions, it was up to the country concerned
to decide how and whether to make the subtraction.
This was the last of the 1967 series of judgments which consider¬
ably modified the accepted interpretation of Articles 27 and 28. But
some social security institutions were reluctant to accept the Courts
interpretation, and the question arose again in three cases (Gross,
Keller, Hohn, Cases 26/71, 27/71, 28/7l/*37^ sent to the Court in
1971 by the Conmission de premiere Instance du Contentieux de la
Se'curite*' Sociale et de la Mutuallte' sociale agricole du Bas-Rhin.
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The French tribunal phrased its question rather provocatively, asking
the Court in each of these cases"to say whether, notwithstanding the
law in force (Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation No. 3 and Article 51
of the Treaty of Rome), migrant workers must have a privileged situ¬
ation in relation to nationals of the country in which they are working".
The fact that the Court was being asked to pronounce yet again on the
question and the tone in which the submissions of the social security
institution involved (the Caisse regionale de Strasbourg) were drawn
up provoked an unusual expression of annoyance from the Advocate
General in the case, M. Dutheillet de Lamothe:
"Le ton de le document (i.e. the submissions of the Caisse
rdglonale), le manque d'informetions sur les reglements
connnunautaires et sur votre jurisf-nudence dont il paralt
proceder font que nous avons h^sitd" & vous en parler autre-
ment que pour lVcarter sans discussion en rappelant seule-
ment le vleux proverbe de not re province d'orlgine: "Le cure"
perd son temps & dire deux fois la messe pour les sourds"^38^
The Court, however, showed more patience and repeated its decision in
the Clechelski case, emphasising that, if certain unwarranted advantages
resulted for the migrant, this was the consequence of the system of
(• to)
co-ordination rather than of its interpretation of that system" ,
Although the textual arguments relating to Article 28, Regulation
(140)
No. 3, were again raised by the Caisse re'gionale , the Court did
not deal with them explicitly in its judgments.
One would have thought that this would be the end of the matter,
but tlie question arose once again in Case 191/73 (Niemann)^ r' K
The question of the compatibility of Article 28 (3), Regulation No. 3,
with Article 51 of the Treaty was raised, and the Court, repeating its
75***
earlier Interpretation, at last concluded explicitly that this provision
Is "Incompatible with Article 51 and moreover devoid of any purpose^42^.
It seems unlikely that the Court will be called upon again to
(143)
repeat its interpretation of Articles 27, 28, Regulation No. 3 »
but the natter is far from closed, for, as we shall see, it is almost
certain that the corresponding provisions of Regulation No. 1408/71
(144)
will raise as much, if wot more, difficulty .
(e) Choice of law:
This is another area in which the Court's teleological approach has
prompted it to discard traditional interpretations in a manner calculated
„(145)
to shock "les juristes respectueux du Droit strict . But it has
already been described^*46^ how the Court was led by its view of the
aims of Regulation No. 3 and of the proper balance between Community
and national law to conclude, in the Nonnenmacher (92/63) and Van der
Vecht (19/67) cases that Article 12. does not exclude the application
of laws other than that of the place of work, provided the result is
not to subject either worker or employer to the obligation to finance a
system which grants them no additional social protection. This abandons
the view, which had generally been accepted until then, put forward by
both the Commission and the Advocate General, that Article 12 is a
simple rule of conflict deciding which of two laws should apply. Like
Volrin in his note on the Ciechelski, De Moor and Colditz^47^cases,
Lyon-Caen too, in a comment on Nonnenmacher, criticises the Court's
lack of respect for thetext of Regulation No. 3: "invoquer le
principe de 1'article 51 du tralte pour e'carter un article precis du
r^glement no. 3, cela peut choquer certains princip&s d'interpretation
Juridique. Invoquer la libre circulation des travaxiieurs pour mettre
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de cdtd" un texte precis&nent inscrit dans le reglement destin£ a
faciliter cette libre circulation, est un peu rapide comme ralsonne-
(148)sent .
The concrete application of these provisions (i.e. of Article 12
and of Article 13, which provides exceptions to the general rule)
to the many sorts of employment relationship and international activity
which arise in practice has been the source of some difficulty, and the
(149)
Court has been asked several times to define more closely the
rules which determine the choice of law. These cases, although difficult,
have not aroused any major controversy and need not detair us here.
(Iv) Conclusion
Within what it considers to be Its proper cor^etence vis-a-vis
(150 )
national law, the Court has, with but few aberrations consistently
Interpreted the social security regulations in the light of the aims
of Article 51 EEC. It considers that the principal aim of this Article
is to establish the greatest possible freedom of movement of workers;
that the fulfilment of this aim involves the elimination of legislative
barriers which cause disadvantage to migrants; but that it follows from
the principal aim that the removal of national barriers may not operate
to the detriment of migrants.
The Court's view of the aims of Article 51 has led it to give a
very generous interpretation of the scope of application of Regulation
No. 3, and an unexpected twist to the provisions concerning aggregation
and proratisatlon, choice of law and the role of bilateral treaties
under Article 52, Regulation No. 3. The weight which it attaches to
its teleological approach, to the subordination of the Regulations to
what it considers to be the aims of Article 51 EEC, has often caused it
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to overlook the actual text of the regulations.
Although the Court's decisions have sometimes caused dismay to
the specialists In social security law, one has the Impression not
of a non-speclallst blundering awkwardly Into a very technical field
of law, but of a Court bringing a fresh approach to the subject and
determined to impose Its views, even If It Is not aware of all the
consequences^^ and even If It means pretending not to notice some
of the provisions of the text.
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B* The National Courts^152^
(i) Introduction
The Court of Justice is not the only Court which deals with
Community law, and it would be wrong to consider the judicial treatment
of Regulation 3 without also considering the case law of the national
courts. Indeed it is the national courts who are primarily responsible
for the application and interpretation of Community law. It is only
where some problem of interpretation arises which is essential to the
solution of a case that the national court has the choice (or, if itie a
court of last instance, the obligation) of referring the problem to the
Court of Justice before giving its decision. If we want to find the
interpretation of Community law which is actually used to settle indi¬
vidual disputes, it is to the case law of the national courts that we
must look.
Just as Regulation No, 3 has been one of the principal sources of
litigation before the Court of Justice, so it has also given rise to a
large number of cases before the national courts. To date, there have
(153)
been over a hundred reported cases , involving about 200 judgments
on Regulation No. 3, more than fifty of them by courts of last instance.
In view of the fact that Regulation No. 3 was designed primarily with
contributory social security schemes in mind, it is not surprising that
the largest number of cases have arisen in the Netherlands. There
appears to have been only one reported case in Italy: this again is not
surprising in view of the relatively small number of migrant workers
in that country. The rest of the litigation is spread fairly evenly
between France, Germany and Belgium, with a small sprinkling of cases
in Luxembourg.
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With so much litigation, at least in five of the six countries,
there is a danger that different schools of interpretation will grow
up. The normal method of countering this danger within a national
system is to provide a system of appeals to a supreme court which
stands in some position of authority over lower courts. But, when
the Treaty of Rome was drafted, this straightforward approach was
rejected in favour of the more subtle and complex procedure of pre¬
liminary references under Article 177, This procedure does not so
much set the Court of Justice above the national courts; rather
it tries to ensure unity of interpretation more gently, by persuading
the national courts to refer their problems to the Community Court for
an authoritative interpretation. It is true that courts of last
instance are under a legal obligation to do so, but this obligation
is not always respected, and neither the parties to the case nor anyone
else can, in practice, enforce it.
To what extent does the procedure under Article 177 achieve its
primary aims, that is, ehsure the unity of interpretation of Community
law by the national courts? What is the impact of a decision by the
Court on the national "Jurisprudence"? Do the courts of last instance
in fact respect their obligations under Article 177? The wealth of
case law on Regulation No. 3 gives us an opportunity to see how this
very important aspect of the Comnunity legal system functions in
practice.
We shall look first at the interpretation by the national courts
of some of the provisions which have caused most problems, both to
national courts and to the Court of Justice. Then we shall see how
the problems of Regulation No. 3 and recourse to Article 177 have been
treated by the courts of last instance in the various countries.
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(ii) The Interpretation of certain articles by the national courts
(a) Articles 27. 28: These troublesome articles have arisen In at least
thirty-five reported cases. In five of the member states.
We have seen alreacfy that the central problem of these two articles
was to determine the proper relationship between aggregation and prora-
tisation, and that there were three possible views, on this problem
which we shall call theories A, B and C:
As Articles 27 and 28 apply even where aggregation is not
necessary for the acquisition, maintenance or recovery
of a right in either (or any) country;
B: Article 28 applies in both (or all) countries where ag¬
gregation under Article 27 is necessary in one of the
countries;
Cs Article 28 applies only in that country in which aggregation
under Article 27 is necessary for the acquisition, maintenance
or recovery of rights.
The Court of Justice, it will be recalled, excluded Theory A in its
judgment of 15.7.64 in Case 100/63 (Van der Veen), but it was not until
its judgments of 5.7.67 (in Cases 1/67 (Ciechelski) and 2/67 (De Moon ))
that it was made quite clear that it favoured Theory C rather than
Theory B. These decisions caused a certain amount of surprise and it
(154)
was argued even that they were contra legem . Because of the
controversial nature of the Court's "jurisprudence** on these articles,
it is particularly interesting to see the attitudes of the national
courts, both before and after these decisions.
Although it was very soon realised that the application of
Regulation No. 3 c&uld be to the detriment of some migrants, particularly
where non-contributory systems were involved, nobody appears to have
181-
even thought of taking the view eventually adopted by the Court (i.e.
Theory C). There were a number of ways in which even before Van der
Veen (Case 100/63), it was sought to reduce the loss which migrants
would have suffered from the application of Theory A. In a number of
cases it was suggested that Regulation No. 3 could not be applicable to
non-contributory schemes. In the Netherlands, this argument was rejected
(155) . (156)
by three courts of first instance, those of Roermond , Arnhem
and Rotterdam^57^, but the court of appeal (and of last instance), the
Centrale Raad van Be roep felt sufficient doubts to send the matter to the
/ | CO \
Court of Justice : this resulted in the judgments of Van der Veen
(100/63) and Dingemans (24/64). In France, similar doubts were felt
. (159)
by the Cour d'appel de Do».ai , but it made the mistake of sending the
parties to the Commission administrative instead of the Court. The
question in this case did eventually reach the Court and resulted in the
judgment in Torr^kens (28/68)^**^, but this slip by the court of Douai
caused the parties more than five years.
In another French case, it was argued that the migrant should at
least have the right of opting between the application of national legi¬
slation and that of Regulation No. 3. The Cour d'appel de Paris
/1 fio )
rightly rejected this argument ; the court found it regrettable that the
claimant should receive no benefit corresponding to his period of contri¬
bution in Italy, but could see no other solution^63The court obviously
did not have the same views of the judicial function as the Court of
Justice:
Nque cette situation pour regrettable quvelle soit, nTsulte
de la strlcte application des textes actuellement en vigueur
et ne saurait etne en aucune fapon ameliortfe sur le plan
judicialreH.
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The problem of the relationship of Article 27 and 28 appears to have
arisen in only two Dutch cases before the Court*s decision in Van der
Veen; in both of those, the courts (the Raad van Be roep of Arnhem^64^
and Roermond/ held, like the Court in Van der Veen, that Article
28 applied only if aggregation under Article 27 were necessary.
After the Court's decision in Van der Veen, we notice, on the one
hand, that there is a general increase in litigation and, on the other,
that the problem of the relationship between Articles 27 and 28 comes
more into the foreground.
The Centrale Raad van Beroep, which asked the questions in the
Van der Veen case - or rather cases, for the questions asked related
to ten cases before the Centrale Raad - understood from the Court's
answer that Article 28 was to be applied if aggregation was necessary
in any of the countries concerned (i.e. Theory B), and applied Regulation
No. 3 accordingly, even in the cases involved in the Van der Veen
. . . (186)
decision .
This view was disputed by the Raad van Beroep of Zwolle, a
(1 fi7 }
court of first instance, in two striking judgments of 15.2.66 f
which held (correctly, as it turned out) that, although this was
obviously contrary to the intention of the authors of Regulation 3 and
meant that some provisions of Regulation No. 3 became unclear, the Court
of Justice had, in Case 100/63, decided in favour of Theory C. On
appeal, these two decisions were quashed by the Centrale Raad van
/ 1 \
Beroep , which, after a thorough examination of the judgment in
Case 100/63 and after setting forth the problem with great clarity,
decided that RB Zwolle was wrong and that Theory B was the correct one.
What is very surprising in these decisions is that the Centrale Raad
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which, earlier on, had been very willing to refer problems to the Court
of Justice, did not even mention Article 177, although it was quite clear
that there was a problem of interpretation and that, as a court of last
instance, it was obliged to refer to the Court of Justice, No doubt
this apparent mental block was due in part to the fact that the conse¬
quences of a decision in favour of Theory C would be far more serious
for the Netherlands than for any other country . The same problem
arose, though not as often and not until later, in other member states,
but led almost immediately to references'70^ to the Court of Justice,
Within a short space of time, the Cour superieure de Justice in Luxem¬
bourg, the Cours d'appel of Orleans and Paris and the Cour de Cassation
in France, and the Belgian Conseil d'Etat all asked questions related
* .u (171)to the same problem .
The Court's decisions in Ciechelski and De Moor case on July 5th
1967, but they were not published until some time later and it was a few
months before they made any impact on national judgments. As late as
4,10,67 we find the Oentrale Raad van Beroep confirming a decision of
RB Roermond in favour of Theory b'72^. It was not until June of the
following year'73 ^ that the Dutch court reversed its earlier jurisprudence
in the light of Court's decisions, although it drew attention to the
exception, of rather unclear extent, made in Case 12/67 (Guissart)'74^,
The decisions appear to have been accepted with less hesitation in the
other member states. The French Cour de Cassation'75^, in a judg¬
ment of 2,7,70, although it did not make express mention of the
Community Court's decisions, adopted Theory C, repeating the arguments
which the Court had used and rejecting arguments based more directly on
the text of Regulation No. 3. The Belgian Conseil d'Etat also applied
that interpretation in a decision of the same year'76^. The Court's
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surprising decisions on Article 27 and 28 seem to have established
themselves and to have been accepted by the national courts^77^.
As a result, the amount of litigation on these articles has decreased
sharply.
(b) Article 4
We have seen that the Court has given a broad interpretation to the
scope of application ratione personae of Regulation No. 3. In its
Judgments of 19.3.64 (75/63, Unger) and of 19.12.68 (14/68, De Cicco)
it gave a broad interpretation to the notion of "travailleur salarie'
on assimile"; and in its judgments of 19.3.64 (75/63) and, more
especially, of 11.3.65 (31/64, Bertholet; 33/64, Van Dijk) and 9.12.65
(44/65, Hessische Knappschaft), it insisted that Regulation No. 3 was in
no way limited to migrant workers in the normal sense of the term. Did
the national courts follow this interpretation?
For some reason, the Court seems to have been less successful in
moulding the jurisprudence of the national courts than it (eventually)
was in the case of Articles 27 and 28. It is not surprising, perhaps,
that before the decision in Unger, the decisions of the national courts^178^
were too restrictive in view of the interpretation adopted by the Court.
But, although the Court pointed out in its judgment of 19.3.64 in that
case that the motive for which an Insured person travelled to another
member state did not affect the application of Regulation No. 3, it
was argued in at least three Dutch cases later that year that Regulation
No. 3 was limited to migrant workers stricto sensu. This argument was
accepted by the court in one of the three cases^7S^j in the other two
cases, it raised sufficient doubt to prompt the court to refer the
(180)
problem to the Court of Justice in the Bertholet and Van Dijk cases •
The judgments in these cases stated clearly that there was nothing in
185-
Article 4 to restrict the application of Regulation No. 3 to migrant
workers strlcto sensu, yet almost three months later^8*^, the French
Cour d'Appel de Colmar felt sufficient doubt to ask the same question
again: this led to a further confirmation of the decision In Case 44/
65 (Hesslsche Knappschaft).
Even after this series of judgments, we find a number of courts
holding that Regulation No. 3 Is limited to migrant workers strlcto
sensu. But these decisions are best attributed to Ignorance or simple
confusion rather than to reasoned rejection of the line taken by the
(182)
Court. Two courts of first Instance, the Tribunale dl Milano
and the Commission de premiere instance du contentieux de la securite'
sociale de Purls^85^, held that Regulation No. 3 was limited to migrant
workers as defined by IJjO convention No. 975 In another case, two
(184)
bizarre decisions, one at first instance , the second on appeal
/ |Of)
to the Cour d*appel de Colmar , appear to have limited the ap¬
plication of Regulation No. 3 to frontier workers. Fortunately, thlswas
corrected by the Cour de Cassation in its decision of 14.1.70 .
Doubts were also felt in Luxembourg, where they were sufficiently
strong for the Cour superieure de justice ^'87 ^ to give the Court
another opportunity to confirm Its earlier jurisprudence in Case 29/69.
It is not clear why this question was asked by the Luxembourg court,
for neither of the parties to the principal litigation disputed, in
their observations before the Court, that Regulation No. 3 was ap¬
plicable to the case. Since that case, there seems to have been no
litigation on the subject, apart from the decision by the French
Cour de Cassation which we have already mentioned.
A more positive aspect of the effect of Article 177 in this area
-186-
is the use made of it by the Sozialgericht Augsburg in its decision
(188)
of 30.7.68 to submit to the Court the question whether Italian
artisans came under Regulation No. 3. The German court had recourse
to Article 177, not because it had any doubt that Regulation No. 3
was applicable, but because the court above it, the Landessozialgericht
Bayern, had already ruled that Regulation No. 3 did not apply^189\ A
similar use had been made of Article 177 in the Welchner case, where
the fourth chamber of the Bundessoziaigericht asked a preliminary
question because a difference of opinion had arisen between it and
(1 so)
the twelfth chamber of the same court ~ .
(c) Article 12
Case 92/63 (Nonnerunacher) was, like the Article 27,28 cases, a
case in which the Court surprised most coimentutors, it decided in
that case that Article 12 did not exclude the application of legis¬
lation other than that of the place of work, provided that it did not
compel a worker to finance a system from which he would derive no
"complement de protection sociale". The decision in Van der Vecht
(19/67) substantially confirmed this^9^.
Before the Nonnenmacher judgment (9.6.64), it was assumed that
Article 12 provided that the law of the place of work should apply
exclusively. At least three Dutch courts, including the Oentrale
(192)
Raad van Beroep, seem to have interpreted the article to that effect
before the peculiar facts of the Nonnenmacher case prompted the Oentrale
Raad^"3^ to ask the Court if the rule under Article 12 was exclusive
even where no effective rights existed under the law of the place of
work. A few days before the Court gave its judgment, a similar case
-187-
(194)
arose before the Raad van Beroep of Groningen , The Gronlngen
court decided, as the Court was to do, that Article 12 did not lay
down an exclusive rule. This appears to be the only case, apart from
the Nonnenmacher and Van der Vecht cases, in which a national court
gave this interpretation. TTie decision of the Court in Nonnenmacher
seems to have been ignored by the national courts - in practice the
Dutch courts, for it is almost exclusively a Dutch problem - in other
cases. In the only other case in which the problem was raised directly,
the Ontrale Raad van Beroep asked the same question as it had in
Nonnenmacher^*95^, In the period between the two cases, the problem is
avoided whenever it appears, although it seems to have been generally
assumed that Article 12 could operate to exclude the provision of
benefits under JXitch legislation^*9**^, although this assumption was
incompatible with the Court's decisions in both Nonnenmacher and Van
der Vecht. Apparently the problem has not arisen since the Van der
Vecht case, so it is difficult to say what effect that decision has had.
(ill) Regulation No. 5 before the Courts of last Instance
Regulation No. 3 has been considered more than fifty times by
courts of last instance, by seven different courts of last instance in
all the member states except Italy^ *97^. Fifteen of the twenty-eight
preliminary references under Article 177 have been made by these
courts: four by the Belgian Conseil d'Etat, two by the French Cour de
Cassation, two by the German Bundessozialgericht, one by the Cour
(198)
superieure de Justice de Luxembourg, sitting as a cour de cassation
and six by the Dutch Oentrale Raad van Beroep.
Nevertheless, there are quite a large number of cases in which
one can argue with confidence that the courts infringed their obligation
-1 SS-
under Article 177i(3) to refer all "questions" of interpretation to the
Court. There are at least seven decisions which can now be seen to be
(199)
plainly wrong. Six of these were decisions of the Centrale Raad
(of which four on Article 28)# one of the Bundessozialgericht^200^.
( 201 )
Of the other decisions, at least four (two by the Hoge Raad,
one by the Bundessozlalgericht and one by the French Cour de Cassation)
are open to considerable doubt, and should certainly have been referred
to the Court of Justice.
(iv) Conclusion: Functioning of Article 177 with regard to Regulation
No. 3.
In this area, perhaps more than in any other, Article 177 has found
wide and early acceptance by the coui»ts of all the countries concerned
as a means of solving difficulties of interpretation. Despite this, we
have seen that courts of last instance have not always respected their
obligations under Article 177 (3), and that there have been quite a
lot of "wrong" decisions (i.e. if one accepts the judgments of the
Court as being "right"). It is to be feared, particularly in the case
(202)
of the Dutch courts , that some reluctance to make use of Article
177 may have resulted from the surprising interpretations given by
the Court in certain cases. Yet it is precisely because the Court's
teleological approach has led it to give some unexpected decisions
that Article 177 becomes extremely Important and strict observance
of Article 177 (3) essential if the rule of a unified Community law is
to prevail.
/ AA4 \
One of the problems of Article 177 which has caused much
discussion is the question of the authority of decisions given by the
-133-
Court of Justice in Article 177 proceedings. One approach is to say
that the interpretations given by the Court are legally binding on
national courts, not because the Court is above the national courts
in any sort of hierarchy but because the Treaty gives the Court the
task of Interpreting Community law and consequently any interpretation
given by the Court is the authentic interpretation and has the same
authority as the text interpreted. But the traditional, apparently
more widely-held view is that this snacks too much of the Anglo-Saxon
doctrine of precedent and is alien to the traditions of continental
Europe, according to which a judicial decision cannot make law.
According to this view, the Court's decision is legally binding only
In the case in which it is given and is merely of persuasive, moral
authority in other cases. The Court of Justice itself has not dealt
with the problem; in case 28-30/62 (Da Costa en Schaake), it held that
it was not bound by its own decisions, but the implications of this
decision for national courts are open to conflicting interpretations.
The national courts themselves are divided on the issue.
With this in mind, it is very interesting to see the attitudes
of the national courts in our area, and particularly their reactions
to the controversial interpretation of Articles 27, 28. We may note
two things: firstly, no court has expressly questioned the authority of
the interpretations of the Court of Justice, or- expressly refused to
follow them. Secondly, three of the courts, at least, have made it
plain that they regard themselves as legally bound by the decisions
of the Court of Justice. We have already seen^204^ that the Raad van
Beroep te Zwolle was prepared to follow the Court's interpretation of
Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation No. 3, even though it went against what
appeared to be the meaning of the text and the plain intention of the
—190—
authors. In a more recent case , the Cour d'Appel de Paris
was even more explicit in its rejection of the argument that the
Court's controversial judgments of 5.7.67 (Ciechelskl and De Moor)
were not binding beyond the cases in which they were given. To
that argument the Court saldt
"Consid^rant que les arrets de la Cour de Justice des
Commumutefs Europ6ennes statuant en interpretation
sont d'ordre g6ne"ral, car destines & 1'unification des
Jurisprudences des tribunaux des divers Etats membres
et de ce fait s'lmposent a ces jurldictions'*.
An earlier decision of the Cour d'Appel de Colmar dealing with
/ rtAfi \
Article 52 of Regulation No. 3 is even more forthright and is
worth recording as a model of how the system should work:
"Attendu ... que la mission de la Cour des Coramnaut^is
Europ6ennes dtant en partlculier de dire le droit au
cas ou se pose une question d*interpretation des
dispositions du traltd' ou des actes des institutions com-
rainautaires, les decisions par elle rendues dans le cadre
des articles 177 et 219 du Tralte s'intbgrent au droit
coranunautaire et partialpent de ce fait de la primauttf
du Traite sur les legislations internes; que, dfcs lors,
elles s'imposent aux Juridictions rationales au meme
titre que le droit coramrautaire; que le respect de
1'interpretation donnge par la cour de Justice se trouve
directernent et intimement 116 & celul du Traite' lui-
mefae ..."
HtLs positive attitude to Article 177 is certainly welcome, for
if the complex system of preliminary references established by that
•lyl-
article is to succeed in ensuring the unity of interpretation of the
Treaty and acts passed thereunder, then it is Important not only that
Courts should make wide use of the Article to send problems to the
Court, but that the answers given by the Court should have the widest
authority possible.
Has the system in fact been effective in ensuring a unified inter¬
pretation of Community law, or would another system, a system of appeals
for example, have been more effective? It is very difficult to give a
firm answer to this. Where there is a clear decision, as in the cases
of Ciechelski and De Moor, it has generally been followed by all the
national courts. These two judgments effectively settled the dispute
as to the relationship between aggregation and proratisation, but the
solution was a long time coming: more than eight years after the
entry into force of Regulation No. 3 and more than five years after
the first litigation on Articles 27, 28. It is Impossible to calculate
how many pensioners must have lost rights through an incorrect appli¬
cation of these articles.
Where the decision is not so clea-eut, it seems to be far less
effective. The Van der Veen and Nonnenmacher decisions, for example,
seem to have made little impact on the national jurisprudence. It
seems essential for the success of Article 177 that the European Court
should try to help not only the referring court by considering the
facts of the case (as it does), but also the national courts in general
by making its decisions as clear and easily applicable as possible.
The fact that this is not an appeal system, but something slower and
more cumbersome would surely justify a less pragmatic approach to the
questions asked.
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C. Conclusion: Interpretation of the social security regulations
by the courts of the European Coniminities
The study of the interpretation of Regulation No. 3 is interesting
not only because of the way in which the principles of international
social security laws are developed, but also because it marks a step
forward in international social security adjudication, and because it
illustrates both the methods of interpretation used by the Court of
Justice and the functioning of the judicial system of the E.C.
The Court of Justice is the first permanent international or
"supranational1* court with competence to hear disputes involving the
social security rights of migrant workers. Quite apart from the creation
of Regulation No. 3, the competence granted to the Court has effectively
extended the rights of migrant workers and their possibility of redress
against social security institutions. The results of the cases have
been overwhelmingly favourable to migrant workers as opposed to the
social security institutions. Moreover, as well as ensuring a certain
unity of interpretation and developing, albeit controversially, several
principles of international social security law, the Court has given
this branch of the law a certain prominence, almost a "legal respect¬
ability". Too often, although perhaps more often in Britain than on
the mainland, social security law is overlooked as an object of stu<Jy
for lawyers; in view of its obvious importance, this seems regrettable.
It emerges clearly from our study that the Court's interpretation
of Regulation 3 can be understood only in the li^t of the Court's
view of the aims of the Regulation. This is the much-discussed
(207)
"teleologicai" approach to interpretation . Although the basis
for interpretation remains the text of the provision in question, the
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Court tries to interpret the text in the light of its aim or "spirit",
seen within the context of the Treaty as a whole. As the Court put
it in the important Van Gend en Loos decision (Case 26/62), one must,
in interpreting a provision, look at "L'esprit, lVconomie et les terraes"
- apparently in that order. As the term "spirit" suggests, it is not
the aim of the authors of the Treaty which concerns the Court, but the
aims of the Treaty and regulations as they stand, i.e. as seen by the
Court. As is clear from Duffy (Case 34/69) and the Article 28 cases,
these aims are not always to be found in other provisions of Community
law - and if they were, there would still be the question of selection -
but quite simply in the collective head of the Court, in the Court*s
conception of what the Treaty is all about. It appears fruitless,
(208)
then, to analyse, as maoy do , the interpretation techniques of
the Court in terms of reasoning a contrario, contra proferentem, ab
absurdo, etc., or even of recourse to general principles of law.
These are little more than tricks of the trade which the Court may
select at will to reach the conclusion it wants to reach, or to
(209)
support that conclusion . tVhat is important is purely to analyse
and criticise the Court's conception of the aims of the Communities and
how far it should go in imposing its views on, or even against, the
text of the Treaties or Community regulations. The extent to which
the Court has in fact imposed its views has raised for some comment¬
ators^2*0^ spectres of the parlements of the Ancien Regime. But,
although it is true that the Court has carved out an unusually import¬
ant and independent role for itself, the general opinion is that its
influence on European integration has been a positive one^2"^. This
favourable opinion is supported, though not unequivocally, by the
Court's jurisprudence on problems of social security law.
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Finally, our study illustrates the workings of the judicial system
of the Communities, and especially of Article 177 which links the two
tiers of that system. The functioning of Article 177 may be considered
from two points of view: from that of Community law and from that of the
individual litigant. From the point of view of ensuring the uniformity
of interpretation of Community law, we have seen that it is moderately
effective. The defects are due in part to an occasional reluctance on
the part of national jurisdictions to send problems to the Court. But,
quite apart from this, the national Judge will often not be in a position
to see the problems raised by Community law, partly because he will not
be aware of the problems raised in other countries of the Community,
partly because he will have no reason for adopting the dynamic, teleolo-
glcal approach adopted by the Court, and which has so influenced its
judgments.
From the point of view of the individual litigant, the most obvious
drawback of the system is the length of time it takes. Though the Court
of Justice seems efficient and usually answers questions within six
months of their being asked, it is generally at least another six months
before the national court considers the reply. This up-and-down procedure
means that at least an extra year Is added before the settlement of a
dispute which has often been going on for five or six years already. In
cases Involving old age pensions (as many do), this result Is rather
grotesque and shocking. While most of the delay is due to the in-
efficiences of the national systems, any measure which could be introduced
to speed procedure at a Community level would surely be an improvement.
The other main drawback of the system for the individual litigant
is that Article 177 gives him no right of redress against a wrong
decision by a national court which does not make a preliminary
—1 o
reference, While we should not underestimate the political and psy¬
chological reasons which made the authors of the Treaty decide to
Introduce the Court of Justice gently Into the judicial life of the
member states, and which may still hold good vis-a-vls the newer
member states, might It not be desirable to envisage introducing a
simple appeal system to replace Article 177? This would be quicker,
would extend the rights of the litigant, and would probably be more
(212)
effective in ensuring a uniform interpretation of Community law ,
A word finally on the role of the Commission and the Advocate
General in proceedings under Article 177. One of the Advocates
General, we know, must present reasoned conclusions in each case that
comes before the Court. Similarly,the Commission has the right to
present observations on each case under Article 177, and invariably
exercises that right. In theory, no doubt, their functions are dif¬
ferent:!: the Commission's is to protect the interests of the Com¬
munities, while the Advocate General's task is to assist the Court
in ensuring "le respect du droit" in the interpretation and application
of the Treaties^*^. In practice, what happens is that the Commission
first presents its arguments on the case and on the way it thinks the
questions should be answered. In his conclusions, the Advocate General
also presents his arguments on the case and the answers he proposes.
In almost every case, he has reached the same conclusion by way of the
same arguments; this is not surprising since both in fact represent
the viewpoint of the Communities, althou^i with a slightly different
emphasis. If the Advocate General is to help the Court in maintain¬
ing "le respect du droit", he might be more usefully employed not in
reproducing the same process of reasoning as the Commission, but in
going beyond the instant case, raising problems of a mere general
nature and probing the implications of the Court's view of the aims of the
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provlslons concerned.
4. Revision of the Social Security Regulations: Regulation No. 1406/71
The last two sections of this chapter have been devoted to a study
of Regulation No. 3, first of its origin, structure and principles and
then of its judicial interpretation. Regulation No. 3 has now been
replaced by Regulation No. 1408/71, but this does not mean that the
legal study of Regulation No. 3 is by any means redundant. The new
Regulation is merely a revised form of the old one: its structure is
the same; its principles are the same; its concrete provisions, where
they differ from those of Regulation No. 3, represent a reaction to
the lacunae of the old Regulation - or to the Court's interpretation
of that Regulation. Like Regulation No. 3, Regulation No. 1408/71 has
its legal foundation in Article 51 of the Treaty and it is certain that
the same principles will be applied in the interpretation of Regulation
No. 1408/71: this is already clear from some of the Court's recent
judgmentsin short, an understanding of the principles and
problems of Regulation No. 3 remains essential for a proper under¬
standing of Regulation No. 1408/71.
The task of revising Regulation No. 3 was undertaken at an early
date. A number of lacunae which appeared were patched up by minor
revisions of the principal regulation. Other regulations were introduced
(215
to extend the system to seasonal workers, frontier workers and seamen
The system was undoubtedly made more complicated by the work of the
courts, and particularly of the Court of Justice, which had thrown
(216)
light on new problems and, in some cases, created them . The
result was an extremely complex and not very watertight system over¬
ripe for revision.
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As early as 1964 work was begun by the Commission on a new
regulation which would expand and simplify the existing ones. This
led to the submission to the Council of a proposal for a new regulation,
early In 1966^2*7^. The Council submitted this proposal to the Economic
and Social Committee and to the T^arliament for their opinions. The
(218)
former gave its opinion in January 1967 ; the Parliament, after
(219)
receiving the excellent and thorough report of its Committee on
Social Affairs and Public Health presented by M. Troclet, gave its
/ OOA \
opinion which appeared early in 1968 In the light of these
opinions, the Commission modified its proposal, and also made a
(221)
proposal concerning the annexes to the proposed regulations .
The Parliament and the ESC gave their opinions on the latter proposal
(222)
late in 1968 After long negotiations, the new regulation,
Regulation No. 1408/7J finally emerged from the Council on 14.6.71 and
was published in the Journal Official of 5.7.71. The implementing
regulation, Regulation No. 574/72, which was to replace Regulation No. 4,
(223)
was passed by the Council on 21.3.72 . The new system finally came
into force on October 1st, 1972.
'That is interesting about the whole revision procedure is not
/OO4.)
only the length of time which it took , but also the role played
(225)
by the Court . The Court, of course, took no direct part in the
elaboration of the new Regulation, but it did have a definite influence
on the procedure. This was so, firstly because the litigation before
the Court constantly threw up new problems; secondly, because it was
to be assumed that the Court's interpretation of the provisions of
Regulation No, 3 would presumably be applied to the corresponding
provisions of the new Regulation unless there was some clear intention
to depart from the earlier provisions; thirdly, because the Court's
-198-
Interpretation of the aims of Article 51 of the Treaty would constitute
wle fondement, le cadre et les limites" of the new regulation as it
had for the old.
For these reasons, the Commission was bound to examine closely
the decisions of the Court in the elaboration of its original proposal,
and was forced to amend that proposal in the light of some of the later
rulings by the Court. Because the Court has no power to give an
advisory opinion on such matters, the Commission found it advisable
in its observations in individual cases, to put forward inter¬
pretations which it proposed to incorporate in the new regulation,
and thus to encourage the Court to say in its judgments whether these
interpretations proposed were compatible with the aims of Article 51
EEC. When the Court gave its series of decisions in 1967 on Articles
27, 28 of Regulation No. 3 just before the Parliament issued its
opinion on the Commission's proposal, the Parliament drew the Com¬
mission's attention to those decisions and asked the Commission to re¬
consider its proposal on the aggregation and proratisation of pensions
in the light of those decisions. Not surprisingly, it is this part of
the new regulation which bears most clearly the stamp of the Court's
work.
To see more concretely the relationship between Regulation No. 3
and Regulation No. 1408/71 and the influence of the Court's decisions, it
is necessary to look more closely at the provisions of the new regulation,
to see how it takes a step farther in the international co-ordination of
social security legislations. One of the most important aspects of
Regulation No. 1408/71 is that it unified the existing set of regulations
and simplified administrative procedure. But it also introduced
a number of significant improvements in substance. For clarity,
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we shall examine these improvements under the headings used In the
(226)
analysis of Regulation No, 3 .
A, Scope of Application of the Regulation
Ratlone personae: The title of the new regulation no longer refers
to "migrant workers" as did the old one, but to the ^employed persons and
their families moving wlthln-the Comrunlty", This is riot a change in
substance, but simply a recognition of the broad interpretation given
to Regulation No, 3 by the Court in cases 75/63, 31/64, 44/65, etc.
The term "travallleur galarie ou assimile'1* is dropped by
Regulation No. 1408/71 in favour of simply "travailleur" (worker).
The Regulation opens with a definition of this term which is rather
complex but seems to correspond roughly to the old term. The principle,
as explained by the preamble of the Regulation is that those covered
are "all nationals of member states insured under social security
schemes for employed persons", what is important to note is that it
was not found possible to Include self-employed workers within the
scope of the Regulation, because of the widely varying position of
these workers under national social security regimes. Both the ESC
and the Parliament recognised the impossibility of extending the
regulations in this way, but both urged that work should be begun on
the admittedly difficult task of elaborating a separate regulation
(227)
to cover the self-employed •
Rat lone naterlaet Here again there Is little change from the
provisions of Regulation No. 3, except that Article 1 (J) of the new
Regulation makes It clear that so-called "complementary" schemes are
not covered by the Regulation:
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"This term excludes provisions of existing or future
Industrial agreements, whether or not they have been the subject of a
decision by the authorities rendering them compulsory or extending
their scope"•
Althou^i It Is provided that any member state may declare this
limitation not applicable to certain provisions of such arrangements,
the limitation is nevertheless a very important one, Troclet, In
(228)
his report to the Parliament f points out the enormous importance
which these complementary schemes have in modern social security
systems and argues convincingly that when a social security scheme
has acquired the force of law, it should be subject to the Regulation,
whether or not Its origin was tn a collective agreement. It is
regrettable that the Council did not see fit to accept the Parli¬
ament's opinion on this point, for this exclusion of complementary
(229)
schemes is surely the most serious lacuna in the whole system ,
Maternity allowances given for demographic reasons are still
(230)
excluded from the application of the Regulation .
B. Equality of treatment: The principle of equality of treatment
contained in Article 8, Regulation No, 3 is extended by Article 3 of
the new Regulation to cover the right to elect members of social
security organisms, but not the right to be elected to such organisms.
There is also a new provision extending the benefit of those other
international social security agreements which remain valid to the
nationals of all member states.
It is interesting to note that the first paragraph of Article 3
makes it clear that equality of treatment extends, as under Regulation
No, 3, only to nationals resident in one of the member states, and not
v
to those resident in a third country. The original proposal of the
Oomnission was unclear on this point, which led Troclet (and the
Parliament) to suggest a precision which would make it quite clear
that the principle of equality of treatment extended even to cover
the provision of benefits to Community nationals in a third country.
This proposal was rejected by the Council,
C, Conservation of acquired Rights: The removal of residence
restrictions on the service of benefits was the area in which most
progress remained to be made, and in which most progress has been
made.
The Court, we saw, raised the prohibition of residence restri¬
ctions into a general rule in its judgment in Case 61/65 (tfaassen-
Gobbels)^?'^. This interpretation was taken over by the Commission
which formulated the prohibition contained in its proposal in general
terms. This was welcomed by Troclet In his report, but again this
too was rejected by the Council, Article 10 of Regulation 1408
(232)
reverts to a slightly expanded version of Article 10, Regulation No,3,
The result is far from clear, but presumably the rule in Vaassers-
Gobbels still holds to the effect that residence restrictions are still
prohibited unless expressly allowed by the provisions of the new
Regulation,
The most interesting area of development is that of family bene¬
fits, Under the old system family benefits were paid by the country
of employment in respect of children resident In other member states,
but only up to a maximum of the amount payable In the country of
(233)
residence. One of the most Important points ' of the Commission's
proposal In 1966 was that such benefits should be paid by the country
of residence according to the law of that country. Troclet, welcoming
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thls proposal, pointed out that It would correspond to the growing
trend In national legislation to separate family benefits from
wages and that It would also simplify administration.
This was evidently a point which caused great difficulty to
the Council and the solution reached was a compromise. It was
(234)
decided that family benefits should be paid by the country
of employment as though the members of the family were resident
In that country; but in the case of workers employed in France
(where family benefits are higher than in the other countries, for
demographic reasons), benefits are to be paid by the country of
residence. It is also provided, however, that the Council should re¬
examine the problem before 1973 *in order to reach a uniform solution
(235)
for Member States* » Even the compromise solution finally reached
is, of course, an improvement on the old system.
Other improvements in the provisions governing family benefits
are the extension of the system to cover members of the family other
than children; the specific provisions relating to the families of
the unemployed; the improvement in the provision of supplements to
orphans and children in the care of pensioners.
Progress has also been made in the field of unemployment benefits,
although again the Commission's original proposal has been somewhat
modified. The principal improvements are the removal of the reser¬
vations of France and Luxembourg restricting the application of these
provisions in those countries to qualified coal and steel workers,
and the removal of the requirement of double authorisation in the case
of transfer of residence. The right to receive unemployment benefits
after transferring residence to another country, however, is now
limited to a maximum period of three months, whereas benefits under
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Regulation No, 3 might be paid for a period of up to four months
after the transfer of residence.
The other area in which most progress has been made is that of
sickness benefits. The provisions in this area are considerably
expanded and clarified. There are also a number of improvements
in substance, notably the suppression of certain pre-conditions to
the granting of medical care outside the competent State, the red¬
uction of the number of cases in which authorisations may be refused
(where such are required), and the special regulation of the position
of the unemployed and of pensioners,
D, Conservation of Rights in the process of being acquired: The
way in which Regulation No, 140€/7t tries to deal with the complex
problems raised by the Court with respect to the aggregation and
proratisation of old-age pensions is one of the most interesting
aspects of the new Regulation,
The provisions on this topic (Articfe 44-51) are not much
Clearer than Articles 27, 28 of Regulation Ho, 3, Article 45 (1)
provides, more or less as Article 27 of Regulation No, 3 before it,
that the institution of one State should take periods of insurance
in another State into consideration where thas is necessary for
"the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to benefits".
Article 45 (3) extends this to the Hagenbeek type of situation and
adopts the solution given by the Court in that case.
It is Article 46 which primarily governs the calculation of
pensions, replacing the old Article 28, The new system appears to
be roughly the following:
•*>04 «■
(1) The institutions in those states In which aggregation
is necessary to open a right to a pension go through
the traditional process of aggregation and proratis¬
ation, that is:
(1) the institution calculates the sum to which the
claimant would have been entitled if all the
periods of Insurance had been accomplished under
its own legislation;
(ii) it then divides this theoretical sum in proportion
to the period of insurance actually accomplished
under that legislation (Article 46(2));
(2) The institutions in those countries in which no
aggregation is necessary to open a right to a
pension:
(i) calculate the pension to which the insured person
is entitled under the legislation of that particular
country;
(ii) calculate the pension which would result from the
process of aggregation and proratisation, as above;
(iii) retain only the higher of the two sums thus obtained.
(3) The insured person then has a right to the total
(Article 46 (1)) of the pensions calculated in the
various countries in this manner, fait only within
the iliait of the highest of the theoretical sums
referred to above (i.e. calculated after aggregation,
but before proratisation) (Article 46 (3)).
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The impact of the Court on the system is obvious* The new
provisions are much more favourable to migrants than the old ones*
But do they, in fact, satisfy the requirements laid down by the
Court? The Court insisted that any reduction in the rights of
migrant workers would be incompatible with the aims of Article 51
EEC, But the limitation imposed by Article 46 (3) of the new
Regulation could certainly, though admittedly only in rare circum¬
stances, have the effect of reducing the rights of the migrant* If
we think back to our hypothetical widow whose husband worked for
forty years in Germany and for one year in the Netherlands before
dying, then we can see that, Under Article 46 of Regulation
No. 1408/71, she would presumably be entitled to a maximum equivalent
to a German pension based on forty-one years insurance, and that this
would be less than the sum of the two pensions she would otherwise
receive. Well may one argue that this loss of rights is a
"lucrum cessans" rather than a "damnum emergens", but the fact
remains that there is a reduction in rights which is plainly contrary
to the Court's jurisprudence on the matter. Is the limitation con¬
tained in Article 46 (3) invalid, then, as being contrary to
Article 51 of the Treaty? Certainly it is, if the Court is to
maintain its present interpretation of that article. It will be
interesting to see what happens when, as it surely must, the matter
(237)
Is raised before the Court .
E. Choice of Law: The provisions concerning the determination of the
law applicable are slightly expanded, but make few important changes in
substance•
The main point of interest is that the controversial decisions
in the cases of Nonnenmacher (92/63) and Van der Vecht (19/67
are reversed. Article 13 (t) of the new Regulation provides that a
worker to whom the Regulation applies shall be subject to the legi¬
slation of a single member state only. Tantaroudas convincingly
(239)
argues that this provision could (as in the facts of the
Nonnenmacher case) operate to the detriment of the claimant and
that, consequently, this provision should, if the Court's inter¬
pretation of Article 51 EEC is to be maintained, be considered
invalid.
F. Relation with bilateral treaties: Apart from the omission of
any equivalent to Article 52 (2) of Regulation No, 3, which the
Court had annihilated anyway, there is not very much change in
this area. In its proposal for the new Regulation, the Commission
had sought to reduce the role of bilateral treaties between member
(240)
states to one of regulating the administration of Community law
but the Council rejected this suggestion, preferring to return to
the formula contained in Regulation No. 3, according to which member
states nay conclude agreements "fondees sur les principes et 1'esprit"
of the Regulation^241
6. Administrative arrangements; The institution of a new Advisory
Committee is the one significant suggestion of the ESC and the Parli¬
ament which has been carried into effect. The original proposal of
the Commission provided that the Administrative Commission should
contain some representatives of the workers, litis was seized upon
by both the ESC and the Parliament, who called, not for represent¬
ation on the Administrative Commission, but for the creation of a
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new committee which would represent the interests of the "part¬
em! res sociaux" and assist the Commission administrative in some
way.
The new Regulation keeps the Commission administrative in
its old form and with much the same functions. But it also
establishes (Articles 82-3) a new "Advisory Coranittee on Social
Security for Migrant Workers", which is composed of thirty-six
members, six from each country - two representatives of the
Government (of whom one must be a member of the Administrative
Commission), two representatives of the trade unions and two of the
employers* organisations. The task of the new committee is twofold:
to examine the general problems raised by the application of the
social security regulations, and to formulate opinions for the




Regulation No. 1408/71, it is clear, is not only an important
development of Community law, it represents also another step forward
in the constant improvement of the social security protection of migrant
workers. Nevertheless, it is likely to have a troubled life. Firstly,
it is bound to encounter problems before the Court: the provisions on
the aggregation and proratisation of pensions, in particular, are
manifestly incompatible with the Court's interpretation of Article
51 of the Treaty. Secondly, the system is likely to become more
difficult to operate as the social security systems covered by the
Regulation develop. TTv? existing Regulation, it was seen, was devised
primarily for systems based on insurance principles: with the
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accession of Britain and Denmark, with the gradual generalisation
of the other systems and the increasing emphasis being placed on
providing a minimum coverage for all the population, it may become
necessary, for reasons of administration as well as for reasons of
clarity and comprehensiveness, to re-think some of the basic prin¬
ciples of the Regulation. The sort of problem which may arise
increasingly is indicated by the Frilli case^243^. Thirdly, these
problems may be compounded by the fact that general economic develop¬
ments may make any advance in this field, and hence any re-negoti¬
ation of the Regulation, increasingly difficult. This last problem




Co-ordination: Its Social Function
"La securite sociale des migrants se trouve ...a
un noeud de conflits d'interets: interets des
Etats d'abord, variant selon qu'ils sont surtout
"exportatuers" ou "importateurs" de main-d,oeuvre,
mais aussl interets des pertenaires sociaux et
notaifinent ceux des travailleurs qui ne coincident
pas tonjours avec l'interet du pays dont lis sont
originaires ni avec ceux de leurs employeurs
successifs?^ ^
It is evident that an understanding of the *conflict of interests"
of which Ribas and VoirAi speak is central to an understanding of the
development of the social security protection of migrant workers. Yet
most discussion of the problems of co-ordinating social security
schemes under Article 51 of the EEC Treaty has restricted itself to
the technical and legal difficulties. Relatively little attention
has been devoted either to examining the "conflict of interests"
which surrounds social security co-ordination or to analysing the
social function of Article 51 and its implementing regulations.
It is usually taken as given that the regulations contribute to the
realisation of the free movement of workers, one the "four freedoms"
(2)
established by the Treaty , and that therefore they are desirable
both from a social and from an economic point of view.
The notion of the "free movement of workers" is, however, far
from being unproblematic. Grammatically, the phrase is ambiguous,
especially when it is placed beside the other three "freedoms":
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the free movement of capital, of goods and of services: it is not
clear whether this is a subjective or an objective genitive, whether
the workers are the subject or the object of the movement. Para¬
doxically, it is frequently regretted, recently even by Dr. Hillery,
(3)
the Commissioner for Social Affairs , that the "free" movement is
all too often a forced movement. And what, then, is the role of
Article 51 - to facilitate the forced movement of labour? A facile
question perhaps, but it does indicate the need to look more closely
at the problem.
The aim of this chapter is to look at the function of the social
security regulations, to disentangle and separate from one another the
various strands in the "noeid de conflits d*inter£ts", to tease apart,
albeit in somewhat crude simplicity, the structural components of this
knot of conflicting interests. The approach adopted is somewhat
different from that adopted in Chapter 3. Whereas, in discussing
the broader implications of harmonlsation under Articles 117 and 118,
it is possible to follow the heated discussion outwards to broader
issues, it is more convenient in the case of co-ordination under
Article 51, where the discussion does not have the same momentum, to
approach the question from the opposite direction, to start with the
broader issues which might throw some light on the function of Article
51• Accordingly, this chapter will start with the phenomenon of mig¬
ration (as it must, if Ribas and Voirin*s suggestion that this is the
key to the conflict is to be pursued), examining briefly the develop¬
ment of labour migrations, the role of the state in relation to such
migrations and the nature of social security treaties designed to
cover migrant workers, before turning to the Comnunity system and the
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origins of Article 51 and Regulation No. 3. Having thus situated the
Comnunity provisions, the question will be posed whether the function
of these provisions has clianged since their creation. In the next
chapter, an attempt will be made to see if the (changing) function of
these provisions is reflected in their legal interpretation and appli¬
cation.
Much of the first part of the chapter may appear to be an excursus,
a deviation from the subject, in so far as it does not deal directly with
the social security regulations. It is the argument of the chapter,
however, that, in order to understand the social function of Regulation
No. 1408/71, or (and this amounts to the same thing) in order to under¬
stand the structure of the conflict of interests which determines the
development of Regulation No. 1408/71, it is necessary to relate the
general course of social development to the particular development of
the social security regulations through a number of mediating steps.
It is argued that it is necessary not only to relate the social security
regulations to the general EEC provisions on free movement, but that to
understand the dynamic of their development, it is necessary to go beyond
the scope of the Treaty of Rome and relate the freedom of movement est¬
ablished by that Treaty to the more general context of migration and its
causes. Just as, in the last chapter, it was argued that a knowledge of
the general problems of the International co-ordination of social
security is important for an understanding of the legal problems raised
by Regulation No. 3 and Regulation No. 1408/71, so in this chapter it is
argued that it is necessary to look at the general features of migration
before examining our immediate subject, their particular manifestation
(4)
in the EEC .
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1. European migration of labour
(1) Before 1945
Migrations in Europe are not new; there have always been important
movements of peoples, for one reason or another. But the development of
lafge scale migration in the modern sense, i.e. the migration of indivi¬
duals to seek or take up employment, is closely linked with the rise of
industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century. As industrial enter¬
prises grew, they exhausted local labour supplies (mainly composed of
evicted peasants and destitute artisans) and workers were induced to
come from further afield, from less developed areas either in the same
or in another country: "The social history of industrialisation is
that of mass movements from country to town; international migration
is a special case within this general pattern"^.
Although we tend to think of international migration in the nine¬
teenth century as migration from Europe to America, migration from the
less developed to the more advanced countries of Europe was in fact
taking place simultaneously. "Of the 15 million Italians who left their
country between 1876 and 1920, nearly half - 6.8 million - went to other
/ 0 \
European countries"
It was Britain which first experienced large-scale migration:
Irish immigration began early in the nineteenth century and increased
considerably after the famines of 1822 and 1846-47. By 1851 there
were already 727,326 Irish immigrants in Britain and they made up
2.9$ of the population of England and Wales and 7.2$ of the population
of Scotland^.
In France there was an excess of immigration over emigration from
1850 onwards. Here, the immigrants were not at first recruited directly
into industry, they were brought in to take the place of French agri-
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cultural labourers who had moved to the new industrial areas. At this
stage they came mainly to frontier regions, Belgians to Northern France
and Northern Italians to Alpes Maritimes or the Bouches-de-Rhone. But
before the end of the century, the immigrants were being employed in
industry and had been attracted away to the industrial centres of Paris,
(8)
Lyon and the East . The number of foreigners in France trebled in
this half-century: from about 300,000 in 1851, the number rose to
(9)
1,037,778 in 1901 .
The development in Germany was similar though somewhat later:
industrialisation in the west attracted landless labourers from the
east of the country. The first immigrants, Poles (of Russian or Austro-
Hungarian nationality) first took the places of these labourers, then
they too moved to the developing industry of the Ruhr. Large numbers
of Italians were also attracted by industry and the building trade,
particularly in the southern part of the country. "In 1907 there was
a total of 800,000 foreign workers in Germany and they made up 4.1$
of the total labour force. The 1910 Census showed a total of 1,259,880
foreign residents, including dependants".
Already before the First World War, we thus see the development
of large scale migrations resulting from the rapid development of
industrial capitalism in some countries coinciding with lack of such
development in others. Under these circumstances, millions of workers
left their country in search of a job or a higher wage. Employers were
glad to have the cheap supply of labour, especially as the immigrants
were prepared to accept work rejected as being too repugnant by
indigenous workers^ Everywhere, large-scale immigration brought
social unrest: competition for jobs and housing led in all countries




If this scenario appears to us remarkably modern, it is no doubt
partly due to the fact that the scale of migration was considerably
smaller between 1914 and 1945. The outbreak of war in 1914 brought
the pre-war migrations to an abrupt halt. After the war, migration
of labour was considerably less important than it had been before 1914.
This may be attributed primarily to economic circumstances, the glut on
the labour market in the immediate post-war years as servicemen returned
home, and later the depressed stste of the economy in most countries,
especially after 1929. There are two principal exceptions to this trend:
France experienced a shortage of manpower in the 1920s, as a result of
war losses and the low birthrate. Workers were recruited under agree¬
ments concluded with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy and other countries.
When the depression came, the foreigners were discriminated against and
almost a million of them were sent back to their country of origin by
(13)
the trainload .
The other exception to the decline in the use of foreign labour in
the inter-war period is Germany after 1933. The growth of industrial
production and (after (939) of military service led to severe labour
shortages. Here, the exploitation of migrant workers took its most
extreme form: by 1944, 7.5 million workers, recruited either through
agreements with "friendly and neutral countries" or by force, were
(14)
employed in Germany, often in unspeakable conditions .
(2) Since 1945
The international migration of labour has grown to an unprecedented
scale in the period since the war. There are now more than ten million
migrants (migrant workers and their families) living in the Common
Market aloneForeign workers form a substantial proportion
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(between 5% and almost 30%) of the labour force of most West European
states. The migration of labour is at once both one of the major
factors contributing to the rapid economic growth of Europe since the
war and one of the most important sources of social tension and griev¬
ance.
There has been continuous immigration into France since 1945.
Table I shows how this immigration developed. Three features are
particularly noteworthy: the gradual, though fluctuating growth in
the number of immigrants; the surge of immigration in the years 1956
and 1957; and the massive preponderance of Italians among the immigrants
until the late 1950s, after which their leading position was taken over
first by Spaniards and later by Portuguese. These figures do not
include Algerians or citizens of former French colonies south of the
Sahara,* the first of these groups, the Algerians, is particularly
important - by the end of 1969 there were 608,000 of them in France.
In that year the total immigrant population in France was 3,177,000,
/ |
or 6.4% of the total population of the country . The national
composition of the immigrant population is shown by Table 2.
The development of migration into the other major labour -
importing country of the Community, the Federal Republic of Germany,
has been rather different. The enormous influx of expellees and
refugees of German nationality, combined with the difficulties
experienced by German industry in the immediate post-war period, meant
that employers did not meet with serious shortages of labour until
about 1956; these shortages became acute in the 1960s, particularly
after the frontier with the GDR had been closed in 1961. Large-
scale migration Into Germany thus began later than in France and its
growth has been remarkably rapid. Table 3 shows the rise in the
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number of migrants employed In Germany since 1954, while Table 4 shows
the number of newly entering foreign workers for each year since 1958.
Again, it will be noted that, until the early IS60s, Italy was by far
the most important source of foreign labour and that its relative
importance declined only gradually during the 1960s. By the end of
1973 there were about 2\ million foreign workers employed in the
Federal Republic and they accounted for more than \\% of the labour
force employed. The foreign population (including workers* families)
was estimated to be almost 4 million, or about 6**$ of the country's
. .. (17)
population •
There is no need for our purposes to examine in detail the pattern
of migration in other European countries. Table 2 shows the scale and
national composition of the immigrant population in France, Germany,
Switzerland and Britain. Thble 5 shows the importance of immigrants
in relation to the labour force (and the populations) of the member
states of the EEC. It is clear from the dimensions that the migration
of labour has assumed that it has important economic and social effects
not only for the major receiving states (F.R. Germany, France, Switzerland,
Luxembourg, etc.) but also for the major labour exporting states (Italy,
Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Jugoslavia, Greece, Ireland, etc.). It is
clear too that, In dealing with the rights of migrants, we are not
dealing with a purely marginal phenomenon, but with the rights of a
very considerable number of people.
2. The Interests Involved
How are we to understand this unprecedented growth in the number
of migrants? Within the scope of a chapter devoted to the social
function of Article 51 EEC, it is not possible to examine fully all
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aspects of European migration. All that can be done is to trace rather
crudely what appear to be the essential features of recent European
migrations, to try and understand the conflict of interests involved
and to draw attention to the central paradox of the phenomenon: on the
one hand, it is seen as an economic "good", on the other, it is the
source of the most flagrant social "ills" in Europe today.
The basic structural pre-condition for large-scale migration can
be seen as the uneven development of capitalism. This uneven develop¬
ment may be due not only to the fact that industry develops more rapidly
in one area than another, but to the interrelation between the economies
of the two areas, i.e. the development in one area may well hinder the
development in the other. This is likely to lead to a situation in
which there is a surplus of capital (i.e. capital seeking a means of
profitable investment) in one area and a surplus of labour (a mass of
unemployed or under-employed workers) in another.
This is what happened in Western Europe after the War. The rapid
economic growth which took place in northern Europe (most importantly,
(18)
for our purposes, in France and later in FR Germany ) soon led to
(19)
shortages of labour (and hence to a surplus of capital) : the
supply of labour had in any case been considerably depleted by the
destruction of two world werd and the relatively low birth rate^20^.
In other countries (particularly in Ireland and the Mediterranean
countries), the economy grew more slowly, too slowly to provide work
for all those seeking it, particularly in view of the generally higher
(21)
rate of natural increase , The result in these countries is, of course,
chronic large-scale unemployment and under-employment.
Given this situation of uneven development, given a surplus of
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capital in some countries and a surplus of labour in others, what
could be more rational than to bring these two factors of production
together? It is clear that in this situation "mobility will result
(•>2)
in a better allocation and utilisation of resources" . A marriage
of the surplus capital and the surplus labour appears to be in every¬
one's interest.
Such a "marriage" can take place either in the advanced or in the
less advanced country. In the former case it involves the migration of
labour, in the latter it involves the movement of capital. In fact
both movements usually take place simultaneously, but for the moment
we are concerned only with the migration of labour, with the employment
of workers from the less developed countries in the more advanced
countries.
Marriage, in today's permissive society, usually takes place
because both partners want it to take place, because both partners
perceive It to be In their interests. So too with the "marriage" of
surplus labour and surplus capital: the question why this marriage
has taken place to the extent of the employment of ten million migrants
can be most simply answered by saying that this is what the partners
wanted - the owners of capital considered it to be in their interest
to employ ten million migrants and ten million workers considered
it to be in their Interest to migrate for the purpose of employment.
If one were to extend the metaphor, one might compare the states of
emigration and of iaaigration to the two sets of parents: the fact
that they have, on the whole considered it in their interest to
encourage the natch has bad an important influence on the scale on
which it has occurred. Perhpps, then, one way of coming to grips with
the phenomenon of integration is to look at the interests of the parties
concerned.
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The fundamental interest of the owners of capital is to increase
that capital, to make profits. There are a number of ways in which
the employment of migrant workers assists the employer in the pursuit
of this interest.
The most immediate and obvious advantage of employing migrants
is simply that they provide extra labour power, an additional source
of profit, and they make possible the full use and expansion of
existing capacity. The effect, however, is not merely cumulative:
the employment of migrants does not merely enable the owners of capital
to increase the mass of their profits, it also allows them to obtain a
higher rate of profit than they would otherwise have obtained. By
swelling the supply of labour, by increasing the elasticity of the
labour market, migrant workers inevitably weaken the position of
labour and the bargaining strength of the labour organisations,
inevitably keep wages lower than they would otherwise have been.
As Kindleberger puts it:
"The slogan *equal pay for foreigners* is a fallacy, of
course, if it is thought that this means that immigrants
do not reduce wages. Increased supplies of labor reduce
wages, relatively, if not absolutely, even if foreigners
(23)
are paid the same wages as natives" .
According to his model, it is principally by Increasing the supply of
labour and thus holding back wage increases and increasing profits that
the migration of workers contributes to the economic growth of the
receiving state:
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"In the country of immigration, short-term elasticity
of the labor supply has a favorable impact on wages
(holding them down), on profits (holding them up), on
(24)
investment and growth, and on price stability"
But it would be wrong to see migrants as simply providing an
additional supply of labour: from the point of view of maintaining
or increasing profits, migrants offer certain advantages not offered
by an extra supply of indigene 3 labour. Migrants will generally
accept lower wages than indigenous workers, since the standard of
living to which they are accustomed and hence their wage expectations
(25)
are lower . The fact that foreigners may not formally be discrimi¬
nated against on the basis of their nationality makes little difference
to this, since the jobs performed by migrants are to a large extent
different from those performed by indigenous workers, i.e. there is a
(26)
dual labour market . The common assertion that there are some Jobs
so repugnant or so boring that only foreign workers can be persuaded
to take them, is another way of saying the same thing: in order to
persuade indigenous workers to accept them, it would be necessary to
(27)
pay a higher wage • Migrants are also prepared to work more night
shifts, more overtime, in worse conditions and at a faster rhythm than
(28)
indigenous workers : thus, for example, an investigation in
(29)
Germany " has shown that employers who wish to increase the rhythm
of conveyor belt production in their factory often begin by improving
it on those parts of the production line where foreign workers
predominate. What makes this possible is in part the traditions of
the migrants, in part the generally low degree of trade union organi¬
sation among migrants, in part the desire of mai\y of them to make as
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much money as possible as quickly as possible before returning home, but
also the fact that the political and industrial rights of migrant workers
(30)
are far more restricted than those of indigenous workers . Quite
apart from practical difficulties of communication, their right to
trade union representation is often restricted by law^3'\ they have
(32)
no right to vote in the country in which they work , their right
to change employment is limited and their continued residence in the
receiving state often depends on their employer's continuing willing¬
ness to employ them. The ability of migrants to bring industrial or
political pressure to bear in order to achieve higher wages or better
working conditions is thus very limited.
Other, more global advantages result for the employers in the
receiving state from the "foreignness,,of the foreign workers. The
receiving state obtains the advantages of an aburidant supply of labour,
without having to bear many of the connected disadvantages. As a
general rule, migrants are in the receiving state only while they are
productive: the costs of the unproductive periods of the migrant's life
(childhood, unemployment, invalidity, old age) are generally borne by
the state of origin. The supply of migrant labour also has the advantage
for the receiving state of being capable of being turned on or off as
required, i.e. migrant workers can be allowed Into the country or refused
admission or sent home in accordance with the demands of the economic
cycle. This function of migrant labour is sometimes referred to as
(34)
the "Konjunkturpufferfunktion" . As the French sociologist, R.
Aron, has put it:
"The supply of foreign labour not only mitigates the inadequacy
of demand for certain types of job, but also forms a sort of
industrial reserve force. The industrialised countries open
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and close the inlet valve and sometimes also the outlet
valve at will. The employment of foreign workers on a
short-term basis serves to prevent unemployment among the
indigenous working population in the event of a slowing
down of the economy or of a recession. It is the foreign
worker who from time to time comes up against closed doors
(35)
or even loses his job" .
In a time of recession, the social tension and financial costs
resulting from unemployment can be reduced by restricting the entry
of new migrants or by sending home those already in the country. The
effect, of course, is to export these costs and tensions to the
(36)
countries of origin . This appears to have happened, for example,
in the German recession of 1966-67. The number of foreigners employed
in FR Germany fell during this recession from t,314,(XX) in June 1966
to 903,500 in January 1968^3^. In 1967 the number of foreigners
employed fell by 18.5$ as compared with 1966, while the total number
(38)
of persons employed dropped by only 3.2$ . Nor can this fall in
the employment of foreigners be entirely attributed to a reduction
in the number of new entrants: official estimates put the number of
of migrants returning home between autumn 1966 and autumn 1967 at
500,000, as compared with figures of 300,000 and 200,000 for comparable
(39)
periods before and after 1966-67 .
A further advantage of migrant workers, from the point of view of
profits, is that they occasion, at least in the short term, little
indirect expenditure via taxation. At least in the initial period of
migration (when migrants are generally young and unaccompanied by their
families) little needs to be (i.e. little is in fact) spent on providing
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(40)
additional housing, education, hospital services, etc. for them .
(41)
As the migration "matures" , as the average age of the migrants
rises and their families follow them, pressure for better social
provision tends to Increase. The build-up of this pressure may,
however, be delayed by a policy of "rotation", by encouraging the
fairly rapid replacement of one "generation" of migrant workers by
another^4^ .
(43)
Finally, there are what may be called the "political advantages"
of importing foreign labour. Recourse to foreign workers means that a
considerable section of the working population is deprived of political,
trade union and civil rights. More important, perhaps, is the effect
on the cohesion of working class solidarity as a whole. Owing to diffi¬
culties of communication (for cultural as well as linguistic reasons),
owing to competition with indigenous labour for unskilled jobs and to
the fact that the influx of migrants allows many indigenous workers to
rise to "superior" positions, large scale immigration has been accomp¬
anied everywhere by a lack of solidarity and even hostility between
(44)
indigenous and foreign workers .
Those, in crude outline, are the principal reasons why it is
profitable for the owners of capital to employ workers from the less
advanced countries. The reasons why many employers have found it more
advantageous to employ these workers in the more advanced countries
rather than in their countries of origin are numerous: among them may
be mentioned the problem of the proximity of the market, the inadequacy
of the infrastructure in the less developed countries, tax and tariff
barriers, political security, etc. It should be noted that neither the
economic advantages of employing migrants in the northern countries nor
the relative disadvantages of investing directly in the less developed
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country are necessarily unchanging: a change in the character of the
migrants going north or an increase in the social tensions engendered
by migration may make the encouragement of labour mobility less
attractive; conversely, an improvement in the communication network or
political stability of the less developed countries may make invest¬
ment there more interesting. To this problem we must return later.
For the moment it must suffice to point out that migration grew
rapidly in scale during the 1950s and 1960s and was seen as being
unequivocally advantageous by most employers.
To say that migration was advantageous to employers is surely
to say also that it was good for profits, for investment, for growth,
in short, for the "economy" of the receiving states. Most economic
analyses, however they see the long-term implications of migration,
recognise that it has played an essential part in the economic growth
of Western Europe since the War^45,!. Thus Kindleberger writes
"the major factor shaping the remarkable economic growth which most
of Europe has experienced since 1950 has been the availability of a large
(47)
supply of labor". Thus Kahn stated In a recent interview :
"France has only been able to develop its economy with the speed it
has because she's been able to make use of 3,000,000 foreigners".
(48)
This was also the view of the Spaak report : '31 est ... indispen-
able de ... noter le facteur tres important d'expansion qu'un afflux
de main-d'oeuvre peut constituer pour un pays".
It would be one-sided to assert that migration was in the sole
interests of the capitalists of the north. The fact that so many
workers from the south have chosen to migrate suggests that, given
the existing situation, they too have found migration to be in their
interests. The main reasons for migrating - the "push" factors as
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(49) (50)
Castles and Kosack call them - are usually economic . The
migrant has usually experienced or faced the prospect of unemploy¬
ment or dire proverty at home. In some cases, the aim Is simply to
earn higher wages, often with some definite purpose in mind, such as
(51)
the purchase of land or of a small business .
The ruling classes in the countries of origin have also seen it
as being in their Interests to encourage, or at least to allow the
emigration of labour. For them too there are both political and
(52)
economic advantages . Politically, emigration provides an
important safety valve through which much of the discontent arising
from large scale unemployment can be released. Economically, the
remittances sent home by workers abroad provide a short-term advantage
(53)
by contributing to the improvement of the balance of payments •
In any case, as Portuguese experience indicates, it would be very
difficult to limit the emigration of workers unless frontiers were
closed altogether, and to do this while high unemployment continued
would almost certainly lead to an explosive situation.
Here we have seen one side of migration, the "good" side of the
paradox mentioned earlier. Migration is good for the economy of the
receiving state, it is in the interests (it least the immediate
interests) not only of the northern employers and the receiving states
but also of the migrants and of the ruling classes in the country of
origin. Hence it appears desirable to encourage migration, since this
leads to the most "rational" allocation of resources.
What of the other side of migration, of the "bad" side of the
paradox, of the fact that migration is widely acknowledged to be the
source of one of Europefs most pressing social problems? If we are to
understand the increasingly vocal criticism of the policy of migration,
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it is necessary to look briefly at the "bad" side of the paradox, at
the social evils and their relation to the economic good. It may be
suggested that the basic flaw in the argument so far has been to
equate the interests of the employers and the interests of the migrants
in migration, to equate the "choice" of the employer to employ migrant
labour and the "choice" of the migrant to emigrate in search of a job,
to equate the "pull" and the "push" factors of migration, witen the
only "choice" for the migrant is often one between utter destitution
and life (often for longer than anticipated) in the worst condtions
of industrial Europe, when the "push" factors of poverty and un¬
employment are always present somewhere while the "pull" factors"
depend on the decision of a relatively small number of people as to
how best they can make profits. This is why some critics have seen
migration not as the rational and harmonious expression of the common
interests of employer and migrant, but have described the relationship
(54)
between employer and migrant as one of "super-exploitation" and
that between receiving state and state of origin as one of "neo-
(55)colonialism" . These expressions, though we do not necessarily
wish to adopt them, have the merit of drawing attention to the negative
aspects of these relationships.
The term "super-exploitation" refers to a feature of migration
already mentioned, namely that migrants are a source of super-profits
or additional profits for the employer. The term draws attention to
the social consequences which this economic "super-exploitation"
entails for the migrants. Part of the advantage of employing migrants
derives, as we saw, from the fact that it is possible to pay them
lower wages than indigenous workers would expect, that they have few
trade union and political rights, that they are prepared to accept
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worse working conditions, that they occasion little social expend¬
iture. It is hardly surprising, then, that some of the very aspects
which make migration an economic "good" mean also that the situation
of migrants is one of the most serious social problem faced by
(56)
Western Europe today
The miserable conditions in which migrants live and work are
well known. It is becoming common to refer to them as a suo-
(57)
proletariat and to draw comparisons between their life and the
conditions suffered by industrial workers in the early capitalism of
(56)
the nineteenth century • Like those early workers they enjoy,
in practice and usually in law, no political ri^its and only rudi¬
mentary trade union rights. At work, they generally occupy the lowest
paid^58^, the most unpleasant^80 ^ and the most dangerous^6' ^ jobs^6*"^.
Outside work, they often live in horrifying conditions. The factory
barracks of Germany, the wretched bidonvilles of Paris do not need -U
to be described here^63^.
The other terra sometimes used to describe the negative aspects
of migration, "neo-colonialismf* or "neo-iiuperiallsm" refers not so
ranch to the consequences for the individual migrants as to the dis¬
advantages for the country of origin. In this view, the essence of
migration is that it involves a transfer of human resources, a transfer
of value (the value of the labour power of the migrants) from the
country of origin to the receiving state. After the country of
origin has paid for the education of the worker up to the ege of his
greatest productivity, the benefit of that productivity goes largely
to the receiving state: some economists have estimated that the
movement of each worker involves a transfer of value equivalent to
(64)
about /5000 . Moreover, the resources so lost to the country of
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origin are far from being always unskilled. On the contrary, it is
usually skilled workers who are the first to migrate from a country,
and some receiving states make great efforts to attract skilled man¬
power while others (Britain, for example) forbid the immigration of
(65)
unskilled workers . This has led to shortages of skilled labour
(66)
in several countries of emigration in recent years . Indeed, if
the regions or countries of origin do manage to industrialise, local
employers sometimes find that, because of emigration, there is a short¬
age of labour or that they cannot afford to pay wages to compete with
(67)
the employers of the north .
It is doubtful whether the short-term or supposed economic
advantages for the country of origin really outweigh the loss of human
resources. Although the remittances sent back by workers abroad
/ ggj
improve the balance of payments and raise the standards of con¬
sumption in the areas from which the migrants come, there is little
evidence that they contribute to the economic growth of the area.
The remittances are only rarely invested productively, and, as the
increased consumption which they stimulate is not matched by a
corresponding increase in production, their effect tends to be
inflationary^69^. Nor does the acquisition of skills by the migrant
normally contribute much, as is sometimes claimed, to the econon^y
of his country of origin. Few migrants actually acquire more than
the basic skills, specific to a specific job on a specific machine,
while they are abroad. Of those who do acquire skills, it seems
that few put them to any use on returning home. An OECD study, based
on reports from Italy, Spain, Turkey, Greece and Portugal, came to
the conclusion that:
"Far from thronging into jobs which are appropriate to the
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skills, or at least the specialised training or works-
discipline, they have acquired i.e. industrial jobs,
they (returning migrants) find themselves places in
the traditional economy at the level of the craft trades
or the services, and in any case prefer to set up for
(70)
themselves" .
• . .1^; jsaEm
Castles and Kosack concluded from their survey that although "it
would be possible to construct a model in which migration did have a
beneficial effect ... the reality looks different ... Our conclusion
must be that at the present time migration does little to assist in
the development of the home countries of the migrants^7^.
If these views are correct, the two sides of the paradox of
migration are not merely related, they are inseparable: the economic
growth of the northern countries is not merely accompanied by social
misery for the migrants and economic disadvantages for the countries
of origin, the growth is actually built on this social misery and
this transfer of value from the home countries. One nay ask why,
when the bad aspects of migration have always been there, they have
only recently attracted so much attention Is it because of the
increase in the scale of migration, because of the Increased voci-
ferousness of migrants, or Is it perhaps due to a conjunction of
these factors with a change in the economic interests of the major
owners of capital?
But we are not concerned with this problem here: the aim at
this stage is merely to "set the scene" for Article 51. Having
sketched some of the essential features of European migration, we must
now turn briefly to the role played by the state in relation to
migration.
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3. The role of the State
Since the early part of this century, receiving states have
played an active part in relation to migration. Before that, in
the second half of the nineteenth century, states had done little
either to restrict or to promote migration. The ideal of "free
movement" did in fact apply to a large extent. Workers moving from
one country to another did not require residence permits, work
permits or even passports; nor would they be recruited by official
agencies.
As the scale of migration increased, these liberal policies were
called into question. On the one hand, workers, fearing greater un¬
employment and a fall in wages as a result of the swelling of the
"industrial reserve army" by immigration, demanded that protectionist
measures be taken to safeguard their position on the labour market.
The employers* interests, on the other hand, required an abundant
but not necessarily an unrestricted supply of labour. The state could
thus apparently meet the demands of both sides by introducing prot¬
ectionist measures and controlling immigration, while at the same time
taking steps to ensure an uninterrupted supply of migrant labour to
the employers of the receiving states. This, broadly speaking, is
what in fact happened. The Introduction of protectionist measures
in most countries at the beginning of this century was accompanied
by the conclusion of international agreements providing for the
recruitment of workers and removing obstacles to the free movement
of the nationals of the contracting parties. Thus, in France, where
the debate on the merits of protectionist and liberal migration
policies was still in progress, the Franco-Italian labour treaty of
1904, the first of its kind, was acclaimed as showing the way forward
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to a system in which international treaties would provide the
(72)
solution to the liberalism-protectionism dilemma .
Since the introduction of protectionist legislation, receiving
states have played an active part in relation to migration in three
main ways: by controlling or restricting entry into a country? by
restricting the rights of migrants after entry and by organising and
subsidising the recruitment of migrant workers.
With certain limited exceptions, all governments now restrict
entry into their country, particularly for the purpose of employment.
Since the introduction of passports, residence permits and work
permits, it has come to be taken for granted that states should
regulate the entry of foreigners into their country and particularly
the employment of foreigners. The degree of control exercised and
the policies behind the exercise of this control vary in time and
from country to country, in response to economic and social tensions.
In recent years, policies have become more rather than less
restrictive. Castles and Kosack's study of immigration policies in
the najor labour-importing countries of Europe leads them to the
conclusion:
"The general pattern is one of governments allowing in
workers according to the needs of the labour market ...
With the exception of the European Economic Community, the
general tendency has been towards greater organisation and
control of migration, rather than towards free movement"^73\
The fact that states control the influx of migrant workers does
not mean that their aim Is simply to reduce their number. On the
contrary, they often take an active part in the recruitment of foreign
workers. The organised recruitment of foreign workers started soon
-232-
after the turn of the century: In 1908, the Agricultural Employers'
Federation of North-Eastern France concluded an agreement with the
Emigration Committee of the Diet of Galicia, which led to the migration
of some twenty thousand Polish agricultural workers to France before
(74)
the First World War . Between the wars, the French government
concluded recruitment agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy
(75)
and other countries , but the actual recruitment was carried out
by private agencies. It was not until 1945 that the Office National
d* Immigration (O.N.I.) was set up and given a monopoly of recruitment.
Recruitment agreements were concluded with all the main labour-supplying
countries and recruiting agencies were actually set up in several of
them. "French employers who want to employ foreign workers are supposed
to apply to O.N.I., which finds suitable workers and arranges their
journey to France, after medical examination. Hie employer pays a
/7
fixed fee for these services' ' .
The system in Germany is rather similar. The Federal Government
has concluded recruitment agreements with all the principal suppliers
of labour: with Italy in 1955, with Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey
in 1961, Portugal in 1964 and Yugoslavia in 1968. Under these agree¬
ments, the Bundesanstalt ftlr Arbeit sets up agencies in the countries
concerned. After specific requests from German employers have been
received by the agencies, the labour authorities of the recruitment
countries try to find suitable candidates. The local German agency
ensures that the worker is suitable for the job, medically fit and
without a criminal record. Finally, after the contract is signed,
(77)
the agency arranges the worker's journey to Germany . The German
employer pays a fee for each worker which, until quite recently was
•25o-
considerably lower than the actual costs incurred by the Bundes-
anstalt ftlr Arbeit. Until the end of 1971, the employer had to pay
60DM for each Italian worker and 165 DM for workers from otter countries,




worker was 235DM . The state thus not organised but also sub¬
sidised the recruitment of migrant workers
Once the migrants arrive at their destination, the state imposes
certain restrictions on them which, as already mentioned, greatly
weaken their position in relation to their employers. The most import¬
ant of these is the system of work permits, without which a foreigner
may not enter into employment. The work permit effectively deprives the
foreign worker of the right, so well established in liberal theory,
to sell his labour power to the highest bidder. In Britain, a work
permit is issued to a foreigner only if no British worker is available
for the job, and it restricts the worker to that particular jobi
(80)
permission must be obtained for any change in employment . In
France too, the work permit required by all foreigners is usually
issued for a specific job, for a limited period and for a restricted
area; if the foreigner wishes to change job, he must obtain a new
(81)
permit and this may be difficult . In Germany, the position of
migrants is even less secure. They are usually employed initially
for one year only, and the work permit usually restricts their right
(82)
to work to that period and to a particular employer .
In all these countries, the system of work permits is reinforced
by a system of residence permits. In order to stay in the country the
foreigner must have a residence permit, and the residence permit is made
dependent on the work permit. This is particularly strictly enforced
in Germanyi any breach of the contract (such as changing jobs before
contract has run its course) will result in expulsion of the migrant
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frora the country. A central index is kept of foreigners who have
broken their contracts or who, for other reasons, are not to be
(83)
allowed to work in Germany again . These measures which bind
a worker to a particular employer and "punish" him for breach of
contract (for it is hard to describe it otherwise) are reminiscent
of the legal provisions which governed employment at the beginning
of the last century.
Other restrictions relating to trade union and political
activity have also been mentioned already. In Germany, foreigners
did not, until recently, have the right to sit on works councils
(&l)
in factories , and their right to engage in political activity
is limited by the AuslSndergesetz of 1965^ ^• In France, foreig-
( 86)
ners are not allowed to be trade union officials . In addition
to these legal provisions, it must be remembered that other forms
(87 )
of action, particularly police harrassment may have the effect
of restricting the trade union and political activity of migrants.
It is clear that the receiving state normally contributes to
the "exploitation" of the migrant in two ways; by organising and
subsidising his recruitment for the employer and by restricting
his rights vis-a-vis the employer. It might be said that there
is a third way in which the state contributes, not so much by
action as by neglect or omission. The fact that most receiving
states have neglected to provide adequate facilities (particularly
housing) for the migrants has added to the short-term economic
benefits to be drawn from their employment: the present debate
(88)
in Germany about infrastructure investments makes this clear .
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4. International social security agreements
It Is within this context that we must place international agree¬
ments aimed at co-ordinating social security schemes to cover migrant
workers. We are at once faced by a paradox, for is It not paradoxical
that States should, on the one hand, not only tolerate the bad housing
and working conditions of the migrants but even make it almost impos¬
sible for migrants to take action to achieve better conditions, while,
on the other hand, they give away millions of pounds In the form of
social security benefits as a result of these social security agree¬
ments? How, in other words, are these social security agreements to
be related to the general process of migration?
It is clear that there is some relation. Most social security
agreements follow or accompany large scale migrations from one of the
(89 )
contracting states to the other. Delmnoo confirms this
"dune mani&re generale, une convention de securite' sociale
est prece'dee par le phenoniene du de'placement de travailleurs
quittant le pays d^migration, ou les possibilities d'emploi
sont limitees, pour se rendre dans le pays d1immigration ou
il y a penuiie de main-dfoeuvre. Ce deplacement est generale-
ment prdce'de d'un Accord entre les deux pays portant sur
l'effectif des travailleurs migrants, sur les conditions de
recrutement et d,emploi, etc"
Then he continues, explaining the motivation of social security
agreements:
"S*il va de soi qu'a ce stade de 1'operation (i.e. at the
stage of the recruitment agreement) les motifs dconomiques
sont prdpond^rants, lors de la conclusion d*une convention
de s^curit^ sociale, par contre, les cons ideations sociales
- , . „ (90)pifvalent •
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What does this mean? Why should the receiving State suddenly exchange
Its economic for its social hat? Whatever its motivation, the conclusion
of a social security agreement often involves the transfer of millions
of pounds from the social insurance institutions of the receiving state
to the nationals of the country of origin, i.e. to the migrants and their
families. The annual net expenditure of German social security insti¬
tutions resulting from the application of social security agreements
(including Regulation No. 1408/71) mist be in the region of at least 1000
(91)
million DM . This may not be a very big sura in relation to total
expenditure on social security benefits, but it is not so small a sura
as to be given away without some reason.
It is not surprising that social security treaties are either sought
by the governments of the labour-exporting states or offered to them as a
concession. The advantages for these states are obvious. Firstly, con¬
siderable sums of money are transferred to it from the receiving state.
This not only helps to improve the country's balance of payments, it also
relieves it of part of the burden of supporting children, the unemployed,
old and disabled. The governments may also be under popular pressure
from migrants' organisations and trade unions to do something to improve
the lot of workers forced to go abroad to find work. But only by assuming
that the first consideration (the transfer of money from the receiving
state to the state of origin) is the more important can we understand why
social security agreements have increased and multiplied, whereas the
governments of the country of origin rarely, if ever, intervene to ask
(92)
for action to be taken to improve the housing and other social
conditions of the migrants.
The advantages for the receiving state are less obvious. One reason
often invoked is the assumption that the non-co-ordination of social
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security schemes would discourage labour mobility, or alternatively,
that where there is competition for migrant labour between several
receiving states, the workers will be attracted to the state which
provides the best protection for the children he has left at home, for
himself in his old age, etc. The conclusion of social security agree¬
ments is thus a means of encouraging labour mobility, of attracting
migrant workers to one's own country; this element of competition is
likely to have a cumulative effect, one bilateral agreement leading to
another^93^.
An additional reason for the receiving state to conclude an agree¬
ment is no doubt the sentiment of social justice or, more concretely,
the wish to maintain social stability. In this sense the provision of
social security for migrant workers is akin to its provision for indi¬
genous workers: extending protection to migrants means extending the
socially stabilising effect of such protection. The resentment likely
to be caused by the non-co-ordination of social security systems and
the argument that migrants should be properly protected is reinforced
by the fact that, whether or not such an agreement exists, whether or
not they are likely to receive any benefits, migrant workers are obliged
to pay social security contributions on the same terms as indigenous
. (94)
workers .
Thirdly, the receiving state may agree to sign a social security
agreement as part of a wider package which would bring other advantages
to it. The current Association negotiations between the EEC and the
Maghreb states provide an example of this: the EEC states have offered
to conclude an agreement on social security as part of the Association
,,(95)
"package . Hanotiau suggests that states may even discriminate
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against foreigners in their social security schemes in order to use
this discrimination as a bargaining counter in international negotiat¬
ions:
"Sur le terrain diplomatique et dans un souci de
protection des nationaux a l'etranger, les discriminations
constituent souvent un facteur de negotiation, une monnaie
d'tcnange dans les discussions Internationales" .
One can see these various factors at work in the negotiation of
(97)
the first (and apparently the best documented ) social security
agreement, the Franco-Italian treaty of April 15th, 1904. As with
later treaties, the agreement was reciprocal in form: French workers
in Italy would benefit as much as Italians in France. In fact, however,
thero <>ere about 200,000 Italians working In France and only 10,000
Frenchmen working in Italy. The benefits for Italy were obvious: the
treaty facilitated the transfer of savings and of such social security
benefits as existed from one country to the other, and removed vis-a¬
vis Italians nationality discriminations contained in the French laws
on industrial injury and old age pensions. In return, the Italians
originally offered the French certain commercial advantages, but this
idea was eventually dropped. The main advantage for the French govern¬
ment was that, in the second part of the treaty, the Italian government
undertook to improve its social legislation. For some time, French
employers had been complaining that, because of the backwardness of
Italian social legislation, the production costs of Italian employers
were very low and French industry had been suffering as a result. It
was hoped that the effect of the 1904 Treaty would be to raise the
production costs of Italian industry.
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The 1904 treaty served as a model for subsequent treaties.
Italy had similar provisions inserted in conwercial treaties with
(98)
Switzerland, Germany and Austro-Hungary within the following year .
After this the agreements increased rapidly in number. By 1920, 31
agreements had been concluded, 24 of them devoted solely to social
security; by 1945, their number had risen to 133; between the begin-
(99)
ning of 1946 and the end of 1966 a further 401 had been signed ,
in addition to a number of multilateral conventions.
It would be both impossible and fruitless to trace the motives
that lay behind all these treaties. It is enough to see them as part
of the general give and take of international relations. A distinction
is suggested by Doublet^*00^ between the old pre-1945 treaties which
had " m caractere utilitaire et empirique" and a new breed of post¬
war treaty in which: "c'est une interpenetration plus grande des
nations et de leurs regimes de securite'" sociale qui a et6 poursuivie
plus que 1'adoption de mesures propres k faciliterdes migrations'^0^.
This is misleading in so far as it suggests that social security
treaties based on socio-economic considerations are a thing of the past
and that the European states of today^10"^ are interested only in
creating a rational network of social protection. Nevertheless, there
is a distinction to be mede here. Delannoo formulates it more precisely
by distinguishing between "les conventions qui s'inspirent de motifs
socio-dconomiques" and "les conventions qui s'inspirent de consider¬
ations axdes sur la politique Internationale d'un pays"^03^. By the
former he means treaties concluded between two countries where there
is an important flow of migrants from one of the countries to the
other. The latter phrase refers to treaties signed by two countries
between which there is no significant migration, for example the
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treaties between l;;ium and the UK or between Belgium and Switzerland.
These treaties, he suggests, should be seen simply as treaties of mutual
benefit or treaties of friendship. Another way of formulating this
distinction, which seems well-founded, would be to distinguish between
those treaties which result in a significant and one-sided transfer of
money and those which do not. Despite Doublet*s chronological disti¬
nction, it seems probable that the number of people benefiting under the
former type of treaty, if not the actual number of these treaties, is
still far higher than the number of those receiving benefits under
(104)
the latter type . It is clear that only the former, the more
traditional type of treaty can be placed squarely within the framework
of migration and migration policies.
5. The EEC System of Free Movement
So far we have approached the social security of migrant workers
in general terms, in terms of the traditional relationships between
states* It has been suggested that migration should be seen as a
result of the uneven development of capitalism, that it brings large
profits to the employers of the north, largely at the expense of the
migrants and their countries of origin* The receiving states have
promoted this migration and restricted the migrants* rights in a
manner favourable to their employers. These states have nevertheless
conceded certain social security rights to migrants through inter¬
national agreements, partly as a means of attracting migrant labour,
partly as a means of preserving social stability, often too as a
means of gaining certain conraercial advantages. It is now time to
approach our subject more directly and ask whether the EEC adds anything
fundamentally new to the relations so far described.
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The notion of Furopean economic Integration adds nothing to
modify our analysis of the main features of the relationships giving
rise to and engendered by migration. The basic conclusion of the
theorists of economic integration*105* is that, in a common market
in which unemployment exists or will be created, factor mobility is
necessary for the efficient allocation of resources, for the maxi¬
misation of production. In otter words, given a situation of uneven
development, given a surplus of capital in one area and a surplus of
labour in another, it is "rational* to try to bring the two factors
of production together, to encourage the employment of southern workers
by northern capital.
(106)
As mentioned above , the Spaak report adopted this approach.
The bringing together of the factors of production would make an import¬
ant contribution to raising standards of living:
*La creation de nessources nouvelles, 1'utilisation de
reasources inemploy^fes, la mise en conraun des facteurs
de production sont finaleraent la contribution essentielle
qu'un marcte' commun doit apporter au relevement du niveau
de vie»<,07).
The encouragement of labour mobility should not be limited, as it was
in the ECSC treaty, to qualified workers. On the contrary, the un¬
skilled and unemployed labour of the south should be encouraged to
take on the worst paid and most unpleasant jobs in the north, thus
giving indigenous workers the opportunity to find better jobs:
"On pourrait meme soutenir qu'il y a un interet common
& faciliter les mouvements de la main-d'oeuvre ii
proportion qu'elle est moins quallfiee: c'est celle-ci,
en effet, qui trouve le plus difficilement a s'employer
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dans les pay ou le ch&mage est etendu; dans les pays
d* immigration, elle vient relayer la main-d'oeuvre
nationals, qui peut alnsi rechercher les metiers raleux
• / / . V .. . (,(lC8)
remuneres ou moins penibles .
The Treaty of Romu adopted the view that the migration of labour
should be encouraged, or at least facilitated. This seemed to cor¬
respond to the interests of all the governments: the Netherlands and
particularly Italy had chronic unemployment, the other countries were
beginning to experience shortages of labour. Italy and the Netherlands
were eager to get rid of their unemployed, the employers of the other
(109)
countries were eager to employ them .
It may be objected that to argue, as has been argued here, that
the common Market adds nothing fundamentally new to the relationships
connected with migration is to overlook the important new element
introduced by the Treaty of Rome, the free movement of workers. The
Treaty does not simply encourage the movement of workers, it removes
from the member states the right to control this movement and the
right to discriminate against the nationals of other member states^
To understand why the labour-importing states agreed to abandon
these rights, it is necessary to see that, although the concept of
European integration in no way transforms the basic relationship of
exploitation, it did add some new elements to the normal pattern of
migration negotiations.
The most important of these new elements was the increased barg¬
aining power of the Italian government. The ILO report of 1955 on
the "Social Aspects of European Co-operation" points out that ever
since the War, Italy and the other states of southern Europe had been
urging a liberalisation of the international labour market, had, in
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all discussions on international co-operation, been putting forward their
desire, "Mittel and Wege fllr eine Abwanderung der flberschflssigen
ArbeitskrHfte nach den nttrdlichen LHndern zu finden"^11^. But this
demand had constantly met with resistance from the northern countries.
The Report thinks it unlikely that the southern governments will per¬
suade the northern countries to accept the free movement of labour
unless they, in return, lower tariff barriers or make similar con¬
cessions:
"Ob sich durch zwischenstaatliche Abkommen fiber die
internationale Freizflgigkeit der Arbeitskr&fte viel
mehr erreichen lHsst, erscheint zweifelhaft, es sei
denn, dass die durch engere wirtschaftliche
Zusanraenarbeit verfolgten Ziele etwas welter gefasst
werden als dies bisher m&glich war. Man darf unseres
Frachtens erwarten, dass nach der Erzielung konkrete«*
Ergebnisse auf anderen Gebieten der wirtschaftlichen
Zusammenarbeit-etwa einer erheblichen Verminderung
der Handelsschranken-die einzelnen Lender sich auch
allraShlich bereit finden, hinsichtlich der Zulassung
(Hi)
frerader Arbeiter eine flexiblere Haltung einzunehmen" ~ .
It seems reasonable to conclude that this is what actually happened.
Thus, it is mt enough simply to say, as Dahlberg does^*3\ that the
principle of free movement was accepted because Italy wanted to get
rid of its unemployed and the northern employers wanted to employ them,
for large-scale migrations have taken place without any "freedom of
movement", without the receiving state abandoning its right to control
entry and to discriminate against foreigners: this explains only why
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migration was enc iraged, not why free movement was accepted. It is
necessary to add that Italy wished to ensure that the northern states
would not be able to limit the migration of Italians, and that they
would not be discriminated against, and that the Italian government
was able to have its way in return for other concessions, i.e. as
part of the general "package deal" of European integration. In this
respect it is perhaps significant that restrictions on the movement
of workers were to be gradually removed during the period of trans¬
ition, at the same time as tariff barriers were gradually being
dismantled .
The Italian position was no doubt supported or justified by a
number of arguments. Firstly, there is the curious notion that the
fre*- movement of workers is somehow part of the "logic of the common
market". Thus Dahlberg tells us that part of the reason for the
inclusion of Articles 48 and 49 in the Treaty urns "the economic
logic involved in establishing a common market"^ The only
reason which Swann, in his book on the "Economics of the Common
Market", gives for the inclusion of the provisions on free movement
is that it is "in Keeping with the concept of a common market"^'
Beever explains this more fully:
"As far as the Cons unity is concerned, free movement is
part of the philosophy of its founders, and is written into
the Rome Treaty. The basic principle of the Coranon Market
is that the economic process roust not be distorted, and if
goods, capital and services are to be permitted free movement
then it would represent a distortion if labour were not"^'7^.
The basic notion behind these arguments seems to be that the "idea of the
common market" (seated no doubt at the right hand of the Idea of the
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Good in Plato's heaven) is to rationalise the econorny by opening up
the narkets of the member states to free competition. By removing
tariffs, protectionism and the wasteful inefficiency it conceals are
done away with, by removing barriers to the free movement of capital
and labour, the most efficient allocation of resources is ensured.
T\w> objections may be made to this sort of argument. Firstly, it
is not at all logical: in no way does it follow from the dismantling
of tariffs that restrictions on the mobility of workers must be
removed; nor is there any evidence that the removal of controls on
migration contributes to the efficient allocation of resources - on
the contrary, the granting of additional rights to Italian workers
has probably deterred northern employers from employing them, from
cons'mmating the intended marriage between surplus Community capital
and surplus Community labour. The second objection is that this sort
of approach conceals the concrete interests Involved: the removal of
tariff barriers is in the interests of efficient or powerful producers
eager to enlarge their market, but it is not at all clear that the
removal of controls on migration is also in their interest, which
perhaps explains, incidentally, why the system of free movement has
not functioned very satisfactorily. The explanation of free movement
in terms of the "logic of the common market" also conceals differences
in national interest. It conjures up the image of a system in which
the interests of the various countries are evenly balanced: this is
not in fact the case, since Italians have consistently accounted for
about 80% of intra-coraminlty migration^ To say that the
argument concerning the "logic of the common market" is untenable is
not of course to deny that it may have been used to some effect.
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Another argument, also related to European integration, which
has been used to support the free movement of workers is based on the
notion of a "European citizenship"^. it is argued that, if the
EEC is a step towards political union, then freedom of movement is to
be seen as a step towards European citizenship, towards the granting
of full civic rights to citizens of any member state wherever he may
be within that political union. This argument, in so far as it goes
beyond expressing an ideal, greatly embellishes the reality of mig¬
ration: if the Italian migrant working in the Ruhr is the symbol of
the future, the outlook is bleak indeed. It Is doubtful whether this
approach had any effect on the negotiation of Articles 48 and 49,
although it may have had some influence on their subsequent application
Probably the most important argument to be used in support of the
Italian demand for free movement was the realisation that the implem¬
entation of the Treaty was likely to create unemployment in certain
industries and certain areas:
"Der fortschreitende Abba:u der iiandelshenranUse bringt es
rait sich, dass einzelne Under oder Regionen nicht mehr im
Windschatten der Konkurrenz liegen und nunraehr dera Inter¬
nationa len vfettbewerb nicht mehr gewachsen sind. Regions le
Freisetzung von Artwitskriften oder Lohnsenkungen zur Hebung
der Konkurrenzfdhigkeit wKren die Folge. In diesen FUllen
1st die Internationale Arbeitsmobilitlt geelgnet, die
Arbeitsn&rkte In den wenlger begttnstigten Gebieten rv
entlosten"^^.
Hie social tensions resulting from the redundancies caused by the
operation of the Common Market could be reduced by making it easier for
workers made redundant to go and work in utiother part of the Community.
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6. The origins -Regulation No, 3
We have now set the scene for Article 51 of the Treaty. As
mentioned at the start of this chapter, the immediate framework for
Article 51 is provided by the notion of the free movement of labour.
The EEC's system of free 'movement has two essential features. On the
one hand, the Treaty of Rome aims to promote or at least facilitate the
migration of labour, because this is economically beneficial. In this
respect, migration within the EEC has the same character and the same
function as migration anywhere. But the system of free movement not
only aims at increasing the number of migrants, it also represents a
concession won by the Italian government, the abandonment by the member
states of the right to control migrations from other member states and
to discriminate against migrants who are nationals of other member
states.
Social security agreements of the traditional variety are, it
has been suggested, to be seen as one element in the migration policies
of, and relations between, labour-importing and labour-exporting states;
more specifically, they can be seen as concessions which benefit not only
migrants directly but also the government of their country of origin and
which may be granted by the receiving states for any or all of three
main reasons: to encourage migration, to ensure social stability, to
obtain trade or other concessions from the state of origin.
It Is the first of these reasons, the encouragement of migration
which is invariably put forward as the main reason for the negotiation
of the Convention which was later transformed into Regulation No. 3.
This Convention had its origins in Article 6G of the ECSC Treaty.
This Article was designed to promote the migration of coal ami steel
workers within the Community. Its fourth paragraph provided that member
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states should try to make "tous arrangements qui demeureralent necessaires
pour que les dispositions relatives a la securite' sociale ne fassent pes
obstacle aux mouvements de main-d'oeuvre". An intergovernmental confer-
(122)
ence met to discuss these "arrangements'* in May 1954 f but the
4123)
discussions which followed were "longs et laborieux . There were
considerable technical difficulties involved in co-ordinating six
different systemsbut one of the main problems appears to have
been the financing of the system and the division of costs between the
various member states. The schene originally proposed seems to have
been less favourable to the labour-exporting states than that which was
eventually adopted^125^• Because of the difficulty of the negotiations,
the Convention was not signed until December 9th, 1957. By this time
the Treaty of Rome had already been signed, and partly in order to
/ j
avoid the process of parliamentary ratification , it was decided
to convert the Convention into a regulation of the new EEC. In the
form of Regulation No. 3, it became the first major piece of EEC
legislation^*27^.
In order to understand the ratio or function of the Convention
(and Regulation), it is necessary once again to distinguish between the
labour-exporting and the labour-importing states, i.e. essentially
between Italy (and to a lesser extent the Netherlands) and the other
states. It is clear from the accounts published by the Commission
(128)
Administrative that the effect of Regulation No. 3 is to transfer
considerable amounts of money from the labour importing states to
Italy. Consequently, it is not surprising that Italian commentators
should regard improvements in the regulations as benefits for which
Italy should negotiate against the other states. Thus, Motta concludes
his review of the proposals to amend Regulation No. 3 by insisting that the
Italian government should take a firmer stand:
—?49—
"Tale dato pone la esigenza di una pib ferma posizione
contestatlva nel corso delle trattative ... Tale
esigenza e tanto plb sentita se si considera che 1
lavoratorl Interessatl alia libera circolazione, per
usare la terrainologia communitaria, sono per la quasi
(1 *>9 )
totalita lavoratori italiani" .
Although six states signed the Convention and there is no large-scale
migration between most of them, it is nevertheless justifiable to think
of the Convention in terms of the more traditional type of social
(130)
security agreement , i.e. it is one of those agreements which
accompanies large-scale migrations and results in considerable net
transfers of money.
If the function of the Convention from the Italian point of view
cannot be divorced from the benefits to Italian migrants and the sum
of money transferred, it must still be asked what the primary aim of
the labour-importing states was. Ail the evidence suggests that they
saw the main aim as being the removal of an important obstacle to the
movement of workers. This is suggested not only the the wording of
Article 69 (4) of the ECSC Treaty but by the fact that it is the only
motive put forward by most commentators (especially those writing at
the time) to explain the existence of the Convention^1 o1 \ Their view
is that the fear of losing entitlement to benefits or of being discrimi¬
nated against by the social security scheme of the receiving state
constituted a serious obstacle to mobility which it was necessary for
the ECSC to remove. The link between the Convention and the mobility
of labour which existed in the minds of some at least of the
(132)
negotiators emerges clearly from an article written in 1957
by Doublet, Director General of Social Security in France and almost
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certainly involved in the negotiation of the Convention. In an aside
he explains why he thinks that the original financing scheme proposed,
under which the costs would have been borne in common by the member
states and the High Authority, was justified:
"II apparaissait, en effet, normal de partager cette charge
entre les trois parties pour les ralsons suivantes:
- le pays du lieu de travail profite de l*activite du
travailleur imralgrtf;
- le pays de residence en benlficie e'galement car son
e'conoraie est indirectement soulagde par le depart
de travailleurs sous-employes, et dlrectement aliment£e
par la consomroation sur son sol eftne partie des gains
r^alls^s par lesdits travailleurs dans le pays ou lis s'emploient;
- la Communautd car elle ben^ficie en definitive des avantages
d^coulant de la liberty de circulation de la main-d*oeuvreM^33^
It does not natter that this argument is unconvincing. What is interest¬
ing is that the costs resulting from the Convention, are treated as
costs Incidental to migration, to moving workers or encouraging them to
move from one country to another. Hie argument is that those who
benefit from the migration should share the costs involved.
To emphasise the motive of the negotiators for the labour-
importing states is not, of course, to deny that the Convention has
had important side-effects. Clearly, the social security position of
Community migrants has been improved, and this may have contributed in
some degree to social stability. But the main aim of the northern
governments, the reason why they were prepared to concede so much
(134)
money *" was the purely economic one of encouraging the movement of
workers. There is no evidence that the conclusion of the Convention
was directly linked to any concession from the Italians in any other
-251-
field.
7. The Changing Function of the Social Security Regulations
We have seen the interests and the policies which brought Reg¬
ulation No. 3 into existence. The question which now arises is this:
if the social security regulation came into being as a result of a
policy (both in Italy and in other member states) of encouraging
migration, what will happen to them if this policy changes? If the
costs which result for the northern governments from the operation
of these regulations are regarded as part of the costs of encouraging
migration, what will happen if the northern governments no longer want
to encourage migration? If the socio-economic forces which brought
the legal structure of Regulation No. 3 into being change radically,
will this change be reflected in the application, interpretation or
development of the social security regulations, or has the legal
structure become independent of its socio-economic basis?
There are two questions to be considered; has the socio-economic
function of the social security regulations changed? If it has, has
this change been reflected in their legal development? The latter
question is considered in the next chapter, here we are concerned only
(135)
with the former. It is sometimes suggested that, although
Article 51 and Regulation No. 3 originally had an economic function,
their social function is now more important. What does this mean?
Various factors suggest that the function of Afticle 51 has
indeed changed, that its prime function is no longer to encourage
Italians to go and work in the factories of the north. Among these
factors are: the decline in the absolute and relative importance of
intra-Gb.,anunity migration; the fact that there is very little ground
for thinking that the system of free movement in general, and the social
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security regulations In particular, have the effect of promoting
migration; and the changes In the migration policies of the receiving
states.
One of the most striking features of the development of mig¬
ratory patterns since 1958 has been the decline in the importance of
intra-Oommunity migrations. In 1958, 65$ of the work permits granted
for the first time to foreign workers in the member states went to
Community workers, and 55$ to workers from outside the Community. By
1965 this proportion had been reversed, 65.8$ of the new entrants being
non-Community workers and only 34.2$ being of Community nationality^"^.
The trend has continued: by 1969 only about 20$ of new entrants came
from within the EEC. In 1970, less than 30$ of the total number of
foreigners In member states came from other member states of the
Community, The number of Italians emigrating to other Community
countries fell absolutely, from 205,530 in 1961 to 145,526 In 1969^37\
There are various reasons for this development. The most obvious,
and probably the most important, is the improvement in the Italian
economy. The development of industry in northern Italy led to a fall
(138)
in the number of unemployed and to a slight closing of the gap
between wage levels in Italy and elsewhere^39^. The incentive for
workers to go abroad to find employment was consequently reduced:
northern Italians could usually find work close at hand, southern
Italians often needed only to migrate as far as northern Italy.
Nevertheless, there were still more than 880,000 unemployed in Italy
in 1970 and the rate of unemployment continues to be far higher than
(140)
in any of the other original member states •
Another reason which contributed to the decline of intra-Community
migration may, paradoxically, have been the Community system of free
movement, one of the aims of which was to promote that migration. The
-253-
system of free movement was put Into effect gradually, the first
regulation being Regulation No, t5/61 (of 16th August, 1961), which
was replaced first by Regulation No. 38/64, which was in force from
May 1964 until it was replaced in November 1968 by the definitive
Regulation, Regulation No. 1812/68. Under this regulation, Community
nationals have the right to seek work in any member state; work permits
are abolished for Community nationalsanda residence permit of five
years* validity is granted automatically to any Community worker who
has found employment; discrimination on the grounds of nationality is
made illegal in practically all areas of work and life except the
sphere of civil rights and voting^41 \ Thus, not only are restrictions
on the right of community nationals to enter employment removed, but
their rights and security after they have entered employment are
extended. Even after they have found a job, their legal position is
considerably more secure than that of non-Community migrants.
One of the points which caused the greatest difficulty in the
negotiation of the regulations was the question of Community priority,
of establishing a system which would give Community migrants some
(142)
priority over non-community migrants • The Italian government
insisted that this was an essential part of the system of free move-
(143) (144)
ment. As Falchi explained subsequently t
"II faut souligner que si ce principe (Community priority)
n*avait pas ete etabli, la libre circulation serait restee
un droit th^orique et n*aurait pas perais aux travailleurs
interessefs k se ddplacer de jouir de conditions plus
favorables, etant donn£ que VTaisemblablement les eraployeurs
des Etats raembres pr^fefreraient embaucher ties travailleurs
(et tel est le cas des travailleurs des Rays tiers) qui ...
disposent, en general, d*une moindre protection Juridique".
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He expands on this point later in the same article !
"Mais il y a d'autres raisons qui, dfapr&s les observateurs,
sont assez importantes pour amener les employeurs a
embaucher de la main-d'oeuvre extra-coumunautaire: en
premier lieu la stabilite derivant du fait que la
rupture du contrat de travail comporterait le retour
inmediat au pays d'origine, et, en outre, le fait que
les travailleurs extra-conrainautaires, ne disposant
que de la tutelle assuree par les Consulates et
n'ayant pas des Associations et des organismes para-
syndicaux, se montravt beaucoup moins revendicatife
que certains travailleurs communautaires."
There was thus a danger, in the Italian view, that the system of free
movement might rebound against Community migrants by giving them
more rights, it might make it more difficult for them to find employment*
Despite strong opposition from the French and particularly the
(146)
German employers and governments , the principle of Community
priority was gradually accepted* Under Article 30 of Regulation
No. 38/64, areas of the Community with a labour surplus had fifteen
days in which to indicate whether they could fill listed Community
vacancies, and only if they could not do this were the member states
free to recruit in third countries* Regulation No. 1612/68 reinforces
this: Article 16 (2) contains a requirement not to offer jobs processed
through the Community vacancy clearance system to workers from non-
member countries within eighteen days of the receipt of the offer by the
services of a member state with labour surpluses. Hut there are indi¬
cations that the system has not worked well. Article 16 (3) contains
important exceptions to the principle^4'\ and employers seem to have
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littie difficulty in evading its effectsrhe Italian govern¬
ment has demanded that the principle of Community priority should be
reinforced and that at the same time the rights of non-Community mig¬
rants after entry into employment within the Community should be
increased, in order to prevent "social dumping", i.e. in order to
discourage employers from turning to these migrants as a particularly
_
, _ (149)
cheap form of labour .
(150)
If the Italian view is correct - and the fact that the numbers
of non-Corriminity workers employed in the Conmunity has grown rapidly
despite the existence of large reserves of unemployed within the
Community^ °lends considerable support to this view - then there
is some ground for believing that the Conmunity system of free move¬
ment has acted as a barrier rather than as a stimulus to intra-
(152)
Community migration , that, by giving the Community workers extra
rights, the Community has simply Increased the attractiveness of non-
Community workers.
Certainly there Is very little evidence to suggest that the
Commmity system of free movement has had the effect of stimulating
migration within the Community. Btthnlng devotes particular attention
to this problem in his book "The Migration of Workers In the United
Kingdom and the European Community". After examining patterns of
migration to all the original member states of the Community and to the
United Kingdom for the period 1958-1970, he comes to the conclusion:
"The existence of free movement effects is clearly visible
on a significant scale only for Belgium and in this case
it is probably due as much to a deliberate Belgian policy
as to the simple removal of the work permit procedure ...
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The key factor is labour demand: when demand is
low, no degree of freedom of movement can help
significant numbers of redundant workers to find
suitable employmentj when demand is high, citizens
of Community countries have in post-war Europe needed
no freedom of movement to find work, to be able to
send for their wives and children, and to stay as long
.(153)
as they wished .
Dahlberg's assertion that the sharp rise in the numbers and relative
importance of intra-Gbmmunity migration in 1965 'is in large part due
(154)
to the greater Co vanity priorities given under Regulation No, 38"
seems unfounded, for he takes no account of conditions affecting the
supply of or demand for labour. In fact, 1965 was a year of economic
recession in Italy in which unemployment rose, and in which new and
stricter Swiss controls on foreign workers led many Italians tliere
to go to GermanyB&hning points out that Italian emigration to
Britain also increased both absolutely and relatively in the same
(156)
year , If the upsurge in Italian migration in 1965 was in part
due to Regulation No. 38/64, then the effect seems to have been short¬
lived, for numbers fell again in 1966.
If the EEC system of free movement as a whole has had no significant
effect on migration patterns, it would seem to follow, a fortiori, that
Article 51 and Regulation No. 3 can have had little effect on migration.
It would be difficult to show that intra-conmunity migration would not
have declined more rapidly had it not been for the existence of Regu¬
lation No. 3, but there is little evidence that the co-ordination of
social security has had any perceptible effect on the flow of migrant
workers.
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Another factor which suggests that the function of Article 51
has changed is the recent trend in migration policies. In recent
years the tendency has been for the migration policies of the main
labour-importing countries to become more restrictive. This may be
attributed to a number of causes. The rapid growth in the number of
foreign workers in these countries, combined with the Inadequacy of
the facilities provided for them, has led to serious tensions and
(157)
even to riots between foreign and indigenous workers in some areas •
If this has been the case even in periods of economic boom, when the
jobs of indigenous workers have not, on the whole, been directly
threatened by the influx of migrants, then the danger of social
instability becomes greater as the economic situation deteriorates,
particularly in the wake of the recent "oil crisisn.
But it is not only the slow-down in the rate of growth which
makes the employment of foreign workers less important for the employ¬
ers of the labours-importing countries. There are signs also that some
of the conditions which made the employment of these workers particul¬
arly profitable are changing. Despite their lack of rights, there
appears to be a growing Industrial militancy among these workers, as
eMdenced for example by the strike at Ford*s in Germany in 1973^58^.
The increased militancy, the growth in numbers and the "maturing"^ 56 ^
of the migration, i.e. the fact that the later migrants are often older
and accompanied or Joined by their families, makes Increased expenditure
on the social infrastructure, so long neglected, almost inevitable .
As the costs are increasing, the quality of the labour imported is
deteriorating: young men are being replaced by older ones, town
people by peasants, migrants from relatively advanced by those from
less advanced countries^6' \ And as the attractions of importing
—2be¬
labour diminish, the attractions of exporting capital appear to be
growing: in particular, the development of the economic infra¬
structure in many peripheral areas is making the profitable invest¬
ment of capital there and the employment of foreign workers in their
/ | go )
country of origin more feasible .
For all these reasons - the rise in social tensions, the slow¬
down in economic growth, the decline in the quality of the migrants,
the increasing attractiveness of investing abroad - there has been a
tendency for migration policies to change in recent years. Switzer¬
land, the country with the highest proportion of foreign workers in its
labour force, took measures to restrict the entry of foreigners as
/1 fit N
early as 1964, measures which were modified in 1970 . Britain
took steps to restrict Commonwealth immigration from 1962. France
(164)
tightened its control of immigration in 1968 ; the issue of
work permits was greatly restricted by the Fontanet circular of
1973^65^, and the immigration of all non-Community workers was
brought to a halt in the sunmer of 1974. Hie most important labour-
importing state, FR Germany, has taken similar steps in the face of
the present economic difficulties, or, as David Stephen has put it,
"Gerraaror took the energy crisis as its excuse for announcing, on
/ I no \
23rd November 1973, a ban on the entry of new foreign workers" .
Of more lasting significance perhaps is the fact that a recent official
/ « gy \
report has recommended that the Government should take permanent
measures to restrict the influx of non Community foreign workers. The
Ekitch government recently (1974) introduced a Bill to restrict lm-
/ | \
migration from countries outside the EEC .
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Three features seem to characterise this latest trend In migration
policy. Firstly, there Is the attempt to reduce the number of foreign
workers entering the country. Secondly, there Is Increased emphasis
on the need to "integrate* migrants into the conwunlty of the receiving
country, by providing better vocational training, language instruction,
housing, etc. In Switzerland, the regulations of 1370 considerably
increased the freedom of foreigners, once In the country, to move fro*
(119)
one job to another . mis integration policy probably represents
a response both to the discontent of migrants and also to the need of
employers for a more stable and more skilled labour force. Castles
and Kosack argue that the liberalisation of movement in Switzerland
corresponded to the particular interests of big business: once the
entry of workers is restricted, they argue, it is in the interests
of big as opposed to small employers to free the movement cf foreign
workers within the country: being able to pay higher wages, they can
then attract scarce labour away from the small entrepreneurs^
That the new trend in migration policy does correspond more to the
interests of big companies than to those of small entrepreneurs is
suggested also by its third feature: the restriction of immigration
Is accompanied by attempts to encourage investment abroad. The re¬
lation between the two aspects emerges particularly clearly from the
German report to which we have already referredThis report,
which recommends a reduction in the number of migrants employed in
Germany, stresses that it is important to reduce as siuch as possible
the damage that would result for the countries of origin. To this
end, the report suggests that the Federal Government might take three
types of action. Firstly, the Government should direct overseas aid
to building up the infrastructure of the country of origin and so
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providing a basis for the profitable investment of capital; within
the EEC, this could be done through the proposed regional fund.
Secondly, the government should promote private German investment
abroad by liberalising its import policy, i.e. by removing tariffs
and other barriers which might cut those investing abroad off from
the markets at home. Thirdly, the Federal Government should "insist"
that the governments of the countries of origin remove all restrictions
on foreign investment, safeguard property rights and try to keep wages
(172 )
down . The fact that the report recommends that the measures taken to
encourage investment abroad should be complemented by a policy of pro¬
moting labour-saving technical innovation at home^73' reinforces the
impression that the measures it proposes correspond primarily to the
/ 4 «*y» \
interests of large companies .
It seems possible, then, that the new trend in migration policy
is more than conjunctural^175^. a combination of factors points in
this direction: the social problems resulting from migration in the
northern countries are growing; the economic attractions of importing
labour power into the northern countries are declining as the quality
of the migrants deteriorates and social costs rise; investment in the
present labour-exporting countries is becoming more feasible as their
(17fO
economic infrastructure develops. Earlier in this chapter ' ' we
pointed out that the desired "marriage" of northern capital and
southern labour could be consummated either in the north (involving
the migration of labour) or in the south (involving the export of
capital). It was stressed that the relative attractions of the two
forms of union were not necessarily unchanging. From what has been
said here, it seems likely that the trend^77^ is for the attractions
of exporting capital to the southern countries to grow, while the
advantages of importing labour decrease. It is the policy of the
Commission to encourage this trend within the EEC by r.eans of a
regional policy. This trend - if trend it be - is generally wel¬
comed: it would free southern workers from the necessity of going
abroad to find work. Against this it might be argued that to change
the place in which northern capital and southern labour come together
does nothing to alter the basic relationship and that the problems
involved in this relationship will merely reappear in a different
(178)
form . But to examine these arguments would be to stray too far
beyond the bounds of our subject.
However one views the significance of these changes, it is clear
that the environment and the function of the social security regulations
have changed. Doublet, writing in 1957, could treat the costs of
implementing the proposed Convention as costs incidental to encouraging
migration. It is no longer satisfactory to see them in tthis light:
there is little evidence that these regulations do in fact encourage
migration; the importance of intra-community migration has declined
greatly, and northern industry does not, in any case, have any diffi-
(179)
culty in attracting migrant labour ; finally, the recent trend in
the policies of the northern countries is to discourage migration.
Certainly one should not exaggerate the change: in particular, the
problem of attracting skilled labour and the role of the social security
regulations in relation to this should not be overlooked. Nevertheless,
it is clear that a change has taken place, that the function of the
social security regulations has to some extent become divorced from the
immediate socio-economic forces which brought them into existence.
If one were to attempt to explain today why governments are prepared to
maintain and even extend the social security rights of foreigners, the
explanation would certainly have to lay less emphasis on the aim of
attracting migrant workers and more on the aims of preserving social
stability and good International relations, and perhaps also on
bureaucratic inertia. It would be absurd to try and quantify the change,
but it is undeniable that a change has taken place.
This is no doubt the kernel of truth in the assertion that the
original "economic" function of Article 5t has now been replaced by a
prifcrily "social" function. It is true that the co-ordination of
social security should be seen less as part of the "economic" policy
of attracting migrants, more as part of the "social" policy of integ¬
rating the migrants into the Conrounity, But this formulation is mis¬
leading if it suggests that the original self-interested motives of
the negotiating states have now been replaced by a disinterested and
concerted effort to improve the lot of the migrant workers. Regulation
No, 1408/71, which succeeded Regulation No. 3, was the subject of seven
years* negotiations. The negotiations - which were described by one of
the participants as "tres, tres, tres, tres, tres dures" - took so long
not only because it was necessary to devise technical solutions to fill
the gaps in the protection afforded by Regulation No. 3, but also
because it was necessary to persuade the northern governments to
increase the amount of money annually transferred to Italy and to
Italian migrants. The difficulty of the negotiations suggests strongly
that, although the nature of the Interests Involved had changed, the
conflict of interests surrounding the social security of migrant
workers had certainly not vanished.
This brings us back to the starting point of this chapter, to
the statement of Ribas and Voirln that:
"La s^curitd sociale se trouve ... a un noeud de conflits
d*lnt£r£ts"*180*.
We have tried to gain sojue insight into the forces involved in this
conflict and their changing pattern. In the next chapter we must
ask whether this change in the nature of forces is reflected at all




Co-ordination Law and Its Social Function
In the last chapter attention was focused on the social
function of the social security regulations, on the socio-economic
forces and policies which brought the regulations into existence.
In the previous chapter, the same regulations were approached from
a different angle, we examined the legal tradition of which these
regulations form part, the way in which the regulations developed
this tradition and the legal problems of interpretation which arose.
It is the task of this chapter to try to relate these two analyses.
At the beginning of chapter 5, it was pointed out that the co¬
ordination regulations are very different from Articles 117, 118 EEC.
Unlike the provisions discussed in the first part of this thesis, they
are very much "lawyer's law", a large and complex body of norms having
a high degree of internal coherence. Whereas legal discussion of
Articles 117, 118 EEC almost invariably refers to extra-legal consi¬
derations, this is rarely the case with the regulations passed under
Article 51 of the Treaty. These are usually treated as being quite
autonomous of the social forces which surround them, as having a
purely internal coherence and an internal dynamic, such that changes
in their provisions can be understood in terms of legal decisions or
reactions to lacunae in the law.
That this view of the autonomy of the regulations has a certain
Justification cannot be doubted. To try to understand a decision of
the Court of Justice or most of the provisions in Regulation No. 1408
without reference to the whole legal structure which surrounds them
would be absurd. As we saw in chapter 5, the development of the
regulations and of the protection which they provide can be presented
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quite coherently without reference to apy external considerations of
policy. As, in general, it would be a mistake to deny the existence
and significance of a specific legal structure, of a specific legal
framework of thought and development, so, in particular, it would be
a mistake to underestimate the autonomy of these regulations and their
insulation from the social and economic forces which surround them.
Nor can it be doubted, however, that this autonoiqy is merely
relative. The autonomy of the legal provisions in this case is
without any doubt greater than in the case of Articles 117 and 118,
but it is clear that the regulations are insulated from the interplay
of social and economic forces only to a certain degree. Thus, to take
an extreme example, if the change in the social climate were so great
as to lead to a war between Italy and the Federal Republic, the social
security regulations would presumably cease to operate altogether. If,
to take a less extreme example, the Council of Ministers ceased to
meet, the existing regulations might well continue to operate, and
to be the subject of interpretation by the Court, but there would be
no legislative development of their provisions. But the question which
interests us is a more realistic one: is it likely that a much less
significant change in the environment of the regulations, namely a
change in the migration policies of the member states, will be
reflected either in the interpretation or in the legislative develop¬
ment of these regulations?
The point can be made clearer by referring to two other examples.
Renner, in his pioneering studyshowed how the change in the socio¬
economic function of property was reflected over the years in a change
(2)
in the legal rules relating to property. A study by the Commission
- to take a less significant example but one which is more closely
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related to our subject - has recently sought to relate the nature of
the immigration policies of the member states (whether primarily
economic or both economic and demographic) to the legal norms governing
the entry and integration of foreigners, the implication being that a
change in the immigration policy of the member states would be reflected
in a change in these norms.
It is a question, then, of trying to understand the degree of
autonomy of the law, the extent to which the processes of interpret¬
ation and legislation are insulated from the social and economic forces
which surround thera, and consequently the extent to which the develop¬
ment of the law is a function not only of its internal cfynamic but also
of these external forces. The answer will clearly vary from one law to
another. The different interpretations of Articles 117, 118 EEC are,
it was suggested in Chapter 4, closely related to social and economic
considerations and consciously directed at obtaining a desired political
end. Similarly, the relation between a change in migration policy and
a change, say, in the regulations governing the entry of family members
is fairly clear. But the relation between a change in the policy which
gave birth to a legal provision and a change in the interpretation or
development of that provision is not always obvious. In particular, it
is not at all obvious how, if at'all, the change in policy towards
migrants which we observed in the last chapter will be reflected in
the interpretation and development of the regulations governing the
social security of migrants.
In order to gain a more precise picture of the relation between
the external factors to which we have referred and the development of
the social security protection of migrants, it may be helpful to deal




In discussing the interpretation of Regulation No. 3 in chapfcer 5,
we concentrated on the work of the Court of Justice. At least as
interesting in the present context is. however, the work of the
Administrative Commission established by Article 43 of Regulation
No. 3, and maintained in existence by Article 80 of Regulation No.1408/
71. One of its duties (Article 81(a), Regulation No. 1408/71) is wto
deal with all ... questions of interpretation arising from this Regu¬
lation and subsequent regulations'*. Such interpretations are not
legally binding, they do not affect the right of recourse to national
tribunals, nor to the Community Court of Justice. Their interest in this
context lies in the fact that they constitute a sort of half-way house
between legislation and interpretation. The Administrative Commission
is a body which is no doubt more open than the Court to policy consider¬
ations and which is likely to give its interpretations more in response
to what it feels to be the needs of the situation than according to aqy
cannons of legal reasoning.
The Administrative Commission normally meets ten times each year.
Each member state is usually represented in practice by one represent¬
ative (usually the director in charge of social security in the
ministry of social affairs), one deputy (who is often a specialist in
international social security questions) and one technical adviser.
The Commission is normally represented by one representative and one
deputy, and a representative of the ILO attends to give technical
assistance. What is interesting about the composition of the Admini¬
strative Commission is that its members are all specialists in social
security rather than experts on migration policy. The published
decisions of the Administrative Commission give little indication of
their motivation, but one of the participants in their meetings felt.
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in an interview, that migration policy played little role In the
deliberations of the Administrative Coimnission, and that changes in
migration policy would have little effect on their decisions.
Most of the decisions taken by the Administrative Commission are
at a level of detail far beyond the bounds of our survey. They are
generally concerned with the smooth administration of the system
rather than with the scope of the protection of migrants. A notable
exception to this was the decision taken at the 37th and 38th
(3)
sessions of the Administrative Commission in 1962 to adopt a broad
interpretation of the scope of application ratione personae of the
regulations, i.e. that it should apply not only to migrant workers
stricto sensu but to all employed persons travelling within the Com¬
munity. It is interesting to note that the arguments within the
Administrative Commission were conducted entirely in legal form,
centring on the question of the compatibility with Article 51 EEC of
a broad interpretation of the scope of the regulations. It is, however,
very unlikely that it was the force of the legal arguments which finally
overcame the initial opposition of the Luxembourg and especially of the
French governments. TT»e decision was, in fact, taken more in spite of,
rather than as a result of, the legal arguments. Because of the
reservations of the Commission's legal service, the decision was recorded
as an "agreement" rather than as a "decision". As we know from the
judgment in Case 75/63 (Unger) and subsequent cases, the Court gave
the same interpretation on "legal" grounds.
The manner in which the decision of the Administrative Commission
on the scope of appiication of the regulations was taken suggests that
the interpretations of this body are indeed made in more or iess direct
response to policy considerations, mediated in this case by "Instructions"
of the French and Luxembourg governments. Neither this decision nor any
of the Administrative Conraission's other decisions indicate, however,
that the policies which motivate them are consciously related to the
member states* migration policies. On the contrary* the evidence that
is available suggests that they are not.
The other major body entrusted with the task of interpreting the
regulations is the Court of Justice. The Court, as we saw in Chapter 5,
has made many important decisions which have had the effect of extending
the social security rights of migrants: the decision in the Unger case
(75/63) that the regulations were not applicable solely to migrants
stricto sensin the Interpretation of the regulations to bring in Italian
artisans (De GLcco, 19/68), workers with a "mixed career" (Janssen, 23/
71) and means-tested pensions (Frilli, 1/72), the insistence that the
system of aggregation and proratisation should not operate to the detri¬
ment of the migrant (Ciechelski, 1/67), etc.
The Court's extensive interpretation of the regulations resulted,
it was argued, from its stress on the aim on policy of Article 48-51
EEC: because the aim of these articles is to promote the free movement
of workers within the Community, any measure which damaged the interests
of the migrant would be incompatible with that aim. litis is, in a sense,
to interpret the provisions of the regulation in the light of a policy.
This "policy", hwever, is not to be identified without more ado either
with the policies which led the member states to include those pro¬
visions in the Treaty or with the present policies of the member states,
or indeed with the policies of the Commission. The Court's interpretation
of the aims of the relevant articles is not one which shows a great aware¬
ness of, or indeed concern for either the immediate interests of the
(4)
states or the broader economic considerations surrounding the whole
question of migration. The "policy considerations" i»y which the Court
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is moved, in other words, are unlikely to follow the contours of economic
development as closely as do the policies of the member states. The
initial policy decision of the Court, as to the extent of the impli¬
cations of Articles 48-51 EEC, was no doubt coloured by all sorts of
attitudes which can be seen in turn as a response to the social and
economic environment, but, once taken, this decision becomes to a large
extent enshrined, or embalmed, in the Judgments of the Court and is
likely to be not very, or only very slowly, responsive to the socio¬
economic environment. In any case, there seems to be very little sign of
any change over the years in the Court's attitude towards free movement
or towards migrants: if anything, the Court's attitude has recently
become even more liberal. It might perhaps be satisfying to be able to
point to a particular judgment of the Court as reflecting a change in
attitude to migrants, to relate that change in attitude to the change in
policy of the governments and to relate the change in policy (and hence
the change in the Coiurt's attitude) to the interests of big business.




It is hardly surprising that changes in the policies which surround
the regulations should find little reflection in the interpretation of
the regulations. The change in the policies has, after all, been a
subtle, a gradual and a recent one which has not directly impinged on
the Community's system of free movement. In any case, it is not clear
what the implications of the new approach, even if fully translated into
law, would be for the social security regulations. Even if those who
develop them through legislation or interpretation consciously sought
to mould the social security regulations to meet the requirements of
the new approach to migration, what effect would this have on the
contents of the regulations? In what way would a regulation co¬
ordinating social security schemes which was designed to "integrate"
migrants into the community of the receiving state differ from one
which was designed to attract migrants to that state?
The problem arises more clearly in relation to the legislative
development of the protection afforded by the regulations. Any change
in policy is likely to affect the process of legislation before it
affects tiie process of judicial interpretation. But, given that no
statements have been made explicitly relating the development of the
social security regulations to recent trends in migration policy, what
is it that one should look for as a reflection of the new policy?
There are three possibilities which might be considered. Firstly,
one might expect that member states which are no longer very interested
in attracting more migrant labour would be reluctant to improve the
existing regulations in any way which would greatly increase their
expenditure. If so, then it is likely that this reluctance would
manifest itself most clearly in the course of the negotiations on the
revision of Regulation No. 3. Secondly, one can ask whether there are
any specific measures more appropriate to "integrating" migrants than
to attracting them, and whether any preference was shown for such
measures in the revision of Regulation No. 3. Thirdly, one wuld expect
to find an increased reluctance to extend the benefit of the existing
regulations to any new categories of workers or to apy more social
security schemes. We shall consider each of these three possibilities
in turn.
The negotiations on the revision of Regulation No. 3 were, as we
saw at the end of the iast chapter, very long and very hard. There were
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certainly technical factors which contributed to the length of the
negotiations - not least of these the difficulties raised by the
decisions of the Court - but the basic reason why the negotiations were
so hard was apparently the fact that no state wanted to pay any more
than was absolutely necessary. In particular, the German delegation
was reluctant to accept any improvement in the provision of unemploy¬
ment benefits, the French refused adamantly to accept the scheme proposed
for the payment of family benefits and the Dutch were reluctant to pay
more on pensions. Eventually, a rather delicate "compromis global1*
was readied, which became Regulation No. 1408/71. This compromise is
rather an unstable one, for 'wo reasons: firstly, because the com¬
promise on the calculation of pensions, which is embodied in Articles 45
and 46 of the new Regulation, is manifestly incompatible with the case
/ 0 \
law of the Court of Justice j and secondly, because no agreement was
reached on the payment of family alltwances. Instead, it was decided
that, in the case of a migrant working in apy of the member states
except France, the family benefits relating to members of the family
residing in another member state should be provided by the first member
state (i.e. the state of employment) according to its own legislation.
In the case of a worker in France, however, the family benefits were to
be provided by the state of residence according to its legislation,
although the cost would be borne ultimately by the competent French
institution. Article 98 of the Regulation provides that the member
states should re-examine the whole problem before January 1st, 1973
in order to reach a uniform solution.
The case of the family benefits is an interesting one. Family
benefits, as we saw in the last chapter, constitute one of the major
items of expenditure under the social security regulations. It is also
the item of expenditure under which the one-sided benefit for Italy
is the most unequivocal^. In the dispute surrounding Article 73
we can see therefore a clear conflict between the demands of the
labour-exporting country (Italy) and the refusal of one of the labour-
importing countries (France) to accede to those demands. Italy, in
the negotiation of Regulation No. 1408/71, refused tc accept the gen¬
eralised payment of family benefits at the rate provided for by the
country of residence, as this would have been less favourable to Italy
and the Italian migrants concerned than the alternative system. France*
refusal to accept the system favoured by Italy constitutes in effect a
refusal to transfer to Italy as much money as Italy demanded. The
agreement of the other member states to Italy's deioands can be explained
no doubt, by the fact that family allowances do not form as important an
item of expenditure in those countries as they do in France.
The negotiations to find a uniform solution are still in progress.
There are presumably many considerations which might influence the
outcome of the negotiations, but one of the most important factors
affecting the bargaining power of the two sides must be strength of the
demand for Italian labour in France. If this is correct, then it will
not be surprising if any uniform solution reached is along the lines
proposed by France rather than those favoured by Italy.
Reluctance on the part of the labour-importing states to increase
their expenditure on the social security regulations cannot, of course,
be taken as an unambiguous reflection of a change in policy towards
migrants: there are many other reasons why a state should show
reluctance to increase its expenditure on these regulations, or indeed
on many other things. The change in policy is likely to find its
reflection more clearly, not in a growing reluctance to increase
-274-
expenditure, but in a change in the relative bargaining strength of
the two sides, in a weakening of the ability of Italy to persuade the
other member states to overcome this reluctance. If there is no real
demand for labour, then Italy's bargaining position is considerably
weakened, and, moreover, the other member states are unlikely to
outbid one another in trying to attract migrants.
It is impossible to assert with any confidence that Regulation
No. 1408/71 reflects o weakening of Italy's bargaining power, and that
this can be attributed to the change in the migration policies of the
other states. The compromise agreement embodied in Regulation No. 1408/71
was, after all, reached as early as November 1969, when the recent trend
in migration policy Sad not yet become so clear. Nevertheless, it
seems inevitable that the change in policy and the fall in the demand
for labour will in the long run affect the development of the co-ord¬
ination of social security. In this respect, the outcome of the present
negotiations on family benefits may give some indication of future trends.
The second possibility mentioned above was that the provisions of
Regulation No. 1408/71 might reflect a preference for specific measures
more appropriate to "Integrating" migrants than to attracting them.
The aim of such measures should presumably be to deter the uncontrolled
entry of workers but to promote a certain stability among those who were
already employed in the receiving state. The social security regulations
could be manipulated to promote these aims. The pursuit of such a
policy ought logically to lead, firstly, to a lack of generosity in
the provision of unemployment benefits for workers going abroad to
seek employment, and, conceivably, also to measures designed to
facilitate reunification of families after the migrant has found worfc in
the receiving state. The provision of improved unemployment benefits
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met, we know, with strong German opposition In the negotiation of the
new Regulation. The provisions on unemployment benefits are, Indeed,
less generous In some respects than those contained In the old Regulation.
Whereas Article 35 of Regulation No. 3 allowed unemployment benefits to be
paid for e maximum of four months after the unemployed worker had moved
to a new state, the maximum period allowed by Regulation No. 1408/71
(8)
(Article 69 (1) (c)) Is only three months • It seems more than likely
that Germany's opposition to any major improvements in this area was
based not only on an unwillingness to pay more money but also on a
reluctance to promote the uncontrolled migration of labour in search
of employment. If our analysis of trends In policies towards migrants
is correct, then the co-ordination of unemployment benefits is an area
which is unlikely to see much development.
It is more difficult to see any direct link between the provisions
on family benefits and an "integration" policy. It might be argued that
the system proposed by the French, namely the provision of family bene¬
fits at the rate provided for by the country of residence rather than at
that provided for by the country of employment, would have the effect
of encouraging the reunification of families, but there is little
evidence that this consideration has played ar\y role in the negotiations.
The third way in which one might expect the legislative develop¬
ment of the social security regulations to be affected by the change in
the policies of the northern states towards migrants is in the extension
of the protection given by the regulations to cover new schemes and new
categories of workers.
The initial proposal of the Commission for the revision of
Regulation No. 3 included measures to extend the coverage of the regu¬
lation to "complementary" or occupational schemes, to "independent" or
self-employed workers and to nationals of the member states living outside
27S-
(g)
the Community. All three proposals were rejected by the Council .
No reason was given for excluding the last category (Conmunity
nationals living outside the Conmunity) The two more important
extensions proposed were said to be rejected because of the technical
complexity of the problems involved and because it yvbs felt that the
problems would be better dealt with in separate regulations. Now,
more than ten years after the Commission began working on the revision
of Regulation No. 3, work is said to be starting on the co-ordination
of social security schemes for self-employed and non-employed workers,
but there is no end in view to the difficulties either of this or of
the co-ordination of "complyao ,tary" schemes.
It is true that co-ordination in both of these spheres raises
considerable technical problems, largely because of the variations
from one country to another in the pattern of protection and the lack
of co-ordination (particularly of "complementary" schemes) which exists
even at the national level; but the delay in dealing with the problems
in these two very important problems surely suggests a lack of urgency.
This lack of urgency, however, probably has little relation to the
recent trend in migration policies. The co-ordination of provision
for the self-employed does not directly impinge at all on the import
or export of migrant labour. The co-ordination of "complementary"
schemes is important in this respect, but it is clear that there are
powerful economic interests which oppose such co-ordination not only
at the international but also at the national level.
More recently, the question has arisen of extending the benefit of
the Community regulations to non-Community migrants. At the moment,
most of these migrants are covered by bilateral agreements between the
receiving state and the state or origin, but the provisioms of these
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agreements are not usually as favourable to the migrant as the
provisions of the Community regulations, and, In addition, a non-
Community migrant who works In more than one member state of the
Community Is not adequately covered.
In its recent Social Action Programme^^, the Commission has
proposed that the three principles of the social security regulations
(equality of treatment, conservation of acquired rights and conservation
of rights in the process of being acquired) should be extended to cover
migrants from outside the Communities. This proposal has not found much
resonance in the Council and it seems unlikely that, in such a general
form, it is likely to have much effect.
Of more significance are the negotiations with individual labour-
exporting countries within the framework of Association agreements. In
the case of Turkey, broad agreement has already been reached on the
adaptation of Regulation No. 1408/7t to cover Turkish workers: such
a measure was already provided for by Article 39 of the Association
(12)
Agreement with Turkey • Negotiations for similar steps to be taken
to protect nationals of the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria) are also in progress, again within the framework of more
general negotiations concerning the Association Agreements with those
countries^^is likely that the recent "thawing" of the Association
with Greece will also lead to similar negotiations.
Once again, it is difficult to relate the outcome of these
negotiations to changes in the migration policies of the labour-
importing states. It is clear that there will be very strong resist¬
ance to any extension of the Community system of free movement, other
(14)
than that to which the Community is already legally committed .
The refusal to extend the system of free movement certainly does not
preclude the extension of the social security regulations to nationals
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of other countries, but, as in the case of Italy, it is inevitable
that the bargaining power of the non-Community labour-exporting
states will be weakened by a fall in the demand for migrant labour in
the labour-importing states. This presumed weakening of the position
of the Associated States is unlikely, however, to be reflected directly
by the outcome of the negotiations, for, unlike the situation in the
negotiations within the Community, these negotiations are being directly
linked to negotiations on other topics. It is likely, therefore, that
the degree of protection extended to non-Community migrants will reflect
concessions given in relation to Arab oil or Greek wine rather than ai\y
change in the situation on the labour market.
Conclusion;
The aim of this chapter tias been to see in what way changes in the
influences and policies which brought the social security regulations
into existence have been reflected in the judicial and legislative
development of these regulations. The conclusion must be rather
negative, it is very probable that the changes in migration policy
have had some effect, particularly on the negotiations surrounding the
legislative development of the regulations, but it is difficult - except
perhaps in the case of unemployment and family benefits - to relate
specific changes in the regulations to changes in migration policy. One
can nevertheless detect certain tendencies in the direction of a
decreasing interest in improving the protection given by the regulations.
There are, of course, influences working in the opposite direction;
pitted against these "external constraints" there is the "internal
dynamic" of the regulations, represented in practice principally by
Italy, the Commission and the Court. As we have seen, there are signs
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that the influence of the "internal dynamic* may be on the wane.
Although the turn in the trend may not yet have had any clear
impact on the shape of the Community regulations, there are already
signs of change at the national level, in relation to the social
security agreements of the most important labour-importing country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. In view of - or perhaps using as a
pretext - the Improvements in the German family allowance system which
come into force on January 1st, 1975, the Federal Government has uni¬
laterally rescinded its agreements on the payment of family benefits
with Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Instead of
paying family benefits for children remaining in the country of origin
at the rate current in the Federal Republic, as had been provided for in
those agreements, the Government has offered to pay benefits at a fixed
rate, which is in fact lower than that which was in force before
January 1st 1975. The Governments of the labour-exporting countries
(15)
have had little choice but to accept the German measure . It is
scarcely conceivable that the Federal Government will not use the
current negotiations on the provision of family benefits under
Article 73, Regulation No. 1408/71, to reach a similar result with
regard to the family members of Italian migrants.
The conclusion, then, must be that, although the changing trend
in migration policy has, as yet, left no unambiguous imprint n the
provisions of Regulation No. 1408/71, there are strong indications that
the trend will, before long, influence the legislative development of
the Regulation. If the effect is to decrease the rights of the migrants,
it will be very interesting what view the Court takes of the compati¬
bility of such measures with the aims of Article 51 EEC, and parti¬
cularly whether its interpretation will reflect any sympathy for the
(16)





The unity of the subject of this thesis, it was suggested in
the Introduction, lay in the theme of social security in the EEC
common to both parts of it. It should now be clear that this ap¬
parent unity of subject matter which brought the harmonisation and
co-ordination of social security together in this thesis, as indeed
in most other works on the subject, is largely illusory. Once the
assertion is made that both Article 51 and Articles 117 and 118 deal
with social security in the EEC and are the only provisions that do
so, there is not very much else that can immediately be said to be
true of both sets of provisions.
The duality of the subject natter is evident on the most im¬
mediate level, the level of legal analysis. The attempt in chapter
two to examine the legal problems of Articles 117 and 118 in ab¬
straction from the economic and political problems involved (as
dictated by the method chosen) was of necessity slightly artificial
and lacking in substance, because of the vague and open-ended nature
of the provisions. Precisely the opposite was true of the law relating
to the co-ordination of social security systems: there the law is of
such complexity, political problems of so little immediate relevance,
that there is ample scope for legal analysis. But not only is the
style of the discussion of the problems of co-ordination and of
harmonisation very different: it also is the case that the discussion
in one area does not have very much bearing on the discussion in the
other, that the solutions proposed in one area do not have very great
relevance for the problems of the other.
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If the duality of the subject matter Is clear on the surface
of the law, it appears to be just as great when an attempt is nade
to penetrate that surface, to examine the social function of the law.
Behind the legal dispute surrounding the harmonlsation of social
security, there was revealed a political conflict, between the Com¬
mission and the member states on the one level, between the trade
unions and employers on the other. Further study of this conflict
led to the conclusion that the struggle and its outcome could be
understood only in relation to the general intensification of the
struggle surrounding labour costs in the mid-1960s, and that this
in turn had to be seen in the context of the growing crisis of
profitability in Western Europe since that period. The discussion
of the social function of the co-ordination regulations initially
led us along quite different paths, to consider the development and
the mechanics of migration, interimtional social security treaties,
the effect of the social security regulations on labour migration,
etc. And yet a theme which had appeared in the discussion of harmo-
nisation reappeared in the discussion of co-ordination: the key to
migration policies, and, in this instance, to the development of the
social security protection of migrants - or, more precisely, the key
to the strength of the various participants in the conflicts sur¬
rounding these policies - was to be found, it was suggested, in the
development of the economy, or, more particularly, in the changes
in the conditions of profitability, upon which the health of a cap¬
italist economy ultimately depends.
The thrust of the argument Is clear enough. The duality of
which we have Just spoken is as illusory, and as real, as the unity
postulated In the Introduction. Just as the original unity dissolved
on closer inspection, so too this apparent duality, this apparently
complete separation of the two subjects, gives way to a new under¬
lying unity. Both parts of our inquiry have led us to the con¬
clusion that the provisions being studied must be understood as the
products of a particular form of society, of a society whose well-
being depends upon the successful pursuit of profits by autonomous
and competing producers. Our study suggests that it is the demands
created by this pursuit of profits, i.e. the necessity in a capi¬
talist society to create an environment favourable to the profit¬
ability of private enterprise, which provide the key to an under¬
standing of the development and application of these legal provisions.
One of the most important of the factors which affect the profit¬
ability of private enterprise is the supply and cost of labour. The
ultimate significance of both sets of provisions studied lies in
their effect on the abundance anc/or on the cost of the labour supply,
and thereby on conditions of profitability. In this sense, the poli¬
cies to which the two sets of provisions relate, i.e. incomes policy
and migration policy, share the same aim and may indeed, as Kindleber-
(1)
ger suggests , be regarded as being in some degree alternative
means of achieving that aim. The reasons which have made migration
policies more restrictive and incomes policies more important in
recent years have been discussed separately in chapters three and six,
but it is evident that the two trends are closely inter-related.
The unity of the thesis, at its most basic level, lies in the
fact that the two sets of provisions studied are but particular
aspects of the seme society and that their development is conditioned
by the development of that society. Piercing the phenomenal form of
the law, or rather of the two sets of legal provisions, has led us to
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the same Inner core, to the study of the structure of that society,
the domain of political econon^^ In so far as this is a conclusion,
it is a stimulating one, one which introduces more than it concludes.
This unity is of course not merely the result of the inquiry,
which in this respect has done no more than to render explicit what
was already implicit in the method of approach, namely the assumption
that these legal provisions were but particular aspects of a greater
whole, and that it is the task of science both to comprehend them in
their particularity and at the same time to transcend that particular¬
ity in grasping its relation to the totality. Given that there were
two phenomena to be analysed, the presentation could not but lack
unity. The task now, it might be argued, would be to reverse the
process, to develop the particular from the totality, to present the
unified flow of the totality into its diverse manifestations. But
that would be to begin again (at a higher stage, perhaps?), to write
as a political economist exploring the law, not as a lawyer trying




1. Cf. Lukacs (1971, p.14: "The knowledge of the real, objective
nature of a phenomenon, the knowledge of its historical character
and the knowledge of its actual function in the totality of
society form ... a single, undivided act of cognition. This
unity is shattered by the pseudo-scientific method".
2. On Weber's theory, see Lukacs (1971), pp. 95-97;
Foulantzas (1965), pp. 256 ff.
3. For an elaboration of his theory, see Foulantzas (1965); for
a shorter account, see Villey (1965), or Foulantzas (1966).
4. It might be objected that the subject matter is ill-suited to
display the relation between the development of the law and the
change in its social function, that it might have been better to
choose a longer time scale and a legal concept of more central
significance, as in Renner's classic study (Renner (1949)).
Such an objection would, however, miss the point, for this is
not an essay in applied legal theory, but an attempt to study
certain legal provisions, adopting a particular method of approach.
5. Article 117 and Article 118 are contained in the chapter "Social
Provisions" in the Title devoted to social policy; Article 51 is
contained in the chapter devoted to the free movement of workers
in the Title, "The Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital".
Both sets of provisions, however, are generally seen as aspects of
the Community's social policy, and their implementation has been
entrusted to the same Directorate General within the Commission,
that responsible for Social Affairs (D.G.V.). To abstract these
two topics from the general context of social policy is not as
arbitrary as it might seem, for Community social policy has never
in fact formed a coherent wholes the social provisions contained
in the Treaty were included for a variety of reasons and grouped
together within the Treaty only after they had been agreed upon.
6. The Dutch system forms a limited exception to this rule: from the
late I950*s it has undergone several important reforms which bring
it much closer to the Anglo-Scandinavian model.
7. On this, and on the evolution of the different systems, see
especially IXipeyroux (1966).
8. The linguistic regime of the thesis must be explained.
Quotations are generally included in the original language.
Where the source has been published in a number of languages, the
most convenient version has been quoted: in the case of Comnunity
documents, this is usually, though not invariably, French. Trans¬
lations of all the major quotations in foreign languages are
included at the end of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
1. And indeed real simplicity compared with the law relating to
Article 51 EEC. Cf. Ch. 5.
2. Cf. Delannoo (1966). He defines "normes Internationales" as
follows (p.406): "Oe sont des regies prescrites ou recommandees
par un organ!sine international aux divers Etats membres ...,
afin d'introduire dans la legislation des Etats membres certaines
tendances, certains principes, voire meme des regies minutieusement
elabor£es".
5. This is not entirely true: the first social security treaty, the
Franco-Italian Treaty of 1904, is concerned, inter alia, with
raising the standards of social protection in Italy. See below:
Ch. 5, Ch. 6.
4. Text published in Ribas, Jonczy, Seche (1973), p.437.
5. Text published in Ribas, Jonezy, Seche (1973), p.408.
6. Surf: an approach was in fact proposed at one stage by the social
committee of the European Parliament: see the Sabatini Report:
Parlement Europe'en, Documents de Se'ance, 1965-66, No. 96, p.3.
7. Nederhorst Report: Parlement Europfeen, Documents de Seance 1965-66,
No . 60 , p . 1.
8. It has been found convenient to quote the French versions of
Articles 117 and 118 in the text because it is with reference to
these versions that much of the discussion has taken place. The
English version of Article 117 reads:
"Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working
conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as
to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is
being maintained.
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from
the functioning of the common market, which will favour the
harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures
provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation of
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action".
Cf. Ch. 1, n.8.
9. Groeben-Bo«kh (1958), p.447; cf. Wohlfarth (1960), p.638.
10. Cf. Les Novelles (1969), 2351.
11. Cf. e.g. Caesar (1964), p.229.
12. Cf. Cannella (1964), p.325: "Que l'harmonisation diff^re de
l'uniformisation d'un cSte et de la coordination de 1'autre
est une chose evidente et reconnue par tous".
13. Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), p.950.
14. Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), p.950.
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15. Wohlfarth (1960), pp. 366-367; for a reply to this argument
see Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), pp. 948-949.
16. Above, p.15.
17. Groeben-Boekh (1958), p,447.
18. Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), p.949.
19. Kahn-Freund (1960), pp. 304-305.
20. Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat (1970), p.293, provide an additional
interpretation: "Bij *de in het verdrag bepaalde procedures* zal
men o.i. mede kunnen en moeten denken aan de procedures tot
coordinatie van de economische politiek, waarvan de basis is
vastgelegd in de artikelen 105 en 145, en van de andere bevoegd-
heden op economisch gebied" The significance of this approach is
discussed in Ch. 4.
21. Cf. Wohlfarth (1960), p.367: "Unter den im Vertrag vorgesehenenn
Verfahren sind augenscheinlich alle sich direkt Oder indirekt auf
die ArbeitskrSfte beziehenden Bestiranungen zu verstehen, also
insbesondere die Artikel 48 bis 51, Artikel 118 und die Artikel 123
bis 128".
22. Thus the quotation above (pp. 18 ), ending "... dall 'at.tuazlone
delle procedure previste" continues: "... cioe da quegli istituti
particolarl che costituiscono la politlca sociale comuunitaria.
SI tratta della libera circolazione delle persone, del funzionamento
del Fondo sociale, dell*attuazione della politica. commune di
formazione professionale, della realizzazione della parity salariale
maschile e femminlle, della stretta collaborazlone che deve instaura-
rsi tra gli stati membri nel campo sociale". Quadri-Monaco-
Trabucchi (1965), p.949.
23. See No. 8 above. The English version of the relevant part of
Article 118 reads:
"Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and
in conformity with its general objectives, the Coranission shall
have the task of promoting close cooperation between Member
States in the social field, particularly in matters relating to:...
- social security ...
To this end, the Commission shall act in close contact with Member
States by making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consul¬
tations both on problems arising at national level and on those of
concern to international organisations. Before delivering the
opinions provided for in this Article, the Commission shall consult
the Economic and Social Committee".
24. Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), p.951.
25. Wohlfarth (1960), p.368.
26. Article 213 provides: "The Commission may, within the limits and
under the conditions laid down by the Council in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty, collect any information and carry
out any checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted
to it". See No. 8 above, and Ch. 1, No. 8.
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27. Quoted by Nederhorst: Parleraent Europeen, Documents de Stance,
1965-66, No. 60, p.4.
28. Cf., e.g. Seffen (1965), pp. 67-68.
29. Article 5 provides: "Member States shall take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
faciliate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the
attainment of the objectives of this Treaty".
30. Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), p.951.
31. Caesar (1964), p.229.
32. Article 155 provides: "In order to ensure the proper functioning
and development of the common market, the Commission shall: ...
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt
with in this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Com¬
mission considers it necessary ..."•
33. M. Leleux has explained the distinction in these terms:
"la recommandation precise une coriduite a tenir et elle equlvaut
& la directive sauf qu'elle n'a pas la force obligatoire de
celle-ci; l'avis exprime une appreciation sur telle ou telle
situation ou sur des m£thodes et les moyens & mettre en oeuvre
pour aboutir & certains objectifs, h certains resultats".
Quoted by Mggret (1973), p.8, n.3.
34. See below.
35. Cf. Nederhorst (1965-66), p.3; Les Novelles (1969), No. 2354.
Art. 121 provides: "The Council may, acting unanimously and after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, assign to the Cora-
mision tasks in connection with the implementation of common
measures, particularly as regards social security for the migrant
workers referred to in Articles 48 to 51".
36. Cf. Nederhorst (1965-66), p.3} Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat (1970),
p.214; Seffen (1965), p.224; Les Novelles (1969), No. 2354. Art.
235 provides: "If action by the Community should prove necessary to
attain, in the course of the operation of the common ma ricet, one
of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided
the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly,
take the appropriate measures".
37. Cf. Wohlfarth (i960), pp. 365-366; Groeben-Boekh (1958), p.448;
Quadri-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), p.949.
38. Art. 100 provides: "The Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approxi¬
mation of such provisions laid down hy the law, regulation or ad¬
ministrative action in Member States as directly affect the est¬
ablishment or functioning of the coirmon market ...".
—2bo—
39. Cannella (1964), p.321.
40. Cf. e.g. Ribas (1965), p.11; Cannella (1964), p.323.
41. Cf. e.g. Quaari-Monaco-Trabucchi (1965), p.948; Ribas (1965), p.11.
42. This issue is discussed in Chapter 3.
43. Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat (1970), p.294.
44. The measures mentioned specifically by Article 51 are not exclusive.
This is clear from the French version, if not from the English
translation.
45. Caesar, one of the few commentators who even suggests that Art. 51
might be used as a basis for harmonisation, nevertheless rejects
this view on the basis that Art. 48 (2) limits the notion of
"freedom of movement" to the "abolition of any discrimination based
on nationality". But it is not clear that this is indeed the effect
of Art. 48 (2), nor that any such limitation can apply to Art. 51,
since both the measures specified in Art. 51 and the measures in
fact taken in accordance with that article go beyond the abolition
of discriminations based on nationality.
Caesar (1964), p.227. And cf. Sabatini (1965-66), p.5.
46. Cf. Seffen (1965), pp. 68-69; (1967), p.225; Kapteyn-VerlLoren van
Themaat (1970), p.294; Lyon-Caen (1969), p.140.
47. The directive on equal pay for women, which has now been published
(OJ, 19.2.75; L.45/19), does indeed adopt a broad interpretation
of Art. 100. One of the paragraphs of its Preamble reads:
"Whereas implementation of the principle that men and women
should receive equal pay contained in Article 119 of the Treaty
is an integral part of the establishment and functioning of the
common market".
The implications for the preceding discussion are obvious.
40. Art. 101 provides: "Where the Commission finds that a difference
between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or admini¬
strative action in Member States is distorting the conditions of
competition in the common market and that the resultant distortion
needs to be eliminated, it shall consult the Member States concerned.
If iguch consultation does not result in an agreement eliminating
the distortion in question, the Council shall, on a proposal from
the Commission, acting unanimously during the first stage and by a
qualified majority thereafter, issue the necessary directives. The
Commission and the Council may take any other appropriate measures
provided for in this Treaty".
49. Art. 102(1) provides: "Where there is reason to fear that the
adoption or amendment of a provision laid down by law, regulation
or administrative action may cause distortion within the meaning of
Art. 101, a Member State desiring to proceed therewith shall consult
the Conmission. After consulting the Member States, the Commission
shall recommend to the States concerned such measures as may be
appropriate to avoid the distortion in question."
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50. Cf. Art. 149 of the Treaty; and cf. Nederhorst (1965-66), p.3.
51. (1970^ p.293.
52. Note that the discussion here is confined to consideration of
the legal basis for general measures of harmonisatlon, and omits
discussion of Art. 39 ff. and Art. 75 ff. which concern the
specific areas of agriculture and transport.
53. 23.7.62; published in JOCE, 31.8.62; cf. Ribas-Hasse (1971),
pp. 82 ff.
54. 20.7.66; published in JOCE, 9.8.66. Cf. Ribas-Hasse (1971),
pp. 82 ff.
55. For a discussion of the implementation of these recommendations,
see Ribas-Hasse (1971), pp. 83-85.
56. This is discussed at greater length in the next chapter.
57. For some details on ad hoc groups consulted by the Commission within
the framework of Art. 118, see Nederhorst (1965-66), Annexe II
(pp. 24-27).
58. For a fuller description of the Commission's studies,see Ribas-
Hasse (1971), pp. 85-95.
59. Thus, Levi Sandri, for example, refers to Mdas mangelnde
Gleichgewicht, das im Vertrag zwischen allgemeinen Zielen,
die sehr wohl iiasserst sozial definiert werden kUnnen, drtd
den vorgeseherien Mitteln und Instrumenten ftlr die Biurchffthrung
der Sozialpoiitik besteht". Quoted hy Seffen (1965), p.225.




t. Of. e.g. C.N.E.L. (1969), iteise (1966), Langendonck (1971),
Lell (1966).
2. Veidkamp (1968), p.676; Seffen, that arch-enemy of the Cosnission's
oolicy, is surely right when he insists: "der Vertrag sieht eben die
Eini<gung Europas, die Errichtung des Gemeinsamen Marktes in hBchstea
asse prioflr unter wirtschaftspolitischen Gesichtspunkten; er will
elne Skonoaisch funktionsfghlge 'Hrtschafts-gemelnschaft. FtJr ihn
spielen daher soziaipolitische Fragen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle".
(Seffen (1967)), p.32. The emphasis is in the original.
3. Of. e.g. Wohlfarth (1960), pp. 362 ff.
4. Cf. Oupeyroux (1971), p.890.
5. Primarily social security charges, but the argument embraces all
costs resulting from "social legislation", including, for example,
legislation requiring equal pay for women.
6. Ohlin (1956)-, cf. Xteinhold (1957).
7. Cf. Veldkaiap (1968), p.677; Elbas-ifasse (1671), pp. 78/79; CNEL (1969),
p.80; Heise (1966), p.28. For further discussion of this problem,
see below, pp.39ff.
8. Cf. Heynig (1966), 277.
9. Cf. Miller in Uebats Parlementaires, 1-7-1969 (J.O.C.E. Annexe,
No. 116, juillet 1969, p.91 at p.92).
10. Despite occasional statements which seem to indicate the contrary,
such as that made by Levi Sandri (then member of the Commission
responsible for social affairs) On 22-1-1964 in the Parliament: "II
ne fait aucun doute que lea regimes nationaux actuellement en vigueur
devi-ont subir des adaptations progressives pour arrlver un jour a se
fond re en un systems coramun" (Debats Parleaentaires 111/64, p.66 at
p.69).
11. Cf. Ohlin (1956), ?4einhold (1957), KnUwe (1958).
12. This was in fact the conclusion reached by a study conducted by the
Statistical Office of the Commission. Oils study found that total
labour costs in the countries with the highest social charges were
below the average. Cf. Commission (1968).
13. Cf. Schork (1966), p.83.
14. For some reason the notion of social security benefits as an indirect,
deferred or socialised wage does not appear to be widely employed by
students of social administration in Britain. It Is possible that the
high degree of state participation in the financing of the British
scheme and the fact that the British system was extended at an earlier
date beyond the protection of wage-earners 1ms obscured the relation¬
ship between wages and benefits.
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15. Montes (1965), p.17. Hence the remark he quotes with approvals
"La seenritd sociale francaise a etef avant tout une victolre de
la classe ouvrlere, sur elle-meme
16. Kteinhold (1964) (1) readies the same conclusion. The Commission
too (1S70,% 422) finds the difficulties which arise in making the
distinction in practice "virtually insurmountable".
17. Of. Uelp^r^e (1966), p.823.
18. Schork (1966), pp. 83 ff.
19. Cf. ftteinhold (1964 (1)), Schork (1966) 87 ff. Commission (1970)
§421.
20. The obvious example is the coal industry.
21. Of. Meinhold (1964 (I)), p.3j Schork, pp. 90 ff; Commission (1970)
§421.
22. These are the conclusions of afeinhold's excellent and influential
article (1964 (1)).
23. After the first year or two (cf. Lifard (1965)), the French do not
seem to have pressed their case very strongly. By the time of the
1962 Conference, the employers of all countries seem to have been
very much on the defensive.
24. Cf. kibas-Hasse (1971).
25. Thus Levi Sandri in a speech to the Parliament as early as 1961:
D^bats Pferlenientaires, 22-11-1961, IV/62, No. 48, p.134 at p.142.
Ribas, Director for Social Security and Social Services at the
Commission, made the point equally clearly in a pamphlet published
by the Commission in 1965: "The approach to harraonisation cannot be
purely economic: it cannot Just aim at eliminating distortions of
competition ... It is doubtful whether this approach can Justify any
but sporadic interventions by the Community in social policy" (Ribas
(1965) p.11). Cf. also Van Praag (1968), p.259.
26. kibas-Hasse (1971), p.81.
27. Cf. Meinhold (t964 (2)).
28. M. Veillon was at the time secretary-general of the "moderate"
socialist CGT-FO. It appears (from interviews) that the trade
union organisations deliberately sought to have M. Veillon named
as the Rapporteur at the Conference on the general subject of social
security benefits, and that the views expressed by M. Veillon
represented the position of the trade unions. It was partly because
of this report that the member states refused to participate in the
Conference.
29. Conference europe'ene ... Vol. 1, pp. 195 ff.
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30. As Is evidenced by the mere titles of some German articles which
appeared at the time: "Die diktatorische Gleichmacherei des
Monsieur Veillon" (Kbhrer (1962)) and "Sind Nivellierung und
Superbllrokratie europSisches Schicksal? Zu den Harmonisierungs-
tendenzen in der EWG* (Meenzen 1962). Cf. also the co-report by
Erdmann and Rosoux at the European Conference: Vol. 1, pp. 239-
246.
31. A. Miller (1963), p.36, calculates that the fulfilment of Veillon,s
demand involves a 15% increase in social security expenditure in the
Federal Republic. For the other member states, the increase would
be even greater.
32. A. Miller (1963) p.36; Meinhold (1964 (2)), p.364.
33. Cf. e.g. Heise (1966), Cannella (1964).
34. Thus Lawson (1973) p.701: "If, in these respects, we have something
to offer some of the other countries we undoubtedly also have some
important lessons to learn".
35. This is confirmed by Delp^rde (1967), p.1565. Pointing out that
trade unions have failed to organise themselves effectively on the
European level, he remarks: "Cela ne signifie pas que les syndicats
n'ont pas utilise les Communautds pour rdsoudre des probl&mes
nationaux. On pourrait dire $ue les Coxamunaute's ont, dans un certain
sens et dans certains cas, e'largi les possibilities de 1'action syn-
dicale nationale ... C'est tellement vrai que certains gouvernements
reprochent a la Commission eeor.omique curope'ene d1avoir utilise a
leur e'gard les syndicats comme groupes de pre33ionw. And cf. Schmatz
(1965), col. 292.
36. Titmuss (1971).
37. The Guardian, January 3rd, 1972.
33. Above, p.35.
39. Ribas-Hasse (1971), p.82.
40. Ribas (1965), pp. 11-12.
41. Cf. Levi Sandri, Debats Parlementaires, 1-12-1967,
1/68, No. 96, p.194.
42. Cf. e.g. Hoernigk (1963); Alexander (1962); Schmatz (196$,A. MQller
(1963); Meenzen (1662); Deutsches Srzteblatt (1964).
43. Cf. Ueynlg (1969) 228.
44. It seems that the refusal of the member states was immediately
related in part at least, to the nature of the demands made in the
Veillon report.
See n. 28 above.
45. The EEC, the ECSC and Euratom.
46. Cf. Conference europeenne ... Co-rapport Erdmann-Rosoux,
pp. 239-346 and passim.
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47. Although the member states took a common stand against the Commission
as early as October 1963: see the Nederhorst report: Parlement
Europ^en, Documents de Stance, 1966/66, No. 60, p.9,§ 34.
48. Cf. Schmatz (1965), col. 292.
49. Cf. Ifeynlg (1969)j Veldkamp (1968).
50. D^bats Parlementaires, 1-12-1966, 1/67, No. 88, pp. 206-227,
esp. at pp. 206-8, 227.
51. Cf. Seffen (1967), p.32., and see the Nederhorst report referred to
in Note 47 above.
52. Cf. Veldkamp (1968), p.678.
53. D^bats Parlementaires, 16-6-1965, IX/65, p.141.
54. Cf. Seffen (1966).
55. It is clear, however, that Mr. Veldkamp's efforts were not being
made in a vacuum. During the period of crisis, changes were taking
place in the attitudes both of the Commission and of the trade
unions. Both bodies gradually came to realise that it was necessary
to adopt a more "realistic" attitude. The representatives of the
trade unions also worked actively to prepare the "Veldkamp com¬
promise" •
56. Cf. Veldkamp (1968), p.678.
57. Veldkamp (1968), p,680.
58. Above, pp. 44 ff.
59. Cf. Copp£, Dtfbats Parlementaires, 6-10-1970, No. 128, Oct. 1970,
p.35.
60. Cf. Ddbats Parlementaires, 25-1-1968, 111/68, no. 98, pp. 189 ff;
1-7-1969, no. 116, juillet 1969, pp. 75-6, 84j 6-10-1970, No. 129,
Oct. 1970, p.21.
61. Dgbats Parlementaires, 2-7-1968, No. 105, juillet 1968, pp. 50-56.
62. The complaints of the Parliament, that the Council is neglecting
social policy, continue. In 1968 there was apparently an attempt
to limit the Comnission's contacts with the "social partners"; a
demand was also made by the member states that the Commission should
obtain the prior approval of the Council before asking independent
experts to help with its study projects, and that the studies should
not be published unless the Council gave its approval. When
questioned on this in the Parliament, both the Council and the
Commission denied that there had been any limitation of the
Commission's powers under the Treaty (Dgbats Parlementaires,
14-5-1968, No. 103, mal 1968, pp. 90-96).
63. These institutional restrictions on the freedom of the Commission
must be seen, not only in relation to the conflict over social
policy, but also as part of the general restriction of the activity
of the Commission in the wake of the crisis of 1965 and the
Luxembourg Agreement of January 1966.
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64. Thus, in a debate in the Parliament in October 1970, Mile. Lulling
urged that the recommendations on maternity and invalidity still
shelved with the Council, should at least be issued hy the Commission,
thus shifting the responsibility of compliance on to the member states;
to this, Coppe, then member of the Commission responsible for social
affairs, replied that the Commission had already fulfilled its
responsibilities by proposing the recommendation to the Council, but
that it had not been accepted by that body (bebats Parlementaires,
6-10-1970, no. 129, oct. 1970, p.35). This, of course, makes nonsense
of the idea of a recommendation under Article 155: instead of being a
public external act, it becomes a private internal transaction between
two Institutions of the comnunity. In practice, the Commission has
abandoned the idea of using recommendations in this area.
65. Of. iieise (1968).
66. In discussing the debate concerning the aims of harmonisation, I have
not considered it necessary to deal with the argument that harmoni-
sation is necessary in order to promote the free movement of labour.
It is sometimes argued that it is impossible to co-ordinate the
various social security systems satisfactorily in order to protect
migrants (in accordance with Article 51), while significant dis¬
parities continue to exist between the systems being co-ordinated.
(Cf. Resolutions of Parliament ami ESC on proposed reform of Keg. 3).
While this is no doubt true, migrants* rights are already protected by
Art. 51 and regulations made thereunder and it would be unrealistic
to expect member states to alter the structure of their social
security schemes radically in order to bring a small additional
benefit to a very small number of migrants. This view is confirmed
by interviews in the Commission. Although the argument that harmoni¬
sation is a necessary pre-condition for efficient co-ordination is
regularly advanced when the administration of co-ordination runs into
difficulties, it was felt by the interviewee that this argument is
not taken seriously by anybody, and that it would not have any
influence in persuading member states to harmonise their legis¬
lations.
The other argument which links harmonisation with the free movement
of labour is that disparities in social security schemes lead to dis¬
tortions on the European labour market, attracting migrants to
countries with high benefits and thus giving a competitive advantage
to the employers of those countries. This is surely merely a
variation on the competition argument analysed in the text and suffers
from the same defects.
Concern for migrants has nevertheless played a certain part in the
Commission's work on harmonisation. This was one of the main in¬
fluences which led to the Commission's recommendations on industrial
illness and its proposed recommendation on invalidity (cf. Levi Sandri,
D^bats Parlementaires, 25-1-1968, 111/68, No. 98, p. 196): it seemed
particularly unjust and without reason that a person should be consi¬
dered an invalid in one country and not in another, or that his dis¬
ease should be recognised as an industrial disease in the one, but
not the other.
67. In fact the "defeat" of the Commission appears to have been spread
over four Council meetings; those of December 1966, June 1967,
December 1967 and February 1968: Seffen (1968), pp. 135-136.
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38, It would be wrong, however, to think of the new policy as being
simply imposed by the Council on a homogeneous and hostile
Commission. There was, from the start, opposition within the
Commission to the policy described in the previous section of
this chapter. As the failure of the policy became snore mani¬
fest, this opposition naturally grew. The opponents of the
policy within the Commission regarded it as legalistic and un¬
realistic, and favoured a more economically realistic approach,
the outcome of the Veldkaap compromise thus corresponded to the
wishes of these sections of the Commission and linked up with
work already in progress, ffithin the Commission, the change to
the new "realistic" policy is seen as a defeat for the lawyers,
the liberation of the economists from the rule of the "juriste".
This chapter suggests that the conflict in fact went much deeper
than that.
69. For an analysis of the conclusions of these studies (on the
economic impact of social security; on the financing of social
security in agriculture; and an the financial problems of social
security) and the Council's decision of 26-11-1970 on the elabo¬
ration of a social budget, see Commission (1971 (1)).
70. Of. Heynig (1969), 228.
71. See below, pp. 72 ff.
72. Of. Veldkamp (I960), p.184.
73. Cf. Lell (19F~), osp. Pt. 2.
74. Cf. SfcinbDld <1964 (2)), p.365.
75. Cf. Copplni, Conference europeenee ... vol. 1, p.186,§ 122.
76. Frisch (1965), p.548.
77. Lell (1969), pp. 149-150.
78. Meerizen (1962).
79. Ifeenzen (1962), p. 185.
80. vfeinhold (19G4 (2)).
81. '.feinhold was one of the experts responsible for the German Sozial-
enquete, as also for the Commission's report on the "Economic
Impact of Social Security" • See below, p.33.
82. Jfeinhoid (1964 (2)), p.3Q5.




84. As Mannoury puts it in a discussion on the rise in social expen¬
diture in the Netherlands! "Een stljging van de sociale lasten
zegt voor de volkshuishouding dus everenin lets als voor een
particulier hulsvader bijvoorbeeld een sterke toeneraing van zijn
uitgaven per giro in tegenstelling tot die per kas. Zulk een
toeneming, hoe sterk ook, is op zlchzelf niet zorgwekkend ..."
(Emphasis in the original). Mannoury in Berends and De Heij
(1968), p.40.
85. Thus, for Belgium cf. e.g. Deiper^e (1966 (2)); for Frances
Dupeyroux (1966); for the Netherlands: Berends and De Heij
(1968), Hartog (1969) 179j for Germany: MMller (1969).
86. Delp^ree (1966), p.819.
87. filler (1969), p.25.
88. Miller (1969), pp. 17-18.
89. Published by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
90. MUler (1969), pp. 19-20.
91. Dupeyroux (1972), p.4.
92. The argument in this paragraph is borne out by the argument of
Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972), ch. 4 and by the figures they provide.
See Table 1 and Figurel at the end of this chapter.
93. By "wage quota" I refer to the share of the national income going
to wage and salary earners. By "wage ratio" I understand the
ratio of wages to total incomes.
94. Cf. Miller (1968J, p.32, n. 55j p.37, n.72j Delp£ree (1966),
p.822.
95. Mflller (1969), p.32.
96. Cf. Mandel (1969), Ch. 2.
97. Cf. Mandel (1969), Ch. 2.
98. Cf. Ulnan and Flanagan (1971), p.159.
99. Cf. Ulman and Flanagan (1971), p.203.
100. Cf. Delpdrde (1966), p.822.
101. Though in the Netherlands the problem arose in a different context
because of the incomes policy which had been in force since the
War. However, not even this could prevent the wage explosion
(1963-64) which followed the attainment of full employment in
i960. Cf. Ulman and Flanagan (1971). p.80.
102. This is pointed out by Meinhold (1964 (2)) and by the German
Sozlalenqu£te report. Cf. Miller (1969), pp. 31-32.
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103. Or indeed to hoarding or some form of non-productive speculation.
The consequences, for our purposes, are similar.
104. Cf. Mttller (1969), p.32.
105. Cf, Mandel (1972), p.461j for links between investment and the
fall in profitability in the EEC countries during the 1960's see Glyu
and Sutcliffe (1972), p.99.
106. Cf. Dupeyroux (1966), p.110. Not only the retention of domestic
capital but also the attraction of foreign capital is involved.
107. Above, p.61. For translation, see translations for p.61.
108. On the relation between incomes policy and the supply of migrant
labour, see Kindleberger (1967), Ch. 11.
109. Anyway, the British experience of 1970-71 indicates that, where
trade union solidarity is strong, unemployment may not lead to a
reduction in the growth of wages, cf. Mandel (1972), p.143.
110. To make them more effective, incomes policies are often accomp¬
anied by measures aimed at weakening the power of trade unions.
Cf. Mandel (1972), pp. 216-219.
111. Because they are an alternative to unemployment, incomes policies
are often associated with "left of centre" government. Cf. Ulman
and Flanagan (1971)), p. 209.
112. Commission (1971 (2)), pp. 82-83. The latest figures are for
19Q8, but the clear trend at that time was for this proportion
to rise. See Table 2 at the end of this Chapter.
113. Commission (1971 (2)), p.50: figures from 1959.
114. Glyn and Sutcliffe, although they make no use of the notion of
"indirect wage" (foreign to the British analysis of social
security), do relate reductions in social security expenditure
to incomes policy in the UK as elements of the Government's
policy to combat the fall in profits: Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972),
pp. 161-162.
115. Delperee (1966), p.812| A. Millier (1963), p.36, etc.
116. Meinhold (1964 (2)), p.364j and cf. KBhrer (1962), p.276.
117. Cf. Fran^ois-Poncet (1970), pp. 110 ffj Huffschmid (1972),
esp. pp. Ill ff.
118. Cf. Berltf (1970), p.11.
119. Cf. Ulman and Flanagan (1971), pp. 200 ff.
120. Cf. Expose Social 1969, pp. 162-163.
121. Cf. Ulman and Flanagan, pp. 147 ff.
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122. Cf. Expos^ Social 1965, pp. 179-180; Note that in the V65 Plan,
"cotisa;lons sodales" are grouped with "salaiiiss" under the
heading "La repartition des revemw": V® Plan, pp. 188 ff.
123. For the Netherlands, see Berends and De Ifeij (1968)j the Rool-
vink memorandum followed the wages explosion of the mid-1960s.
(Cf. Ulinan and Flanagan (1971) pp. 48 ff); for social security
planning in Belgium, see Delp^ree (1966).
124. Cf. e.g. Expos^ Social 1965, p.158.
125. Expose' Social 1966, p. 113, 131, 132.
126. Levi Sandri, D6bats P&rlementaires 1-12-1967, 1/68, no. 96,
pp. 192-196.
127. Levi Sandri, Debat.s P&rlementalres 13-3-1968, mars 1968,
no. 101, pp. 61-67. An English summary can be found in Inter¬
national Social Security Abstracts, 1969, no. 1; the point is
repeated in Expos^ Social, 1988, p.18.
128. As has already been pointed out (above, p.63), the problem in a
capitalist society is not as simple as Levi Sandri makes it
appear.
129. Levi Sandri, Ddbats Parlementaires, 13-3-1968, mars 1968,
no. 101, p.67.
130. Social Report, 1971, p.189. And see also Commission (1971 (1)),
where the same thing is said.
131. Commission (1971 (3)).
132. J.O.C.E., 30.5.1989, no. L129/95.
133. J.O.C.E., 30.5.1969, no. L129/Q5.
134. The same point is made by Stock (1972) at p.80: "Nodi eln weit-
erer Gesichtspunkt 1st bei der Einkoramenspolitik zu berflcksich-
tigen; all das, was man unter dem Begriff der sozialen Sicher-
heit zusammenfasst •••"•
135. Cf. Seffen (1965 (1)), pp. 67-68; Seffen (1967), p.32.
136. Cf. Heynig (1969) 229. And Cf. Draperie (1971), p.76.
137. There is little evidence to suggest that changes in the party-
political complexion of the various governments have had much
influence on the formation of policy in this area.
138. Seffen (1967), p.32. Even Seffen, the most grudging of all the
Commission's critics, finally welcomed the change in the
Commission's policy. His article of June 1968, entitled
"Deutllclie !Vfissigung der BrOsseler harmonisierungspolitlk",
begins: "!Vhn kann geradezu von einer Umkehrurig der ifT-onten
sprechen He goes on to praise "die neue und begrdssens-
werte realistische Slcht der Harmonisierung" and mentions with
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approval the emphasis in the social report of 1967 on the
"Notwendigkeit einer Verbindung der sozialen und der wirt-
schaftlichen Ziele". Seffen (1968).
Another bitter opponent of the Commission's early policy,
KBhrer (the author of "Die diktatorische Gleichmacherei des
Monsieur Veillon") is also favourable to the change in policy.
lie too welcomes particularly the emphasis on the necessity to
relate social and economic policies: "Das klingt glQcklicher-
weise etwas anders als die seinerzeitigen Vei1lon-Vorschlage"
... KBhrer (1969), p.105.
159. Supra, p.66.
HO. Of which Berid (1970) says (p.8): "Dieser Vortrag wurde zura
Ausgangspunkt der wissenschaftlichen Beratlhungen, die Soziallei-
stungen transparent (Uberschaubar) und ihren 5tandort in gesamt-
wirtschaftlicher Sicht deutlich zu raachen".
141. Mackenroth in KJIlp und Schreiber (1971), p.269.
142. The double-edged nature of social security forecasts is nade
clear by a recent German report. The report points to the
danger that these forecasts can, in their present form, lead
to "Politische Fehlentscheidungen": "Diese Gefahr 1st dann am
grhssten, wenn derartige Vorausberechnungen iberschOsse
ergoben, die politisch erwttnschte MJglichkeiten erweiterter
leistungsgewahrung anzuzeigen scheinen. Die Vorausberechnungen
der Ikindesregierung sind denn auch immer wieder als echte
Prognose missdeutet und so zur Grundlage ausgabewirksamer
Forderungen und Entscheidungen geaacht worden". sVissenschaftlicher
Dei rat, 1973, p.157f.
143. Cf. ktondel (1972), ch. 7, esp. at pp. 219 ff.j and cf.
Galbraith (1987), ch. 2.
144. Cf. fdorrell (1972), ch. 7; and cf. UNICE (1973), p.13.
145. Cf. Veldkamp (1969), p.184.
146. Cf. Commission (1970), esp. ch. 3 and ch. 6. In so far as rises
In labour costs are passed on to prices, the squeeze on profits
referred to in the argument on pp. 32 ff. does not of course
come about. In an international economy, however, inflation
provides no solution to the problem, for exports, the balance of
payments and monetary stability all suffer. Thus, Glyn and
Sutcliffe (1972), p.73, speak of profits being "squeezed between
the pressure of wages and international competition".
147. The relation between the Common Market, labour costs, social
security costs and social security planning emerges clearly from
a declaration in 1961 by the French employers' organisation, the
CNPF (Consell National du Patronat Francais). The report begins:
"Au moment ou, k un toumant particuliknement difficile de la
conjonctune Cconomlque Internationale,1'Economic fran^aise doit
en outre, pour repondre aux exigences particuli&res du March£
common, proedder h une revision extranement severe de tous les
elements qui peuvent contribuer a alourdlr au-dela de ses pos-
slbllltes concurrentielles ie prix de revient de ses produits, la
'progression teaJours plus considerable du cout de la S^curite'
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Soclaie provoque les inquietudes les plus vives". "Ibe
declaration goes on to insist on the necessity of established
long-term forecasts of social security expenditure: CNPF (1865),
pp. 105-108*
148, Hence the German provision that pensions should follow wages with
a time lag of three years*
149* Commission (1970), § 563.
150* Commission (1970),§ 585.
151. Not surprisingly, since Msinhold, who drafted this section
of the Sozialcnquete, was also a member of the consulttee
responsible for the Comisslon's study.
152. Sozialenquete, p.142. The English version of the Commission's
study quotes this in English, but the translation is not as
clear as the original.
153. Thus, the change in the direction of Community policy raust be
seen not just as a reflection of national policies, but also
as a result of the growing importance of the development of a
concerted Cociminity economic policy. This, incidentally, makes
more relevant the original French argument concerning competition
as it becomes more important to maintain monetary stability.
154. Commission (1970)•
155. See n , 54 above. And of. Commission (1971) (4).
156. Cf. Rlbas-fiasse (1971).
157. See the Council's decision on the elaboration of a European social
budget, reproduced in the Annexe of Commission (1971 (1)). The
first Social Budget has already been submitted to the Council,
but it is not proposed to publish it, partly because Inflation
has already rendered obsolete the figures on which it was based.
The first Social Budget contains three headings of which the
fir3t is the most important: social security, social assistance
and benefits for war victims. It is hoped gradually to extend it
to all forms of social expenditure and to have an annual sliding
budget.
158. This does not mean that the European social budget docs not
(like its national counterparts - see p.71 and n. 142 above),
have a two-edged nature. On the contrary, the ambiguous nature
of the European undertaking is much stronger, for a coherent
comparison of the social expenditure of the member states say
well give added force to demands made in the states which have
a less well developed system of social services. It is possible
that the social budget way give life again to controversy which,
in this area, has been dead since 1966.
159. Cf. Montes (1965), p.!7.
160. Above, p.62.
-301
161. Montes (1965), p.18,
162. Meinhold (1964 (2)).
163. Meinhold (1964 (2)), p.364.
164. The extent to which this will actually happen in any given
situation depends on a host of factors not considered, including
the question whether similar developments are also taking place
in other countries.
165. For both the French and the German governments.
166. This illustrates the change that has taken place in German
policy on harmonisation in the last ten years.
167. Ribas (1973), p.210.
168. Commission (1973): Actions III5, III6, 1110, 119 respectively.
169. Ribas (1973), p.214.
170. Ribas (1973), p.214.
171. For the implementation of these Recommendations by the member
States, see the annual Social Reports of the Commission.
172. Cf. Ribas-Hasse (1971), p.81.
T73. Cf. Ribas-Hasse, pp. 81-82.
174. Coppe", Debate Parlementaires, 10-5-1972, no. 150.
mai 1972, p.89} Comoission (1971) (4); and see Table 3 at the end
of this chapter.
175. Above, n. 69.
176. By a series of reforms (Algemene Weduwen-en Weaenwet (AWW)
of 1959; Algemene Ouderdoms Wet (ACW) of 1957), the Dutch
converted important parts of their social security scheme into
a national system providing a basic flat rate coverage for
everybody. A law of 1967 (Algemene Wet Bijzondere 2i)ktekosten
(AWBZ)) abolished the distinction between industrial injury
benefits and sickness benefits. At no time were the Dutch
reforms openly opposed by the Conmission.
177. Cf. Rodgers (197'5»i Titmuss (1971)} Caesar (1964),
p.229.
178. An untimely Italian proposal of 1971 to harmonise benefits met
with some surprise and not very much enthusiasm in the Commission.
179. Meinhold (1964 (1)); above, p.41.
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180. Ribas (1973), p.214.
181. It is sometimes argued that the effect of "harmonisation" cannot
but be beneficial Thus, for example, Shirley Williams states:
••What is abundantly clear in the social services is that the
EEC principle of "harmonisation upwards"can only benefit Britain
because she has slipped so far down the list in social service
provision". (Williams (1973), p. 400). It is arguable that the
effect on Britain may be beneficial but it is certainly not
"abundantly clear".
182. On the relation between Community decisions on social policy and
public debate, a passage from the latest UNICE Memorandum on
social policy throws an interesting light: "All countries in
Europe are at present faced with the acute problem of inflation,
of which one of the main causes is too great an increase in
wages and salaries. It is conceivable that a dialogue on this
subject with the trade union organisations, should they wish to
take part, would be less heated and consequently more fruitful
at European level". UNICE (1973), p.7. Perhaps it is this
relative isolation from social pressures which provides the key
to an understanding of the Community's social policies.
See pp. 53 -54 above.
-303-
Chapter 4
1. Wohlfarth (1960), p.366.
2. See Chapter 3 above.
3. Cf. e.g. Levi Sandri, quoted by Seffen (1965 (2)), p.225;
Ribas (1965), pp. 11-12; Levi Sandri in Confe'rence Europeenne
(1962), Vol. 1, p.46.
4. Confe'rence Europeenne (1962), Vol. 1, p.196.
5. Cannella (1964), p.322; also Conference Europeenne (1962), p.322.
6. Conference Europeenne (1962), p.745.
7. Or perhaps, more accurately, for the German social insurance
institutions: for the purposes of our discussion, the two
coincide•
8. (1965), p.67.
9. An exception must, of course, be made for the Italian government which
supported the Commission. On the position of the Italian government,
see Nederhorst (1965-66), Annexe 1.
10. Conference Europeenne (1962), Vol 1, p.706.
11. Seffen (1965 (1)).
12. To these might be added another general work on the law of the EEC:
"Einfllhrung in die Rechtsfragen der Europaischen Integration",
published by the Gustav-Stresemann - Institut. The chapter on the
law relating to social policy is written by Schlotfeldt, "GeschSfts-
fdhrer in der Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverb&nde",
one of Germany's main employers* organisations. Not surprisingly,
Schlotfeldt favours a narrow interpretation of the Commission's
competence. Schlotfeldt (1967). It should be noted that many of the
other legal commentaries, (e.g. Les Novelles, Megret, Lyon-Caen)
reproduce the arguments without taking any clear position.
13. Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat (1970), p.292.
14. Kapteyn-Verloren van Themaat (1970), p.293.
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Chapter 5
1. Cf. Ribas-Voirin (1969), p.855: "La s&curite sociale des travailleurs
migrants est un sujet repute ardu que seuls, dit-or\ queiques rares
specialistes seraient a m£me de dominer dans chaque pays".
2. Ribas-Voirin (1969), p.855, n. 1; Cf. Fiorenza (1970), p.12.
3. Ribas-Voirin (1969), p.585, n. 1: "Quant aux mouvements de fonds
correspondants, ils sont £valu£s pour 1967 a pr&s de ... 140 millions
d'unit^s de compte. A cette somme, 11 convient d'ajouter le montant
des prestations servies par les differents Etats membres aux ressort-
issants des autres Etats membres, en application de la legislation
interne." For more details, see chapter 6.
4. All the examples in this section describe the situation under national
law, i.e. in the absence of any form of international co-ordination.
5. Cf. Lyon-Caen (1969), pp. 30-34; Haute Autorite (1966), pp. 43-51.
6. Cf. e.g. Art. L245 of the Code de la securite sociale (France);
Article 231 of the anrete loi of 28.12.1944 concerning the social
security of workers (Belgium); Art. 3 of the law of 5.6.1913 on
sickness insurance (Netherlands), etc. Haute Autorite' (1966),
pp. 29, 43, 73.
7. Cf. Lyon-Caen (1969), p.30.
8. Haute Autorite" (1966), p.74.
9. Art. 6, 40 de la loi du 2.5.1955 relative k la pension de retraite et
de survie des ouvriers, and Art. 1 de l*arrSt<? royal du 19.12.1955.
Haute Autorite (1966), p.29.
10. Lyon-Caen U9G9), p.28.
11. Haute Autorit£ (1966), pp. 44, 59; lyon-Caen (1969), pp. 30-31.
12. Lyon-Caen (1969), p.28, Hanotiaa (1973), p.44.
13. Netter (1959), pp. 388-390; Rouast-Durand (1961), p.241.
14. Cf. Haute Autorit£ (1966), p.35.
15. For more details on residence restrictions in the various members
stages, see Haute Autorite" (1966), passim; Commission (1962),
pp. 116-117; Lyon-Caen (1969), pp. 31-34; Netter (1959), pp. 388-393.
16. Cf. e.g. Commission (1962), p.117; Haute Autorite' (1966), p.4 and
passim.
17. Cf. Haute Autorite" (1966).
18. Cf. Lyon-Caen (1969), pp. 61-70; Rouast, Durand (1961), p.238.
19. Mart* Bufill (1967).
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20. Cf. Commission (1962), pp. 118-119; Ribas (1969), pp. 151-154;
Rouast Durand (1961), pp. 247-250; Netter (1959), pp. 405-408;
Delpe'ree (1956), pp. 170-175.
21. Thus, in treaties concluded in France, for example, state-financed
pension schemes (where nationality restrictions are most common)
are rarely covered. Cf. Rouast, Durand (1961), p.244.
22. Cf. Delpere'e (1956), pp. 166-167; Netter (1959); pp. 393-394;
Rouasfc Durand (1961), p.244.
23. Haute Autorite (1966), pp. 42, 57, 72.
24. Rouast, Durand (1961), pp. 245-247; Netter (1959), pp. 395-398.
25. "Terme un peu barbare mals commode": Voirln (1968), p.335.
26. Cf. Netter (1959), pp. 400-405; Rouast, Durand (1961), pp. 244-245.
27. Cf. Netter (1954), pp. 394-395; Rouast, IXirand (1961), pp. 243-244.
28. Cf. Rouast, Durand (1961), pp. 247-248; Deiperee (1956), pp. 170-171,
182-184; Netter (1959), pp. 405-406; Commission (1962), p.119.
29. Cf. Commission (1962), p.119; for more precise information on the
lacunae of a number of bilateral arrangements, see Haute Autorite
(1966).
30. There were nearly 200,000 foreign workers working in the coal and
steel industries of the ECSC. Cf. I^yon-Caen (1969), p.290.
31. This is chapter 1 (Workers) of Title III (The free movement of persons,
services and capital) of Fart Two (Foundations of the Community) of
the Treaty.
32. It has been found convenient, for the purposes of the discussion, to
quote Article 51 in French. The English version reads:
"The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission, adopt such measures in the field of social security as
are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers; to this end,
it shall make arrangements to secure for migrant workers and their
dependants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the
right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit,
of all periods taken into account under the laws of the
several countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of
Member States".
33. The two regulations are published together in J.O.C.E. 16.12.1958.
34. J.O.C.E. 20.4.63.
35. J.O.C.E. 24.7.63.
36. Reg. 47/67 of 7.3.67. Published in J.O.C.E. 10.3.67.
—306—
37# On the origins of Regulation No. 3, see Lyon-Caen (1969), pp. 289-
294; Rouast, Ourand (1961), pp. 250-253; kibes (1969), pp. 154-155;
Delp^ree (1956), pp. 177-178; Conmission (1962), pp. 119-120.
The question is considered from another angle in the next chapter.
38. Lyon-Caen (1969), p.294.
39. But note that more favourable provisions had been granted by some
bilateral agreements; Helpdree (1966) (1) suggests that there is
little ground for enthusiasm about this chapter of Regulation 3,
particularly in view of the fact that Article 41 can have an adverse
effect on the rights granted by some bilateral treaties.
40. See the previous note.
41. Cf. the Torrekens case (28/68).
42. See Table 1 at the end of this Chapter.
43. Rec. p.362.
44. (fee. X, p.573.
45. Above, p.104.
46. Cf. Rouast, Durand (1961), p.253; Lyon-Caen (1969), p.319.
47. Rec. XV, p.597.
48. For the texts of Art. 11(2), see the Appendix to this Chbpter.
49. Rec. XV, p.602.
50. Rec. XV. p.603. % emphasis.
51. Rec. XII, pp. 399-400.
52. Lyon-Caen (1968), p.152.
53. Rec. X, p. 1124.
54. Rec. XIII, p.276.
55. The expression used in Art. 4, Regulation No. 3.
56. Case 28/62, Van Qend en Loos; Rec. IX, p.1.
57. Rec. X, p.557.
58. Rec. X, p.574.
59. Seche (1968), pp.488-490.
60. lyon-Caen (1965), pp. 88-90.
61. Rec. XVI, p.171.
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62. Rec. XVI, p.179.
63. Rec. XIII, p.445.
64. In this sense: Seche' (1968), p.489.
65. As is the case in many bilateral treaties.
66. Rec. XI, p.III.
67. Rec. XI, p.131.
68. Quoted from the judgment in the Bertholet case. Rec. XI, p.118.
These Art. 52 cases are of course but one example of the Court's
generosity in extending the protection of the regulations to cover
as many persons as possible. See below p.152.
69. Louis (1965).
70. Case 26/62, Rec. IX, 1.
71. Case 6/64, Rec. X, 1141.
72. Rec. XV, p.405.
73. Art. 50, Regulation No. 3.
74. Cf. Art. 3(1), 6(3), 24(2), 36(3), Regulation No. 3.
75. Cf. e.g. Cases 100/63 (Van der Veen); 24/64 (Dingemans); 61/65
(Vaassen-Oobbels); 4/66 (Ilagenbeck); 14/67 (iVelchner); 19/68 (De Cicco).
76. Rec. X, p.1105.
77. Rec. X, p.1122.
78. Rec. X, p.1259.
79. Specific problems involving the relationship between the Regulation
and bilateral treaties have arisen on a number of occasions (See Table 1)
On a general level, the Court has confirmed (Case 28/68, Torrekens) that
those bilateral agreements specifically preserved by Art. 6(2) and
Annex D, Regulation No. 3, enjoy priority over the provisions of
Regulation No. 3, and that their interpretation falls not to the
Court of Justice, but to the national Jurisdictions. More recently,
in Case 82/72 (Walder), the Court has held, conversely, that Regulation
No. 3 overrides prior bilateral agreements unless these are speci¬
fically excepted by the Regulation, where the terms of the bilateral
agreement were more favourable to the migrant than the terms of the
Regulation. It is somewhat questionable whether this can be reconciled
with the principle laid down in the Article 27,28 cases (below pp. 63-
92), namely that the provisions of Regulation No. 3 are valid only to
the extent that they do not operate to the detriment of the migrants
affected.
80. The only decision worthy of mention in this area is the reassertion in
the Van der Vecht case (19/67) that interpretations given by the Com¬
mission administrative are in no way binding on the national courts.
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81. Cf. Commission Administrative, Deuxi&ne Rapport, pp. 19-20,
Quatrieme Rapport, pp. 23-24.
82. Rec. X, p.347.
83. Rec. XX, p.131.
84. Rec. XI, p.1191.
85. Rec. XI, p.1199.
86. Rec. XV, p.405.
87. Rec. XV, p.413.
88. Rec. X, p.347.
89. Rec. XIV, p.689.
90. Rec. XVII, p.857.
91. Rec. XIV. p.700.
92. Rec. XVII, p.865.
93. Cf. Cases 100/63 (Van der Veen) concerning the Dutch AiVWj 24/64
(Dingemans) on the Dutch EVIj 28/68 (Torrekens) on the French AVTS.
94. Cf. Cases 75/63 ('Jnger)j 61/65 (Vaassen-GObbels)•
95. Rec. XII, p.377.
96. Lyon-Caen (1969), p.342.
97. Rec. XVII, p.445.
98. Rec. XVIII, p.457•
99. Rec. XVIII, p.463•
100. Rec. XVIII, p.466.
101. It may be questioned whether this is really the best way of co¬
ordinating legislations of this type. It is evident from the Court's
judgment that it saw itself as "making do" in the absence of any
satisfactory 6 immunity regulation of the problem (Rec. XVIII, p.467. )
"que si ces difficultes ne peuvent etre resolues dans leur ensemble
que dans le cadre d'une intervention legislative de la Corarauraute,
cette circonstance ne saurait cependant porter prejudice au droit et
au devoir des Juridictions d'assurer la protection des travailleurs
migrants dans tous les cas ou celle-ci s'avere possible dans le
respect des prlncipes de la legislation sociale de la Communaute
et sans que soit bouleverse, pour autant, le systeme des legislations
nationales en cause".
102. Rec. XVIII, pp. 466-467. For a similar insistence on this principle in
a related sphere, see Case 2/74 (Reyners v. Belgian State), Rept. XX,
p.631. And cf. also Case 9/74 (Casagrande v. Munchen) Rept. XX, p.773.
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103. Rec. XIX, 1213*
104. For an interesting case in a related sphere (R.I^2/68), see the
Court's treatment of nationality restrictions in the case of
ughola (15/69). Rec. XV, p.363.
105. Rec. XII, p.377.
106. For another vindication of this principle which carried the Court
beyond the text of the regulation, see Case 3/70 (Di Bella) on
family benefits. For other cases involving residence restrictions,
see cases 75/63 (Unger), 33/65 (Dekker) and of course 5l/73
(Smiej*) described above (pp. 59-60).
107. The text of Art. 27, 28 is reproduced in the appendix to this
chapter. For the list of cases involved, see Table 1.
108. Above, pp. 109 ff. and cf. the Conclusions of Lagrange A.G. in
case 100/63 (Van der Veen), Rec. X, p.1105.
109. AWW, 1959.
110. WI, 1961.
111. As amended by Art. 7 of Regulation 130.
112. And cf. Case 28/68 (Torrekens) where the Court held that Regulation
No. 3 applied also to the French AVTS.
113. Rec. XII, p.617.
114. Se'chd (1968), p.502.
115. Above, p.104.
116. This pension is at a flat rate.
117. Which is not, of course, so in the case of the Dutch survivor's
pension.
118. Rec. X, p.1105.
119. Rec. X, p.1128.
120. The Van der Veen decision in fact involved ten different cases.
For the Qentrale Raad's interpretation of the Court's judgment, see
especially its decision of 7.10.64 in the case of Raad van Arbeid te
Arnhem v.W-W: Jupiter P-B 14.
121. Decision of 15.2.66 (Steenbergen)s Jupiter P-B 26; and cf. the
RB Zwolle's decision of the same day in Wind-Hocchma: Jupiter P-B 28.
122. Rec. XII, p.626.
123. Rec. XIII, p.235. This case involved a man (Ciechelski) who had paid
contributions in FR Germany for only 21 terms (and where, consequently,
aggregation was necessary to give him a right to a pension) and in
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France for 113 terns (and where, consequently, no aggregation was
necessary). As French pensions are calculated on the basis of a
maximum period of 120 terras, the French pension to which Clechelski
would have been entitled in the absence of proratisation was 113/120
of the maximum; if Art. 28 were applied, he would have received only
113/134 of the same maximum. Consequently, Ciechelski argued that
Art. 27 and 28, Regulation No. 3 should be applied to give him a
German pension, but not to reduce his French pension. The Court
upheld his argument.
124. Rec. XIII, p.244. % emphasis.
125. See above, pp. 132 ff.
123. Voirin (1968); for another discussion of the effects of the Court's
decision, see Huij (1969).
127. Thesi provisions are reproduced in the appendix to this chapter.
Voirin's argument (at p.334) that the decision is also contrary to
Art. 11(1), Regulation No. 3 (which forbids the accumulation of two
benefits relating to the same period) is less convincing, for it
rests on the view that a pension which does not depend on the length
of insurance (such as the Dutch widows' pension) is nevertheless
granted in return for the whole professional career of the person
concerned, so that any other pension relating to the same career will
necessarily constitute an unjustified accumulation within the
meaning of Article It (1) Regulation No. 3.
123. Voirin (1968), p.337.
129. Voirin (1968), p.334.
130. In so far as the Court does argue from the text, what it sees In the
text is often far from obvious. Thus, one "attendu" In Ciechelski
(Case 1/67) reads:
"Attendu qu'll resulte de son llbelle" raeme que l'article 51 vise
avant tout, le cas oft la legislation d'un Etat membre, a elle seule ,
n'ouvrirait pas b 1'assure un droit a prestations, en raison du
nombre insuffisant de periodes accoraplies sous cette legislation".
Rec. XIII, p.244 (% emphasis). One legal representative commission
has aptly spoken of the "curious legal reasoning" of the Court in
some of these cases.
131. See n. 119 above.
132. Rec. XIII, p.413.
133. Rec. XIII, p.487.
134. Rec. XIII, p.502.
135. Rec. XIII, p.551.
136. Rec. XIII, p.563.
137. Rec. XVII, pp. 871, 885, 893 respectively.
138. Rec. XVII, p.880.
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139. Rec. XVII, p.891. The relevant "attendu" reads:
"que si une telle fa9<m de proc^der devalt condulre, dans certains
cas, & avantager un travallleur migrant par rapport aux ressort-
Issants du pays dans lequel 11 travallle, cette consequence
d^coulerait, non de l'lnterpretation du droit coimainautaire,
mals du systerae actuellement en vlgueur qui, faute d'un regime
conmun de s^curite soclale, repose sur urese simple co-ordination
de legislations rationales non encore harmonisCes}"
140. Rec. XVII, pp. 874-5.
141. Rec. XX, 571.
142. Cf. Rec. XX, p.581.
143. Although the Court did have to repeat its position again in a case
relating to Invalidity pensions, Case 140/73 (Mancuso), Rec. XIX,
p.1449.
144. It is also possible that the measures taken by the Dutch government
to counter the effect of the Court's decisions (Cf. ExpossafSocial
1968, p.185) may be the source of further litigation, as it is
doubtful whether they are entirely compatible with the Court's
decisions.
145. Lyon-Caen (1969), p.347.
146. Above, pp. 142-144.
147. Voirin (1968).
148. Lyon-Oco (1969), p.347.
149. Cf. Cases 19/67 (Van der Vecht); 35/70 (Manpower)} 73/72 (Bentzinger)}
and the particularly complicated case 13/73 (Hakenberg).
150. Cf. e.g. Case 14/67 (Welchner), Case 82/72 (Walder).
151. This can perhaps be seen in the Court's slight modification in
Case 12/67 (Guissart) of the principles announced in the Ciechelski
case (1/67). (See p.88 above). One of the legal advisers to the
Commission doubted, in an interview, whether the Court was always
aware of the "eramerdement" which resulted from some of its decisions.
152. The main intention of this section is to look at the judicial appli¬
cation of Regulation No. 3 by the national courts and its relation
to the interpretation of that Regulation by the European Court of
Justice. Since our concern here is therefore not the ongoing devel¬
opment of the Regulation but rather the mechanics of its application,
it has not been found necessary to extend the study of the national
decisions beyond the time at which this section was first written
(Summer, 1971).
153. See Table 2 in the Appendix to this chapter. It is difficult to
establish a full list of national decisions with any confidence. The
sources from which these decisions have been gleaned are indicated at
the foot of Table 2.
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154. See above, pp. 168 ff.
155. Decision of 22.1.1963. This case is listed as No. 8 in the list of
Dutch cases in Table 2.
156. Decision of 24.1.1963. No. 9 in the Netherlands list (NL9).
157. 26.6.1963. No. 11 in the Netherlands list (NL11).
158. Decisions of 29.4.1964 (Dingemans): NL 12b, and 30.10.1963, NL 13a.
159. Decision of 8.10.1963s No. 2a in the list of French cases (F2a).
160. The question sent to the Court of Justice was finally posed by the
Cour de cassation in its judgment of 24.10.1968: F2c.
161. 4.3.1964 (F3).
162. Cf. Case 11/67 (COlditz).
163. The same conclusion was reached in Luxembourg by the Consell
Arbitral des assurances sociales: 19.4.1962. No. 2 on the list of
Luxembourg cases (L2).
164. 24.1.63 (NL 9).
165. 22.1.63 (NL8).
166. Cf. the Oentrale Raad's decisions of 7.10.64 (Van der Veen) (NL
13b (i))j 7.10.64 (W-W) (NL 13b (ii))j 1.4.65 (NL 13b (iii)).
167. NL 29a and 30a.
168. Oentrale Raad, two decisions of 5.10.66 (NL 29b, 30b).
169. The Oentrale Raad's approach was followed in a later decision by
RB Roermond, 21.2.67 (NL 37a).
170. TCius, all the 1967 cases concerning Art. 27, 28, Regulation No. 3,
were referred to the Court of Justice by courts from other member
states.
171. Hie same period between the judgments in Van der Veen (Case 100/63)
and Ciechelskl (Case 1/67) also saw other problems concerning Articles
27 and 28, Regulation No. 3, in the national courts, which might be
mentioned, although they are not relevant to the main point at issue.
These Include the Hagenbeck case (4/66; cf. NL 24 in Table 2) and
the Cossutta case (18/67; cf. case no. 8 in the list of Belgian cases
in Table 2|B8)) end a dispute in Germany between two chambers of the
Bundessozialgericht which was resolved only by the Court's decision in
Case 14/67 (rVelchner) (Cf. cases No. 5 and No. 7 in the list of German
cases in Table 2 (G5,G7)).
172. NL 35a, 35b; and cf. the decisions of the same courts listed in
Table 2 as NL 37a and 37b.
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177. This did not however prevent their being questioned in the gross
(26/71, Keller (27/71, Hohn (28/71) and Niemann (190/73) cases.
See above, pp. 173 ff.
178. Cf. Bundessozialgericht 25.8.60 (G2); Tribunal de grande instance
de Strasbourg 4.10.63 (F1a)| RB Amsterdam 24.11.62 (NL 5a).
179. Kontonrechter, Delft, 12.11.64 (NL 22).
180. Cf. Arrondi&sementsrechtbank Maastricht (28.5.64 (NL 18a));
Arrondissementsrechtbank Assen, 23.7.64 (NL 19a).
181. 1.6.65 (Fib).
182. 26.9.68, the only case on the Italian list in Table 2 (II).
183. 11.7.67 (Flla). This was the first stage of the Duffy case. The
part of the decision referred to here was overruled on appeal by the
Cour d*appel de Paris.







190. Cf. G5, 07a.
191. See above, pp. 142 ff.
192. R. B. Roerraond, 1.4.62 (NLIa); Oentrale Raad van Geroep 19.11.63
(NLIb); R.B. Amsterdam, 19.3.63 (NLlOa).
193. 16.10.63 (NL 10b)
194. 7.4.64 (NL 16a).
195. This was the Van der Vecht case (NL 36a).
196. Cf. Oentrale Raad van Beroep, 20.10.65 (NL 16b); R. B. Gronin $en,
3.8.64 (NL 20); Hogc Raad, 22.12.65 (NL 28).
197. See Table 2.
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198. In the Caisse d*Entraide case (27/69), this court was apparently
sitting as an appeal court.
199. Decisions of 19.7.67 (NL 37b); 5.10.66 (Steenbergen) (NL 29b);
5.10.66 (Wind-Hoechma) (NL 30b); 4.10.67 (NL 35b) (all on
Articles 27, 28 of Regulation No. 3); 19.11.63 (NL lb) (on Art. 12);
27.10.62 (NL 3) (on Art. 43).
200. Bundessozialgericht, 28.8.64 (G5).
201. Hoge Raad, 15.4.64 (NL 17); Hoge Raad 22.12.65 (NL 28); Bundes-
sosialgericht, 5.8.60 (G2); Cour de cassation, 16.2.65 (F4).
202. The first six social security references to the Court of Justice
came from Dutch courts, four of them from the Centrale Raad van
Beroep. But after the Court had given its decision in the
Ciechelski case (1/67), no Dutch tribunal sent a social security
case to it for five years (until Case 78/72 (De Waal)).
203. Cf. e.g. Holloway (1971).
201. Above, p.165.
205. Decision of 13.11.70 (F20).
205. 15.11.67 (F12). It is interesting to note too the attitude of the
Advocate General, Dutheillet de Lamothe, who is tempted to repeat
to a national court which questions the decision of the Court of
Justice the proverb: Mle curd perd son temps h dire deux fois la
me3se pour les sourdsM. Above, p.174.
207. Cf. especially KBln (1965).
208. Cf. e.g. Green (1969); Campbell (1969); Degan (1966).
209. Cf. Monaco (1965), pp. 178-9; Bisdom ((!|965), p.188.
210. Cf. e.g. Colin (1966).
211. Cf. e.g. Green (1969); Schlochauer (1966).
212. For further discussion of the problem, see Holloway (1971).
213. Cf. Art. 166 EEC.
214. Cf. e.g. Cases 82/72 (Walder); 51/73 (Smieja); 130/73 (Vandeweghe)
215. Cf, Regs. 73/63; 36/63; 47/67; see p. 119 and notes 29-31 above.
216. Huij (1968) aptly speaks (p.548) of the "dislocation" ("ontwrichten")
of the system of aggregation and proratisation by the decisions of the
Court.
217. Not published until J.O.C.E. no. 194 of 28.10.66, p.3333.
218. J.O.C.E. No. 64, 5.4.67, p.1009.
219. Parlement Europlen, Documents de seance, 1967-68, no. 158.
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220. J.O.C.E., 14.2.68.
221. J.O.C.E., No. C95, 21.9.68, p.18.
222. The Parliament's opinion was published in J.O.C.E. No. C135,
14.12.68, p.4. It was based on a report by M. Servais (Documents
de Seance, 1968-69, No. 158). The opinion of the ESC was published
in J.O.C.E. No. C21, 20.2.60, p.18.
223. QJ, No. L74, 27.3.72.
224. We shall return to the difficulties of negotiation in Chapters
6 and 7.
225. For an account, see Seche (1968-69).
226. For a more exhaustive description of the new regulation, see
Tantaroudas (1972).
227. For a discussion of this problem see Troclet'a report to the
Parliament: Documents de seance, 1967-68, No. 158, at pp. 78-80.
228. pp. 81-84.
229. But note that nationality discriminations contained in collective
agreements are forbidden by Article 7, Regulation 1612/68.
250. Article 1(a), Annex II.
251. Above, p.161.
232. The Court of Justice has already had occasion to interpret
Article 10 in the Saieja case (51/73). Art. 10 (1) Regulation
1408/71 was taken as having the same meaning as Art. 10 (1),
Regulation No. 3. See p. 157 above.
233. Article 60 of the proposed regulation.
234. Article 73, Regulation 1408/71.
235. Art. 98, R. 1406/71. In fact no such uniform solution has yet been
agreed on. The question continues (December 1974) to cause dif¬
ficulty and it is not clear whether a uniform solution would mean
universal payment of the country of employment or by the country
of residence.
236. Cf. Voirin (1968).
237. It is thought that the Commission also take the view that
Article 46X3) of the new regulation is incompatible with the case
law of the Court of Justice.
238. These cases are discussed above, pp. 141 ff.
239. Tantaroudao (1972), p.55.
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240. Article 7 of the proposed regulation. Cf. the Troclet report,
Document de seance, 1967-68, No. 158.
241. Cf. Art. 7, Regulation No. 3 and Art. 8, Regulation No. 1408/71.
242. In September 1974, the first meeting of the new Committee was still
at the stage of preparation.
243. See pp. 155 ff. above and No. 94.
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CHAPTER 6
1. Rlbas and Voirin (1969), p.855.
2. Cf. Dr. Hillary's speech at the European Colloquy on the problem of
Migration, Catholic University of Louvain, 31.1.74.
3. Cf. e.g. Maestripieri (1972). This is an example of a concept which
Is admirably suited for legal exposition, but which nevertheless
presents a distorted image of social reality.
4. See pp. 58 ff. below.
5. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.15.
6. Castles and Kosack (1972), p.16. Most of the facts and figures on
migration before the Second World War are taken from this source.
7. Castles and Kosack (1973, p.17.
8. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.18.
9. Pic (1905)1 pp. 275-276. Note that this figure does not include
frontier workers, nor the large number of foreigners naturalised
under the nationality laws of 1889 and 1893.
10. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.19.
11. Pic (1905), p.277, n.1.
12. Cf. Pic (1905), p.277; Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 17,19,21.
13. Cf. Kindleberger (1967), p.179; Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 22-23.
14. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 23-25.
15. The Times, 15.6.1974.
16. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 5U»6, 32-35,
17. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974), p.568.
18. Although the percentage of migrants in the work-force in Luxembourg
is much higher than in the other member states, the number involved
and the political weight of the various countries are such that it
is necessary to pay particular attention to developments in France
and F.R. Germany.
19. Since one can only speak of a shortage of labour when employers have
difficulty in finding workers for jobs they have created or wish to
create•
20. But the importance of demographic trends should not be over-emphasised,
labour shortages are caused not by a low natural supply of labour, but
by the fact that demand for labour exceeds the supply, whatever its
rate of natural increase.
21. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.27.
22. Hunter and Reid (1970), p.2.
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23. Kindleberger (1967), p.182.
24. Kindleberger (1967), p.200.
25. Cf, Geiselberger (1972), p.30.
26. Cf. Kindleberger (1967), p.182.
27. Cf. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974), p.572s This report comes to
the conclusion that if the supply of foreign workers is restricted,
it will not be impossible to fill the most repugnant jobs: it will
simply be necessary to pay the workers more and give them better
equipment.
28. Cf. Geiselberger (1972), pp. 30-31.
29. Geiselberger (1972), pp. 29-30.
30. As M. Rigaux has put it: HThe fact that they have no share in the
political life of the place where they reside, and that an admini¬
strative measure can arbitrarily terminate their sojourn, subjects
them without defence to the dominant economic interest of the host
country". Rigaux (1974), p.4.
31. This is the case in France, for example, where foreigners are not
allowed to become trade union officials. See below, p.234.
32. The risk in Britain forms an exception to this rule.
33. The immaculate strike record of a country like Switzerland must no
doubt be seen as a result not only of the good behaviour of the Swiss,
but also of the good behaviour of the Italians, Spanish etc. working
under such legal restrictions.
34. Cf. Nikolinakos (1973), pp. 63 ff.
35. Aron (1974), pp. 9-10.
36. According to the U.N. "Economic Survey of Europe": "Since migrants
tend to be concentrated in unskilled jobs, which are more heavily hit
by unemployment, the proportion losing their jobs is far higher than
among nationals. Thus a large part of the social cost of supporting
unemployment can be transferred to the countries of origin of
immigrants". U.N. E.C.E., Economic Survey of Europe, 1967, Ch. 1,
p.49j quoted by Castles and Kosack (1973), p.410-411,
37. Nikolinakos (1973), p.38.
38. Nikolinakos (1973), p.66.
39. Geiselberger (1973), p.23.
40. Cf. e.g. Kindleberger (1867), p.202 "In the early stages of the Lewis
model, high profits permit the country to focus on productive capital,
because the foreign workers will accept low levels of accommodation ...
investment in social-overhead capital can be kept relatively low ...
Men crowd into barracks and slums in the short run, as they did in the
Industrial Revolution in Britain and in the period of heavy migration
in the United States".
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41. Cf. Bohning (1972), ch. 4.
42. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), pp. 31-37.
43. Cf. Gorar (1970).
44. Extreme manifestations of this can be seen in the anti-Algerian riots
in France, the hostility between migrant and German workers shown
during the Ford's strike in Germany in 1973, the Schwarzenbach movement
in Switzerland.
45. For a review of the discussion, see Castles and Kosack (1973),
pp. 384 ff.
46. Kindleberger (1967), p.3.
47. Quoted in the Times, 15.6.1974.
48. Spaak (1956), p.88.
49. Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 28-29.
50. Though of course this is not always the case. One need only think
of movements from the G.D.R. before 1961, or of more recent movements
from Portugal, Greece or Spain.
51. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), p.18.
52. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 426-427.
53. Table 6 shows the importance of these receipts for Italy, Greece and
Spain.
54. Cf. Gorz (1970), p.39.
55. Cf. Cinanni (1969)*, Blumer (1970), pp. 207-208i Geiselberger (1973),
pp. 37-38} Castles ami Kosack p.427; Nikolinakos (1973), p.136.
56. Cf. e.g. the headline on the front page of Die Zeit, 15/73,
6th April 1973: "Nigger, Kulis Oder Mitbdrger? Unser Sozialproblem
Nr. 1: die Gastarbeiter".
57. Cf. e.g. Dr. Hillery's speech at Louvain: 31.1.74. The term is
unhelpful from an analytical point of view, but does convey the
particularly bad conditions under which migrants work.
58. Cf. e.g. Theo Sommer in the article under the heading quoted in n.56,
where he speaks of the danger "dass wir aus Selb- tsucht inmitten des
zwantzigsten Jahrhunderts auslandische Arbeiter als Konjunktur-
kulis in Zust£nden des friihkapitalis tischen neunzshn ten Jahrhunderts
gefangen halten". M. Bencheikh, Counsellor at the Algerian Embassy
in Brussels, has made an even more severe comparison: "The whole
European attitude towards immigration from non-member countries has
been to obtain the maximum economic advantage from it at minimum cost.
The immigrant worker thus appears as a latter-day slave, at the will
and mercy of his masters, having more duties than rights in a society
to whose prosperity he contributes but which both in practice and in
law places him in a social, moral and intellectual ghetto, thus
creating a breeding ground for racialism and systematic violence".
Bencheikh (1974), p.6.
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59. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), pp. 75-78j Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 79
-87.
60. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), pp. 73-74.
61. The industrial accident rate for migrant workers in FR Germany is
2% times higher than that for German workers. Cf. Geiselberger
(1973), pp. 74-75.
62. Generally, on this topic see Geiselberger (1973), ch. 3; Castles
and Kosack (1973), ch. 3.
63. Perhaps, however, it might be salutary to quote from the Times'
description (15,6.1974) of a typical hostel for migrant workers in
Paris: "Take 45 rue Gabriel Peri, Ivry-sur-Seine, a disused factory:
541 Africans:
Average Room Size: 17x12.80x2.57 metres.
Average vertical space between beds: 1.17 metres.
Average horizontal space between beds: 0,05 metres.
Ground floor
1st room: 13 beds
2nd room: 10 beds
First floor (without windows): 70 beds
Second floor
1st room: 93 beds, 17 campbeds.
2nd room: 58 beds, 3 campbeds.
3rd room (without windows): 40 beds, 3 campbeds.
4th room: 19 beds
5th room: 3 beds.
Third floor
1st room: 100 beds, 4 campbeds
2nd room: 60 beds, 4 campbeds.
3rd room (without windows): 22 beds.
Water: On second and third floors one tap of non-drinkable water
Drinking water: Two taps in kitchen on ground floor
Toilets: Five WCs on ground floor, and one on second and third floors.
Bed clothes: One sheet, 1.50 metres long per person; cleaned once
every 40 days. Blankets provided; not cleaned once in
four years.
Price: (i) Entrance fee £14.
(ii) Price of bed per month £4.
Revenue per month: 54 x 4 = £2,164.
64. But that was several years ago: cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.410.
65. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.413.
66. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), p.185; Oastles and Kosack (1973), p.413.
67. Hence the tendency for countries of emigration to become simultan¬
eously countries of immigration: thus, growing numbers of Africans
are now being employed in Greece and Spain: Nikolinakos (1973),
pp. 147-151: Geiselberger (1973), p.185).
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68. See above, p.28 (n.49).
69. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 416-420.
70. Kayser (1971), p.150.
71. Castles and Kosack (1975), p.420.
72. Pic (1906), pp. 307, 309 ff.
73. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.45.
74. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.19.
75. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.22.
76. Castles and Kosack (1973), pp. 34 ff.
77. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), pp. 39-45; Castles and Kosack (1973),
pp. 40-41.
78. Geiselberger (1973),p41. The fee was increased to 300 DM from the
beginning of 1972.
79. 44$ of newly entering migrants came through the official recruiting
system in 1969: Castles and Kosack (1973), p.42.
80. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), po106.
81. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.104.
82. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), pp. 51-53; Castles and Kosack (1973),
pp. 101-102.
83. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.101.
84. Geiselberger (1973), p.54.
85. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), pp. 55-58; Castles and Kosack (1973), p.126.
86. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.126.
87. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.126.
88. Cf. e.g. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974), p.572.
89. Delannoo (1969), p.982.
90. Delannoo (1969), p.983.
91. This is a very rough estimate. It is difficult to get any precise
idea of the costs which result from a social security agreement,
especially as the figures which are available distinguish only
between payments abroad and payments at home and not according to
the nationality of the recipient. According to figures given by
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Geiselberger (see Table 7), and borne out by Salowsky's figures,
in so far as they overlap (see Tables 8 and 9), the net export
from Germany of pensions, sickness benefits and industrial
injury benefits amounted to almost 186 million DM for the year
1969. Of this total, however, a remarkably small proportion
went to the countries in which migrants are recruited. Although
these countries accounted for 1.5 million of the 1.8 million
foreigners, then working in Germany, of the gross 196.5 million DM
paid out in pensions, only 27.5 million DM went to the recruitment
countries; of the remainder, a large proportion probably went to
Germans living abroad in retirement. This is easily explained by
the fact that very few of the migrants recruited since the war will
yet have reached retirement age. The main cost to the pension
funds of the social security agreements is yet to come. Far more
significant for the moment is the payment of family benefits.
In 1970, 380 million DM were paid abroad to children of foreigners
working in Germany; of this, 370.5 million DM went to the recruit¬
ment countries (Geiselberger (1973), p.109). If one allows for
inflation, for the improvement of social security agreements (and
the replacement of Regulation No. 3 by Regulation No. 1408/71),
for the aging of the workers and for the substantial growth in
the number of migrant workers (from \% million in 1969 to about 2^
million by the end of 1973), then the estimate of 1,000 million DM
as the annual expenditure must be a very conservative one indeed.
For details of the payment of pensions, see Tables 7, 8 and 9.
92. Although this is not true of Algeria's position in the current
negotiations on Association with the EEC. Cf. Agence Europe
2445-9-73.
93. Kindleberger relates that: "When Belgium signed an agreement with
Turkey over immigration, it hoped to be able to avoid providing
social-security benefits at the same level as to Belgian citizens.
Turkey had been able to obtain the local level from other countries,
however ... and Belgium had to fall in line". Kindleberger (1967),
pp. 181-2.
94. In 1970, the contributions (employees' and employers') paid for the
insurance against sickness and old age of foreign workers in FR
Germany amounted to 5,000 million DM, i.e. the contributions paid
to these funds exceeded the benefits paid by them to foreign workers
in that year by a sum probably well over 4,500 million DM.
(Geiselberger (1973), p.104). The fact that foreign workers con¬
tribute so much to social insurance schemes does not, of course,
modify in any way the cost of giving those workers wider protection
through bilateral social security agreements. Although the size of
their contribution strengthens the argument for the conclusion of
social security agreements, it should be noted that very large
groups of workers may nevertheless be left without protection for
some time. This is shown for the Yugoslavs, for example, by
tables 7 and S. Although there were in 1969 already 388,953
Yugoslavs working in Germany (the largest group of foreign workers)
and contributing to the social insurance funds, the payments made
from those funds to Yugoslavia in that year amounted to only
24,990DM, and this sum apparently (Table 8) went to only ten people,
who had presumably worked for so long in Germany that they were en¬
titled to a pension even in the absence of a treaty. The social
security agreement with Yugoslavia was not concluded until ft70.
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95. Cf. Agency Europe 20.9.73; 7.2.74.
96. Hanotian (1973), p.44.
97. Cf. Troclet (1962), pp. 136-149; Pic (1905-1906); Raynaud (1905).
98. Cf. Pic. (1906), p.302, h. 2; Raynaud (1905), p.579, n. 1.
99. Cf. Hanotiau (1973), p.65, nn. 3, 5, 8.
100. Doublet (1955).
101. Doublet (1955), p.269.
102. Admittedly, Doublet wrote this article in 1955, when the importance
of post-wvar migrations had not yet become clear.
103. Delannoo (1969), p.982.
104. This is borne out by the figures in table 7.
105. As Yannopoulos puts it: "These measures (to free movement) can be
justified for their contribution both to an improved spatial
allocation of resources and to the strengthening of growth prop¬
agation". Yannopoulos (1969), p.226. Cf. also Balassa (1962),
Ch. 4.
106. p.27.
107. Spaak (1956), p.17.
108. Spaak (1957), p.89.
109. Cf. Dahlberg (1968), p.311: "One of Italy's most pressing economic
problems was that of high unemployment, while at the same time
Germany had a shortage of all types of labour. It was thus logical
for Italy to seek jobs for its unemployed through strong provisions
to free the movement of labour and for Germany to view such demands
sympathetically". The logic of this is questionable.
110. All too often (see, for example, the quotation from Dahlberg in the
previous note, or the critique of Cinanni (1969) at pp. 93 ff)
the Community system of free movement is presented simply as a
system designed to promote the migration of labour. It should be
clear from the analysis that follows that this neglects the most
important innovation - the abandonment of the member states of the
right to control the entry of Community nationals and to discrim¬
inate against them.
1 11. Ohlin (1955), p.120.
112. Ohlin (1955), p.121.
1 13. Dahlberg (1968), p.311: see notes 109,110, above.
114. Note that Articles 48 and 49 were actually implemented only after
tough negotiations, concessions to Italy in this sphere often being
related to concessions from Italy In other spheres. For an account,
see Dahlberg (1968).
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ttS. Dahlberg (1968), p.311.
116. Swann (1973), p.69.
117. Beever (1969), p.26.
118. Yannopoulos (1969), p.234.
119. CI', e.g. Grabitz (1970); Sinagra (1966); Srauraglia (1968), p.33.
120. rrhe ideological importance of free movement for ardent supporters
of European integration is neatly captured by Delp^h^e.
"Pendant plusieurs anndes, la libre circulation des travailleurs
migrants fut la tarte & la Crdme des Europdens" Delpdrde (1967),
p.1558.
121. Konrad (1969), p.6; Cf, Braillon (1959), p.134; Doublet (1955),
p.273.
122. Commission Administrative, Premier Rapport Annuel, pp. 9-11.
123. Commission Administrative, Premier Rapport, p.10,
124. Commission Administrative, Premier Rapport, p.10.
125. Cf. Doublet (1957), pp. 583-584.
126. Cf. Beilagamba (1963), p.25: After describing the conclusion of
the Convention: "Essa necessitava per entrare in vigore della
normale procedure di ratifies da parte del Parlamenti dei sei
paesi: questo fatto avrebbe comportato una sensibile perdita di
tempo e avrebbe potuto forse comprometterne l^ttuazione per
l'eventuale sovrepporsi di ostacoli e dinieghi da parte degli
stessi organ! legislativi. Allora, per owiare a tali incon-
venienti, ... si ritenne opportuno da parte del Consiglio dei
Ministri della Coaraunita Economica Europea, di recepire la
Convenzione stessa e renderla esecutiva attraverso un proprio
prowediraento". This is confirmed by Van Nijnanter. (1962), p.182.
Hardly the most democratic birth for a regulation.
127. Cf. Kahn-Freund (1960^ p.321: "It is no exaggeration to say that the
Regulations (Regulation No. 3 and Regulation No. 4) ... are, at the
time of writing (autumn 1959), not only the most important step
taken by the Community in the fields of labour law and social
security, but by far its most significant achievement in legis¬
lation altogether".
128. Seme of the tables published in annex to the latest report of the
Commission Administrative (for the year 1969) are reproduced as
Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 at the end of this chapter.
These tables make clear the extent to which the regulations effect
a one--way transfer of money to Italy. Thus, in 1969:
- 5,415 million FB were transferred as pensions from one member
state to another; of this sum 1,916 million FB went to Italy;
to the total amount, Italy contributed only 322 million FB
(Table 13).
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- 1,415 million FB were paid as family benefits for children
living in another member state; of this sum, 905 million
FB were paid for children living in Italy; Italy's contri¬
bution to the total sum was so sinsignificant that the
Commission did not consider it necessary to quantify it (Table 14).
- Medical treatment to the value of 1,154 million FB was given
to members of families of migrant workers residing outside the
debtor country: of this sum, treatment to the value of 932.5
million FB was given to family members residing in Italy; to the
total amount, Italy contributed only 24 million FB (Table 10).
These figures do not give an accurate picture of the extent to
which Italy and Italian migrants benefit from the regulations,
partly because some of the statistics are defective, but, more
important, because they do not indicate the importance of benefits
to pensioners and children residing in the debtor country. It is
likely that, if these figures wre available, our picture of a
one-sided transfer of money to Italians would be reinforced.
129. IViotta (1967), p.306.
130. See p.233 above.
131. Cf. e.g. Doublet (1955), p.273, Doublet (1957), p.574; Dupeyroux
(1959); Dedieti (1959), pp. 93, 94; Ribas (1971), p.30.
132. Doublet (1957).
133. Doublet (1957), p.584.
134. In 1969, over 8,262 million FB were transferred from one member
state to another under the regulations. See tables 10-16.
135. Cf. e.g. Ribas (1971), p.30.
136. Cf. Yannopoulos (1969), p.237.
137. Cf. Falchi (1971), p.19; for a picture of the development of lntra-
Community migration in relation to total migration, see Table 17
at the end of this chapter.
138. For figures, see Konrad (1969), p.155 and Commission (1971), p.107.
139. Cf. Commission (1973), Exposd' Social, Annex D.V. 2(p.240).
140. Cf. Commission (1971), p.108; (1973) expose' Social, Annex D.I.3b
(p.252).
141. For a full account, see Bohning (1972), ch. 2.
142. Cf. Dahlberg (1968), p.324 and passim.
143. Falchl's title is given as "Ministre plenipotentiaire, Ministere
des Affaires etrangeres (Rome)". Presumably the views which he
expresses can be taken as reflecting the official Italian position.
144. Falchi (1971), p.17.
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145. Falchi (1971), p.23.
148. Cf. Dahlberg (1968); Geiselberger (1973), p.47 reproduces a passage
from the report of the principal German employers* organisation,
the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, for 1962-63: "Wir haben
uns im Berichtsjahr gemeinsam mit der Bundesvereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande gegen alle Bestrebungen der EWG
gewandt, gleichzeitig mit tier schrittweisen Verwirklichung der
Freizttgigkeit innerhalb des Gemeinsamen Marktes den Zugang von
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1962/63, S.69).
147. Cf. Bonnet (1969), p.169; Heynig (1969), p.69.
148. Cf. Geiselberger (1973), p.48; Falchi (1971), p.21; Cinanni
(1964), p.101; Offeddu (1967), p.9; Castellani (1967), p.18.
149. Cf. Falchi (1971). The two Italian demands have met with sympathy
in the Commission and form an important part of the Commission's
current iocialAction Programme on migrant workers. Opposition,
particularly from the German government, remains strongf out it may be
that the current economic downturn and the fall in demand for migrant
labour will assist the Commission in the pursuit of its aims.
150. This view is by and large accepted by the Commission, as by some
French and German commentators - cf. Jaumont (1973), p.76,
Geiselberger (1973), pp. 48-49.
151. M. Coppe, in presenting the Social Report for 1972, expressed concern
at the fact that, although there were 2,300,000 unemployed in the
Community, there were at the same time almost 3,000,000 non-
Community workers employed in the Community. (Geiselberger (1973),
p.49).
152. Thus Geiselberger has some justification in asserting: "Aber auch
fhr die italienischen Arbeiter brachte der Dryck ihrer Regierung
auf Hierstellung der FreizGgigkeit letzten Endes keinen echten
Mutzen". Geiselberger (1973), p.49.
153. Bdhning (1972), p.86. For a fuller discussion, see ch. 5 of that
book.
154. Dahlberg (1968), p.326.
155. Hunter and Reld (1970^ pp. 23-24.
156. Bdhning (1972), p.86.
157. Cf. No. 39 above.
158. For a report, see "Der Spiegel", 36/73, pp. 19-26.
159. Cf. BOhning (1972), Ch. 4.
180. Cf. Wissenschaftllcher Beirat (1974); Merx (1972), p.233.
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162. For a discussion of this, see Nikollnakos (1973), pp. 142-152,
Geiselberger (1973), pp. 187-192.
163. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.423.
164. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.35.
165. Cf. Stephen (1974), p.630.
166. Stephen (1974), p.630.
167. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974).
168. Agenee Europe 20.4.74.
169. Cf. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.423.
170. Castles and Kosack (1973), p.423.
171. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974).
172. Vissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974), pp. 573-574: wUm Auslands-
invest*tlonen in die HerkunftslSnder der ausl8ndlschen
Arbeitskr8fte zu verlagem und zusdtzllche Direktlnvestitlonen
in ihnen anzuregen, sollte die Bundesingle rung darauf bestehen,
dass dort Kontrollen und Niederlassungsbeschrankungen fflr
ausl&'ndische Unternehmen beseitigt werden. Die Aufnahme von
ArbeitskrSften in der Bundesrepublik sollte ihre notwendigen
Gegenstttcke in der Niederlassungsfreiheit der Unternelunen, der
Freiheit des Kapitalverkehrs und der Sicherung von Eigentums-
rechten in den HerkunftslMndern der auslSndischer Arbeits-krfittfe
haben ... In den HerkunftslSndern entsprUche ihnen (i.e. measures
proposed in the FRG) eine Politik der gezielten HerbeifOhrung
komparativer Vorteile fOr arbeitslntensive Produkte durch eine auf
eine nledrige Bewertung der Wahrung tunauslaufende Kombination von
Lohn-und Wechselkursgestalfung".
173. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974), p.573, III, 5.
174. It is interesting to note that the views put forward by this Report
agree in many respects with those expressed in a recent interview
by D.W. von Manges, managing director (Vorstandsvorsitzender) of
the GutehoffnungshStte Aktlenverein, the largest machine-building
concern in the EEC (Spiegel 7/74, pp. 44 ff)^ as also with those
expressed in the Zeit article by Theo Sonmer to which we have
already referred (Die Zeit, 15/74, p.1).
175. This is borne out by the analysis of the German economy by
Altvater et al. (1974).
176. p. 25, above.
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177. Perhaps this "trend" would be better described as a "tendency",
which could well be upset by various factors, e.g. by the recent
political instability in some of the Mediterranean countries.
It is clear that the development suggested would not, in any
case, mean an end to all large-scale labour migration.
Cf. Nlkolinakos (1973), pp. 142-150.
178. One can see some of these problems foreshadowed in the report of the
Wissenschaftliche Beirat; these are the problems involved In the
dependence of any country on foreign capital.
179. Cf. Merx (1972), p.238: "Auch von der Angebotsseite sind der
weiteren Zunahme der AuslfinderbeschMftigung auf absehbare
Zeit kaum Grengen gesetzt. Zum Beispiel waren aHeir, in der
Ttlrkel 1971 mehr als elne Million Arbeitskrflfte registriert,





2. Commission (1971 (5)).
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3. Cf. Commission Administrative, 2 Rapport, pp. 19-20; 4"
Rapport, pp. 23-24,
4. This is made clear by the hostile reaction with which some of the
Court's decisions (e.g. on the aggregation and proratisation of
pensions) have been greeted by the member states,
5. As was pointed out in the introduction, the capitalist mode of
production requires a legal system that is relatively stable. In
a sense, then, it is in the interests of the owners of capital that
courts should not be particularly responsive to their short-term
interests. Cf. Re liner (1949), p,256: "The law aims at the control of
, the organic texture of nature, of the interconnections among man and
matter. The whole of this intricate structure forms the substratum,
the foundation of the law. And since this substratum is subject to
change, the same applies to the law. But the imperceptible process
of change does not immediately react upon the norms. At first It is
scarcely noticeable to the Individual, rnich less to the Community, and
so the norm remains constant. The legal Institution remains the same,
as regards Its normative content, but It no longer retains its
former social functions".
6. See Chapter 5.
7. See Chapter 3, it. 128 and Tables 10-16.
8. It Is significant that this restriction of the maximum period was
contained neither In the Commisslon's original proposal nor (and
this Is more important) in the amendments proposed by the Admini¬
strative Commission, which discus sede^|je prog^ged revision In great
detail (Commission Administrative, 6 et 7 Rapports annuels,
pp. 83-84). The limitation must, therefore, have been Introduced
by the Council and at the prompting of some-one other than the top
advisers on social security matters, who had agreed to more generous
provisions In the Administrative Commission. The members of the
Administrative Commission usually also take part In the Council
negotiations, but apparently act under stricter government
Instructions.
9. dlsgj^gsion of these proposals, see the Commission Administrative,
6 et 7 Rapports annuels, pp. 60-63,
10. Strictly speaking, it was not proposed that Community nationals
living outside the Community should be covered by all the provisions
of the regulation: that would be administratively impossible. It
was proposed that they should benefit from the equality of treatment
prescribed by Article 3, Regulation No. 1408/71• It is this which
was rejected, both by the Administrative Commission and by the
Council.
•"OOl/1*
It. Social Action Programme (1973), Action 115 1(d).
12. Cf. Agence Europe, 22.2.74j 5.4.74; 17/18-6-74.
13. Cf. Agencg Europe, 20.9.73; 7.2.74; 22.2.74.
14. The German report referred to in the last chapter specifically
urged the Federal Government not to extend its commitment to
the free movement of labour. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1974),
15. Cf. Dsr Spiegel, 7.10.1974 (41/74), pp. 32-34.
16. One important influence on the development of the regulations
which has not been considered either in this or in the last
chapter is the internal evolution of the social security
systems of the member states. This topic has been omitted
because our interest has been focused, not on the absolute
social security protection of mig,"ants - a vast subject -
but on the protection of migrants' relative to the protection
of non-migrants. It should not be overlooked, however, that
changes (reinforced by the entry of the three new member states)
in the concepts and organisation, and particularly the gradual
generalisation of social security schemes within the member states
may eventually lead to a restructuring of the regulations and a
modification of the mechanisms of co-ordination which would
inevitably affect also the relative position of migrants. Given
the diversity of the systems involved, however, it is likely that
such a development, if it comes about at all, will take a long time.
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Chapter 8
1. Kindleberger (1967), ch. 11.
2. This result bears an obvious affinity to the more general
conclusion reached by Marx: "My inquiry led me to the conclusion
that neither legal relations nor political forms could be com¬
prehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called
general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary,
they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality
of which Hegel, following the example of English and French
thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term "civil
society"} that the anatony of this civil society, however, has to






Wage Ratio in Capitalist Countries (per cent)
Country Sector 1950-54 1955-9 1960-64 1964 1965 1966 1967 196S 1969 1970
U.K. Corporate 68-5 70-2 71-7 71-4 72'1 74'7 73-8 74-8 76'9 78'4
Manufacturing 64'9 67'6 69 "2 69-1 70-1 72'7 70'8 72-2 75 -2 76'6
U.S. Corporate 71 0 71 -7 71-4 . 70'2 69'1 69-4 70'4 70-5 71-7 73-3
Manufacturing 69'2 70-7 71-5 70-2 68-8 69-3 70'8 70'8 72'2
France G.D.P. 49-5 52-5 53-2 54-7 54-9 54-5 54-4 55-0 54-8
Germany G.D.P. 520 53-8 56'2 56-9 57'4 57-9 57-8 57-5 57-5 59-1
Manufacturing 59-6 60'3 61 -5 62-1 62-1 63-7 63-6 60-7 61-9
Italy G.D.P. 43-5"> 45-4 49-5 52-8 52-0 51-3 51-6 51-9 51 '8 53-7
Manufacturing 53-6«> 57-8 61-7 65-3 62-8 60-9 63'4 62-7 63-7
Japan G.D.P. 44,5<J> 45-9 45-6 46-0 48-4 48-2 47-2 46-4 46-7
Manufacturing (large
companies) 39-6 41-8 41-0 40-3 41-3 40-9 41-3
Netherlands G.D.P. 49-2 50-9 54-7 57-2 58-1 60-1 59-4 59-8 60-3 62-0
Manufacturing 54'6 56-6 60-2 62-5 62-8 64-5 63-6 63-4 64-2
Sweden Manufacturing 66-5<» 67-1 70-1 69 -4 69-3 70-9 71-0 69-9 69-0
Canada G.D.P. 55-4 57-5 58-6 58-2 59-2 60 0 61-8 61-9 62-8 64-0
Belgium G.D.P. 48-4<» 50-3 52-9 54-4 55-2 56-6 56-7 56-8 57-0
(«) 1951—4 (») 1952-4 (J) 1953-4
Note: Output is gross of depreciation in every case, and it is domestic output, i.e. excluding income from abroad. In the case
of U.K. and U.S. it is net of stock appreciation; for other countries there is no mention of stock appreciation and it is.
assumed that output is defined net of stock appreciation.
The wage ratio is wages and salaries and employers' contributions to social security as a proportion of output.
For U.S. and U.K. the corporate sector excludes financial companies.? " : i" """" ' •" ■ ■ -t-- ■
1 —wnQmqtm*1 i} yppri ~-*wi r* —* 'i Hi-1 "' ■ ■ ■ i
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Sources Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972), pp. 264-5.
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J. Shares of wages and salaries in tolal income in different
countries 1950-70
Note: Comparison between countries and overtime is complicated
(except for the U.S. and the U.K.) by the inclusion of self-employed




Source; Glyn and Sutciiffe (1972), p.7e/
TABLE 2
Prestations de Securite socinle en % du revenu disponible des manages
Luxem¬
bourg
"I "n .ijjwuuifjp '.»




















(on '/ du revonu national)
-transferts oxclus-
AnneOB B D P I L M
Prestations en nature 1965 3,1 3,6 1,5 3,6 2,8 3,3
1970 3,8 1,1 5,3 4,4 3,1 . • <8
1975 •1,0 5,4 5,5 3,3 6,3
Prestations en espices 1965 1-1,1 14,7 14,3 13,7 17,1 15,3
(1) 1970 15,7 15,5 14,3 13,9 18,5 18, a
1975 15,8 16,4 14,9 12,9 19,3 19,7
Total das prestations 1965 17,5 18,3 18,3 17,3 19,9 13,6
1970 19,4 19,9 19,6 18,3 21,6 23,2
1975 19,8 21,8 21,5 10,4 22,6 26, V
Frais administrates 1965 1,0 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,7 0,7
1970 1,0 1,1 0,8 0,8 0,6 0,8
1975 0,8 1,0 0,7 0,3 0,6 0,3
Autres dispenses 1965 _ _
'
0,5 0,1 0,2 ..
•
1970 0,1 - o,6 1,2 0,2 -
1975 - 0,5 0,9 0,1 -
Total des dupenses 1965 18,4 19,2 20,0 18,5 20,8 19,3
oane tran6ferts 1970 20,5 21,0 21,0 20,3 22, > 2 1,0
(1) 1975 20,6 22,8 22,9 20,1 23,3 27,2
(l) Italie 1975 — Si lcs prestations familialee etaiont revalorisues corane
lcs Balairos lor. proctutions en espSces ot le total dos ddpcnoos
devrait Stro majore de. 0,0
M^ I! JI m ■ ,!l^" • gppm
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SECURITE SOCIALE PES TRAVAILLEURS MIGRANTS
Dispositif du reglement n° 3 du Conseil




Aux fins de l'application du present reglement :
(a) les termes «territoire d'un Etat membre »
et « ressortissant d'un Etat membre »sont definis a
Tannexe A ;
(b) le terme «legislation » designe les lois, les
reglements et les dispositions statutaires, existants
et futurs, de chaque Etat membre, qui concernent
les regimes et branches de la securite sociale vises
aux paragraphes (1) et (2) de 1'article 2 du present
reglement;
(c) le terme «convention de securite sociale»
designe tout instrument, bilateral ou multilateral,
intervenu ou a intervenir exclusivement entre deux
ou plusicurs Etats membres et tout autre instru¬
ment multilateral qui lie cu liera deux ou plusieurs
Etats membres dans le domaine de l'ensemble de
la securite sociale ou de l'un ou de plusieurs des
regimes et branches de la securite sociale vises
aux paragraphes (1) et (2) de Particle 2 du present
reglement, ainsi que les accords de toute nature
conclus dans le cadre desdits instruments ;
(d) le terme «autorite competente» designe
pour chaque Etat membre le ministre, les ministres
ou une autre autorite correspondante dont relevent,
dans Pensemble ou dans une partie quelconque du
territoire de l'Etat dont il s'agit, les regimes de la
securite sociale ;
(e) le terme «institution » designe, pour chaque
Etat membre, 1'organisme ou 1'autorite charge
d'appliquer tout ou partie de la legislation ;
(f) le terme «institution competente » designe :
(i) s'il s'agit d'une assurance sociale, l'insti-
tution designee par l'autorite competente
de l'Etat membre interesse ou l'institution
a laquelle l'assure est affilie au moment de
la demande de prestations, ou envers la¬
quelle il a ou continuerait a avoir droit aux
prestations s'il residait sur le territoire de
l'Etat membre oil il etait occupe en dernier
lieu ;
(ii) s'il s'agit d'un regime autre qu'une assuran¬
ce sociale, relatif aux obligations de l'em-
ployeur concernant les prestations visees
au paragraphe (1) de Particle 2 du present
reglement, soit Pemployeur ou l'assureur
subroge, soit, adefaut, un organisme ou une
autorite a determiner par l'autorite com¬
petente de PEtat membre interesse ;
(iii) s'il s'agit d'un regime non contributif ou
d'un regime d'allocations familiales, l'orga-
nisme ou l'autorite charge de liquider des
prestations suivant les dispositions du pre¬
sent reglement;
(g) le terme «pays competent» designe l'Etat
membre sur le territoire duquel se trouve Pinsti-
tution competente ;
(h) le terme « residence » signifie le sejour habi-
tuel ;
(i) les termes «institution du lieu de residence »
et « institution du lieu de sejour » designent :
(i) l'institution qui est competente pour le lieu
oil l'interesse reside ou sejourne, suivant les
dispositions de la legislation de l'Etat
membre en cause ;
(ii) si une telle institution n'est pas designee par
la legislation, l'institution que l'autorite
competente de l'Etat membre en question
designera aux fins de Papplication du pre¬
sent reglement;
(j) le terme « refugie » a la signification qui lui
est attribute a 1'article premier de la convention
relative au statut des refugies, signee a Geneve,
le 28 juillet 1951 ;
(k) - *)
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(1) **) le terme «travailleur saisonnier » desi-
gne le travailleur salarie ou assimiie qui se rend sur
le territoire d'un des Etats membres pour y effec-
tuer, pour le compte d'un ou de plusieurs employ-
eurs de cet Etat, un travail a caractere saisonnier
d'une duree ne devant pas exceder 8 mois, et qui
sejourne sur le territoire dudit Etat pendant la
duree de son travail. Par travail a caractere saison¬
nier, il convient d'entendre le travail dependant du
rythme des saisons, se repetant automatiquement
chaque annee;
La preuve de la qualite de saisonnier est etablie
par la production du contrat de travail vise par les
services de l'emploi de l'Etat mernbre sur le territoire
duquel le travailleur saisonnier vient exercer son
activite ou d'un document vise par ces services et
attestant que l'interesse dispose d'un emploi sai¬
sonnier sur ledit territoire.
(m) l'expression «travailleur de qualification
confirmee dans les professions du charbon et de
l'acier » designe un travailleur qui est muni de la
carte de travail de la Communaute europeenne du
charbon et de l'acier au sens de la decision du 8 de-
cembre 1954 relative a 1'application de 1'article 69
du traite du 18 avril 1951 instituant la Communaute
europeenne du charbon et de l'acier, et le terme
« professions du charbon et de l'acier » designe les
metiers figurant en annexe a ladite decision ;
(n) le terme « membres de la famille » designe
les personnes definies ou admises comrne telles, ou
designees comme membres du menage par la legis¬
lation du pays de leur residence ; toutefois, si cette
legislation ne considere comme membres de la fa¬
mille ou membres du menage que les personnes
vivant sous le toit du travailleur, cette condition,
dans les cas ou 1'on peut fa ire appel au present regle-
ment, est reputee remplie lorsque ces personnes sont
principalement a la charge de ce travailleur ;
(o) le terme « survivants » designe les personnes
definies comme telles par la legislation applicable ;
toutefois, si cette legislation ne considere comme
survivants que les personnes qui vivaient sous le
toit du travailleur decede, cette condition, dans les
cas oil l'on peut faire appel au present reglement,
est reputee remplie lorsque ces personnes etaient
principalement a la charge de ce travailleur ;
(p) le terme «periodes d'assurance» comprend
les periodes de cotisation ou d'emploi, telles qu'elles
sont definies ou prises en consideration comme perio¬
des d'assurance selon la legislation concernant un
regime contributif sous laquelle elles out ete accom-
plies ;
(q) le terme «periodes d'emploi» designe les
periodes d'emploi, telles qu'elles sont definies ou
prises en consideration selon la legislation sous la¬
quelle elles ont ete accomplies ;
(r) le terme «periodes assimilees» designe les
periodes assimilees aux periodes d'assurance ou, le
cas echeant, aux periodes d'emploi, telles qu'elles
sont definies par la legislation sous laquelle elles
ont ete accomplies et dans la mesure ou elles sont
reconnues equivalentes par cette legislation aux
periodes d'assurance ou d'emploi;
(s) les termes « prestations », « pensions »,« ren¬
tes » designent les prestations, pensions, rentes, y
compris tous les elements a la charge des fonds pu¬
blics, les majorations, allocations de reevaluation ou
allocations supplementaires, ainsi que les prestations
en capital qui peuvent etre substitutes aux pen¬
sions ou rentes ;
(t) le terme « allocations au deces » designe toute
somme versee en une seule fois en cas de deces.
Observations
(Article premier)
*) L'alinea (k) ainsi redige :
(k) le terme « travailleur fronlalier » a la significa¬
tion qui lui est attribuee dans les conventions
de securite sociale bilaterales ou dans d'aultes
accords bilateraux intervenus oil a intervenir
entre deux Etats membres, ou designe, si une
d&finition du terme «travailleur frontalier » n'a
pas ite convenue entre les Etats membres inte-
ressSs, les travailleurs qui, tout en conservant
leur residence dans la zone limitrophe de I'un
des Etats membres ou ils rentrent normalement
au moins une fois par semaine, sont occupes
dans la zone limitrophe de I'autre des Etats
membres; les zones limilrophes seront determi-
nees d'un commun accord par les autorites
competctites des Etats membres en question ;
a ete abroge par l'article premier du reglement
n° 36/63/CEE du Conseil du 2 avril 1963 — JO
n° 62 du 20 avril 1963.
Cette abrogation a pris effet le lcr fevrier 1964
(cf. article 26 du reglement n° 36/03/CEE pre-
cite et article 4 du reglement n° 3/64/CEF. du
Conseil du 18 decembre 1963 — JO n° 5 du 17
janvier 1964).
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**) Ce texte remplace (cf. article premier du regle-
ment n° 73/C3/CEE du Conseil du 11 juillet 1963
— JO-n° 112 du 24 juillet 1903) le texte initial
redige comme suit :
(I) le lerme « travailleur saisonnier » a la significa¬
tion qui lui est attribuee dans les conventions
de securite sociale bilaterales ou dans d'autres
accords bilatdraux intervenus ou d intervenir
entre deux Etats membres, ou designe, si une
definition dudit terme n'a pas ete convenue
entre les deux Etats membres intdressds, les
travailleurs qui se rendent pour une duree de-
terminee d'un pays dans I'autre pour y effec-
tuer, pour le compte d'un employeur de ce der¬
nier pays, un travail salarid ou assimile de
caracterc saisonnier, tout en conservant leur
residence dans I'autre pays oil continue a rd-
sider leur familie. La Commission administra¬
tive prdcisera, en tant que de besoin, les activi-
tes considerees comme ayant un caraclere sai¬
sonnier.
Cette modification a pris effet le 1" fevrier 1964
(cf. article 15 du reglement n° 73/63/CEE precite
et article 3 du reglement n° 2/64/CEE du Conseil
du 18 decembre 1963 — JO n° 5 du 17 janvier
1964).
Les articles 13 et 14 du reglement 73/63/CEE
precite precisent ce qui suit:
pas opposables aux interesses, si la demande men~
tionnee au paragraphe precedent est presentee dans
un delai de deux ans a compter de Ventree en vi-
gueur du present reglement. Si la demande est pre¬
sentee apres I'expiration de ce ddlai, le droit aux
prestations qui n'est pas frappd de decheance ou
qui n'est pas prescrit est acquis a parlir de la date
de la demande d moins que les dispositions plus
favorables de la legislation d'un Etat membre ne
soient applicables.
Article 14
Nonobstanl les dispositions du present regle¬
ment, restent applicables les dispositions particulieres
aux travailleurs saisonniers figurant dans une con¬
vention de securite sociale qui, d'une maniere gend-
rale, peuvent etre considerees comme plus favo¬
rables ou qui, lorsqu'il s'agit seulement de modali-
tds d'application sans influence sur les droits des
intdressds, out donne satisfaction sur le plan de la
pratique administrative. Ces dispositions seront
respectivement dnumerdes dans Vannexe D du regle¬
ment n° 3 et dans I'annexe 6 du reglement n° 4 par
un reglement ulterieur du Conseil arrets sur pro¬
position de la Commission en meme temps que le
rbglement preuu aux paragraphes (1) et (2) de
1'article 4 du rdglement n° 36/G3ICEE du Conseil
concernanl la securite sociale des travailleurs fron-
taliers.
Article 13
(1) Le present reglement n'ouvre aucun droit au
paiement de prestations pour une periode antd-
rieure a la date de son entree en vigueur.
(2) Toute periode d'assurance ou periode assimi-
lee, ainsi que, le cas echeant, toute periode d'emploi
ou periode assimilee, ou toute periode de residence
accomplie en vertu de la legislation d'un Etat
membre avant la date d'entrce en vigueur du pre¬
sent reglement est prise en consideration pour la
determination du droit aux prestations s'ouvrant
conformement aux dispositions du prdsent regle¬
ment.
(3) Sous reserve des dispositions du paragraphe
(1) du prdsent article, une prestation est due en
vertu du prdsent reglement, meme si elle se rapporte
a un evdnement anterieur a la date de son entree
en vigueur. A cet effet, toule prestation qui n'a pas
ete liquidee ou qui a ete suspendue en raison de la
residence de I'interesse sur le territoire d'un Etat
membre autre que le pays oil se trouve I'institution
ddbitrice, sera, a la demande de I'interessd, liquidee
ou retablie a parlir de I'cntree en vigueur du pre¬
sent reglement, sous rdserve que les droits ante-
rieurement liquidds n'aient pas donne lieu a un
reglement en capital.
(4) Ouant aux droits rdsultant de I'application du
paragraphe prdcedent, les dispositions prevues par
les legislations des Etats membres en ce qui concerne
la ddcheance et la prescription des droits ne sont
Article 2
(1) Le present reglement s'applique a toutes les
legislations qui visent :
(a) les prestations de maladie et de maternite ;
(b) les prestations d'invalidite, y compris celles
destinees a maintenir ou a ameliorer la capacite de
gain, autres que celles qui sont servies en cas d'ac-
cidents du travail ou de maladies professionnelles ;
(c) les prestations de vieillesse ;
(d) les prestations de survivants autres que les
prestations qui sont servies en cas d'accidents du
travail ou de maladies professionnelles ;
(e) les prestations en cas d'accidents du travail
ou de maladies professionnelles ;
(f) les allocations au deces ;
(g) les prestations de chomage ;
(h) les allocations familiales.
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(2) Le present reglement s'applique aux regimes
de securite sociale generaux et speciaux, contribu-
tifs et non contributifs, y compris les regimes reia-
tifs aux obligations de l'employeur concernant les
prestations visees au paragraphe precedent.
(3) Le present reglement ne s'applique ni a l'as-
sistance sociale et medicale, ni aux svstemes des
prestations en faveur de victimes de la guerre ou de
ses consequences, ni aux regimes speciaux des fonc-
tionnaires publics ou assimiles.
Article 3
(1) L'annexe B au present reglement precise,
en ce qui concerne chaque Etat membre, les legis¬
lations de securite sociale auxquelles s'applique le
reglement et qui sont en vigueur sur son territoire
a la date de l'adoption du present reglement.
(2) Chaque Etat membre notifiera, confcrme-
ment aux dispositions du paragraphe (1) de l'article
54 du present reglement, tout amendement qui doit
etre apporte a l'annexe B par suite de l'adoption
d'une nouvelle legislation. La notification sera
effectuee dans un delai de trois mois a partir de la
publication de ladite legislation.
Article 4
(1) Les dispositions du present reglement sont
applicables aux travailleurs salaries ou assimiles
qui sont ou ont ete soumis a la legislation de l'un
ou de plusieurs des Etats membres, et qui sont des
ressortissants de l'un des Etats membres, ou qui
sont des apatrides ou des refugies residant sur le
territoire de 1'un des Etats membres, ainsi qu'aux
membres de leurs families et a leurs survivants.
(2) De plus, les dispositions du present reglement
sont applicables aux survivants des travailleurs sa¬
laries ou assimiles qui ont ete soumis a la legislation
de l'un ou de plusieurs des Etats membres sans egard
a la nationality de ces derniers, lorsque ces survi¬
vants sont des ressortissants de 1'un des Etats
membres ou sont des apatrides ou des refugies resi¬
dant sur le territoire de l'un des Etats membres.
(3) - *)
(4) - *)
(5) Les dispositions du present reglement ne sont
applicables ni aux agents diplomatiques et consu¬
lates de carriere, v compris les fonctionnaires
appurtenant au cadre des chancelleries ni aux per-
sonnes qui, apparcenant au cadre d'une administra¬
tion gouvernementale d'un Etat membre, sont en-
voyees par leur gouvernement sur le territoire d'un
autre Etat membre.
(6) L'application des dispositions du present re¬





*) Les paragraphes (3), (4) et (7) ainsi rediges :
(3) Toutefois, les dispositions du present reglentenl
ne sont applicables ni aux travailleurs frontaliers ni
aux travailleurs saisonniers, dans la -mesure oil
les prestations dont ils bdneficient sont ou seror.t
reglementees par des dispositions particulieres d
ces travailleurs, figwant dans une convention dc
security sociale.
(4) En outre, les dispositions enumerees a I'annexe
C, en ce qui concerne respectivement les travailleurs
frontaliers et les travailleurs saisonniers occupes surle
territoire de 1'Etat membre mentionne a ladite annexe,
'
ne sont pas appliquees par les institutions de cet
Etat membre ; au regard des travailleurs frontaliers
et des travailleurs saisonniers qui sont ressortissants
de I'Etat membre mentionne a I'annexe C, ou apa¬
trides ou refugids residant sur le territoire dudit
Etat, la rneme limitation intcrvient de la part de
celui des autres Etats membres sur le tcrritoire du-
quel ils sont occupds. Toutefois, dans ces cas, les
travailleurs susvises continuent a beneficier des avan-
tages correspondants que leur conferent les conven¬
tions de securite sociale liant I'Etat membre mention¬
ne a I'annexe C a Vautre Etat membre.
(7) Des rlglements ultdrieurs fixeront des disposi¬
tions particulieres aux travailleurs frontaliers et aux
travailleurs saisonniers; a partir de I'entrde en
vigueur desdits reglements, les dispositions des pa-
ragraphes (3) et (4) du present article cesseront
d'etre applicables.
ont ete supprimes par l'article premier du regle¬
ment n° 73/63/CEE du Conseil du 11 juillet 1993
— JO n° 112 du 24 juillet 1963. (Pour les travail¬
leurs frontaliers, cf. reglement nJ 30/63/CEE du
Conseil du 2 avril 1963, reproduit a la page 133)
Cette suppression a pris effet le 1" fevrier 1964
(cf. article 15 du reglement n° 73/63/CEE precite
et article 3 du reglement n° 2/64/CEE du Conseil
du 18 decembre 1963 — TO n° 5 du 17 janvier
1964).
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Article 5
A moins qu'il n'en soit stipule autrement d'une
fa<;on expresse dans le present reglement, les dispo¬
sitions de celui-ci se substituent, en ce qui concerne
les personnes auxquelles il s'applique, aux disposi¬
tions :
(a) des conventions de securite sociale interve-
nues exclusivement entre deux ou plusieurs Etats
membres et des accords complernentaires a ces con¬
ventions ;
(b) de toute convention de securite sociale mul-
tilaterale qui lie deux ou plusieurs Etats membres
et un ou plusieurs pays qui ne sont pas des Etats
membres, pour autant qu'il s'agit de cas dans le
reglement desquels n'intervient pas un regime de
l'un des derniers pays.
Article 6
(1) Les dispositions du present reglement ne
portent pas atteinte aux obligations decoulant:
(a) d'une convention quelconque adoptee par
la Conference Internationale du travail;
(b) des accords interimaires europeens du 11
decembre 1953 concernant la securite sociale, con-
clus entre les gouvernements des membres du Con-
seil de l'Europe.
(2) Nonobstant les dispositions du present regle¬
ment, restent applicables :
(a) les dispositions de l'accord du 27 juillet 1950
concernant la securite sociale des bateliers rhenans ;
(b) les dispositions de la convention europeenne
du 9 juillet 1956 concernant la securite sociale des
travailleurs des transports internationaux ;
(c) - *)
(d) - *)
(e) d'autres dispositions des conventions de
securite sociale, pour autant qu'elles soient enume-
rees dans l'annexe D du present reglement.
(3) Deux ou plusieurs Etats membres ayant con-
clu des conventions de securite sociale dont certaines
dispositions sont enumerees dans 1'annexe D du pre¬
sent reglement peuvent, apres avis conforme de la
Commission administrative visee a l'article 43 du
present reglement, apporter a l'annexe D les amen-
dements qu'ils considerent necessaires en les noti-
fiant conformement aux dispositions du para-
graphe (1) de 1'article 54 du present reglement.
(4) Les dispositions du present reglement ne
portent pas atteinte aux dispositions de la legisla¬
tion de chacun des Etats membres concernant la
participation des assures ou des autres categories
de personnes interessees a la gestion de la securite




*) Les alineas (c) et (d) ainsi rediges :
(c) les dispositions particulieres aux iravailleurs
frontaliers et aux travailleurs saisonniers, figu¬
rant dans une convention de sicurite sociale ;
(d) les dispositions des conventions de security so¬
ciale qui, en vcrtu de la derniere phrase du para-
graphe (4) de I'article 4 du present rbglement
restent applicables aux travailleurs frontaliers
et aux travailleurs saisonniers ;
ont ete abroges par l'article 4 du reglement n° 36/63/
CEE du Conseil du 2 avril 1963 — JO n° 62 du
20 avril 1963.
Cette abrogation a pris effet le ler fevrier 1964 (cf.
article 26 du reglement n° 36/63/CEE precite et
article 4 du,reglement n° 3/64/CEE du Conseil du
18 d6cembre 1963 — JO n° 5 du 17 janvier 1964).
Article 7
(1) Deux ou plusieurs Etats niembres peuvent
conclure entre eux, en tant que de besoin, des con¬
ventions fondees sur les principes et l'esprit du
present reglement.
(2) Chaque Etat membre notifiera, conformement
aux dispositions du paragraphe (1) de l'article 54
du present reglement, toute convention conclue
entre lui et un autre Etat membre en vertu du para¬
graphe precedent.
Article 8
Les personnes qui resident sur le territoire de
l'un des Etats membres et auxquelles les disposi¬
tions du present reglement sont applicables, sont
soumises aux obligations et sont admises au bene¬
fice de la legislation de securite sociale de tout Etat
membre dans les mernes conditions que les ressor-
tissants de celui-ci.
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Article 9
(1) En vue de l'admission a l'assurance obliga-
toire, volontaire ou facultative continuee confor-
mement a la legislation de l'Etat membre sur le
territoire duquel 1'interesse reside, les periodes
d'assurance et les periodes assimilees accomplies
en vertu des legislations des autres Etats membres
sont prises en compte, dans la mesure ou cela est
necessaire, comme periodes d'assurance accomplies
en vertu de la legislation du premier Etat.
(2) Les dispositions du paragraphe precedent ne
sont applicables qu'aux travailleurs salaries ou
assimiles qui ne peuvent beneficier de l'assurance
obligatoire en raison de la legislation du pays d'em-
ploi.
Article 10
(1) Les pensions ou rentes et les allocations au
deces acquises en vertu des legislations de l'un ou
de plusieurs des Etats membres ne peuvent subir
aucune reduction, ni modification, ni suspension,
ni suppression, ni confiscation du fait que le benefi-
ciaire reside sur le territoire d'un Etat membre
autre que celui oil se trouve 1'institution debitrice.
(2) Toutefois, les dispositions du paragraphe pre¬
cedent ne sont pas applicables aux prestations enu-
merees ci-apres, dans la mesure ou celles-ci sont
inscrites dans 1'annexe E du present reglement:
(a) Les avantages"speciaux de l'assurance vieil-
lesse, accordes aux travailleurs dont l'age etait trop
eleve au moment de l'entree en vigueur de la legis¬
lation applicable ;
(b) les prestations transitoires au titre d'un
regime non contributif en faveur des personnes
qui ne peuvent plus beneficier des prestations nor-
males de securite sociale a cause de leur age avance ;
(c) les prestations d'assistance speciale au titre
d'un regime non contributif en faveur de certaines
categories de personnes qui sont incapables de
gagner leur vie a cause de leur etat de sante.
(3) Apres avis conforme de la Commission admi¬
nistrative visee a 1'article 43 du present regiernent,
chaque Etat membre notifiera, conformement aux
dispositions du paragraphe (1) de 1'article 54 du pre¬
sent reglement, tout amendement qui doit etre
apporte a 1 annexe E Cette notification sera effec-
tuee dans un delai de trois mois a partir de la pu¬
blication de ladite legislation.
Article 11
(1) Sauf en ce qui concerne l'assurance vieillesse-
deces (pensions), d'une part, et l'assurance invalidi-
te lorsqu'elle donne lieu a repartition de la charge
entre les institutions de deux ou de plusieurs Etats
membres, d'autre part, les dispositions du present
reglement ne peuvent conferer ni maintenir le droit
de beneficier, en vertu des legislations des Etats
membres, de plusieurs prestations de meme nature
ou de plusieurs prestations se rapportant a une
periode d'assurance ou periode assimilee.
(2) Les clauses de reduction ou de suspension pre-
vues par la legislation d'un Etat membre, en cas de
cumul d'une prestation avec d'autres prestations
de securite sociale ou avec d'autres revenus, ou du
fait de l'exercice d'un emploi, sont opposables au
beneficiaire, meme s'il s'agit de prestations acquises
sous un regime d'un autre Etat membre ou s'il
s'agit de revenus obtenus, ou d'un emploi exerce,
sur le territoire d'un autre Etat membre. Toute¬
fois, cette regie n'est pas applicable aux cas ou des
prestations de meme nature sont acquises con¬






Sous reserve des dispositions du present titre,
les travailleurs salaries ou assimiles occupes sur le
territoire d'un Etat membre sont soumis a la legis¬
lation de cet Etat, meme s'ils resident sur le terri¬
toire d'un autre Etat membre ou si leur employeur
ou le siege de 1'entreprise qui les occupe se trouve
sur le territoire d'un autre Etat membre.
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sont a la charge de cette institution si 1'une des ins¬
titutions debitrices de la pension ou de la rente se
trouve sur le territoire du pays ou le titulaire ou le
membre de sa famille beneficie des prestations en
nature. Sinon, elles restent a la charge de l'institu-
tion telle qu'elle est precisee par les dispositions de
la derniere phrase du paragraphe (1) ou par les
dispositions du paragraphe (3) du present article ;
dans ce cas, les dispositions du paragraphe (5)
de l'article 19 du present reglement sont applicables
par analogie.
(7) Si la legislation d'un Etat membre prevoit
des retenues de cotisation a la charge du titulaire
de la pension ou de la rente, pour la couverture des
prestations en nature, l'institution debitrice de la
pension ou de la rente, a la charge de laquelle se
trouvent les prestations en nature, est autorisee a
operer ces retenues dans les cas vises par le present
article.
Article 23
(1) *) Les prestations en nature servies en vertu
des dispositions des paragraphes (1), (2), (7) et (9)
de l'article 19, des paragraphes (1)**) et (6) de
l'article 20, des paragraphes (2), (3) et (5) et de la
derniere phrase du paragraphe (C) de l'article 22
du present reglement font l'objet d'un rembourse-
ment aux institutions qui les ont servies.
(2) *) En ce qui concerne les prestations en nature
servies dans les cas vises a Particle 19, au paragra¬
phe (G) de l'article 20, aux paragraphes (2) et (3) et
a la derniere phrase du paragraphe (G) de l'article 22,
l'institution competente est tenue de rembourser
le montant desdites prestations.
(3) *) En ce qui concerne les prestations en nature
servies aux membres de la famille vises au para¬
graphe (1)**) de l'article 20 et au paragraphe (5)
de l'article 22, l'institution competente est tenue
de rembourser -des montants equivalant aux trois
quarts des depenses afferentes auxdites prestations.
(4) Le remboursement est determine et effectue
suivant les modalites a fixer par la Commission
administrative.
(5) Les autorites competentes de deux ou de plu-
sieurs Etatsmembres peuvent convenir, notamment
dans un souci de simplification, qu'aucun rembour¬




*) Les paragraphes (1) a (3) remplacent (cf. article
2 du reglement ri° 73/63/CEE du Conseil du 11
juillet 1963 — JO n° 112 du 24 juillet 1963 — cf.
egaleinent observation au sujet de l'article pre¬
mier alinea (1) ) le texte initial redig6 comme
suit:
(1) Les prestations en nature servies en vertu des
dispositions des paragraphes (1), (2) et (7) de
1'article 19, du paragraphe (1) de I'article 20, des
paragraphes (2), (3) et (5) et de la dernihe
phrase du paragraphe (6) de I'article 22 du pre¬
sent reglement font I'objet d'un remboursement aux
institutions qui les ont servies.
(2) En ce qui concerne les prestations en nature
servies dans les cas visis-d I'article 19, aux para¬
graphes (2), (3) et a la derniere phrase du para¬
graphe (G) de I'article 22, I'institution competente
est tenue de rembourser le montant desdites presta¬
tions.
(3) En ce qui concerne les prestations en nature
servies aux membres de la famille visis au para¬
graphe (1) de 1'article 20, et au paragraphe (5)
de 1'article 22, I'institution competente est tenue de
rembourser des montants iquivalar.t aux trois-
quarts des depenses afferentes auxdites prestations.
Cette modification a pris effet le ler f6vrier 1964
(cf. article 15 du reglement n° 73/63/CEE precit6
et article 3 du reglement n° 2/64/CEE du Conseil
du 18 decembre 1963 — JO n° 5 du 17 ianvier
1964).
* *) La reference au paragraphe (3) de l'article 20 a
etc supprimee avec effet au ler septembre 1964
par Particle premier du reglement n° 108/64/CEE





(1) Les prestations auxquelles un assure peut
pretendre sont liquidees conformement aux dispo¬
sitions des articles suivants selon que l'assure
a accompli des periodes :
(a) exc.lusivement en vertu de legislations du
type A d'apres lesquelles les prestations en cas
d'invalidite sont calculees, en princ.ipe, indepen-
damment de la duree des periodes accomplies,
(b) exclusivement en vertu de legislations du
type B, d'apres lesqueiles les prestations en cas
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d'invalidite sont calculees, en principe, compte tenu
de la duree des periodes accomplies,
(c) en vertu de legislations du type A et du
type B.
(2) L'annexe F du present reglement precise, en
ce qui concerne chaque Etat membre, les legisla¬
tions du type A et celles du type B qui sont en vi-
gueur sur tout ou partie de son territoire a la date
de l'adoption du present reglement. Chaque Etat
membre notifiera, conformement aux dispositions
du paragraphe (1) de l'article 54 du present regle¬
ment, tout amendement qui doit etre apporte a
l'annexe F par suite d'une nouvelle legislation.
Cette notification sera effectuee dans un delai de
trois mois a dater de la publication de ladite legis¬
lation.
Article 25
Dans les cas vises a 1'alinea (a) du paragraphe (1)
de l'article 24, les conventions de securite sociale
peuvent comporter des dispositions particulieres
differentes des regies fixees par l'article 26 du pre¬
sent reglement .
Article 26
(1) Dans les cas autres que ceux vises a l'article 25
du present reglement, les dispositions du chapitre 3
ci-apres sont applicables par analogic.
(2) Lorsque, dans un Dtat membre, l'assurance-
invaliditd est entree en vigueur posterieurement a
l'assurance-vieillesse, les periodes d'assurance- vieil-
lesse et les periodes assimilees accomplies selon la
legislation dudit- Etat membre sont retenues fic-
tivement comme periodes accomplies dans l'assu-
rance-invalidite du meme pays, qu'il s'agisse de
periodes accomplies avant ou apres l'entree en vi¬
gueur de 1'assurance-invalidite.
(3) Si, apres suspension de la pension ou de i'in-
demnite d'invalidite, l'assure recouvre son droit,
le service des prestations est repris par l'organisme
debiteur de la pension ou de l'indemnite primitive-
ment accordee. Si, apres une suppression de la
pension ou de l'indemnite d'invalidite, l'etat de
l'assure justifie l'octroi d'une pension ou d'une
indemnite d'invalidite, cellcs-ci sont liquidees sui-
vant les regies qui auraient ete applicables si au-
cune pension ou indemnite n'avait cte accordee
anterieurement.
(4) Si, d'apres la legislation de l'un des Etats
membres, le montant de la prestation varie avec
le nombre des membres de la famille, l'institution
qui determine cette prestation prend egalement en
compte, en vue de son calcul, le nombre des mem¬
bres de la famille residant sur le territoire d'un
Etat membre autre que celui ou se trouve ladite
institution.
(5) La prestation est transformee, le cas echeant,
en pension de vieillesse, dans les conditions prevues
par la legislation en vertu de laquelle elle a ete
accordee et conformement aux dispositions du
chapitre 3 ci-apres.
Chapitre 3
Vieillesse et deces (pensions)
Article 27
(1) En vue de 1'acquisition, du maintien ou du
recouvrement du droit aux prestations, lorsqu'un
assure a ete soumis successivement ou alternative-
ment a la legislation de deux ou piusieurs Etats
membres, les periodes d'assurance et les periodes
assimilees accomplies en vertu de la legislation de
chacun des Etats membres sont totalisees pour au-
tant qu'elles ne se superposent pas.
(2) Lorsque la legislation d'un Etat membre
subordonne l'octroi de certaines prestations a la
condition que les periodes d'assurance aient ete
accomplies dans une profession soumise a un regime
special, seules sont totalisees pour l'admission au
benefice de ces prestations, les periodes accomplies
en vertu des regimes correspondants des autres
Etats membres et les periodes accomplies dans la
meme profession en vertu d'autres regimes desdits
Etats membres, pour autant qu'elles ne se super¬
posent 'pas. Si, nonobstant la totalisation desdites
periodes, l'assure ne remplit pas les conditions lui
permettant de beneficier desdites prestations, les
pdrodes dont il s'agit sont egalement totalisees
pour l'admission au benefice des prestations du
regime general de ces Etats membres.
Article 28
(1) Les prestations auxquelles un assure vise a
l'article 27 du present reglement ou ses survivants
peuvent pretendre en vertu des legislations des
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Etats membres selon lesquelles 1'assure a accompli
des periodes d'assurance ou des periodes assimilees
sont liquidees de la maniere suivante :
reserve des modalites qui pourront etre fix^es par
un reglement ulterieur afin d'dviter toute double
revalorisation ;
(a) L'institution de chacun de ces Etats mem¬
bres determine, d'apres sa propre legislation, si
l'interesse reunit les conditions requises pour avoir
droit aux prestations prevues par cette legislation,
compte tenu de la totalisation des periodes visee
a l'article precedent;
(b) si le droit est acquis en vertu de 1'alinea pre¬
cedent, ladite institution determine, pour ordre, le
montant de la prestation a laquelle l'interesse au-
rait droit si toutes les periodes d'assurance ou pe¬
riodes assimilees, totalisees suivant les modalites
visees a l'article precedent, avaient ete accomplies
exclusivement sous sa propre legislation; sur la base
dudit montant, l'institution fixe le montant du
au prorata de la duree des periodes accomplies sous
ladite legislation avant la realisation du risque par
rapport a la duree totale des periodes accomplies
sous les legislations de tousles Etats membres inte-
ressfe avant la realisation du risque ; ce montant
constitue la prestation due a l'interesse par l'insti¬
tution dont il s'agit;
(c) s'il resulte de la legislation de l'un des fitats
membres que le calcul des prestations repose sur un
salaire moyen, une cotisation moyenne, ou une
majoration moyenne, ou sur la relation ayant existe,
pendant les periodes de cotisation accomplies, entre
le salaire brut de l'interesse et la moyenne des sa-
laires bruts de tous les assures a l'exclusion des
apprentis, ces moyennes ou ces chiffres propor-
tionnels sont determines pourle calcul desprestations
a la charge de 1 'institution de cet Etat, compte tenu
des seules periodes d'assurance et periodes assimi¬
lees accomplies en vertu de la legislation dudit Etat
membre, ou compte tenu du salaire brut de l'inte¬
resse afferent a ces periodes. Si, selon la legislation
d'un des Etats membres, les prestations sont cal-
culees par rapport au montant des salaires gagnes
ou des cotisations versees, les salaires ou les coti-
sations concernant les periodes d'assurance accom¬
plies en vertu des regimes des autres Etats membres
sont pris en consideration, par l'institution qui de¬
termine les prestations, sur la base de la moyennc
des salaires ou des cotisations constatees pour les
periodes d'assurance accomplies en vertu de son
propre regime. Dans chaque legislation sont prises
en consideration les regies de revalorisation, sous
(d) si, d'apres la legislation de l'un des Etats
membres, le montant de la prestation varie avec le
nombre des membres de la famille, l'institution qui
determine cette prestation prend en compte, en vue
de son calcul, le nombre des membres de la famille
residant sur le territoire d'un Etat membre autre
que celui ou se trouve ladite institution ;
(e) si l'interesse, compte tenu de la totalisation
des periodes visee a l'article precedent, ne remplit
pas, a un moment donne, les conditions exigdes par
toutes les legislations qui lui sont applicables, mais
satisfait seulement aux conditions de l'une ou de
plusieurs d'entre elles, le montant de la prestation
est determine conformement aux dispositions de
l'alinea (b) du present paragraphe ; toutcfois, si le
droit est ainsi ouvert au regard de deux legislations
au moins et s'il n'est pas necessaire de faire appel
aux periodes accomplies sous les legislations dont
les conditions ne sont pas remplies, ces periodes ne
sont pas prises en consideration pour l'application
des dispositions de l'alinea (b) du present para¬
graphe ;
(f) si 1'interesse ne remplit pas, a un moment
donne, les conditions exigees par toutes les legisla¬
tions qui lui sont applicables, mais satisfait aux
conditions d'une seule d'entre elles, sans qu'il soit
necessaire de faire appel aux periodes accomplies
sous une ou plusieurs des autres legislations, le
montant de la prestation est determine en vertu
de la seule legislation au regard de laquelle le droit
est ouvert et compte tenu des seules periodes ac¬
complies sous cette legislation ;
(g) dans les cas vises aux alineas (e) et (f) du
present paragraphe, les prestations deja liquidees
sont revisees conformement aux dispositions de
l'alinea (b) du present paragraphe au fur et a mesure
que les conditions exigees par une ou plusieurs des
autres legislations sont satisfaites, compte tenu de
la totalisation des periodes visee a l'article prece¬
dent.
(2) Un reglement ulterieur fixera les modalites
d'application du paragraphe (1) du present article,
notamment celles relatives au maintien des droits
du beneficiaire d'une pension, accordee en vertu
d'une legislation, au regard d'une autre legislation
pour laquelle des droits ne sont pas encore ouverts.
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(3) Si le montant de la prestation a laquelle l'in-
teresse peut pretendre sans application des dispo¬
sitions de l'article 27, pour les seules periodes d'assu-
rance et periodes assimilees accomplies en vertu de
la legislation d'un Etat membre, est superieur au
total des prestations resultant de l'application des
paragraphes precedents du present article, il a droit,
de la part de l'institution de cet Etat, a un comple¬
ment egal a la difference. Si l'interesse a droit a des
complements de la part des institutions de deux ou
de plusieurs Etats membres, il ne beneficie que du
complement le plus eleve. La charge de ce comple¬
ment est repartie entre les institutions desdits £tats
en tenant compte des complements que chacune
d'elles aurait du servir1; les modalites de cette re¬
partition seront fixees par un reglement ulterieur.
(4) Sous reserve de la disposition de l'alinea (f)
du paragraphe (1) du present article, les interesses
qui peuvent se prevaloir des dispositions du pre¬
sent chapitre ne peuvent pretendre au benefice d'une
pension en vertu des seules dispositions de la legisla¬
tion d'un Etat membre.
Chapitre 4
Accidents du travail et maladies professionnelles
Article 29
(1) *) Tout travailleur salarie ou assimile devenu
victime d'un accident du travail ou d'une maladie
professionnelle beneficie, lorsqu'il se trouve sur le
territoire d'un Etat membre autre que le pays com¬
petent, des prestations en nature servies par l'ins-
titution du lieu de residence ou de sejour a la charge
de 1'institution competente.
En cas de transfert de residence, le travailleur
admis au benefice des prestations a charge d'une
institution d'un des Etats membres doit, avant le
transfert, obtenir l'autorisation de cette institution,
laquelle tient dument compte desmotifs de ce trans¬
fert. Cette autorisation est egalement necessaire
pour le travailleur qui va se faire soigner sur le terri¬
toire d'un Etat membre autre que le pays compe¬
tent sans pour autant y transferer sa residence, ainsi
que pour le travailleur saisonnier qui rentre se faire
soigner sur le territoire de l'Etat membre ou il a
sa residence.
(2) En ce qui concerne l'etendue, la duree et les
modalites du service des prestations en nature qui
sont servies dans les cas vises au paragraphe prece¬
dent, les dispositions des paragraphes (3), (4) et (5)
de 1'article 19 du present reglement sont applicables
par analogie.
(3) Dans le cas ou il n'existe pas d'assurance acci¬
dents du travail ou maladies professionnelles sur le
territoire de 1'Etat membre dans lequel le travail¬
leur se trouve, ou lorsqu'une telle assurance existe
mais ne prevoit pas d'institutions pour le service
des prestations en nature, celles-ci sont servies par
l'institution du lieu de sejour ou de residence res-
ponsable pour le service des prestations en nature
en cas de maladie.
(4) Si une legislation subordonne la gratuite com¬
plete des prestations en nature a l'utilisation, par le
beneficiaire, du service medical organise par l'em-
ploveur, les prestations en nature accordees con-
formement aux paragraphes precedents du present
article sont considerees comme avant ete servies
par un tel service medical.
(5) Si le regime de la reparation des accidents du
travail du pays competent n'a pas le caractere d'une
assurance obligatoire, le service des prestations en
nature, suivant les dispositions des paragraphes pre¬
cedents du present article, est repute ctre effectue a
la demande de l'institution competente.
(6) Les prestations en nature servies dans les cas
vises au paragraphe (1) du present article font l'ob-
jet d'un remboursement aux institutions qui les ont
servies, conformement aux dispositions des para¬
graphes (2), (4) et (5) de l'article 23 du present regle¬
ment.
(7) Dans les cas vises au paragraphe (1) du pre¬
sent article, les prestations en especes sont servies
a la charge de 1'institution competente, conforme¬
ment a la legislation qui lui est applicable, et sui¬
vant les modalites a fixer, eventuellement d'un com-
mun accord, par les autorites competentes des Etats
membres interesses.
(8) **) Lorsque la legislation d'un Etat membre
prevoit la prise en charge des frais de transport de
la victime soit jusqu'a son lieu de residence, soit
jusqu'a l'etablissement hospitalier, et lorsque la
victime est un travailleur saisonnier, les frais deson
transport jusqu'a son lieu de residence ou un eta-
blissement hospitalier sur le territoire d'un autre
Etat membre sont pris en charge sous reserve de
l'autorisation de l'institution competente, laquelle
tient dument compte des motifs de ce transport;
ces frais sont assumes par cette institution suivant
les dispositions de la legislation qu'elle applique.
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cle premier paragraphc (2) du reglement n° 73/63/
CEE du Conseil du 11 jnillet 1963 — JO n° 112 du
24 juillet 1963.
Cettc suppression a pris cffet le 1" fevrier 1964
(of. article 15 du reglement n° 73/63/CEE precite
et article 3 du reglement n° 2/64/CEE du Conseil
du 18 decembre 1963 — JO n° 5 du 17 janvier
1964).
Article 51
Le recouvrement des cotisations dues a une ins¬
titution de l'un des Etats membres peut se faire
sur le territoire d'un autre Etat membre, suivant
la procedure administrative et avec garanties et
privileges applicables au recouvrement des cotisa¬
tions dues a une institution correspondante de ce
dernier Etat. L'application de cette disposition fera
l'objet d'accords biiateraux qui pourront egalement
concerner la procedure judiciaire du recouvrement.
Article 52
Si une personne qui beneficie de prestations en
vertu de la legislation d'un Etat membre pour un
dommage survenu sur le territoire d'un autre Etat
a, sur le territoire de ce deuxieme Etat, le droit de
reclamer a un tiers la reparation de ce dommage,
les droits eventuels de l'institution debitrice a l'en-
contre du tiers sont regies comme suit :
(a) lorsque institution debitrice est subrogee,
en vertu de la legislation qui lui est applicable,
dans les droits que le beneficiaire detient a l'egard
du tiers, chaque Etat membre reconnait une telle
subrogation ;
(b) lorsque institution debitrice a un droit
direct contre le tiers, chaque Etat membre recon¬
nait ce droit.
L'application de ces dispositions fera l'objet
d'accords biiateraux.
TITRE V
DISPOSITIONS TRANSITOIRES ET FINALES
Article 53
(1) Le present reglement n'ouvre aucun droit
au paiement de prestations pour une pariode ante-
rieure a la date de son entree en vigueur.
(2) Toute periode d'assurance ou periode assi-
milee, ainsi que, le cas echeant, toute periode d'em-
ploi ou periode assimilee ou toute periode de resi¬
dence accomplie en vertu de la legislation d'un Etat
membre avant la date d'entree en vigueur du pre¬
sent reglement est prise en consideration pour la
determination du droit aux prestations s'ouvrant
conformement aux dispositions du present reglement.
(3) Sous reserve des dispositions du paragraphe
(1) du present article, une prestation est due en
vertu du present reglement, meme si elle se rapporte
a un evenement anterieur a la date de son entree
en vigueur. A cet effet, toute prestation qui n'a
pas ete liquidee ou qui a ete suspendue a cause de
la nationality de 1'interesse ou en raison de sa re¬
sidence sur le territoire d'un Etat membre autre
que celui oil se trouve 1'institution debitrice, sera,
a la demande de l'interesse, liquidee ou retablie
a partir de l'entree en vigueur du present reglement
sous reserve que les droits anterieurement liquides
n'aient pas donne lieu a un reglement en capital.
(4) Les droits des interesses ayant obtenu, ante¬
rieurement a l'entree en vigueur du present regle¬
ment, la liquidation d'une pension ou rente, pour¬
ront etre revises a leur demande. La revision aura
pour effet d'accorder aux beneficiaires, a partir
de l'entree en vigueur du present reglement, les
memes droits que si le reglement avait ete en vigueur
au moment de la liquidation. La demande de re¬
vision doit etre introduite dans un delai de deux
ans a compter de 1'entree en vigueur du present
reglement.
(5) Quant au droit resultant de 1'application des
paragraphes (3) et (4) du present article, les dis¬
positions prevues par les legislations des Etats
membres en ce qui concerne la decheance et la
prescription des droits ne sonf pas opposables aux
interesses, si la demande visee aux paragraphes
(3) et (4) du present article est presentee dans un
delai de deux ans a compter de l'entrce en vigueur
du present reglement. Si la demande est presentee
apres l'expiration de ce delai, le droit aux prestations
qui n'cst pas frappe de decheance ou qui n'est pas
prescrit est acquis a partir de la date de la demande
a moins que les disposition's plus favorables de la
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(8) Jusqu'a l'entree en vigueur du reglement
prevu au paragraphe (6) de l'article 4 du present
reglement, les dispositions des conventions de secu¬
rity sociale existantes, en ce qui concerne les gens
de mer, restent applicables.
Observations
(Article 53)
*) Les paragraphes (6) et (7) rediges comme suit :
(6) Le ddlai prevu a I'article 20 paragraphe (2)
et repris par le paragraphe (5) de I'article 40 du
prdsent reglement, court a partir de 1'entree en vigueur
de celui-ci pour les travailleurs qui sont occupes a
cette date.
(7) Pour les travailleurs italiens occupds en France
a, la date de I'entree en vigueur du present reglement
les autoritds competentes franqaises et italiennes
rdgleront, d'un commun accord, les modalites d'adap¬
tation des dispositions du paragraphe (5) de I'article
40 du present reglement, dans la mesure oil elles se
rdfdrent au paragraphe (2) de I'article 20, d la situa¬
tion ddcoulant d'accords antdrieurs.
ont ete abroges avec effet au 1" septembre 1904
par l'article premier du reglement n° 108/64/CEE
du Conseil du 30 juillet 1904 — JO n° 127 du 7
aofit 1904.
(2) Le president du Conseil notifiera a la Commis¬
sion de la Communaute cconomique europeenne, a
la Haute Autorite de la Communaute europeenne
du charbon et de l'acier et aux Etats membres,
toute notification re^ue en application du para¬
graphe (1) du present article.
Article 55
Un reglement fixera les modalites d'applica-
tion du present reglement.
Article 56 *)
Le present reglement entrera en vigueur le
ler janvier 1959 ; toutefois, les dispositions des ar¬
ticles 43 et 44 entreront en vigueur le troisieme




(1) Les notifications a faire en application des
dispositions du paragraphe (2) de l'article 3, du
paragraphe (3) de l'article 6, du paragraphe (2) de
l'article 7, du paragraphe (3) de l'article 10, du para¬
graphe (2) de l'article 24 et du paragraphe (3) de
1'article 36 du present reglement seront adressees
au president du Conseil de la Communaute econo-
mique europeenne.
*) Ce texte remplace avec effet au 16 decembre 1958
(cf. article 88 du reglement n° 4 du 3 decembre
1958 — JO n° 30 du 10 decembre 1958) le texte
initial redige comme suit :
Le present reglement entrera en vigueur le 1"
octobre 1958.
Toutefois, les dispositions des articles 43 et 44
entreront en vigueur le vingtieme jour suivant la
publication du present reglement.
Le present reglement est obligatoire dans tous ses elements et directement



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Zahl dcr Einwandcrer (travailleurs pcrmanents)
nach Jahr und Nationalitaton in Frankreich
Jahr Spanier Italiener Marokkaner Portugiesen Tunesiet Jugoslawen Insgesamt
1996 27 831 1 439
_ 30 171
1949 _ 36 889 - -
- — 58 702
1950 650 6 083 72
- — 10 925




1955 2 204 14 246 - 949
- - 19 029
1956 8 823 52 782 - 1 432 - - 65 428
1957 23 096 80 385 - 4 160
- — 111 693
1961 39 623 23 808 3 924 6 716
- 78 927
1962 63 535 21 516 8 626 12916
- 490 113 069
1964 66 269 11 393 17 502 43 751 2 730 3 947 153 731
1965 ^ 49 865 18 043 15 494 47 330 5 776 6 656 152 063
1966 33 448 13 379 14 331 44 916 6 631 10 035 131 725
196B 23 847 6 498 19 335 80 829 14 925 11 270 167 802
Insges. 475 580 576 980 123 872 347 513 42 705 52 066 . 1 792 038
Sources Nikolinakos (1B73), p.31.
TABLE 2 'T."
IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, AND
BRITAIN BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (THOUSANDS)
































* "3 nil 231
43 116 142 301
47 5d 34 '3'
3 '43 43 30 219
to 104 '7 '3'
480 54 6 54°
617 246 98 35 996
612 574 533 102 1,820
52 5'5 21 '3 601














Mote: In the caie ofBritain, the figures are for persona with birthplaces outside the
United Kingdom. In tho oilier countries, the figures aro for persons of foreign
nutlnnnllili's,
" " "-"""imui.'i in— i.i. n-if i.» fmmemrmmemrftff
• -tt'
. y-'.',
Source: Castles and Xosack (1973), p.5.
TABLE3









































































































































































































(AQuote-Auslindenquote;nt ilderbeschiftigt na slindischerbe tnehm r GesamtzahlderbeschiftigtenArbeitnehmeriBRD) Source:Geiselbe ger(1973),p.:6.
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TABLE4
Number of newly entering foreign workers (first row), the pro¬
portion of recruited new entrants (in brackets), and number of
employed foreign workers at mid-year (second row), in the Federal
Republic of Germany, by nationality, in thousands.
195 8 3 1959 I960 1901 1962 1953 mi 1965 1%6 1967 19f.8b 1959b mob
Mglt* 0.5 0.7 7.1 3.6 3.8 7.7 2.1 .1,6 7.9 7.9 0.8 0.9 7.0'
7.0 2.3 7.7 4.9 M 6.7 6.7 6.0 7.3 f.J 6.2 7.1 0,7
Fr*te 1.? 2.6 6.5 10.8 10.2 9.8 19.9 V.,6 13.2 7.8 0.1 6.2 0.0'
3.1 6.8 9.) 14.5 19.4 20.1 21.1 25.0 29.3 23.6 74.2 28.7 36.2
Half 19.5 47.5 141.3 165.8 165.3 134.9 142.1 20s. 3 165.5 58.5 130.2 136.2 168.3C
(I rtcr.) (50) (59) (66) (65) (40) (24) (19) (D) (8) (7) (8) (8) (»)C
25.6 48.8 121,7 207.7 266.0 299.2 269.3 359.8 399.2 274.3 287.4 340.2 375.0
Luxbg, 0.05 0.C5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 o"7
0.5 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2
Netherld. 3.3 7.9 16.5 28.5 29.3 27.4 25.2 22.9 15.7 6.9 3.4 3.9 8.46
?3.1 29.7 33.5 44.7 52.9 53.1 60.4 59.6 58.5 44.9 *4.7 49.9 55.5
etc 29.5 53.7 166.6 203.8 200.5 175.0 131.2 246.5 197.4 75.4 139.7 1*7.a 187.0C
60.0 86.2 167.9 272.5 345.4 385.0 373.4 452.7 495.3 3*9.7 363.5 *26.9 *77.5
Greece 1.5 2.5 23.4 36.6 47.5 58.0 65.1 61.8 39.7 7.6 37.3 65.1 64.0
(1 r,cr.) - - (41) (58) (67) (70) (62) (54) (68) (26) (55) (79) (78)
2.8 4.1 13.0 4*.8 69.1 106.2 143.9 161.7 196.2 146.3 136.2 174.3 229.4
TurVey _ _ _
I
I 7.1 15.3 27.9 62.9 59.8 43.5 14.8 62.4 121.5 123.6
(* rtcr.) - - . . (3D (72) (94) («7) (76) (75) (49) (67) (ei) (77)
- - 2.5 5.2 15.3 27.1 69.2 121.1 158.0 137.1 139.3 213.0 328.9
Ui»W. Klngd, 1.1 1.5 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.7 3.6 4.5 *.7 3.7 4.1 4.8 5.9
?.o 2.6 3.2 *.1 5.1 6.1 6.7 7.5 8.8 3.6 9.1 10.9 13.3
Tugoil. 3.* 4.2 «.4 10.0 25.1 19.4 17.5 31.0 50.9 15.4 76.8 192.2 202.4
(J recr.) - - • - - - - - - - - (35) (53)
4.8 7.3 8.8 12.9 23.6 44.4 53.1 64.1 So. 7 97.7 99.7 226.3 389.0
Spain 1.2 1.9 26.7 51.2 55.0 51.7 65.9 65.1 38.5 7.3 32.0 50.1 43.8
(* rtcr.) - - (41) (53) (66) (58) (63) (62) (69) (42) (73) (84) (83)
1.5 2.2 9.5 43.4 87.3 117.5 14*.3 180.6 185.3 129.1 112.0 135.5 105.9
Portugal _ . _ 0.9 1.0 1.5 3.9 11.1 9.2 1.8 6.7 13.2 20.1
(* rtcr.,) . - . . - . (50 (74) (60) (46) (70) (P6) (90)
- - 0.3 0.7 1.4 2.2 3.5 10.5 19.8 18.5 18.7 <6.4 *0.2-
Extra-£ur, J. 4 5.0 8.9 15.7 17.0 15.0 14.2 15.0 13.6 8.6 10.7 15.1 24.7
4.1 5.5 9.9 16.5 26.7 35.5 *1.6 47.8 50.2 43.9 44.3 *9.0 61.1
Other 14.5 15.5 27.4 27.6 24.0 25.3 28.0 30.1 27.2 16.8 21.2 36.7 37.4
51.9 55.9 64.3 106.3 81.6 87.2 92.2 03.3 103.7 92.3 92.0 109.8 134.5
CVERJSll 54.6 85.3 259.5 360.5 390.5 377.5 *42.3 524.9 4?*.8 151.9 393.9 6*6.1 713.0
(* rtcr.) (18) (30) (43) (43) (39) (35) (38) (29) (25) (11) (27) (43) (*5)
127.1 155.8 279.4 507.4 655.5 811.2 932.9 1,164,4 1,314.0 1,023.7 1,014.0 1,372.1 1,833.9
J to»en 15* 15* 12* 15* 19* 22* 21* 25* 291 35* 23* 25* 25*
- 19* 15* 14* 18* 21* 22* 23* 25* 29* 30* 29* 29*
i etp'eei 0.6* 0.8* 1.3* 2.31 3.01 3.61 4/1 5.0* C.11 4.9* 4.9* 6.4* 0.5*
- ■= Not available or not applicable. a = Excluding Saar.
b => New entrants excluding frontier workers (21,400 in 1968; 29,200 in 1969;
8,600 in 1970). c = Estimated.
~
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i960 266-3 61 1-0
1961 315-6 6-8 l*i
1962 343-6 6-3 pi
1963 331-0 4*7 o-g
1964 301-7 47 o-8
Greece
i960 99-i I9'0 '3'7
1961 107-2 18-3 )3-41962 153-3 23-3 4"7
1963 '4i-5 18-9 ' 3-9
1964 123-7 14-0 3-o
>965 134-6 131 n.a.
Spain
i960 63-8 9-1 0-7
1961
_ i'9-3 11-4 J 1-2
1962 164-0 "•3 i-4
1963 272-0 '5-' 2-0
1964 335-0 15-7 2-1
" ' ?-/' ■
Source: Castles & Kosack (1973), p.417
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TABLE 7 ✓ '
ld"lnanzlcllc Auswirktinr.cn tier rwcircHlp.cn Abkommrn (ibcr Sozlal-
'
VClsidtcrung und dcr KVVG-Vcrordnungcn Nr. 3 und 4 Ubcr die soziale Sidtcr-
bci! dcr Wandcrarbeilnchmer Int Jaltre 1969 (Auszug Anwcrbcliindcr, fUr Jugo-
tlawicn vom 1. 9. bis .31. la. 1969)
j. Zcile: Rentenlclstungen Znblungen dcr BRD in den Vcrtragsstnat
a. Zcile t Zahlunp.cn dcr Vcrlrnp/stnatcn an die BRD
3. Zcile: NcnoicHiunp.cn dcr BR!) an die Verlragsstnntcn
4. Zcile: Krankcnvcnddtcrung von ami. Vcmldicrungstriigrrn tibcrsnndte Ko-











Zahlungcn an ausl. VcrsUherungslrngcr - in den
angcgcbcncn Zflhlcn find Urstnttungcn fur Kosten-
rcdinungcn dc$ Bcriditsjahrs und fiir fruhcre
Jahrc cnthaltcn
an ausl. Vcrsidicrungstrager iibersandlc Kostcn-
rcchnungcn
Zahlungcn dcr ausl. Vcrsidtcrungstragcr a. d. BRD
Ncttoleistungcn dcr BRD an die Vcrtragsstaatcn
Unfallversidterung Rcntcn-, Sacn- u. Barlcistungcn bci Hcilbchand-
lung - Lcislungen dcr BRD an die Vcrtragsstaatcn
Lcistungcn dcr Vcrtragsslaatcn an die BRD
Ncttolcistungcn dcr BRD an die Vcrtragsslaatcn
Sozialvcrsichcrung Lcistungcn dcr BRD abzuglich dcr Zahlungcn def
Vertragsstaatcn
Anzahl dcr in dcr BRD besdiaftigten ausl. Arbcitnchmcr iin Juli 1069
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Source: Geiselberger (1973), pp. 104-5.
TABLE8
j —£.






































































































DurchschnittlicheZahlderRente berechtigtenjMonat.4 ZahlderFallenochi termittelt;b id nBetragenhand ltess chumvorlauficeSchatz ng nerRe en-versicnerungstrager. Source:alowsky(1972),p.19
TABLL9
-■-——,,■• —-■*■—saiAi
FinanzielleAuswirkungenderzw iseitig r.A'ckc—enlib rSozialversicherungu ddEWG-Veror nungen Nr.3und4iiberdi9rrealsSicherheitd rWa.rde arb itnehmer t±-Jsiire1969 Rentenversicherurgen-Zahlun nidVertragsstaat-
Vertrags- staat











































































































































































































































































































DieMehrzahld rV rsicherungstragertdieurnhs: derRentenamJahres ndeang geben.




Preatitione en nature servios aux families (families de travailleurs, pensionnds et leurs families)





BSLGIQUE ALLEMACNE FRANCE ITALIE LUXEMBOURG PAYS-BAS
TOTAL
j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Mont'.nts exprime s en monnaies nationales
Belgique (FB) - 4.018.999 151.539.036 9.140.580 2.547.233 - 167.245.853
Allemagne (SO (DK^ 4-242 - J 2.123 2.128 1.864 10.357
; Prance (FF) 1.860.978 936.369 - 1.628.555 206.841 • 4.632.743
i Italio(o)(1OOOlit) 493.432 9.876.588 1.062.652 - 165.677 134.852 11.656.335
'
Luxembourg (Fl) 706.003 624.308 2.171.420 331.411 - 6.863 3.840.005
: Pays-Baa (fl) 432.184 203.215 9.485 1.325 2.287 — 648.496
1 Montants exprimes en francs beiges
Belgique - 4.018.999 151.539.036 9.140.580 2.547.238 - 167.245-853
• Allemagne 57.951 - - 29.003 29.071 25.464 141.489
France 16.752.915 8 . 429 . 390 - 14.660.594 1.862.026 - 41.704.925
Italie 39.474.560 790.127.040 85.012.160 - 13.254.160 4.638.88O 932.506.800
] Luxembourg 706.003 624.308 2.171.420 331.411 - 6.863 3.840.005
j Pays-Baa 5.969.390 2.806.836 131.008 18.301 31.589 - 8.957.124
! Total o 62.960.819
.
806.006.573 238.853.624 24.179 .889 17.724.084 4.671.207 1.154.396.196 ;




Source: Ifj^Ri^ort annuel de la Commission Administrative,
exercise 1969 Annexe relative a l'actlvite de verification
des comptes, et aux r^sultats d'application des reglements







Prestations en nature eervies aux autres categories en 1969 (travailleurs detaches et leurs families,





BELGILUE ALLEMACNE PRANCE ITALIE LUXEMBOURG PAYS-BAS
TOTAL
1 ' 2 4 5 6 7 8
Montanta oxprimeo en monnuios natior.alno
Bolgiquo (re) - 4.052.097 10.811.628 1.452.223 763.238 2.958.486 20.077.67?
Allemngne (DM) 753.648 - 1.523.637 534.838 61.653 687.285 3.561.261
I Prunes(u) (pp) 2.729.557 1.261.050
- 835.359 79.643 80.498 4.986.307
! It t1lo(b) (1000L1t•) 135.566 636.107 229.479 - 11.153 11.073 1.223.380
j Luxembourg (PL) 1.099 .641 769.776 1 .971 .241 131.730 - 100.325 4.092.713
i Pays-Bae (fl) 722.753 1.346.101 109.520 13.928 3.311 - 2.195.613
J •iont\nts exprimes en francs beiges
si Belgique - 4.052.097 10.811.626 '• 1 .492.223 763.238 2.958.466 20.077.672
— Allemagna 10.295.738 - 20.817.445 7.306.530 842.254 9.369 .139 48.651.106
Prune# 24.572.045 11.352.228 - 7.520.066 718.764 724.660 44.867.783
I talio 10.645.440 66.686.560 18.358.320 - 692.240 885.640 97.670.400
Luxembourg 1.099 .641 789.776 1.971.241 131.730 - 100.325 4.092.713
Paye-Bae 9.982.773 16.592.549 1.512.707 192.375 45.732 - 30.326.136
Total 56.795.637 101.675.210 53.471.341 16.642.944 3.262.226 14.058.450 245.905.810 I
(a) Donnees incompletes.
(h) Donndes provisoiros
.11"' " ■'■"Vywm.l ——y HMI.-I..I.I J* .WHWIW. HI I—— 4« i;v.-—v r — - -
Source: 1 letne Rapport annuel de la Conmission Administrative,
exercise 1969 Annexe relative a 1'activity de verification
des conq?tes, et aux resultats d 'application des reglements








Prestations en esp^ces en ess d'incapacity temporaire do travail s
a) sarvies pour lo compte d'un autre Etat raembre en 1969
Pays Pays ddbitours
TOTALexpanders
BELQ1 nUE ALLEMAONE FH..NCB ITALIE LUXEMBOURO PAYS-BAS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0
Eon tunlu oxprimuo on monnaioo nationuloo
Italio (lOOOLit) 2.191 202.292 3C.130 - - 94a 249.961
(1)
Luxembourg (FL] - - 71.400 - - - 71.400




Montants exprimes en francs beiges




- 71.400 | - - 71 .400
Pays-Bas 264•608
1
- 1 _ - - 264.666
Total- 175.260 17.248.028 2.481.800 - 75.840 19.98O.948
transferees dans un autro Etat membro en 1969
Montants exprimds en franos beiges
Luxembourg 42.770 24.864 .33.154 j 143.455
I
— - 244.243
1) Pour les preat.tions cervies par l'ltalie, lea dpnnueo relatives k 1969 n'dtant pas enoore disponiblua^ il
a 6te fait usage des montanls do 1968.
—„ „ — u , p —HljMj ■■■..» ■MBM ■ IP "■ '"V"
T)?- ... ' ' ■ ' .. ■ 1 .
Source: Heme Rapport annuel, de la Commission Actaiinistrative,
exercise 1969 Annexe relative a l*activite de verification
des comptes, et aux resultats d'application des reglements
en 1969, pp. 22-27.
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TABLE 13
Pensions at rentes de vioillosoe, u'1nvaliuite, d'oocidont du travail, do maladie profesoionno]]o ou
de survie transferees dans un autre Eta t ir.embre en 1969
Pays
debiteurs
L Pays de resid ence
• BELGItJUE AI.LK.VACKE FRANCE ITALIE LI IZEXBOHRG , PAYS-BAS
TOTAL











































Merit'.lite exprtnidw an frunae l.algas
la 1 que - 39.405.607 160.09 1.796 634.543.594 12.530.651 72.393.554 •919.045.102
illomagn. 308.006.922 - 284.107.264 444.508.163 25.790.573 553.765.635 1 .614.176.557
Vance 659.746.160 390.106.728 - 747.726.245 55.152.697 5.467.546 1.858.199.396
talis 92.344.880 28.904.640 197.547.6OO - 3.086.400 780.960 322.664.480
uxembourg 102.927.624 54.545.687 30.768.073 78.503.145 - 1 .273.530 268.018.059
aye-Bae 151.256.551 251.545.343 18.036.900 10.671.778 1 .527.900 433.038.472
otal 1 .314.28,'. 57 764.588. C5 688.551.133 1 .915.952.925 98.086.421 633.681.255 5.415.144.066
) Non compris lec montcnts oorvis au titro doa "autres prestations"(notamment 11 ir.demni td fundrairo on co qui
concerns loo victimes d'acoicent du travail ou de maladie profesoionnollo).
) Pour leo prestations oervios par l'ltalie, les donndes relatives a 1969 n'etant pas a rore dioponiblea, il a
dtd fait usage des montanta de 1968. .
Source: Heme Rapport annuel de la Commission Administrative,
'gjjeygiBe'" 190S iMutoao 'fojittfeivo a l^aetivito" de verifi-eation
des comptes, et aux resultats duplication des reglements
en 1969, pp. 22-27./
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TABLE 14
■ . V. ....... > . ... J, . . > *M< . Ll: ... . A...-.- .... . . Uv. . . ..iLjk. .
Allooationa fftinl ] lnlnii at pront > Llonn nan lit. 1 lAuo trnnufiirdoi) dunti uri tiutrei Etftt mumbro ou
pnydou pour don on fan tu dlnvdu ilitnn un mitre Klnt iiwmbro on 1969
(•Aglementu, oonvnntlonn maintenuea on vigunur)
Pays
dibiteura
Pa^o ou son^_61eves lcr, enfanto
BELCI'JJE ALI.EMAGNE FRANCE
4




















































































a) Hon oomprle las alloo«tlono familielou uux trovailloura aalaonnioro.
—b) Lea donndaa, trie faibloe, n'ont pas dtdrepriaea.
•«P7-W" T' ■ nil I. inn», i**- "I
Source: Heme Rapport annuel de la Commission Administrative,
exercise 1969 Annexe relative i l'activite*'de verification
des comptes, et aux resultsts d'application des regleraents
•A • . 1
en 1969, pp. 22-27.
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TABLfc 15
Prestations da chOmage sorvies en 1969 (Montants exprimes en franca belgoa)
(Donneas incompletes)
Pays ayant servi des prestations, directement ou par l'inter-
mediaire d'un autre Etat membra
TOTAL FB




1.092.640 879.583 368.494 8.357.9 22
(a) Ce mor.tant comprond le8 allooationa familialed paydea aui chOmeurs.
I iUHBauiilii.il -I III/ IIJPI :. 11^- I 1.1. ..r . —1 1 I..., , lmut , , , ....... —
Source: Heme Rapport annuel de la Commission Administrative,
exercise 1969 Annexe relative a 1•activity de verification
des comptes, et aux resultats d'application des risgleraents
en 1969, pp. 22-27.
TABL£ "16
Recapitulation dea montants des prestations servies en 1969 (Donnees incompletes)
Montants eiprimds en franca beiges
- Soinste aante aux membres de famille
- Soins ae sintd aux autres categories
- Prestations en esp&ces en oaa d'incapaoite temporaire de travail
- Pensions et rentes
- Allocations familiales et prestations asaimileea









(1) La totalisation des montants servis est faite k titre indicatpf.
(2) Un indioe devolution pcrfaitement aignificatif ne peut Stre calcule.
»■»'. 1 1,1. -
Sources Heme Rapport annuel de la Commission Administrative,
exercise 1969 Annexe relative a l*activlt6 de verification
des comptes, et aux resultats d*application des reglements
en 1969, pp. 22-27.
" "
7 I.
VOLUkE of ncv; intakes from j j
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TABLK 1f —=-•-•• -
member countries of the ESC, except for Italy Italy
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excluding movements between Benelux countries, after
November I96G excluding other Community workers.
figures for the period 1959-1960 include frontier
workers.
After the abolition of work permits for Community
workers as from 1 January i960, a new method of
counting was adopted.. As a result, the figures given
in respect of the Community workers are 'not -wholly
comparable with those of the^preceding years.
Prance: Excluding Algerians, Laotians and nationals of Afri¬





including frontier and seasonal workers and .movements
between Benelux countries.
Netherlands: figures include: frontier and seasonal workers for the-
period 1959-1967, seasonal workers as from 1963, move¬
ments between Benelux countries as from 1969*
•vw 1 |..,|| ....IIKMI IW...MI I .finn-m.... ....II ........... .U. ! I. ... ——
Source: Commission's report on the Tactual situation of migrant workers
1974, p.3.
'
V '• 7 •V.-/'7.''Y •' 7-' 7. 77j,y '7:;*V• 7': 7 \
,. 'O'. I', : - hv g ' 1 ^
7' ' ' « '' ' ' •/ ' ' ,i u* ;7 7 „ ' 7 7 -
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p.15. "Article 11)7 starts from the principle that the
member states remain basically responsible for
their own social policy ..."This is why Art. 117
sets only general guidelines for the social policy
of the member states ••• and gives to neither the
Commission nor the Council the right to be active
in the sphere of social policy.
p. 16 "ilarmonisatlon is not synonymous with unification ...
One must think not so much of identity as of a common
orientation. And that not for ar\y abstract and
theoretical end, but in view of the realisation and
functioning of the Common Market".
p.18 (1) "An improvement of living and working conditions is
expected to result essentially from the automatic
functioning of the Common Market".
(2) "This means is not sufficient. The social consequences
of European integration cannot result solely, and almost
automatically, from the realisation of the Treaty in the
various sectors: they must also be encouraged and
promoted by following the procedures provided for".
p.21 "The Commission of the EEC has reaffirmed, several times,
its competence and its power to undertake, also in the
domains indicated by Art. 118, all the studies which it
deems necessary, and to organise all the consultations
which it deems opportune, especially with the social
partners".
p. 23 "Even if one adopts the view that the single states in
the EEC remain basically competent to decide on their
own social policy, in the sphere of social security one
must conclude on the basis of Art. 117 and Art. 5,
paragraph 2 of the EEC Treaty that the individual
governments are obliged to see to it that legal dif¬
ferences in the social sphere do not become even greater,
but rather diminish".
p.25 "have an etiological, direct and immediate influence on
the Common IVfarket".
p.26 "A mutual approximation of social security provisions
based on social considerations could again be based on
Art. 100, by stressing the direct influence on the




2. "These are rules prescribed or recommended by an inter¬
national organism to the different member states in
order to introduce into the legislation of the member
states certain tendencies, certain principles, and
even minutely elaborated rules".
12. "That harmonisation differs from uniformisation on the
one hand and from co-ordination on the other is evident
and recognised by everybody".
20. "By 'the procedures provided for in this Treaty1, one
can and must, in our opinion, also think of the pro¬
cedures for the co-ordination of economic policy, the
basis of which is established by Art. 105 and 145, and
of the other competences in the economic sphere • • • *•
21. "By 'the procedures provided for in this Treaty', one
should evidently understand all provisions relating
directly or indirectly to labour, and thus especially
Art. 48-51, Art. 118 and Art. 125-128".
22. "By following the procedures provided for" ... "that is,
by those particular institutions which make up the
Conraunity social policy. By that we mean the free move¬
ment of persons, the functioning of the Social Fund, the
establishment of the common policy of professional training,
the realisation of equal wages for men and women, the close
collaboration which must be established between the member
states in the social sphere".
33. "A recommendation defines what line of action is to be
adopted and is equivalent to a directive, except that it
does not have the same binding force; an opinion expresses
an appreciation of a certain situation or of the methods
and means to be adopted to reach certain objectives,
certain results".
59. "the lack of balance which exists in the Treaty between
the general aims, which can very well be defined in a very
social manner, and the means and instruments which have
been provided for the implementation of social policy".
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CHAPTER 3
p.35. "(The authors of the Treaty) based themselves on the
principle that it was necessary to regulate everything
which might artificially disturb the rules of competition,
in other words, everything which might lead to distortions
on the economic plane, but that the regulation of social
conditions and social policy as such - i.e. independently
of the efforts to bring about economic unity - was not
necessary".
pp. 36-37 "The need to promote improved working conditions and an
improved standard of living for workers, so as to make
possible their harmonisation while the improvement is
being maintained".
p. 37 "They believe that such a development will ensue not only
from the functioning of the common market, which will
favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from
the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from the
approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation
or administrative action."
p. 43 "Harmonisation remains an objective because it conveys
the will to social progress as implied in "improvement
of living and working conditions"."
p.57 "The system of social Insurance in France - model for the
harmonisation of social policy in the EEC?"
p.58 (1) "In apy case, one should try with every means to keep
social security within some limits, so that it does not
impress upon the social order a collectivist stamp,
which would certainly be undesirable in the long run".
(2) "Are levelling down and super bureaucracy the European
fate?".
(3) "To mobilise, not only in the Federal Republic but in
the whole of Western Europe, the forces which support
those who think it is time not to extend but to check
the growth of social insurance".
p.59 (1) "We should not, however, overlook the fact that there can
be opposed tendencies; there are, as is known, forces
which, if in different forms, exist in all parties and in
all countries and which aim at reducing, in this time of
rising affluence, the number of risks covered by society,
or at least the degree to which they are covered, and thus
relieving the social budget of some of its burden".
(2) "Hie very narrow nargin which the use of the social
product leaves free for the harmonisation (in the sense of
approximation) of the social systems can be broadened, and
the process of such a harmonisation accelerated, to the
extent to which those forces within the inherent dynamic of
national development are strengthened, which moderate or
even cancel the upward trend (of costs)".
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p.61 "The statement of international science that re¬
distribution becomes questionable from a certain
point onwards".
p.62 "That is to say, half of a minimum considered, ex
hypothesi, to be incompressible".
p.68 "But now a more developed economic analysis is
necessary to determine the margin available and the
optimal division of the growth in the national income,
especially between the present and the future, that is,
between consumption and investment, with the clear
awareness that this choice will condition the economic
and social future".
p.69 "The economic and social effect of social contributions
and benefits is extremely important from the point of
view of incomes policy".
p.70 "Incomes policy cannot avoid taking an interest in the
development of social benefits and the methods by which
they are financed".
p.71 (1) "The reform of social policy by means of a German social
plan"•
(2) "Where one must stop recognising demands, because the
economy cannot support them any more or because achieve-
aient incomes (i.e. take-home income differentials)
would have to be cut too much".
p.74 "Wherever possible, one should try, within the limits set
by its aims, to orient social policy to the needs of
conjuncture], policy".
p.75 "Social security has been, above all, a victory for the
working class, over itself".
p.76 "One of the basic pre-conditions of our market-economic
order"•
p.78 "To give the lie to that impression by assigning to the
European construction goals which would attract popular
support".
p.79 (1) "Economic and monetary union will not be able to function
without a social policy, because the development of incomes,
of wage costs, of all the social charges borne by enter¬
prises is at the heart of the problem of economic and
monetary policy as of social policy; it broadly determines
the development of prices ... Social security expenditure
has now reached a sum close to that of the state budget
and exercises on the economic and monetary equilibrium
an influence comparable to that of the budget".
(2) "Once they form part of a single market, states in fact
lose their autonomy in social policy".
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"The goal is not to achieve social uniformity within the
EEC, but to have a relatively comparable rhythm of
progress, while at the same time reducing excessive
distortions a little".
Footnotes
"The Treaty sees the unification of Europe, the
creation of the Common Market, to a high degree primarily
from the point of view of economic policy; its goal is an
economically efficient "Economic" Community. For the
Treaty, questions of social policy therefore play a sub¬
ordinate role".
"There is no doubt that the national systems now in force
must be progressively adapted until one day they blend
into a common system".
"This does not mean that the trade unions heve not used
the Communities to solve national problems. One could
say that the Communities, in a certain sense and in
certain cases, have enlarged the possibilities of national
trade union action. This is so true that certain govern¬
ments have accused the European Economic Commission of
having used the trade unions as pressure groups against
them".
"Tiki fact that there is a rise in social expenditure
tells us as little about the economy as the fact that a man
sharply increases his expenditure by cheque vis-a-vis his
cash expenditure tells us about the state of his finances.
Such an increase, however great it may be, is not in itself
cause for anxiety ...".
"A further point has to be considered in relation to
incones policy: everything that falls within the
concept of social security ...".
"Distinct moderation of Brussels' harmonisation policy"....
"One can actually speak of a reversal of the fronts ..."
..."the new and welcome realistic view of harmonisation"
..."necessity of relating the social and economic aims"
... "Happily, that sounds somewhat different from the
earlier Veillon proposals".
"This talk became the point of departure for scientific
attempts to make social benefits transparent and to clarify
their position in the economy as a whole".
"wrong political decisions": "This danger is greatest when
such forecasts indicate surpluses which appear to point to
politically desired possibilities of extending benefits.
The calculations of the Federal Government are constantly
being misinterpreted as genuine prognoses and so being
made the basis of demands and of decisions which have the
effect of increasing expenditure".
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wAt the moment in which, at a particularly difficult
point in the international economic conjuncture, the
French economy must also, to meet the particular
demands of the Common Market, undertake an extremely
severe review of all elements which may contribute
to increasing the cost price of its products beyond
competitive possibilities, the constantly growing cost
of social security is the source of the gravest anxiety**
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CHAPTER 4
p.85 "Social harmonisation possesses a particular legal
basis in the combined provisions of Art. 117 and 118
of the Treaty, since the close collaboration between
the member States in the social domain provided for
by Art. 118 has no purpose if it is not to attain the
objective of realising through social harmonisation
the improvement of the living and working conditions
of workers ..."•
p.86 "The social provisions of the EEC Treaty are thus,
contrary to the opinion of the EEC organs, not at all
unprecise, but rather very precise in the limitation
of the EEC competence and powers".
pp. 86-87 "The Treaty instituting the EEC nowhere contains the
obligation to proceed to a harmonisation in the social
domain, not even in the domain of social security. It
starts from the hypothesis that states which unite to
constitute an economic community remain autonomous.
In these circumstances, there exists, according to the
Treaty, no •common' or •community• social policy.
Moreover, the Commission of the EEC is not empowered to
formulate proposals and the Council of the EEC is not
authorised to make any binding rules in this domain".
p.88 "Pragmatism in the legal approach of the EEC organs to
the harmonisation of European social policy".
p.89 "that social policy has come to be seen also as an
integral part of economic policy".
p.90 "By 'the procedures provided for in this Treaty*, one
can and must, in our opinion, also think of the proc¬
edures for the co-ordination of economic policy, the
basis of which is established by Art. 105 and 145, and
of the other competences in the economic sphere ...
We have already pointed to the fact that practice has
already been going in this direction for several years".
-423-
C1IAPTER 5
p.126 "on the principles and the spirit of the present
regulation".
p.131 (1) "The establishment of the greatest possible freedom of
movement of workers, being one of the "foundations" of the
Community, thus constitutes the principal aim of Art. 51
and hence conditions the interpretation of the regulations
made under this regulation".
(2) "These provisions aim to establish the greatest possible
freedom of movement of workers. This goal involves the
elimination of legislative obstacles which might be to the
disadvantage of migrant workers".
p.135 "In order to define the sense and the scope of this
provision (Art. 11(2)), it is necessary to interpret it
in the light of Art. 48 to 51 of the Treaty which constitute
the basis, the framework and the limits of the social
security regulations.
"As the aim of these articles is to ensure the free move¬
ment of workers by conferring on them certain rights, it
would be going beyond the finality and the framework of
the said provisions to impose on workers a reduction of
their rights which was not compensated for by advantages
provided for in the regulations".
p.136 (1) "in accordance with the spirit of Articles 48-51 of the
Treaty, as of Regulation no. 3, which is to prevent, over
and above the protection of the migrant worker stricto sensu,
that in the domain of social security, territoriality
clauses should be opposed to workers and their survivors".
(2) "The aim of eliminating the territorial partitioning of
social security is the connecting thread which runs through
the whole of Regulation No. 3 ... 'mis is in fact an
essential objective of the Treaty: over and above the
protection of the migrant worker himself, to eliminate
territoriality clauses".
p.137 "Article 51 cannot allow the regulations to contravene
the objectives laid down, which are designed to favour the
free movement of workers, and which would be incompatible
with a possible reduction of their rights".
p.138 "If one had to restrict oneself to the text of Regulation
No. 3, the interpretation could hardly raise any difficulties
in my opinion ... (but) such a method of interpretation is
not sufficient for the texts of Community law".
pp. 142-143 "Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty do not allow one to forbid
a State to apply to all Its population, Including those of
its nationals who work in another member country, a
complement of social protection".
p.143 "Article 53 Is no obstacle to solutions which might be more
advantageous for the insured persons, contained in national
legislations".
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p.145 "The application of these provisions shall be the
subject of bilateral agreements".
p.146 "Thus, the second paragraph owes its existence to the
prudence of its authors, who desired to allow the member
States to regulate among themselves the possible details
of application".
p.147 "arbitrarily decide on the scope of application".
p.151 (1) "It would not be in accordance with this spirit to
limit the notion of "worker" solely to migrant workers
stricto sensu or solely to rnove'-^nts which relate to
the exercise of their employment."
"Nothing in Article 51 imposes such distinctions which
would be capable, moreover, of making impracticable the
application of the rules envisaged.
"On the contrary, the system adopted for keg:lation No. 3,
which consists of suppressing, as far as possible, the
territorial limits to the application of the different
social security regimes, corresponds well to the objectives
of Article 51 of the Treaty".
(2) "to every employed worker or person treated as such who is
placed in one of the situations of international character
provided for by the said regulation, and to his survivors".
p.152 (1) "social security of migrant workers"..."on the application
of social security schemes to employed persons and their
families moving within the Community".
(2) "employed workers or persons treated as such".
p.153 "Such an assimilation exists whenever, as the result of a
national legislation, the provisions of a general social
security scheme are extended to persons other than the
employed workers provided for in Regulation No. 3, whatever
be the forms or modalities used by the national legislation;
"Artisans must therefore be considered to be assimilated to
employed workers to the extent that they are protected, by
virtue of a national legislation, against one or more
risks organised for the benefit of the generality of workers"
p.154 "The aim of Articles 48 to 51 would not be attained but
rather contravened if the periods of insurance acquired by
the worker in accordance with the legislation of a member
State were to be lost to him when, taking advantage of the
free movement which Is guaranteed to him, he changes his
place of work and is thus subjected to a social security
scheme of another member State.
"This conclusion is moreover confirmed by Article 9 (1)
of Regulation No. 3".
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p.156 (1) "the classical distinctive criteria of a social
assistance benefit, namely the scope of its application,
the means tests to which its grant is made subject, and
the means by which it is financed, are no longer suf¬
ficient" •
(2) "th&s escaping all global classification".
p.157 (1) "In view of the wide definition of the circle of bene¬
ficiaries, such a legislation fulfils, in reality, a
double function, consisting, on the one hand, of
guaranteeing a minimum of the means of existence to
persons placed entirely outside the social security
system, and, on the other, of ensuring a supplementary
income for recipients of inadequate social security
benefits".
(2) "the rule of equality of treatment which is one of the
fundamental principles of Community law, embodied, in
this case, in Article 8 of Regulation No. 3".
p.159 "the provisions of Regulation No. 3 are opposed to ..."
p.164 "if it is a question of the acquisition, the maintenance
or the recovery of the right to benefits which are the
object of Art. 27".
p.167. "vis-a-vis the situation which would result for him from
the exclusive application of internal law."
p.169 "in the double perspective of the suppression of discrim¬
inations and the realisation of free movement. ... The two
aims are, moreover, linked, whether the discrimination is
to the advantage or the disadvantage of the migrant".
p.170 "a manner of proceeding which seems quite foreign to the
legal tradition of the six member States".
p.172 (1) "at least in the context of those systems with periods,
where retirement pension varies uniquely as a function
of the periods of insurance completed."
(2) "However, the complexity of the problems posed by the
co-ordination of national legislations makes it impossible
to erect the interpretation given above into an absolute
principle".
p.174 "The tone of this document and the lack of information on
the Community regulations and on your case law on which it
is apparently based matte me hesitate as to whether I
should speak to you about It other than to dismiss it
without discussion, recalling simply the old proverb of
ray province of origin: "the curate wastes his time by
saying mass twice for the deaf*.
—42 G—
p.175 "Invoking the principle of Article 51 of the Treaty to
dismiss a precise article of Regulation No. 3 may offend
against certain principles of legal interpretation.
Invoking the free movement of workers to put aside a text
precisely inscribed in the regulation designed to facilitate
that free movement is a rather hasty argument".
p.181 "This situation, however regrettable it may be, results
from the strict application of the texts now in force
and cannot be improved in any way on the judicial level".
p.190 (1) "The interpretative judgments of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities are of a general character,
for they are designed to unify the case law of the courts
of the various member States, and hence they are binding
on those courts".
(2) "Since the mission of the Court of the European Communities
is in particular to define the law in cases in which there
arises a question of interpretation of the provisions of
the Treaty or of acts of the Community institutions, the
decisions given by it in the framework of Articles 177 and
219 of the Treaty form an integral part of Community law
and hence participate In the primacy of the Treaty over
Internal legislation.
Tlierefore they are binding on the national courts In the
same way as Community law. Respect for the interpretation
given by the Court of Justice is directly and intimately
linked to respect for the Treaty Itself".
Footnotes
1. "The social security of migrant workers is a subject reputed
to be difficult, which, It is said, only a few rare
specialists in each country are capable of mastering".
3. "As for the corresponding movements of funds, they are
estimated for 1967 at nearly 140 million units of account.
To this sum must be added the amount of benefits provided
by the different member States to nationals of other member
States, In application of Internal legislation".
25. "A rather barbarous but convenient term",
101. "If these difficulties cannot be resolved entirely except
within the framework of a legislative intervention by the
Community, this circumstance cannot, however, affect the
right and the duty of the courts to ensure the protection
of migrant workers in all cases In which this is possible,
while respecting the principles of Community social legis¬
lation and without disturbing the national system of legis¬
lation In question".
130. "It results from the very text of Article 51 that the
article aims to cover, above all, the case where the
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legislation of a member State, taken on its own, would
not open to the insured person a right to benefits,
because of the insufficient number of periods completed
under that legislation".
139. "If such a manner of proceeding leads, in certain cases,
to putting the migrant worker in a more advantageous
position than the nationals of the country in which he
works, this is the result, not of the interpretation of
Community law, but of the system now in force which, in
the absence of a common social security scheme, rests on
a simple co-ordination of national legislations which
have not yet been harmonised".
-428-
CHAPTF.R 6
p.209 "The social security of migrants is at a knot of
conflicting interests! interests of the States,
first of all, varying according to whether they are
primarily "exporters" or "importers" of labour, but
also interests of the social partners and particularly
those of the workers, which do not always coincide with
the interests of their country of origin, nor with
those of their successive employers".
p.224 "It is essential to note the very ia^>ortant factor of
expansion which an afflux of labour can constitute for
a country".
p.235 (t) "Generally, a social security agreement is preceded by
the phenomenon of the movement of workers, leaving the
country of emigration, where the possibilities of em¬
ployment are limited, and going to the country of im¬
migration where there is a penury of labour. This
movement is generally preceded by an Agreement between
the two countries relating to the number of migrant workers
to the conditions of recruitment and employment, etc.".
(2) "If It is evident that at this stage of the operation,
economic motives are preponderant, when a social security
agreement is concluded, on the other hand, social consider¬
ations prevail".
p.238. "On the diplomatic field, and with the object of protecting
nationals abroad, discriminations often constitute a factor
in negotiations, an exchange token in international
discussions".
p.239 "Agreements which are inspired by socio-economic motives"
and "agreements which are inspired by considerations based
on tiie international policy of a country".
p.241 "The creation of new resources, the utilisation of unemployed
resources, the pooling of factors of production are, after
all, the essential contribution which a common market must
make to raising the standard of living".
pp. 241-2 "One could even take the view that there is a common
Interest in facilitating the movement of labour in prop¬
ortion to its lack of qualification: it Is in fact the
less qualified labour which has the most difficulty in
finding employment in the countries in which there is high
unemployment; in the countries of immigration, this
labour takes the place of national workers, who can thus
seek better paid and less repulsive work".
-429-
p,243 "That much more can be achieved through multilateral
agreements on the free movement of workers seems doubt¬
ful, unless the goals pursued by closer economic co¬
operation can be defined somewhat more broadly than has
been possible until now, one may expect, in our opinion,
that, after the realisation of concrete results in other
areas of economic co-operation - a significant reducation
of trade barriers, for example - the individual countries
may gradually be prepared to adopt a more flexible attitude
to the admission of foreign workers'*•
p.246 "The progressive dismantling of trade barriers means that
individual countries or regions no longer lie in the lee
of competition and are no longer able to face up to inter¬
national competition. Regional redundancy or wage reductions
to raise competitivity would be the consequence. In these
cases, the international mobility of labour is appropriate to
free of their burden the labour markets in the less
favoured areas".
p, 248, "all arrangements that are necessary to ensure that provi¬
sions relating to social security do not constitute an
obstacle to movements of labour".
p.249 "This snows the necessity of a firmer stand in the negotiation
,,, This necessity is so much the stronger if one considers
that the workers interested in the free movement, to adopt
the Community terminology, are almost all Italian workers?
p.250 "It seemed reasonable, indeed, to divide these costs between
the three parties, for the following reasons:
- the country of the place of work benefits from the
activity of the immigrant workers;
- the country of residence benefits also, for its economy
is indirectly relieved by the departure of under-employed
workers, and directly helped by the consumption on its
soil of a part of the earnings won by the said workers in
the country where they are employed;
- the Community, because it benefits from the advantages
resulting from the freedom of movement of workers".
p.253 "It Is necessary to emphasise that if this principle
(Community priority) had not been established, free move¬
ment would have remained a theoretical right and would not
have allowed workers interested in migrating to enjoy more
favourable conditions, seeing that the employers of the member
States would probably prefer to hire workers (and such is the
case of workers from third countries) who dispose, in general,
of less legal protection".
p,254 "But there are other reasons which, according to observers,
are fairly important in leading employers to hire extra-
Community labour: in the first place the stability resulting
from the fact that the rupture of the contract of employment
would involve immediate return to the country of origin, and,









the protection ensured by Consulates and not having
associations and organisms of a trade union type, are much
less demanding than certain Comnunity workers".
"Social security is at a knot of conflicting interests".
Footnotes
"that, through greed, we should, in the middle of the
twentieth century, keep foreign workers imprisoned as
conjuncture-coolies In conditions of the early capitalist
nineteenth century".
"For several years, the free movement of workers was the
cream bun of Europeans".
"In order to enter into force, it required the normal
procedure of ratification by the Parliaments of the six
countries: this would have involved a considerable loss of
time and might perhaps have compromised its fulfilment
because of the possible imposition of obstacles and refusals
by these legislative organs. So, to avoid these incon¬
veniences, the Council of Ministers of the European Economic
Community found it opportune to adopt the Convention and to
apply it through its own provisions".
"In the year covered by the report, we have, together with
the B.D.A., opposed all attempts by the EEC to make the entry
of workers from third countries more difficult as free
movement within the Community is gradually realised".
"But even for Italian workers, the pressure of their
government for the establishment of free movement finally
brought them no real benefit".
"In order to displace foreign investments to the country of
origin of the foreign workers and to stimulate additional
direct investments in them, the Federal Government should
insist that controls and limitations on the right of
establishment of foreign companies should be abandoned in
those countries. The acceptance of workers in the Federal
Republic should have as its necessary counterpart the free
establishment of companies, the free movement of capital
and the securing of property rights in the countries of
origin of the foreign workers ... corresponding to these
measures, it would be appropriate for the countries of
origin to adopt a policy of purposefully bringing about
comparative advantages for labour-intensive products by
shaping wages and the rate of exchange in such a way as
to bring about a low valuation of the currency".
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179* "Also from the supply side, there are hardly any limits
set to the further increase in the employment of foreign
labour for the foreseeable future* In Turkey alone* for
example* there were on the register in 1971 more than a
million workers who want to work in the Federal Republic" •
